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dummy variables
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THE EFFECT OF CONTRACT TYPE AND SIZE ON
COMPETITIVENESS IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BIDDING
ABSTRACT
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the bidding performances of three
contractors. In developing this study, the aim of this research is to demonstrate
through statistical modelling that, in terms of competitiveness, competing
contractors are influenced, to varying degrees, by contract type and size and that
a competitiveness relationship exists between contractor size and contract size.
Bidding behaviour between construction firms is regarded as the outcome of
strategic management decisions undertaken in an economic setting. Contractors are
seen to compete for construction work in a competitive environment made up of
a series of market sectors, each containing an amalgam of contract types and sizes,
while clients are viewed as initiators of the whole contracting process. Contractors
are shown to respond to client demands by deciding on a strategic domain within
which to operate, which contracts to bid for and, if opting to bid, the appropriate
bid level.
Two approaches to modelling competitiveness are offered. The first approach
examines the relationship between competitiveness and variability in bidding and
a four-way classification system of bidder behaviour is developed. The main goal
of this work, however, is contained in the second approach, which uses multiple
regression to construct a competitiveness model - a prediction equation relating
bidder competitiveness (the dependent variable) to the independent variables of
bidder (analysed individually and also grouped according to size), contract type
and contract size. The regression model shows that differences in competitiveness
are greater for different contract sizes than different contract types. The most
competitive contractors appear to be those with a preferred contract size range.
The results are inconclusive in providing evidence that large bidders are more
competitive on larger contracts and vice versa.
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21 INTRODUCTION
The nature of the construction industry is such that contractors entering
consistently low value bids are regarded as being more competitive than those
entering consistently high value bids. Contractors may also be seen as being
inconsistently competitive. In addition to mistake, competitiveness variability has
been attributed to many factors including differences in cost estimates (Beeston
1983), mark-up policies (Fine 1975, Stone 1983), serious and non-serious bids
(Skitmore 1989) and the effect of subcontracting (Flanagan and Norman 1985).
There is a relationship between competitiveness and variability since a contractor
who is consistently competitive in bidding is by definition less variable. Over a
series of competitions less competitive contractors are likely to be more variable
in bidding, otherwise they would fail to get any work. One explanation for
differences in bidding variability between contractors is for reasons just described.
Another is that some contractors have preferred contract' types and sizes within
the construction market and for which they bid more competitively.
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the bidding performance of a small,
medium and large contractor. They found that when bidding (1) the small
contractor considered both contract type and size, (2) the large contractor was
more successful in bidding for large contracts and (3) the medium contractor's
competitiveness was not related to either contract type or size. Flanagan and
Norman's study suggests that (1) competing contractors are influenced to varying
degrees by contract type and size and (2) there is a relationship between size of
contractor and contract size.
I A contract may comprise several projects for construction of building and/or
infrastructure work. Although the term 'project' is often used in a construction
context, in this thesis the term 'contract' is used as it more correctly denotes the
object of the bidding process, ie. to secure a contract. Hence the term 'contract
type' relates to the intended function of the project contained in the contact, eg.
school or hostel. For consistency the term 'contract size' is used to denote the
monetary value of a contract (usually the lowest bid).
3A contractor's competitiveness is the outcome of strategic considerations.
Strategies vary from contractor to contractor and appear to be very much
dependent on company objectives. Male (1991b: 40) suggests that as part of their
corporate strategy contractors formulate a strategic domain. He states 'The
strategic domain sets the parameters within which senior management chooses to
operate ... this may vary from a narrow domain in which bidders specialize in
certain contract characteristics such as type and location to a broad domain which
encompasses undertaking both building and civil engineering work'. In other
words, the strategic domain sets out the market dimensions within which
contractors plan to operate.
It follows that each firm manages its own strategic domain within a contract size
continuum made up from a series of contract types. Depending on the contract
type, the range of contract values contained within the contract size continuum
may be broad or narrow. For smaller contractors, with more limited resources, this
is likely to cover a smaller range of possible contract values at the smaller end of
the contract size continuum than that of larger contractors. This, coupled with the
fact that there are many more smaller contractors than larger contractors, means
that the variety of potential contractors increases as the contract size decreases.
Larger contractors will almost certainly be the lowest bidder for the larger
contracts. However, either larger or smaller contractors have the potential of
becoming the lowest bidder on the small contracts.
In the course of running the construction firm contractors are given numerous
opportunities to bid for work both within and outside the strategic domain.
Skitmore (1982) identifies that job desirability is influenced by many factors
including favoured types within the contractor's expertise. It seems, therefore, that
different contractors are likely to have varying degrees of preference towards the
type and size of contact. This appears to be dictated, to some extent, by available
resources and experience. Further considerations are: present and future workloads;
the workload of the industry as a whole; and differences in perceptions of
contractors concerning these matters.
4Although competitive relationships can be considered within a bid or by
examining bid distributions, construction contract bidding is essentially concerned
with competitiveness relationships between contractors and the contracts they are
bidding for which can vary considerably, particularly in terms of contract type and
size, from one contract to the next.
The primary aim of this research is to demonstrate through statistical modelling
that, in terms of competitiveness, competing contractors are influenced, to varying
degrees, by contract type and contract size. A secondary aim is to demonstrate that
a competitiveness relationship exists between bidder size and contract size.
By developing Flanagan and Norman's study the specific objectives of this
research are to:
(1) measure the effect of contract type on competitiveness and variability in
bidding;
(2) measure the effect of contract type and size on competitiveness in bidding;
(3) develop (2) to measure the effect of bidder size on competitiveness in
bidding;
(4) exercise the development of suitable regression analysis methodology to
model the effect of contract type, contract size and bidder size;
(5) devise suitable bidder classification systems for evaluating the competitive
bidding behaviour of contractors.
By considering the competitiveness relationships of bids submitted to the client,
the focus of this thesis is, therefore, on the bidding behaviour of contractors who
are in competition with each other for various contract packages of construction
work. The thesis is specifically concerned with modelling the effect that contract
type and contract size have on the competitiveness level of different bidders. Two
different approaches are developed. The first approach examines the relationship
between competitiveness and variability in bidding from which a four way
classification system of bidder behaviour is offered. The second more sophisticated
approach, based on multiple regression, identifies the extent to which different
5contract types and range of contract sizes influence each bidder's competitiveness.
Drawing upon the economies of scale theory, each bidder is modelled as having
a preferred or optimum contract size at which it is most competitive. The emphasis
is, however, on identifying the range of contract sizes within which bidders are
competitive, rather than determining a particular optimum contract size. The model
is not principally concerned with optimisation and is not, therefore, considered
specifically as an operational research problem. It is a comparative model of
contractors' bidding performance and focuses on identifying contractors' bidding
behaviour, in terms of competitiveness, according to contract type and size. The
effect of bidder size on competitiveness in bidding is also modelled.
This thesis is divided into three parts; background to the research is presented in
Chapters 2 to 4, empirical work is contained in Chapters 5 to 11 and summary and
conclusions are presented in Chapter 12.
Bidding behaviour between construction firms is regarded as the outcome of
strategic management decisions undertaken in an economic setting. In Chapter 2
contractors are seen to compete for construction work in a competitive
environment made up of a series of market sectors, each containing an amalgam
of contract types and sizes. Clients are viewed as initiators of the whole
contracting process and set out the nature and form of competition. In Chapter 3
contractors are shown to respond to client demands by strategically deciding a
strategic domain within which to operate, which contracts to bid for and, if opting
to bid, the appropriate bid level. Chapter 4 reviews previous empirical studies and
identifies various approaches to modelling competitiveness.
The methodology is developed in Chapter 5. Bid data from five contract types was
collected from the Hong Kong Government's tender reports on the basis of
Flanagan and Norman's study. Three contractors were selected from the Hong
Kong data and Flanagan and Norman's study was replicated in Chapter 6. Using
the same three contractors the analysis was developed by introducing another
preferred measure of competitiveness and also investigating the relationship
6between competitiveness, C' and competitiveness variability, C". All the data in
the sample was used and a matrix produced to identify four classes of bidder
behaviour. In selecting the most frequent bidders in the sample (ie. those who bid
10 times or more) this was extended to consider the effect of contract type on
competitiveness .
Although this thesis offers a four way classification system to model competitive
bidding behaviour, the main goal of this work is to build a good regression model
- a prediction equation relating bidder competitiveness (the dependent variable) to
the independent variables of bidder (analysed individually and also according to
size), contract type and contract size.
A chunkwise approach was used and twenty two candidate models containing
different chunk combinations of predictor variables were developed. In Chapter 7
the best of the candidate models was selected using a forward chunkwise
sequential variable selection algorithm based on the F-test. In using this algorithm
the best model according to individual bidder behaviour was determined by
incrementally adding bidders into the analysis up to a pre-determined 15 bidder
cut off point. All the bidders in the sample were then grouped according to size
and the best model based on bidder size was found using the same algorithm. In
comparing the best models according individual and grouped behaviour, it can be
seen that a 15 bidder model based on individual behaviour is a better predictor of
competitiveness.
The reliability of the 15 bidder best model was considered in Chapter 8 by
examining the residuals to see if one or more of the standard least squares
assumptions is violated. Each assumption was examined in turn and where
necessary the model was transformed in such a way that it not only satisfies the
regression assumptions but also that it remains the best model for predicting the
dependent variable, competitiveness. The best model in its transformed state was
verified as the best model in Chapter 9. The competitiveness predictions according
to contract type and contract size were also observed and the best model's
7reliability examined by constructing 95% prediction intervals.
The 15 bidder model was refined in Chapter 10 by grouping together bidders with
similar bidding behaviour patterns and prediction and reliability comparisons were
made with the model before refinement. Finally, using the 15 bidder refmed model
as the starting point, Chapter 11 explored the effect of adding new bidders to the
refined model.
An overall summary, conclusions and suggested further research are presented in
Chapter 12.
PART 1
BACKGROUND
8CHAPTER 2
The construction industry and the competitive environment
92 THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND THE COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Introduction
Much of the constructors' work in the construction industry stems from
contracting. This involves a customised design being constructed with the roles of
the client and contractor being contractually defined. Contracting may be defined
as 'a service which is related to individual construction work packages each one
of which may be likened to a firm with a relatively short and finite life' (Cannon
and Hillebrandt 1989c: 57).
Construction contract bidding is widely used in the construction industry as a
vehicle for distributing work to willing contractors. It is seen by the majority of
clients as being fair and likely to produce the lowest possible commercially viable
tender price in the prevailing market conditions (Harris and McCaffer 1989).
Construction contract bidding is the mechanism frequently adopted within the
construction market for obtaining a price for this work. It is a special type of
auction commonly referred to in economics and management science literature as
a 'sealed bid auction' (Flanagan and Norman 1985). Sealed bidding is 'where all
the bidders, supply the client with their terms and conditions in sealed envelopes
which are opened at a fixed date' (King and Mercer 1988).
In this context, bidding is essentially a pricing problem. The bidder 'must choose
a price high enough to provide sufficient contribution to overheads and profits, yet
low enough to ensure that a sufficient volume of work is actually obtained ... in
an environment of considerable uncertainty about the behaviour of the competitors'
(Douglas 1989: 482).
This chapter describes the overall construction industry environment in relation to
competition and comprises four sections. After first considering the theoretical
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development of this research in the context of management and economic theory,
the competitive environment within which contractors operate and the influence
it has over construction organisations are each discussed in turn. The client's role
in setting up the competition is described in the last section.
2.1.1	 Management theories
Management theorists have developed a systems approach to model the behaviour
of firms based on an input-conversion-output model. Management theorists see
firms as organisations which can be defined as arrangements of people or roles
operating within a particular environment with which they must interact to survive.
Organisations obtain inputs from their environment in the form of human, physical
and financial resources and export outputs to the environment in the form of
products, services and, less tangibly, behaviour and attitudes. The environment
constrains the organisation through, at least, political, economic, social and
technological pressures. Organisations receive feedback from their environment
about the acceptability of their products or services, expressed for example in
terms of purchasing patterns or financial support, which enables managers to make
adjustments to inputs and the conversion process. They may exist in a steady state
or increase in size and range of activities through increasing inputs and outputs.
Systems thinking has been modified with the emergence of the contingency
approach to management 'which argues there is no single best way to run a
business and that mangers must adapt their style and methods to suit the
circumstances' (Fryer 1990: 13).
Kast and Rosenzweig (1985) regard the organisation as a composite of several
sub-systems - operating, coordinative and strategic. Each system is separated by
a boundary which screens the inputs and outputs. The outermost boundary is
between the strategic sub-system and the environment of the system. 'Strategic
management is concerned with the management of the long term relationship of
the company with its external environment' (Male 1991c: 50). Selecting which
contacts to bid for and setting the appropriate bid level can, therefore, be regarded
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as a strategic management problem.
Management is essentially concerned with relationships, with management theory
being centred on business strategy, organisation theory and the management of
human resources. It has emerged from a composite of ideas drawn from many
areas including economics and, certainly in its behavioural aspects, draws quite
heavily on psychology. However, it seems to be deficient in the sense that 'there
is no body of management theory in the way that there is an economic theory of
the firm, in which all the component parts are interrelated to a total system'
(Cannon and Hillebrandt 1989a: 6).
2.1.2	 Theories of competition
Competition is defined as 'emulous striving for the same object; the struggle for
existence or gain in industrial and mercantile pursuits' (Hayward and Sparkes
1986: 230). Competition theories can be found in the fields of economics and
biology. Czepiel (1992 :16) defines basic economic competition as 'when a good
or service is consumed, utility is created which has a value. Competition gets that
value ... the buyer always wants to pay as little as possible for the product, while
the seller wants to get as high a price as possible. Both are competing for the
value created by the production and consumption of the good or service'.
Henderson (1984) has suggested that biology may be more relevant than
economics in the development of a useful competitive theory. In an earlier paper
Henderson (1983) describes natural competition as the basic form of competition
between living organisms for their necessary life resources. Organisms that more
effectively obtain sustenance and that more efficiently process it preempt those
resources from their competitors, thereby weakening the competitors. At the same
time those resources are strengthening the organism. Over time, this process leads
to the extinction of the less effective competitor through the process known as
natural selection.
There are many parallels between economic and natural competition. Henderson
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(1981, 1983) highlights the business implications of natural competition as
follows:
(1) Businesses which continue in existence over time have a unique advantage
over all others with which they compete;
(2) Businesses which are most similar to each other will compete most severely;
(3) Effective competition produces a wide range of sizes among competing
businesses;
(4) Where one competitor has a clear visible superiority, there will be a very low
level of competition from others;
(5) The smaller the number of key strategic variables in an industry, the smaller
the numbers of competitors that exist;
(6) The successful entry of a new competitor requires a clear superiority over all
existing competitors in some part of the market.
Czepiel (1992) concludes that a fundamental difference between natural
competition and economic competition is that natural competition just happens
through natural selection and mutation with those possessing the characteristics
needed for continued existence surviving while those that do not eventually
disappear. Economic competition, however, through strategic decision making is
marked by carefully considered and tightly reasoned actions with long term
survival being largely dependent on the strategies employed.
2.1.3	 Economics and competition theory
The competition theory of firms has its roots firmly embedded in economics. The
nature of competition and of market structure are the outcome of interaction
between supply and demand. Two extremes of competition are monopoly and pure
competition. Intermediate levels of competition are classed as imperfect. The
concept of demand elasticity is usually regarded as the basic indicator of the
nature of competition. Elasticity is a measure of the degree to which a change in
price will result in a change of demand.
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As Baker (1985) points out, the factor which really distinguishes imperfect
competition is that the firm must take into account not only the external
environment within which it must operate, but also the action of other competitors
in the market place. The need for firms, under conditions of imperfect competition,
to take into account the actions of their immediate competitors makes for a much
more complex situation, and one demanding high levels of managerial skill. Under
conditions of imperfect competition competitors are mutually interdependent, and
so must allow for each other's actions when formulating their plans.
The study of competition places increasing emphasis upon the strategic choices
made by participating firms and the impact which these have upon both the
fortunes of their competitors and market structure. In making such choices, firms
have to operate within multi-dimensional constraints which are common to them
all. Microeconomic aspects of supply are concerned with the behaviour of the
firm. In economics, the theory of the firm adopts a number of simplifying
assumptions in order to provide a benchmark against which to compare real world
behaviour. This includes the assumption that each firm's objective is to maximise
profits, although it is recognised by many economists that firms in fact seek to
satisfice rather than seeking to maximise. Most firms satisfice in the sense that
they see survival as the primary objective and growth the second. In order both to
survive and grow, firms will also tend to take the line of least resistance by
seeking to operate in those markets with the largest and most stable demand.
2.1.4	 Management and economics theory
Kast and Rosenzweig (1985) recognise that economics has strongly influenced
managerial thought but also state that it is limited in explaining the behaviour of
the firm as it treats the firm as a single person based on simplified assumptions.
These limiting assumptions present an unreal picture of actual business
organisations which may restrict the predictive value of the theory. Kast and
Rosenzweig, however, identify that progress has been made with the work of
Cyert and March (1963) who considered behavioural factors relating to the theory
14
of the firm. Studies of industrial economics have also made significant
contributions to managerial decision making. Hillebrandt (1985: 6) states
'increasingly the theories of organisation and management are being linked to
economic theory to provide a more comprehensive approach to the understanding
of business behaviour and hence ultimately to assist in decision making'.
With particular respect to the construction industry, Hillebrandt (1985) suggests
that general economic theory deals inadequately with the method of price
determination within the construction industry which is a discrete process for each
contract and for each piece of work subcontracted, either by bidding or by some
form of negotiation. Cannon and Hillebrandt (1989a: 6) state that although theories
of the firm have developed from small entrepreneurial business to large firms in
an oligopolistic environment, it still treats firms as being 'involved in processing
standardised products, the sales of which are influenced by advertising
expenditures'. Moreover, Skitmore (1989) observes that economists have devoted
relatively little space to the consideration of pricing in the construction industry.
Cannon and Hillebrandt (1989a) conclude that it remains inherently difficult to
relate the economic structure, behaviour and performance of construction firms to
theoretical structures. They identify the main problem as lying in the
characteristics of the products of the construction industry and particularly in their
one off nature and long gestation period.
The foregoing tends to suggest that management theory is more comprehensive at
modelling strategic behaviour within construction firms, while economic theory
seems to be more developed at modelling competitive performance between
construction firms. Since competitive relationships between firms are based on
management decisions that have taken place within a firm, the approach taken in
the theoretical development of this research is to view the bidding behaviour of
construction firms as the outcome of strategic management decisions undertaken
in an economic setting.
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2.2 The competitive environment
The construction industry environment within which contractors operate is seen
by Newcombe et al (1990a) as consisting of the general environmental factors of
politics and law, economics, sociology and technology as well as the competitive
environmental factors of finance, plant, labour, management, suppliers,
subcontractors, consultants and clients. This latter set of factors includes contracts
undertaken by the organisation at local, national and international levels.
Newcombe et al (1990a: 48) state 'to define the competitive environment it is
important to understand the distinction between an industry and a market ... an
industry is an output concept whilst a market is a demand concept. For the
strategist what is important is the nature of the competition, that is the market.
Markets can be described and defined by the nature of competition. If the strategy
of one company has a significant effect on the demand for the output of another
firm, then it can be said that the two firms are in competition with each other and
thus in the same market. In defming market boundaries it is the degree of
substitutability which is the key factor'.
An organisation's competitive environment can therefore be defined in terms of
markets. Porter (1980) has developed a structured means of examining the state
of the competitive environment by considering the influence of five forces.
Newcombe et al (1990a) relate these five forces to the construction industry as
follows:
(1) New entrants: threat of new entrants is high for small contracts, however, for
larger contracts the barriers of entry are considerable. Experience and
expertise have become essential pre-requisites for larger contracts and the
threats usually come from known competitors. Barriers of economies of scale
of operation limit the ability of small firms competing for large contracts and
vice versa;
(2) Substitutes: Traditional demarcations between design and construction being
eroded with design and build and management contracting. These approaches
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offer clients substitutes for the traditional competitive tendering methods;
(3) Buyers: bargaining power of public sector clients declining with switch to
private sector projects in which private sector clients have been more
demanding of the construction industry;
(4) Suppliers: since the construction industry has low capitalisation the
bargaining power of suppliers and subcontractors is considerable and
withdrawal of credit may lead to the contractors becoming bankrupt;
(5) Industry competitors: degree of rivalry between competitors in construction
markets is dependent on (a) the extent to which construction firms are in
balance which depends on market share and size of competing contractors
(b) the state of the market ie. whether it is in a slump or boom period (c) the
workload of competitors (d) the degree to which the work is differentiated,
with less differentiation leading to greater rivalry.
2.2.1	 The construction market
Economists define a market as 'whenever potential sellers of a good or service are
brought into contact with potential buyers and a means of exchange is available.
The medium of exchange may be money or barter' (Bannock et al 1987: 262).
Competitive bidding markets are defined by Douglas (1989: 482) as 'those in
which there are a number of sellers (who do not generally communicate with each
other) who compete to provide a product or service to a single buyer. The buyer
makes it known that he or she wishes to purchase a particular product or service,
and the sellers tender their bids or quotes for the supply of that service. If the
suppliers are quoting to a particular set of specifications, the buyer presumably
chooses the lowest bid, whereas if there are quality differences in the products or
services offered by the supplier, the buyer must decide which offers the best deal,
by considering both the price and quality of services'.
In the context of the construction market the buyer is commonly referred to as the
client and the seller as the contractor where the client has a need in the form of
construction work which the contractor can satisfy for a mutually agreed price.
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The nature of competition experienced within the market is influenced by market
structure and characteristics (Bannock et al 1987).
2.2.2	 Market structure
Economists see the most important features of market structure as being the
number and size distribution of buyers and sellers which reflect the extent of
monopoly. This in turn is affected by the existence or absence of barriers to entry
(Bannock et al 1987).
The construction industry is highly fragmented with the dominant firm being the
small contractor (Male 1991b). Porter (1980) defines a fragmented industry as one
in which no company has a significant market share which usually comprises:
(1) large numbers of small and medium sized companies, and as Male (1991b)
suggests, by implication this means a small number of large companies;
(2) a high incidence of privately owned companies;
(3) competitors being in a weak bargaining position with respect to both buyer
and seller and that profitability is marginal.
Small firms have obvious different characteristics from large companies, including
scale and scope of operations, ownership and management style and their state of
independence (Carson 1985). Stocks (1991) considers small contractors as those
that have limited resources, lack of expertise and limited impact on the market
place. Evidence of the dominant firm being the small contractor can be found, for
example, in the Hong Kong construction market where the number of firms
engaged in building and civil engineering work employing 20 persons or less
amounts to approximately 94% of the total number of construction companies.
However, in terms of number of employees directly engaged this equates to only
49% and for gross value of construction work performed this amounts to only 20%
(Hong Kong Government 1991).
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2.2.2.1	 Entry barriers in the construction market
Construction markets have low entry and exit barriers with low capital
requirements especially at the low end of company size (Betts and Ofori 1992).
Contractors' 'know-how' knowledge is easily transferable through hiring (Seymour
1987). Entry barriers at the lower end of the company size criterion are relatively
easy. The reason for this is that the nature and sophistication of the client who
commissions the work is likely to change as a firm grows in size. Briscoe (1988:
104) observes that 'small firms deal predominantly with individual householders
and perhaps carry out some work for the corporate sector. Larger firms also deal
with house buyers, but much of their workload stems from the industrial and
commercial sector, and also from local authorities. The largest firms carry out
most government contracts: they are also the organisations that deal with overseas
governments'.
2.2.3	 Character of the construction market
Briscoe (1988) suggests the character of construction markets is set by the type
and nature of construction work, the geographical location and the nature of the
client and that the exact type of competition experienced by the construction firm
depends on all these factors.
2.2.3.1
	 Type and nature of construction work
The Standard Industrial Classification, which defines industries for the purpose of
official statistics, lists the following activities under the heading 'Construction':
`... erecting, repairing buildings; constructing and repairing roads and bridges;
erecting steel and reinforced concrete structures; other civil engineering work such
as laying sewers and gas mains, erecting overhead line supports and ariel masts,
open cast mining, etc.'
The construction industry includes building and civil engineering firms engaged
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in new build work and repair, maintenance and improvements. Construction work
is commonly divided into building and civil engineering work. Building and civil
engineering work can be subdivided into either broad or narrow type groupings.
Skitmore (1989) states that the types of buildings are usually denoted by function
such as residential, commercial, industrial, educational and recreational with the
building's function being largely associated with benefits to the consumer.
A comprehensive construction type classification system used for the UK
construction industry is based on the Cl/ Sf13 1 construction indexing manual (Ray-
Jones and Clegg 1976). This classifies type of work into nine main groupings.
Each of these categories are then split into many sub-groupings. The nine main
groupings with examples of sub-groupings are as follows:
(1) Utilities, civil engineering facilities eg. railway tracks, garages, piers;
(2) Industrial facilities eg. glasshouses, factories;
(3) Administrative, commercial, protective service facilities eg. offices, shopping
centres, prisons;
(4) Health, welfare facilities eg. hospitals, nursing homes;
(5) Recreational facilities eg. restaurants, swimming pools;
(6) Religious facilities eg.temples, cathedrals;
(7) Educational, scientific, information facilities eg. schools, libraries;
(8) Residential facilities eg. housing, apartments;
(9) Common facilities, other facilities eg. laundries, kitchens.
The nature of construction work is commonly broken down into new build work
and existing building alteration work. New build work is a term used to describe
a construction facility which is constructed from new whereas alteration work is
regarded as an all embracing term which includes conversion, modernisation,
rehabilitation, extension, repair, maintenance and demolition work (Cook 1991).
"The Construction Index Samarbetskommitem for Byggnadsfrager (CL/SIB)
is a co-ordination system developed for the construction industry which allows
cross-referencing between drawings, specifications and technical literature. It
originated in Sweden and in 1968 the RIBA (Royal Institute of British Architects)
developed the System further' (Aqua Group 1992).
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Griffith (1992), for example, subdivides new build work into:
(1) Replacement and/or erection of a new building;
(2) Extension of an existing building;
and existing building work into:
(1) Maintenance;
(a) Unplanned repair and maintenance;
(b) Preventative maintenance;
(2) Repairs and restoration;
(a) Modernisation;
(b) Refurbishment.
The Department of the Environment (Department of Environment 1992) splits
construction work into twenty-two separate trades according to new build and
repair and maintenance work. The principal divisions comprise:
(1) New build work;
(a) Public housing;
(b) Private housing;
(c) Other new work;
(i) industrial;
(ii) commercial;
(d) Other new work - public;
(2) Repair and maintenance;
(a) Housing;
(b) Other work - public;
(c) Other work- private.
Construction work can also be classified according to size. For example, small
building works are described by Griffith (1992: 2-3) as 'minor building repair or
maintenance task undertaken by a jobbing builder, to a new build project such as
a major extension or even a complete building or structure procured under a
shorter form of building contract' and 'will assume only a minor proportion of
activity in the new build sector and, in the main will be concerned with
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extensions, alterations or improvement works (with) the greatest proportion of
small building works occurring in the repair and maintenance sector'. He identifies
that small building works have the following characteristics:
(1) limited scale;
(2) limited content;
(3) small quantities;
(4) they may be unspecified, of an uncertain nature or even be of an unknown
nature prior to their commencement;
(5) short project duration.
In contracting, the type and nature of construction work is dictated by the make
up of the contract package. This is determined by the client. For example, the
contract package may consist of either or both new build work and alteration
work. Some contract packages may be for construction work that is more
standardised in design than other contract work. The contract package may
comprise one or more building types. There is also likely to be specification
differences and variability in the number of units contained in the packages. These
packages are also likely to vary in content (eg. the contract package may contain
either or both substructure and superstructure work).
The make up of the contract package according to type and nature will in turn
influence the range and distribution of contract sizes. Contract size can be
measured according to area or volume. This, however, does not take account of
complexity. Hillebrandt (1985) states that it should be theoretically possible to
measure the degree of complexity but acknowledges that the practical difficulties
are great. It is suggested that the nearest readily available approximation for
measuring complexity is the cost per square metre. Since cost reflects complexity
to some extent, ie. if the construction work is very costly, it might well be
complex (Naoum 1991), an alternative readily available measure that reflects, to
some degree, both complexity and size of the contract package is the bid price
submitted by the contractor.
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Size and complexity of construction work would seem to be correlated with larger
construction work tending to be more complex. The very smallest and simplest
contract packages will almost certainly be for alteration work, although the scope
of this work can vary quite considerably with massive and complex refurbishment
projects. New build work will also generate a wide range of contract package sizes
of differing complexity.
2.2.3.2	 Location
The construction work that goes to make up the construction market is dispersed
geographically. The extent of dispersion appears is affected by density of
population and extent of geographical area. Hillebrandt (1985) suggests the small
market share of any one contractor is more likely to occur in areas of relatively
dense population where the amount of work within the area is substantial, so that
a large volume of work is available to firms in the area without having to incur
heavy transport costs. In such cases the client has a large choice of contractors
which will lead to effective competition. Also a large volume of work in a
confined geographical area will allow a greater degree of contractor specialisation.
Hong Kong, for example, appears to fall into this category as it is both very
densely populated and very limited geographically.
2.2.3.3	 Clients of the construction industry
The type, nature, size and location of construction work that clients demand varies
considerably. Construction clients themselves also vary considerably. They range
from individuals through to large multinational companies and come from both the
private and public sector. Shutt (1988) regards the private sector as any private
owner, developer or private organisation and the public sector as any public
authority, such as local authorities, nationalised industries and new town
corporations. Hillebrandt (1985) classifies clients according to differing roles and
objectives. The public sector is classified into commercial or industrial enterprises
including nationalised industries, infrastructure and other community goods
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enterprises (eg. roads, prisons) and non-commercial social enterprises (eg. health
care and water supply). The private sector is classified into owner occupiers and
developers.
In addition, clients are dissimilar in the degree of knowledge they possess about
the workings of the construction industry. Clients of construction may also be
regular or irregular procurers of facilities and approach the industry frequently or
on an intermittent basis (Fellows et al 1983). Masterman (1992) presents a client
classification system in which clients are divided into public and private sector and
sub-divided firstly into whether they are experienced or inexperienced and
secondly according to whether they are primary or secondary constructors. For
example, he regards all public sector clients experienced with primary constructors
comprising government funded development agencies and local authorities and
secondary constructors as central and local government.
2.2.4	 Entry barriers and contract size and complexity
The structure and character of the construction market will influence the number
of competitors in the market. Hillebrandt (1985) regards size of contract as a major
determinant of the number of firms who can undertake the work, with complexity
as another determinant. 'A large contract requires more of all inputs than a small
contract, and only some of the total number of contractors in the country have
these inputs available to them ... a complicated building can be constructed only
by firms having control over the technical expertise required. This technical
expertise has many components: for example, the variety and depth of technical
skills, and the level of technology of the materials and processes' (Hillebrandt
1985: 25).
Male (1991: 17) points out that 'as project size and complexity increases there are
fewer companies about to undertake particular types of project - through
managerial capability and access to finance'. He also points out that 'These pose
barriers to entry for particular types of project and hence arrange contracting into
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a project based vertical market defined by project size and complexity'.
Hillebrandt (1985) proposes two market scenarios based on size and complexity
of work. One where there are many firms in the market and the other where there
are few firms in the market. The distinction drawn between these markets is in
terms of the size and complexity of work. For scenario 1 projects may be of a
relatively straight forward type with many companies able to undertake the work.
For scenario 2 the project may be larger and complex where there are fewer
companies able to undertake the work. The degree of competition within these
scenarios is shown to be dependent on the type of contractor selection system. For
example, with respect to open tendering, this varies from approaching perfect
competition (scenario 1) to oligopoly (scenario 2), while for single stage selective
tendering this varies from partial oligopoly (scenario 1) to oligopoly (scenario 2).
Contract size and complexity are therefore important determinants in the number
of contractors able to undertake work. Related to this is managerial capability and
access to finance, the implications of which are discussed in Chapter 3.
2.2.5	 Market sectors within the construction market
The structure and character of the construction market also shape the divisions of
work within the market, thereby creating market sectors. Newcombe (1976) sees
a series of different markets existing within the overall construction market, each
requiring a different set of resources, skills and management expertise and
comprise general contracting, civil engineering, speculative house building,
property development, building products and plant hire. Langford and Male
(1991) identify that the market is made up of four main areas, namely building,
civil engineering, repairs and maintenance and materials manufacturing and that
these may be sub-divided into market sectors. For example, they state that the
building market is composed of housing, industrial and commercial markets.
Fisher (1986) identifies market sectors within the building market as industrial
buildings, commercial buildings, renovation work, private sector house building,
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public sector building, jobbing and maintenance work.
Lansley et al (1979) suggest an alternative view, that is with the exception of
housing development, contractors do not consider demand in terms of market
sectors, but in terms of technologies to execute project types. They found the main
features that managers stated in assessing projects were project size, project
complexity and construction method. In respect of construction methods, it would
seem the broad divisions that occur within the construction market, in terms of
type, are for building and civil engineering work and, with respect to nature of
work, for new build and alteration work.
At a national level Lansley et al (1979) found that there was a clear distinction
between building and civil engineering by some contractors but not by others.
However, for smaller projects at a regional level there was a clear distinction for
building and civil engineering work. Since civil engineering projects are less
homogeneous than building projects (Raftery 1994), this may result in greater
range of market sectors. Civil engineering market sectors may be viewed in terms
of plant requirements for different types of project such as dredging and tunnelling
equipment. Specialist plant availability and requirements are likely to have an
important bearing on the number of contractors entering that particular market
sector. On the other hand, building can be viewed in terms of method of
fabrication and extent of prefabrication, with some contractors focusing their
attention on particular construction methods.
The foregoing discussion tends to indicate that the construction market is made up
of market sectors, although there appears to be a lack of consensus on the precise
boundaries of these sectors. Newcombe et al (1990a: 48) suggests 'in defining
market boundaries it is the degree of substitutability between products or services
which is the key factor ... a civil engineering firm and a speculative house builder
are in the same construction industry ... but in patently different markets because
a bridge is no substitute for a house and vice versa'.
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2.2.6	 Defining the construction market
Hillebrandt (1985: 26) suggests that 'markets in the construction industry should
... be defined in terms of the total demand for a particular service of a certain
degree of complexity and size of contract and in a geographical area which may
be covered, without undue increases in costs, by firms likely to be capable of
undertaking work of that type. The total number of firms interested in work of this
type will be referred to as being in a particular market'. Male (1991b) develops
this definition further by introducing the notion of a project-based vertical market
defined by project size and complexity. He considers 'construction in terms of a
geographically dispersed project-based vertical market that operates world wide
from local to international arena, and as we go up the vertical market, defmed by
project size and complexity, there are fewer and fewer companies able to
undertake particular types of project and fragmentation tends to decrease as the
industry is segmented by overlapping project based market structures' (Male
1991b: 18). He also suggests that it is hierarchically structured in terms of
company size with fragmentation being high at the smaller end of the vertical
market structure in repair and maintenance work while for new build work
fragmentation decreases according to project characteristics.
Male's definition could perhaps be further extended by viewing the market sectors
on two levels in terms of main contract work and sub-contract work. It would
seem that if the market for main contract work is project based then for sub-
contract work it is likely to be specialist trade based.
Common threads in both Hillebrandt and Male's definitions of the construction
market appear to be contract size and complexity, type of contract and location.
With the exception of contract size and complexity these definitions appear to
conform with the economists' view of the market which is seen as existing in two
main dimensions: (1) product type and (2) geographic area (Shepherd 1990). It
seems that project size and complexity is regarded as an additional important
dimension in the construction market because of the wide range of contract sizes
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that exists within the construction market and it is this which, according to
Hillebrandt (1985), is the major determinant of the number of firms able to
undertake the work.
2.2.7	 Market conditions
The total number of firms interested in undertaking construction work according
to these three main dimensions appears to some extent dependent on market
conditions. Market conditions are regarded by Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) as an
all embracing subjective term which on a macro-(industry) level includes such
factors as:
(1) the total construction order for all work;
(2) the total orders for each market sector;
(3) projected future orders;
(4) current and projected governmental policy and legislation;
(5) construction (input) price levels;
(6) cost of capital;
and on a micro-(company) level it will include an assessment of:
(1) local, national and international opportunities;
(2) competitor activity;
(3) volume of on-going work;
(4) order books.
In construction contracting the method of price determination is the reverse of
manufacturing in that the contractor determines the price prior to production.
Under this form of market structure the construction work is pre-demanded by the
client (Male 1991b). In other words construction contracting is demand driven and
as such the construction work demanded by clients fluctuates over time. These
fluctuations create feast or famine for the construction firms involved (Newcombe
et al 1990a) although these fluctuations are seen by Male (1991c) to be no worse
than those experienced in other industries.
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When the construction market is in recession there is normally less work available.
This will inevitably lead to greater competition between contractors. Flanagan and
Norman (1985) state that a fall in workload can be expected to affect all
contractors and with very low workloads the opportunity cost will be low.
2.3 The construction organisation
The competitive environment also exerts major influences over the structure and
operations of organisations. The points of contact between the organisation and its
environment are of primary significance to an organisation's success. Strengths
and weaknesses are internal and are determined by the organisation. Opportunities
and threats are external and consist of environmental factors to which the
organisation must respond. Environment generates the main risks and uncertainties
for an organisation.
2.3.1	 Organisational structure of construction companies
Construction companies are complex and a number of different corporate
organisational structures have evolved ranging from the simple structure
appropriate for the small company through a series of variations to the
divisionalised structure and holding company pattern present in large companies.
Robbins (1983) identifies three basic components to organisational structure. They
are:
(1) complexity which relates the extent of structural differentiation which
consists of horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation and spacial
dispersion;
(2) formalisation which is concerned with the extent to which the norms of an
organisation are made explicit;
(3) centralisation which refers to the extent to which power is centralised or
concentrated within the organisation.
Based on work by Channon (1973), Newcombe (1976) identified four forms of
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organisational structure relevant to construction:
(1) integrated: no division of the total task of the business into specialised
functions with many unrelated activities grouped under a single individual;
(2) functional: business subdivided into a series of specialised functions;
(3) holding company: comprised a system of semi autonomous subsidiaries or
companies, held together only as a corporate legal entity;
(4) multidivisional: general office, usually divorced from operations, which
serviced and monitored the operating divisions.
2.3.2	 Operations of construction companies
A construction company may be solely engaged with business activities within the
construction industry or, with particular respect to larger companies, have a
diversified range of interests outside the construction industry. Cannon and
Hillebrandt (1989b) define diversification as the process by which firms extend the
range of their business operations outside those in which they are currently
engaged. They identify that diversification can be initiated by a firm within or
outside the construction industry. Advantages to diversification in contracting
identified by Cannon and Hillebrandt (1989b) are that it enables
(1) greater spreading of risk;
(2) fluctuations in workload easier to overcome;
(3) an opportunity for more efficient use of available resources, notably skilled
personnel and cash.
Edwards (1968: 118) states 'because a large conglomerate operates in many
markets, it can (1) divert income from one market to another (2) subsidise its
losses in one market from profits in another (3) make investments in production
for one market with resources derived from another' and concludes it is thus
immunised from some of the competitive pressures to which its specialised rivals
must respond'.
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2.3.3	 Strategic business units and project portfolio
A multi-market firm that operates in more than one business arena or market
manages a portfolio of businesses termed strategic business units (SBU) (Kerin et
al 1990). Each business unit operates in its own unique market environment and
deals with a specific set of customers and competitors. Newcombe (1976) defined
firms in terms of the markets they were competing in by using a specialisation /
diversification continuum. Four market diversification strategies were identified
as single market, dominant market, related market and unrelated market.
Each contractor may therefore have a project portfolio (Ball 1988) which includes
not only construction work but also investments of liquid capital from contracting
in stocks, property, land and areas outside construction as well as a potential
capacity. Potential capacity (Ba11 1988) in construction refers to the capability of
a company to undertake different types of construction work in the future and
stems from organisational structure and the accumulated knowledge of
management and support functions. Male (1991c) suggests potential capacity of
contacting companies begins from site agent level upwards where a high level of
subcontracting is undertaken.
2.3.4	 Ownership and size of company
Organisational structure and operations seem to be very much dependent on the
type of ownership and size of the company. Construction companies are often
classified by ownership (eg. Department of Environment 1992, Hong Kong
Government 1991) into four main groupings which comprise:
(1) sole proprietor: single person provides the capital, takes all the management
decisions and incurs the risks;
(2) partnership: development from sole partnership, usually between 2 to 20 can
combine together;
(3) limited liability company: association of people who contribute towards the
joint stock capital of the company with personal liability limited to original
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contribution. Ownership and management may or may not be divorced;
(4) public limited company: complex organisational structures with operating
divisions which often reflect wide diversity of interests.
Type of ownership appears to have an important bearing on the numbers and sizes
of contractors. It would seem, in terms of ownership, that the smaller projects in
the construction market are likely to be dominated by sole proprietors and
partnerships. As pointed out by Briscoe (1988), sole proprietors are flexible
enough to respond very rapidly to change yet have a restricted financial basis and
the rate of insolvency is high. Partnerships have the advantage that partners can
bring new management skills into the firm and thereby permit a greater degree of
specialisation of function. However, unlimited liability stifles growth and taking
risks in pursuit of greater profit. The larger projects are more likely to be
undertaken by limited liability companies and public limited companies. Fellows
et al (1983) identify that limited liability overcomes unlimited liability with
transferable shares. However, ownership may become divorced from management
leading to a divergence of interests. Public limited companies find it easier to raise
capital. The capital structure of a joint-stock company makes it easy for one
company to acquire ownership of another. Briscoe (1988) observes that larger
contractors typically have separate divisions for civil engineering, housing,
property, overseas work and materials and plant supply. Usually the largest public
limited companies operate across all national regions and frequently they own
associated companies in foreign countries. They grow not only by increasing
turnover in established markets, but also through acquisitions and mergers with
other companies.
The most numerous type of firm found in the Hong Kong, according to ownership,
is the sole proprietor (72%), which is followed by limited liability companies (15
%), partnerships (12%) and public limited company (0.03%) (Hong Kong
Government 1988).
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) see contractor size as being important for three
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reasons:
(1) when the project size is large it often needs to be financed as well as actually
undertaken on the building site;
(2) size gives confidence to the client in the capability of the company;
(3) an increase in facilities enables a spread of risk and also enables good ideas
to be put into practice.
Edwards (1968: 117) summarises the advantages of a large firm over a small firm
as 'a big firm can outbid, outspend, and outlose a small firm. It can advertise more
intensively, do more intensive and extensive research, buy up the inventions of
others, defend its legal rights or alleged rights more thoroughly, bid higher for
scarce resources, acquire the best locations and the best technicians and executives.
If it overdoes its expenditures, it can absorb losses that would bankrupt a small
rival'.
The size of firm appears greatly to affect the ease to which the firm can obtain the
necessary resources to undertake the contract. It will also influence the experience
level as the larger firms are likely to have undertaken a broader range of contract
values and therefore be in a position to undertake a greater variety of work.
Additionally it will influence the strategy as larger firms are more likely to have
a more formalised strategic plan and their decision making process is almost
certain to be grouped rather than individual.
2.3.5	 Organisation of construction projects
Fellows et al (1983) point out that not only are there large differences between
firms in terms of size and scope of work, but within firms there is often a great
diversity of activity. Typically a large construction company may be engaged in
activities ranging from general building and civil engineering to materials
manufacturing, property development trade specialisation and even open-cast coal
mining. Many large contractors regionalise their operations; civil and engineering
work is undertaken by separate divisions and property development, plant hire and
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materials production are executed by subsidiary companies. The greater the degree
of diversification within an organisation, and the greater the number of
contributors to projects undertaken by the organisation, the more necessary and
difficult is the co-ordination of those diverse units to produce an integrated whole
(Newcombe et al 1990a).
For most construction contracts the main contractor has overall responsibility for
organising the construction contract. However, for contracts which are large and
complex a joint venture may be formed in which a consortium of firms group
together to undertake the construction work.
It is common practice for main contractors and joint ventures to employ
subcontractors who often undertake the majority of the construction work.
Subcontracting has become more prevalent in the construction industry because of
increasing technical complexity of projects, changes in employment legislation
over the past 20 years, increasing pressures on employers to reduce fixed costs
(Gray and Flanagan 1989) coupled with inherent short term variability of
geographically dispersed construction workloads, necessitating organisational
flexibility (Male 1991c). The extent of this growth in UK has been studied by
Abdel-Razek and McCaffer (1987).
Gray and Flanagan (1989) identify that subcontractors can be broken down into
four distinct groups:
(1) design, manufacture, supply and fix
(2) design, supply and fix
(3) supply and fix
(4) fix only
The National Economic Development Office (1978) identified that with such high
levels of subcontracting the role of the main contractor has become one of
organising, co-ordinating and procuring inputs into the production process and also
providing core services of management expertise, experience, backup and
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resources from an established organisation and an ability to carry contractual risks
and obligations for large and complex projects.
The high use of subcontracting gives the contractor organisational flexibility,
reduces capital lock up in fixed and human assets and is seen as an effective
mechanism for production cost control by sub-letting work packages at a known
price, generally through competition (Male 1991c). Thorpe and McCaffer (1991)
identify that the size and uniqueness of a project dictate the extent to which
contractors decide whether or not to sub-contract work normally undertaken by
themselves.
This project organisation has led Ball (1988) to suggest that construction is a
hierarchial industry designated by size of firm where many small companies are
tending to act as subcontractors to the large companies. Stocks (1984) has
characterised the building process as the 'organisation of organisations'. It is
perhaps only for the very smallest projects that the subcontracting phenomenon
does not occur.
2.4 Setting up the competition
The nature and form of the competitive arena for a contractor is largely
determined by the client and/or advisors. Hillebrandt (1985) regards clients as the
initiators of the whole construction process. Although this appears to hold true for
contracting work, contractors are able to create demand through speculative
projects (Male 1991b).
2.4.1	 Construction contract bidding systems
There is a variety of competitive bidding systems available for selecting
contractors to undertake construction work. Common bidding systems used in the
construction industry include:
(1) open tendering: any or a restricted number of contractors based on an
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approved list can compete;
(2) selective tendering (single stage): contractors are invited to bid and
award of contract is based on the bid submitted;
(3) selective tendering (two stage): contractors are invited to bid and award of
contract is based on subsequent negotiation;
(4) serial/continuity tendering: combining competition initially and then
negotiation for a series of similar contracts.
An important distinction between these systems is that for (1) and (2) the contract
is normally awarded on the basis of competition only (usually to the lowest
bidder), whereas for (3) and (4) award of contract is normally on the basis of
initial competition followed by subsequent negotiation. It should also be noted that
the award of contract for many 'competition only' construction contracts is based
purely on the assessment of bid prices. However, in some cases the award of
contract assessment may be based on other additional criteria such as time, where
each contractor is required to propose the contract period, quality (eg. lift
installations) and design (eg. civil engineering work).
2.4.1.1
	 Construction contract bidding systems in Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, lump sum tendering based on firm bills of quantities appears to be
the dominant procurement system for building work. It is commonly used in both
the private and public sector as a means of obtaining competitive tenders.
Selective tendering is commonly practised in the private sector. In the public
sector, with the exception of contracts with special requirements, the Hong Kong
Government uses restrictive open tendering based on its own set of rules as the
means of obtaining bids (Hong Kong Government 1980). For those exceptions
single stage selective tendering is used (Hong Kong Government 1990). The Hong
Kong Housing Authority, though once users of serial tendering, now use single
stage selective tendering.
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It is common practice for construction clients in Hong Kong to split the project
into a series of separate contracts. This appears to stem from two building
development characteristics peculiar to Hong Kong; high land costs and political
uncertainty. High land costs coupled with political uncertainty have led many
developers to look for a quick return on their capital outlay. Keeping design and
construction time to a minimum is regarded by most Hong Kong clients as
essential and in terms of Flanagan's study (Flanagan 1990) on construction clients'
priorities ranks second only to cost. Since many of the high rise buildings in Hong
Kong require piled foundations, a common procedure in optimising development
time is for the client to let the foundation work under a separate contract to a
specialist contractor (Davis, Langdon and Seah International 1994). The
superstructure work is then designed while the foundation work is being carried
out. In the same way it is common practice for prime cost sums for nominated
subcontractors to be included in the bills of quantities, particularly for electrical
and mechanical installations. The system of splitting work into separate contracts
is also adopted by the Hong Kong Government which commonly splits the
substructure, superstructure shell and fitting out work into separate contracts.
2.4.2	 Entry barriers to bidding systems
The choice of bidding system used by the client will influence the ease with which
the contractor can enter or exit the competition. Selective tendering systems appear
to be more restrictive than open tendering systems as the contractor can only
normally bid upon receiving an invitation either directly from the client or from
the client's representative, whereas for open tendering the onus is on the contractor
to bid by responding to an advertisement.
Related to this is the extent to which contractor prequalification is formalised by
the client and/or advisors. Prequalification has been defined as 'a process of
determining a candidate's competence or ability to meet the specific requirements
for a task involving a wide range of criteria for which information is often
qualitative or subjective' (Russell and Skibneiwski 1988). One of the objectives
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of the prequalification process is to try and ensure that the selected group of
bidders will submit genuinely competitive bids.
Private sector clients appear to have more flexibility in contractor prequalification
since public sector clients, mainly for the sake of public accountability, are forced
to adopt strict procedures. Carefully structured prequalification systems appear to
be generally under used in the construction industry. This results in (1) subjective
bidder selection and (2) the involvement of too many bidders. Subjective practices
may result in the unnecessary exclusion of bidders who would satisfy
prequalification criteria, and the selection of bidders who would not satisfy
prequalification criteria. Flanagan and Norman (1985) state that if a bid list is
drawn up without attention being paid to the relative efficiencies and experience
of the contractors, this is likely to lead to the client paying a higher price. In
addition they state that there is at least some possibility that the contract will be
won by a relatively inefficient and inexperienced contractor .
Fellows (1992) found that clients classify contractors by project type (specialism),
then by size of organisation and region of operation with the following major
qualifiers to be acceptable to clients:
(1) general experience and reputation;
(2) financial standing and record;
(3) quality assured;
(4) prior business relationship.
Male (1991: 15) states that 'any form of prequalification differentiates one group
of contractors from another, since the group of contractors that prequalify are seen
to have the expertise to carry out the project and, by implication those not selected
do not'. Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) point out that differentiation between
contractors is possible only until selection has taken place; thereafter competition
is on price alone. They also comment that (unrestricted) open tendering does not
even allow this degree of product differentiation because the tender price is the
only criterion adopted.
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2.4.3	 Number and identities of bidders
The choice of bidding system coupled with bidder selection practices has a direct
bearing on the degree of competition since it affects both the number and identities
of bidders competing for a particular contract. For example, open tendering
systems are likely to provide a greater variability in both number and identities of
bidders since the client and / or client advisors have less control over the particular
combination of bidders that is likely to compete for any given contract.
The effect of introducing additional contractors to the competition will reduce the
probability of success of any one contractor and can be expected to increase the
elasticity of the probability of winning the contract with a particular bid price
(Flanagan and Norman 1985). A greater number of bidders in competition with
one another tends to reduce the value of the lowest bid (McCaffer 1976; Wilson
et al, 1987) and tends to produce a smaller coefficient of variation, probably due
to the increased level of competition (Skitmore, 1987b).
The identities of individual bidders are important since different bidders achieve
different levels of competitiveness. Skitmore (1981) examined the implications of
a virtually random prequalification procedure in which it was shown that
identification of the most competitive bidders was a crucial missing factor.
Schweizer and Ungern-Sternberg (1983) comment that an addition in the number
of bidders above four or five has only a marginal impact on competitiveness. Also
that an improvement in the quality of information made available to bidders will
have a much sharper impact on the competitiveness of bidders than will an
increase in the number of bidders. Flanagan and Norman (1985) point out that
improvements in information need to be a more efficient method for increasing the
competitiveness of bids than increasing the number of bidders. They suggest that
one relatively costless method of improving the information base of bidders can
be accomplished by selecting contractors with experience of the contract type.
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2.5 Summary
A brief review of management and economic theory indicates that management
theory is more comprehensive at modelling strategic behaviour within construction
firms, while economic theory seems to be more developed at modelling
competitive performance between construction firms. Since competitive
relationships between firms are based on the outcome of management decisions
that have taken place within a firm, the approach taken in the theoretical
development of this research is to view the bidding behaviour of construction
firms as the outcome of strategic management decisions undertaken in an
economic setting.
The construction industry environment within which contractors operate is seen
to consist of general environmental factors as well as competitive environmental
factors. Since contracting is demand driven the competitive environment can be
defined in terms of markets. Markets can be described and defined by the nature
of competition. The nature of competition is influenced by the market structure
and characteristics. The construction industry is highly fragmented with the
dominant firm being the small contractor. Construction markets have low entry
and exit barriers with low capital requirements, especially at the low end of
company size. The character of construction markets is set by the type and nature
of construction work, the geographical location and the nature of the client, and
the exact type of competition experienced by the construction firm depends on all
these factors. Definitions of the construction market indicate that it exists in three
main dimensions: (1) contract type and nature (2) contract size and complexity (3)
geographic area. The total number of firms interested in undertaking construction
work according to these three dimensions is affected by prevailing and perceived
future market conditions.
The type and nature of construction work undertaken within the construction
market is diverse, producing a series of market sectors within which contractors
compete for work. Contract size and complexity is regarded as an important
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dimension in the construction market because of the wide range of contract sizes
that exists within the construction market and it is this which is regarded as the
major determinant of the number of firms able to undertake the work. A readily
available measure that reflects to a degree both contract size and complexity is the
bid price submitted by the contractor. The influence geographic area has on the
market seems to be largely dependent on the extent of geographical area and
population density. Geographic area appears to have less influence in markets of
limited area in which transportation costs are reduced. In markets of high
population density a larger volume of work leads to a greater choice of contractors
to undertake the work which in turn reduces the market share of any one
contractor.
In contracting the type and nature of construction work is dictated by the make up
of the contract packages which is determined by the client. The type and nature
of construction work in the contract packages influences the complexity of work,
distribution and range of contract sizes. In terms of contract type and contract size
construction contracting can therefore be arranged into a series of contract based
vertical market sectors, each made up of varying combinations of contract types
and bounded by contract size and complexity.
The construction environment exerts major influences over the structure and
operations of organisations. Construction companies are complex and a number of
different organisational structures have evolved. A construction company may be
solely engaged with business within the construction industry or, with particular
respect to larger companies have a diversified range of interests outside the
construction industry. Organisational structure and extent of operations seem to be
very much dependent on the type of ownership and size of the company.
The nature and form of the competitive arena for the contractor in construction
contracting is largely determined by the client and/or advisors. The choice of
bidding system coupled with bidder selection practices has a direct bearing on the
degree of competition since it affects both the number and identities of bidders
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competing for a particular contract. An increase in numbers of bidders above four
or five has only a marginal impact on competitiveness. The identities of individual
bidders are important since different bidders achieve different levels of
competitiveness.
In describing the overall construction industry environment this chapter reviews
the competitive environment within which contractors operate. Contractors are
seen to react to this environment by making strategic decisions. This is now
considered in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
Bidding as a strategic process
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3 BIDDING AS A STRATEGIC PROCESS
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 defined the competitive environment for construction contracting in
terms of markets. Definitions of the construction market indicate that it exists
according to three main dimensions: (1) contract type and nature, (2) contract size
and complexity and (3) geographic area. This chapter establishes that contractors
respond to these markets by making strategic decisions at different levels and
stages of the strategic process. At the corporate strategy level contractors define
a strategic domain. The strategic domain establishes the market dimensions within
which contractors plan to operate and compete for work. Contractors make
decisions on which contracts to bid for at the business strategy level. If opting to
bid, the baseline estimate is formulated at the operational strategy level and then
fed back to the business strategy level where the senior management decides the
appropriate bid level at an adjudication meeting. The bid, which can be regarded
as the outcome of the strategic decision process, is then submitted to the client. In
describing the strategic decision process at the different levels and stages, this
chapter identifies the underlying factors which influence competitive bidding
behaviour and in doing so highlights the effect of contract type and contract size
on competitiveness in construction contract bidding.
This chapter is set out in three sections. The first section identifies and relates
different levels of strategic decision making to the bidding process. The second
section examines the strategic response made by contractors and the last section
discusses the outcome of the strategic process.
3.2 Strategic decisions
Strategic decisions define the boundary between the firm and the external
environment. It is the point of contact between the firm and the environment and
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strategic decisions can shift this boundary. Male (1991b) suggests for analytical
purposes, it is useful to think of a company having a permeable boundary that
delineates its internal workings from the external business environment. Langford
and Male (1991: 31) utilised the term 'spheres of influence' to indicate that the
boundaries of a company, especially in construction are very movable.
Contract bidding, like all other forms of pricing, is essentially about contractors
making strategic decisions in respect of which contracts to bid for and the bid
levels necessary to secure them (Skitmore 1989). Strategic decisions are defined
by Newcombe et al (1990a: 42) as 'any decision at any level of the business which
impacts on the whole organisation and a tactical decision is one which does not
exhibit any of the above characteristics'. They identify the characteristics of
strategic decisions as relating to:
(1) defining the scope of the organisation's activities including the extent of
diversification of services and markets;
(2) matching the organisations's activities with the environment in which it
operates including matching the strengths and weaknesses of the firm to the
opportunities and threats in the market place and the changing environment;
(3) matching the firm's activities to the capabilities of the firm and to its
resources;
(4) assessing major resource implications arising from strategic decisions;
(5) evaluating the effect on operational and administrative decisions;
(6) meeting expectations and values of the key stakeholders in the business;
(7) assessing the high degree of uncertainty about environmental forces and
outcomes;
(8) determining the impact of the decision on the whole organisation.
Cusack's investigation (Cusack 1981) of decision making in construction
companies concluded that decisions were based on experience. Lansley et al
(1980) established that 'organisational experience' in management is a key factor
responding to market conditions with the breadth of experience being 'particularly
important in enabling firms to develop alternative organisational method
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appropriate to the different types of work they needed to undertake'. Jarman
(1978) concluded that large companies do not tackle business ventures with little
knowledge or expertise.
3.2.1	 Levels of strategic decision making
Strategic decision making in construction contracting is seen by Newcombe et al
(1990a) and Male (1991a) to occur at the following levels within an organisation:
(1) Corporate strategy
Andrews (1987: 13) defines corporate strategy as the 'pattern of major
objectives, purposes, or goals and essential policies and plans for achieving
those goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company is
in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be'. Benes and
Diepeveen (1985) state that planning at the corporate level starts with an
agreement on the objectives of the firm and on the strategy needed for their
realisation. Barnard (1981) states that 'objectives are the decision rules that
enable management to guide and measure the firm's performance towards its
purpose'. Grinyer (1972) classifies objectives into economic objectives (eg.
growth of turnover, earnings, market share in existing markets, number of
markets in which the firm operates, stability of annual gross turnover, gross
profit, return on investments and in utilisation of scarce physical or human
resources held by the firm) and non-economic objectives (eg. internal
political, external political, meet aspirations of employees, serve clients and
the general community well, maintain a good industry reputation).
Corporate strategy denotes the most general level of strategy in an
organisation and in this sense embraces other levels of strategy and is
therefore concerned with the competitive positioning of the whole company
and the management of the relationship of the total firm with its environment
(Male 1991a). Porter (1979) has shown that corporate strategy involves:
(1) positioning a firm in relation to the five forces previously described in
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Chapter 2;
(2) influencing their balance within an industry;
(3) exploiting industry change and its effect on the forces.
In respect of a construction firm, 'corporate strategy could involve issues
such as the type of client, both existing and potential, the range of projects
that the firm could undertake and in what geographic locations; the impact
of the economy of the firm; relations with suppliers; what new companies
may be entering the markets; and finally, any new services the firm wishes
to offer' (Male 1991a: 1).
(2) Business strategy
Whereas corporate strategy is concerned with the competitive position of the
whole company and the management of the relationship of the total firm
with its environment, the second level of strategic decision making is
referred to as business or competitive strategy and is 'about how to compete
in a market' (Johnson and Scholes 1993: 11). Male (1991a) identifies that
this is typified in contracting by a decision to bid for a particular project and
that it is a firm's bidding strategy.
(3) Operational strategy
Under business strategy there exists a third level of strategy, known as
operational strategy (Johnson and Scholes 1993) which is concerned with
how the other functions of the firm contribute to the other levels of strategy.
In contracting this has been identified by Newcombe et al (1990a) as being
at the project end of the organisation, for example, the chief estimator's
decision on pricing strategy for a major contract and the method decisions
taken by a site manager.
3.3 The strategic response
Most contractors recognise that they cannot undertake work in all the sectors of
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the construction market. 'The customers are too numerous, widely scattered and
varied in their buying requirements' (Kotler 1988: 279). Therefore, as part of their
corporate strategy, contractors need to identify market sectors within which to
compete. Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990), however, point out that up until the mid
1970's contractors' major marketing efforts were not directed toward seeking work
in a particular market area but getting on the tender list as they saw the dominant
decision factor being that of price. However, since this time a steady fall in
demand has created an awareness to strengthen marketing efforts considerably,
although these activities are still being developed in a largely ad hoc manner.
Grinyer (1972) and Barnard (1981) suggests contractors need to consider:
(1) geographic areas within which the firm will operate;
(2) types of structures or civil engineering works it will seek to construct;
(3) types of services it will offer (ranging from the complete package deal to
specialist subcontracting);
(4) type of client it will favour;
(5) maximum contract size;
(6) period of maximum commitment to various (market) sectors;
(7) timing of any changes in these aspects of business.
The type and location of projects is reckoned by Lamley et at (1979) to be by far
the most important factor in determining the direction of the construction
organisation. In a survey of eight large contractors Bell (1981) concluded that
these contractors tended to operate regionally and undertook similar work in
various regions and that they considered labour availability, the location and the
size of project to be important.
Benes and Diepeveen (1985) suggest that it is the competitive strength of the firm
which management needs to consider when deciding its policy on the
product/market combination, that is, the turnover per product for each market
sector. Ramsay (1989) sees market segmentation becoming more prevalent, not
only in services provided by the contractor, but also specialisation in the type of
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work sought. This allows the contractor to seek and establish a special relationship
with target clients, particularly in growth industries such as retailing and should
include:
(1) deciding on whether to satisfy most segments of the market or focus
specifically on one or two segments;
(2) prioritising allocation of resources;
(3) identifying exactly where the firm is superior to its competition;
(4) combining parts or processes of the firm to create synergy.
3.3.1	 The strategic domain
Male (1991b) introduces the concept of strategic domain to construction
contracting and states 'the strategic domain sets the parameters within which
senior management chooses to operate. Some senior managements define a narrow
domain - perhaps a regional geographic market for constructing to contract on
building projects. Others may specialise by project types within this. Others may
define a broader strategic domain undertaking both civil and building projects'. In
other words, the strategic domain establishes the market dimensions within which
contractors plan to operate. This includes making decisions on which contract type
and size of contracts to compete for and the extent of geographical area within
which to undertake the construction work.
Since contractors will win only a proportion of the contracts they bid for, the
strategic domain is most likely to be set at a level where number of bidding
opportunities exceed the contracting capacity of the contractor. Male (1991b)
suggests that developing the strategic domain involves:
(1) studying the markets which the firm is now involved or likely to be involved
and assessing future trends, for example, by type of product, type of client,
the method of production and the length of time to produce;
(2) determining the total volume of each section of the market, its past trend and
the factors which affect demand;
(3) deciding on the common factors in each market group. The general value of
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contracts may be similar in one group to another;
(4) assessing of the probable competition in the different markets;
(5) analysing the profitability of the different types and sizes of construction
projects.
Marsh (1987) also suggests the contractors' business can also be usefully defined
according to class of work which includes (1) technical expertise with certain
types (2) size \ value constraints which are largely dependent on finances and
contractual risk. Also there should be a business policy in which it is determined
(1) what lines of business constitute the contractor's market (which presumably
includes contract type preferences) (2) what limitations is the contractor going to
place upon himself in terms of size of contract.
3.3.1.1	 The effect of contract type
A contractor's strategic domain can be defined according to a number of contract
types and may comprise undertaking all or specialising in certain contract types
within one or more sectors of the construction market. The strategic domain may
also include only undertaking new build work or alteration work or both.
An important variable influencing the scope of the strategic domain according to
type seems to be the size of contactor. Most large contractors appear to work in
more than one market sectors simultaneously. Shash (1993), for example, defined
the scope of work undertaken by 83 top UK contractors into four broad categories
of work made up of housing, building (ie. non-housing), industrial (ie. power
plants, refineries etc.) and engineering (ie. highways, harbours and airports etc.).
Of the 83 contractors, 26% undertook work in one of these categories, 38% in two
categories, 22% in three categories and 11% in all four categories. Within these
categories 18.8% of contractors focused on building work only and 28.8% on
housing and buildings.
Bell (1981) found that in examining the marketing attitudes of eight large UK
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contractors:
(1) contractor policies varied from one contractor where all sectors of the market
sectors of the industry are within its capabilities to another which stays with
the traditional 'proven to work' construction;
(2) some contractors appeared to be more flexible in their policy towards type
of work (no specific mention was made in respect of specific types of work,
except that two of the contractors avoided housing work);
(3) profitable and of high quality construction work appeared to be important.
When interviewing large contractors Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) found in
general the contractors are prepared to undertake any type of building or civil
engineering work with the following exceptions:
(1) some firms do not have the skills required to undertake very large projects
of a very specialised nature and which occur infrequently such as nuclear
power stations, oil platforms and refineries;
(2) a few firms are specialists in a particular type of work either in their main
operations or as specialist contractors in a particular field;
(3) a few companies have now effectively withdrawn from overseas work;
(4) all contractors wished for a broad and balanced range of activities since it
enables them to take advantage of growth in a particular sector of the market
and restricts their exposure to risk in any one of them.
On the other hand medium size companies usually concentrate in one area both
spacially and by product (Jarman 1978). Jarman (1978) also found that small
companies specialised in maintenance and repairs which the large builders avoided
unless they had a rolling programme. Norris (1984) points out that repairs and
maintenance work, due to its nature, tends to comprise a large number of minor
jobs, many of which only require the employment of one operative. Consequently,
this type of work is ideally suited to the small local builder. Male (1991b) also
suggests that there is a relationship between size of contractor and repair and
maintenance work and new build work Repair and maintenance favours small
companies but acts against large company operations by the relatively small
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amount of work by value undertaken by the larger company categories within the
industry. However, he states some large contractors have responded to this by
setting up 'small' works divisions or subsidiaries. For new build work the industry
the construction industry has a distinct hierarchial structure, with the larger
companies capturing the work by value.
Norris (1984) states that the economic advantages associated with size of firm are
dependent upon the type and nature of the work undertaken; 'At the one end of
the scale, repair and maintenance entails carrying out a large number of very small
jobs which in most cases only require the services of a single craftsman. This type
of work is suited to the local firm which is close to where the work is required,
operates with low overheads and the minimum amount of supervision. At the other
end of the market, large national firms have significant advantages when
undertaking large projects'.
Specialist contractors may be large, such as those specialising in house building
(Ball 1988) or small; for example, Flanagan and Norman (1982b) found a small
contractor who successfully specialised in constructing local schools. It appears
therefore that it is the size of market that limits the degree of specialisation
(Hillebrandt 1985) rather than the size of contractor. Contractors do not specialise
more in the type of work they undertake because:
(1) fluctuations in demand for work of any particular type and location make it
risky to place too much reliance on one market;
(2) construction is a complex assembly process, therefore if the contractor is
successful in one type of work he may fairly easily transfer his skills to a
related work type;
(3) markets are determined by geographical spread as well as type and size of
work, therefore the total work available in one market may be relatively
small (Hillebrandt, 1985).
It should also be noted that a contractor's domain in terms of contract type can
also linked to client type. Regular clients of the construction industry generate a
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range of one or more project types that fit into one or more market sectors.
Contractors respond to this demand through determining their market mix of
clients and contract type. Fellows (1992) found that contractors classify clients as
public or private by building function, project size and location.
3.3.1.2	 The effect of contract size
Contractors' strategic domains can also be defined according to the range of
contracts sizes they wish to undertake. Most contractors, as part of the strategic
planning process, identify a turnover they wish to attain for a given year. King
(1990) found the most common method of quantifying or measuring a contractor's
need for work was a comparison of the current project backlog against the annual
projected turnover with a lower ratio indicating a greater need for work.
Hillebrandt (1985) points out that for most construction firms each contract
accounts for an important proportion of total turnover and that this dependence on
a few contracts is a feature of construction firms in the industry and has important
repercussions on the operation of firms. Fine (1974) points out that the range of
job size should be considered so as to achieve the turnover desired. The state of
the market will also provide an indicator to assess the turnover available in the
market without tackling jobs that are too small.
Ferry and Brandon (1984) state that for each contractor there is an optimum size
of contract that will suit its particular structure and resources. Fine (1974) points
out that large organisations are geared to dealing with large contracts so these will
be chosen in preference to smaller ones. In examining the marketing attitudes of
eight large UK contractors, Bell (1981) found that all but two of the contractors
aim for large projects. Of the two exceptions one appeared to have no group
policy whilst another had upper and lower limits. It was pointed out that this latter
company had lower resources than other contactors. Shash (1993), in a study of
83 top UK contractors, found that 56% of the surveyed contractors obtained an
average contract size of between one to five million pounds. When interviewing
large contractors Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) found that:
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(1) no contractor will undertake small contracts except where he is obliging an
existing client. The reason is that the overhead costs of managing small
contracts are disproportionate to their total value. This is their explanation
for their not undertaking repair and maintenance work but being willing to
bid for large renovation schemes.
(2) at the other end of the scale, there is a limit to the size of project which they
will handle on their own. This is a function of risk on contract relative to the
total workload of the company with joint ventures being the answer to this
type of problem.
At the other end of the scale Shutt (1988) identifies the reasons why smaller
building firms tend to carry out smaller works as follows:
(1) smaller firms have lower overhead costs and so can do smaller jobs cheaper
than the bigger firms, who carry higher overheads to cope with larger jobs;
(2) smaller firms have lower overhead costs and so can do smaller jobs cheaper
than the bigger firms, who carry higher overheads to cope with larger jobs;
(3) lack of finance for carrying out larger works;
(4) personal attention by a small builder is appreciated by clients.
Ferry and Brandon (1984), however, state that large firms very often create 'small
works' sections of the main company to deal with those contracts which are small
and which cannot carry the overheads of a giant corporation. In respect of clients,
Shutt (1988) points out that much of the work for public bodies is on a large scale,
then the firms doing public work tend to be of a medium to large size.
3.3.1.3	 The effect of geographic area
The extent of the international contractor's strategic domain in terms of geographic
area can be considered in world-wide terms. Bon (1993) undertook a survey of the
various construction markets world-wide in which market attractiveness was
scored according to 'fastest growing', 'most profitable' and 'most open'. It would
seem, therefore, that in international contracting 'market attractiveness' is a key
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factor in the planning of a strategic domain. The extent of contractors' strategic
domain on a national level varies from country to country. Chapter 2 identified
two important factors affecting the influence of geographic area as being density
of population and extent of geographic area. In the larger, more sparsely populated
countries the extent of contractors' strategic domain may be classified, for
example, according to the different areas of operation such as local, regional and
national. Briscoe (1988) suggests the smallest firms restrict their operations to
local markets, but as a firm grows it is likely to expand into the wider regional
market. Also larger firms operate nationally and they are likely to have regional
divisions or trading companies to enable the firm to compete effectively in all
areas of the country and only the very largest firms tend to pursue contracts in
international markets where the degree of competition is intense. These•
characteristics can be found in specific studies of contractors. For example,
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) studied a small contractor who worked within a 20
mile radius of a county town, a medium contractor who undertook work
throughout the county and a large contractor who operated nationally. Bell (1981)
in a study of large contractors found that, apart from national projects most
undertook their work from regional offices.
There therefore appears to be a correlation between size of contractor and area of
operation with larger contractors covering a wider area of operation'. This
correlation can also be linked to the size of contract. Hillebrandt (1985) points out
the reason why firms do not go outside a certain geographic area of operation is
that the input costs in terms of fixed and variable become excessive in relation to
the total costs. However, for larger projects this phenomenon decreases, thereby
making it possible for contractors to cover larger distances.
Strategic domain differences in terms of geographic area are likely to become less
apparent in smaller, more densely populated countries. In Hong Kong for example,
It should be noted, however, that subcontractors specialised in a particular
type of work may operate over a wider geographical area than main contractors
for a given turnover (Hillebrandt 1985).
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the influence of geographic area appears to be minimal. Most contractors tend to
operate territory wide with the exception of undertaking work on some of Hong
Kong's more remote islands (Davis, Langdon and Seah International 1994). Hong
Kong's construction market, therefore, appears to exist largely according to two
main market dimensions, that of contract size and type.
3.3.1.4	 The effect of market conditions
The scope of a contractor's strategic domain is likely to be affected by both
prevailing and perceived future market conditions. For example, if contractors'
workload is low because of market conditions and/or it is perceived that there will
be a scarcity of future work, in order to maintain the same level of work, some
contractors may consider broadening the scope of their strategic domain, thereby
increasing the total number of contractors interested in competing for a particular
contract. With ever changing market conditions, Benes and Diepeveen (1985) call
for flexible planning at the corporate level and Lansley e al (1980) suggest that
flexibility is an increasingly important attribute for the success or survival of the
construction organisation. To cope with market changes Thorpe and McCaffer
(1991) recommend that a flexible attitude needs to be adopted with decisions on
market sector, public or private client, new work, engineering or building, repair
and maintenance and decisions on geographic region always being kept under
review. Sidwell (1984), however, comments that moving into new and unfamiliar
markets places greater strain on the efficiency and skills of the company.
Hillebrandt (1985) points out that it is probably easier for a contractor to move
into a market for a different end product than to move into a market of a greatly
different size of work because the managers he employs will be able to deal with
a certain size of work, be unwilling to manage something much smaller and are
untried in managing anything larger.
3.3.2	 Decision to bid
In the course of running the construction firm, it is at the business strategy level
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where contractors are given numerous opportunities to bid for work both within
and outside the strategic domain. The contract decision selection problem
essentially targets at identifying the decision which will result in the most
favourable outcome (Male 1991c). Multiple criteria that influence project selection
have been classified by Mohanty (1992) as intrinsic criteria (comprising project
identification ability, resource requirements and availabilities, the past experience
of the organisation in managing the project, management attitudes, the time
horizon of the project) and extrinsic criteria (comprising the risk return ratio, the
market environment, government policies and regulations, the socioeconomic
climate, legal and technological implications).
Mohanty (1992) also points out that:
(1) project identification needs to be carried out with the utmost care, because
unless projects are properly identified, it is impossible to utilise the resources
available to the enterprise optimally;
(2) resources are invariably a constraint in that they limit the alternatives that
can be considered ... it is essential for the organisation to choose projects so
that the resources at its command are most fruitfully employed, and the
dividends accruing from them to the organisation are maximised;
(3) past experience has a substantial influence on the selection of projects with
a conservative management style being less conductive to change;
(4) managerial attitudes strongly influence the final decision in project selection;
(5) willingness of an organisation to choose and implement a project depends on
its time characteristics with a general preference for projects that promise
returns within a short time;
(6) risk/return ratio is seen as a dominant factor, and has often been the sole
criterion for the choice of project;
(7) a decision maker seeks projects within a favourable market environment;
(8) policy considerations may affect both the profitability and the manageability
of any project.
In a questionnaire survey to contractors aimed at identifying important factors in
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contractors' contract selection decisions, Odusote and Fellows (1992) found that
client related factors ranked as the most important factor followed by type of work
and value of the contract. They identified the following important client related
factors:
(1) the ability to pay;
(2) good relationship with important regular clients;
(3) the ability to provide client satisfaction.
For type of work Odusote and Fellows (1992) identified the following factors as
important:
(1) the margin of profit projected for the contract;
(2) the contractor's workload;
(3) the contractor's chances of getting the job;
(4) the time available in which to tender;
(5) the current estimating workload of the company.
Skitmore (1982) points out that job desirability is influenced by many factors
including favoured contract types within the bidder's expertise area. It seems,
therefore, that different bidders are likely to have varying degrees of preference
towards the type, size and location of the contract. These are dictated to some
extent by their available resources and experience. Further considerations are
present and future workloads, the workload of the industry as a whole and
differences in perceptions of bidders concerning these matters.
In deciding to bid, the contractor has a two-stage decision process to make -
whether to bid or not and if the former, the various bids and alternatives he could
offer together with the likely consequences of each decision option (Skitmore
1989). As construction contracting is largely demand driven (Male 1991b), in
making the decision to bid, contractors are likely to consider both their current
workload and future available work in the construction market. Hillebrandt and
Cannon (1990) state that timing is exceedingly important and managers look at the
ability to resource the project and the impact on the forward trading. Smith (1986)
suggests that if the timing is right, it would suit the contractor to move smoothly
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from a successfully completed contract to a new one which, if existing resources
are used, could save a great deal in capital expenditure, in which case the
contractor will be more competitive. Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) state that
contractors' senior managers are making judgements that balance market
opportunities with risk.
Contractors' decisions to bid is seen by Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) to be
influenced by:
(1) the skill of the contractor to undertake the work;
(2) client payment arrangement;
(3) degree of competition;
(4) current workload in the estimating department;
(5) previous experience of undertaking work in a particular area.
Marsh (1987) suggests the factors contractors need to consider in deciding whether
to bid are:
the likelihood of the project ever happening;
the value of the opportunity;
the costs of trying to realise the opportunity;
the chances of success;
the risks to the bidder if he wins.
Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) suggest that contractors avoid contracts that are too
large for their size, outside their experience range, likely to stretch their available
resources including cash, well beyond their normal geographical area of operation,
or contracts that have unusually onerous conditions of contract. Farrow (1976)
states 'a company should not ... submit tenders for types of work unknown to it
or beyond its experience or expertise both in terms of scale or technical
complexity'.
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3.3.2.1	 Resources and changes in workload
Contractors do not have unlimited resources nor do they bid on only single
contracts. Since 'relatively few projects account for the major operations of a firm'
(Cannon and Hillebrandt 1989: 57), winning a particular contract will carry
implications for the resources available to undertake future contracts. Flanagan and
Norman (1985) state that 'in economic terms the contractor in formulating a bid
for any one contract must take into account both the direct costs and opportunity
costs of the contract. Opportunity costs reflect the contractor's currently available
resources, and the effect on resource availability of winning the particular bid
competition ie. if a contract is won scarce resources will be employed on that
contract which will not be available for use on future contracts'.
Flanagan and Norman (1985) consider the impact of workload changes in relation
to opportunity costs which, if a contractor chooses to submit a bid, appears to have
a direct bearing on a bidder's competitiveness. They state 'If the contractor has
been successful on a number of recent bids it is likely that he will be working near
capacity. The opportunity costs of any additional contract are likely to be
relatively high. In contrast, if a number of unsuccessful bids have been submitted,
workload is likely to be low and may approach zero. Indeed with extensive spare
capacity opportunity costs may approach zero. This leads to the appealing
conclusion that tender prices should be sensitive to the market condition of the
tenderer. A tenderer can be expected to submit a relatively high price when
workload is high and a relatively low price when workload is low'.
3.3.2.2	 Optimum efficiency
Economic theory of the firm suggests firms operate most efficiently when they are
operating just under capacity of their total resources. If the firm attempts to
operate beyond this point the firm may run into assorted bottlenecks making it less
competitive. Achieving optimum efficiency therefore becomes an issue of
balancing the resources in hand with the size of the proposed contract.
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3.3.2.3	 Resources
Resources may be defined as those parts of the decision environment which are
at the decision makers' disposal in accommodating the decision (Ansoff 1987).
Although information can be regarded as a resource (Betts 1990), resources usually
include personnel, property and finance (Ramsay 1989).
3.3.2.3.1 Personnel
Skitmore (1989) identifies personnel within the organisation as including
workmen, managers, administrators, executives and directors and considers that it
is the managers who have a role in the organisation to be formally responsible for
resources and, therefore, resource allocation. Pilcher (1985) presents the
management process by identifying alternative plans in terms of matching a
companies objectives with available resources. In relation to this Ansoff (1987)
has identified three different types of decisions in organisations which have
resource implications. These decisions comprise:
(1) operating decisions ie. the resource conversion process. Key decisions
include: pricing, establishing a market strategy, production scheduling and
budgetary allocations among functions. These key decisions have been
related by Male (1991) to construction companies as bidding, establishing
which project type, site planning and departmental and project budgets;
(2) administrative decisions ie. optimizing the use of resources in a company;
(3) strategic decisions ie. resource allocation while focusing on the relationship
of the company with its external environment.
Cannon and Hillebrandt (1989c) believe that the number of contracts which a
contractor can undertake is more or less fixed by its management or skills
capacity. They see management as the principal resource of construction
companies and it is the lack of this resource that places the greatest constraint on
limiting the opportunities for growth (Hillebrandt and Cannon 1990).
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3.3.2.3.2 Property
Property, termed 'physical resources' by Johnson and Scholes (1993) is interpreted
by Skitmore (1989) as consisting of such physical assets as land, buildings,
machines and materials. Skitmore (1989) points out that the extent to which
property is affected by the project decision is minimal as many effects of
undertaking construction work are of a temporary nature. However, he also states
that property becomes a more important factor when there is a need to increase the
company size by acquiring further land and buildings to accommodate expanding
permanent staff and also acquire some large items of plant which would be used
on multiple projects.
3.3.2.3.3 Finance
Monetary resources have been classified by Harris and McCaffer (1989) into short
term and long/medium term finance. They point out that short term capital is
needed to overcome immediate cash flow problems such as purchasing materials,
hiring plant, paying labour and subcontractors whereas long term capital is
required either to start the business or to carry out expansion programmes
including purchasing buildings, plant and equipment and to carry stocks of
materials. Harris and McCaffer (1989) also identify a range of sources for both
short term and long/medium term finance. Short term sources include bank
overdraft and loan facilities, private sources, taxation concessions, hire purchase,
creditors, internal transfer and factoring. Long term sources include retained
profits, shares merchant bank, finance corporations debentures and government
grant.
Seymour (1989) points out that a larger firm will have greater access to cheap
finance (via either loan market or internal funding) and better production
resources. This not only enables the contractor to bid for larger contracts but also
to diversify into technical and construction related services that will enable the
contractor further to differentiate the product. As these factors may also enhance
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the reputation of the firm, the size of the contracting company is likely to provide
a significant firm-specific advantage. Debt capacity as determined by Cannon and
Hillebrandt (1989) includes the size of firm, its potential growth, its business risk
and asset structure and state that large firms are able to borrow funds and raise
equity more easily than small firms and have greater flexibility in deciding
whether to use retained earnings. Therefore, the ease to which capital can be raised
gives a construction company greater flexibility in the size of project a contractor
can undertake. Stocks (1991) states that lack of financial resources is an inhibiting
factor in small firms.
Pilcher (1985) points out that the cost of borrowing capital or raising funds from
other sources clearly plays a major role in the determination of the cost of capital
and, because a firm frequently has more opportunities in which to invest, needs
to determine those projects which are expected to give rise to a greater return are
acceptable and vice versa. He also points out that funds may not be available to
the company or it may have chosen to restrict its capital investment over a given
period.
3.3.2.4	 Resource implications
The extent to which a bidder can operate in the construction market is, therefore,
influenced by its available resources. The ease to which it can obtain these
resources appears to be related to its size. Property related resources do not appear
to an important factor in obtaining new work, unless the company needs to expand
because of the new work (Skitmore 1989). Skitmore (1989) also states that the
physical and monetary size of a project affects the companies resources and
particularly finance and management. Financial resourcing becomes increasingly
important, particularly with larger projects (Hillebrandt 1985). However,
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) identify management (and not fixed capital) as the
most important determinant of the capacity as well as the capability of
construction firms. The managerial skills capacity gives the contractor greater
flexibility in the work it undertakes.
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Odusote and Fellows (1992) found that contractors do not attach too much
importance to availability of resources since resource constraints can be easily
overcome by obtaining extra resources from alternative sources, such as hire, lease
and subcontracting, when those at the contractor's direct disposal cannot cope with
the work-in-hand. Male (1991c) states that the high use of subcontracting gives the
contractor greater organisational flexibility and reduces the need for capital lock-
up.
Milne (1980) observes that tendering and accepting work without adequate
financial managerial or manpower resources will mean that, at times, the value of
work-in-hand will go beyond that which the principals of the firm can successfully
control. The unnecessary additional work, even if secured at high rates, may prove
to be a source of difficulty resulting in low return or possible loss.
3.3.3	 Submitting the bid
Models of the bid preparation process, (eg. Flanagan and Norman 1989 and Betts
1990), identify a large range of activities which highlights that the strategic
process is based on many decisions. Hillebrandt (1985) discusses the problems of
the firm in the pricing situation, and considers these as three stages in the decision
making process: the first is the cost of undertaking the project (prime cost); the
second is the lowest worthwhile bid price (lowest mark-up); and the third is the
problem of winning a profitable contract (balancing various prices and mark-ups
the contractor could put in against the likelihood of obtaining the job in
competition).
If the contractor opts to submit a bid, the pricing of the bid normally comprises
a two stage formulation process consisting baseline estimate and mark-up. It has
been said that long-term differences between bidders' pricing are a reflection of
their relative efficiencies - more efficient bidders tending to enter lower bids
(Flanagan and Norman 1985), thereby over a series of competitions being more
able to achieve greater level of competitiveness.
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3.3.3.1	 Baseline estimate
The baseline estimate is compiled at the operational strategy level of an
organisation, normally by a contractor's estimator. Andrews (1990) regards
estimating as an essential but subordinate part of the bidding process and that its
purpose is to assess the likely prime cost and pattern of overheads of the work to
be done; and to highlight and evaluate risks. It is commonly referred to in
literature (eg. Chartered Institute of Building 1983, Upson 1987, Cook 1991) as
the cost estimate. The baseline estimate is a reflection of actual cost to the
contractor plus some profit/risk allowance and also subcontractors' cost and profit.
Since it is not made up purely of cost the term 'baseline estimate' is preferred.
Risks and uncertainties affecting the baseline estimate have been divided by
Raftery (1994) into technical (eg. adequacy of site investigation), logistical (eg.
sourcing materials, plant and labour), construction (eg. productivity) and financial
(eg. short term escalation / inflation).
The degree to which the baseline estimate affects competitiveness can be
considered by breaking the it into two components; fixed and variable. Fixed
items, such as provisional and prime cost sums do not affect competitiveness and
are, therefore, identical for every bidder. Variable items, however, which do affect
bidders' competitiveness are those priced by bidders and are normally made up of
preliminaries and builder's work.
3.3.3.1.1 Cost efficiency
In formulating their baseline estimates different contractors are able to achieve
different levels of cost efficiency. Johnson and Scholes (1993) identify four
sources of cost efficiency. These comprise economies of scale, supply costs,
product process design and experience.
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(1) Economies of scale
Economies of scale are those features of increasing size which account for
increasing returns to scale. The causes of falling efficiency as the size of
firm increases are described as diseconomies of scale. Internal economies of
scale are those which arise from the growth of the firm independently of
what is happening to other firms and arise from an increase in the scale of
production. External economies of scale accrue due to the advantages of
lower average costs which a firm gains from the growth of industry.
Advantages arising from internal economies of scale as seen by Stanlake
(1988) comprise:
(1) technical economies such as increased specialisation in and greater
divisibility of resources for larger firms;
(2) marketing economies such as bulk buying in which larger firms can
obtain preferential terms in buying goods at lower prices and dictate
the quality and delivery much more efficiently than the smaller firm;
(3) financial economies in which a large firm is a more credit worthy
borrower providing greater security on more favourable terms. A larger
firm has access to more sources of finance including the issuing of
shares and debentures;
(4) risk borrowing economies in which large firms benefit from the law of
averages. Total demand for new work is more stable and predictable
than with small firms where variations in new work will tend to have
a relatively larger impact on total business. The larger firm is able to
reduce risk by means of a policy of diversification in which it is likely
to have a diversified market structure. A small firm with a restricted
market is much more vulnerable to changes in market conditions.
In respect of the construction industry Male (1991b) suggests that economies
of scale do exist and that they are predominantly in the areas of managerial
expertise and financial management.
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For each particular industry there will be some optimum size of firm in
which the average cost reaches a minimum. As firms grow beyond this
optimum size, efficiency declines and average costs begin to increase.
Economists have usually attributed the major cause of diseconomies to
management difficulties which can be related in terms of managerial ability.
The entrepreneurial skills required to manage large companies are, it seems,
limited in supply so that it is often difficult to match the increase in the
supply of other factors with a corresponding increase in the supply of
management ability. Management difficulties occur in the form of co-
ordination, control, communication and morale.
The prices of inputs may also have an effect. For example it may be difficult
to obtain increased supplies of labour which leads to a firm attempting to
increase the scale of production having to increase the price of its units.
Male (1991b) identifies the following reasons for diseconomies of scale in
the construction industry:
(1) low overheads critical to success, especially in selective (and open)
tendering;
(2) range of project types diverse with each project being unique;
(3) unique client demands;
(4) demand varies according to location;
(5) smaller companies favoured with lower overhead costs, however, larger
companies gain through managerial and financial efficiency but suffer
increased overhead costs;
(6) design changes in respect of project type;
(7) changes in local regulation requirements;
(8) high product differentiation through pressure of client requirements and
operation of the procurement and tendering process;
(9) presence of exit barriers with the possibility of a contractor
withdrawing once a project has been completed, especially at the lower
end of the vertical market. However, as project type increases, project
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duration increases making it more difficult to disengage from a market.
Economy of scale theory tends to suggest that cost efficiency is to some
extent linked to matching the size of contractor to the size of contract in that
larger contractors are able to achieve greater cost efficiency for larger
contracts and vice versa. It is possible that, if the proposed contract size
matches the contractor's size then, all other things being equal, the contractor
may be able to achieve greater cost efficiency and therefore be in a position
to bid more competitively.
(2) Supply costs
Johnson and Scholes (1993) see that supply costs influence an organisation's
overall cost position and are of most importance to organisations which act
as intermediaries, where the added value through their own activities is low
and so the need to identify and manage inputs is critically important to
success.
Major sources of supply in construction contracting appear to originate from
materials supplier and domestic subcontractor quotations. Davis Landon and
Seah International (1994) point out that in Hong Kong, for example, there
is a wide variety of sources and quality of materials with correspondingly
wide price variation and that the prices of imported materials are heavily
influenced by exchange rates. Walker and Rowlinson (1990) identify an
extensive list of countries from which the Hong Kong construction industry's
basic materials are obtained. The list includes China together with a host of
other Far East countries, to countries as far away as North America and
Europe.
It is also common in Hong Kong for main contractors to split the work into
subcontract packages. Ganesan (1981) concluded that the Hong Kong
construction industry is characterised by a high level of subcontracting and
large numbers of small sub-contracting firms. Main contractors tend to carry
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out very little construction work themselves, apart from possibly the concrete
structure, and prefer to employ small subcontractors and labour only gangs
(Davis, Langdon and Seah International 1994). A survey of 17 building
contracts showed that the work subcontracted was never less than 92.5% (Lai
1987). A study by Chan and Pau (1980) found a multi-level nature of
contracting/subcontracting hierarchy ranging from principal subcontractor
(responsible for the whole subcontract package) through to high, mid and
low level subcontracting. Fox (1989) states there can be many levels in the
subcontracting hierarchy and that this is largely dependent on project size,
nature of work and market demand. Walker and Rowlinson (1991) point out
that the number of subcontract packages is dependent on the policy of the
individual main contractor with some contractors limiting the number of sub-
contractors in order to improve co-ordination and integration of the
subcontract work.
The impact of supply costs on cost efficiency and therefore competitiveness
would therefore appear to be largely dependent on the bidder's ability to
select a particular combination of materials suppliers and domestic
subcontractors who as a collective group are able to offer a competitive price
which the bidder is then able to incorporate into the baseline estimate.
Product process design
'In contacting the design is normally undertaken elsewhere and the
contractor has limited ability to differentiate his product from those of other
contractors on technical merit. However, there are other ways in which the
contractor can offer the client a service such as shorter contract duration,
quality of work and good client-contractor relationships. They can offer a
variety of services which are different from the traditional contracting service
including design and build, management contracting, project management,
financial packages, equipment and furnishing the building, maintenance
contracts and management of the facilities' (Hillebrandt and Cannon 1990:
22).
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(4) Experience
Johnson and Scholes (1993) see experience as a key source of cost
advantage. They identify the work of the Boston Consulting Group which
established important relationships between the cumulative experience gained
by an organisation and its unit costs which is described as the experience
curve. The premise of the Boston Consultant Group findings is that in any
market sector of an industry price levels tend to be very similar for similar
products. Therefore what makes one firm more profitable than the next must
be the level of its costs. The experience curve suggests that an organisation
undertaking any tasks learns to do them better over time.
Cost is also seen by the Boston Consultant Group as a function of market
share. Johnson and Scholes (1993) also point out that it is the relative market
share which matters and that in highly fragmented industries (which
presumably includes the construction industry) it is quite possible to operate
profitably without dominating a market sector. The objective is to have more
experience than anyone else in that sector.
Kerin et al (1990) identify three major sources of cost reduction arising from
cumulated experience effects as:
(1) exogenous progress which refers to cost reductions that are the result
of advances in general technical knowledge, inputs from suppliers and
customers, and feedback from customers;
(2) economies of scale which relates to the potential of large businesses to
operate at a lower unit cost than their smaller counterparts;
(3) basic improvements arising from cumulated output effects is concerned
with concerted efforts by firms to lower costs by exploiting various
potential sources of cost reduction which include labour efficiency,
work specialisation and methods improvements, new production
processes, getting better performance from production equipment,
changes in resources mix, product standardisation, product redesign.
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With respect to construction contracting Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) point
out that due to the nature and previous history of construction companies,
each will have a unique level of competence in different types of work and
corporate efficiency and therefore different levels of competence result in
companies specialising or preferring certain market sectors or types of work.
They also state that detailed knowledge gained from previous works puts
them at an advantage when tendering for similar projects. In addition,
required items of specialised plant may be available in house.
Male (1991b) considers that a main contractor's experience stems from the
degree of repetitive work that is allowed through the ability to obtain
projects of a similar type. The experienced bidder appears to have a number
of advantages over the inexperienced competitor. These may be classified as
offsite and onsite. Offsite factors include proven managerial skill, problem
awareness (Flanagan and Norman 1982b), greater accuracy in cost
estimating, greater competitor awareness, greater market price awareness and
greater confidence in being able to complete the project in accordance with
the client's brief - less risk premium needed in the bid. Onsite factors include
operative skill - learning curve, plant availability, proven material suppliers
and domestic subcontractors, site management skill, team awareness.
Flanagan and Norman (1985) relate efficiency 2 with knowledge and
experience of previous contracts. A highly efficient contactor is regarded as
having extensive knowledge of previous contracts similar to the contract
being tendered for and an inefficient contractor with little previous
experience of this type of work. Flanagan and Norman (1985) state 'it is
much more likely that a contractor will formulate his bid price on the basis
of knowledge of his own relative efficiency and experience rather than on
2Based on work undertaken by Kortanek et al (1973), Flanagan and Norman
(1985) define efficiency in terms of direct plus opportunity costs to which is added
a competitive advantage fee.
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the basis of reacting in a highly strategic way to what he expects his
competitors to do'.
Experience is also related to expertise in management. Since the construction
industry is project based and therefore short term and fmite, there is a
constant juggling of site managers between projects. Hillebrandt and Cannon
(1990) found that most large contractors expressed a preference for obtaining
as large a proportion of their senior managers from within an organisation
as they:
already possess the necessary training;
are available when projects come on stream;
have a strong identification with the company's general philosophy,
name and its approach to the management of sites which become
highly desirable given the mobility and isolation from head office
together with the employment of subcontractors.
Norris (1984) points out that small firms suffer from a lack of management
expertise and found in a survey of 112 firms that over three quarters were
owned by craftsmen and of these only 15% had any managerial experience
or training prior to owning their business.
A greater level of expertise of management should give the contractor a
greater flexibility undertaking projects in terms of size and complexity.
Related to this is the name of the firm in the sense that it 'embodies past
experience, reputation and specialist expertise as a major factor of firm
specific differentiation as it enables the contractor to compete effectively
against all others in the industry by the differentiation of the firm in the bid
situation. The name of the firm reflects the expertise of the firm's workforce
and that human capital in the form of a skilled and experienced workforce
is a major firm-specific ownership advantage to the contractor that ensures
product differentiation and additionally affects the rate of tendering success'
(Seymour 1989: 47).
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Experience should enhance a contractor's confidence to meet specification
requirements of the contract in terms of quality of materials and standard of
workmanship and additionally complete the contract on time. This in turn
should enable a contractor to reduce risk allowances and therefore be in a
position to achieve greater efficiency in terms of cost.
3.3.3.2	 Mark-up
The baseline is combined with a mark-up to form the bid. The bid level is decided
at the business strategy level of an organisation. Skitmore (1988) defines the
meaning of estimating and bidding as 'estimating is the process of working out
likely costs and bidding is the process of converting an estimate into a tender
price.' Most bidders undertake this conversion process at an adjudication meeting
in which the bidder may make some final adjustments to the baseline and also a
tactical decision on the level of mark up. The adjudication of an estimate and its
conversion to a tender are the responsibility of management and that process is a
separate commercial function based on the cost estimate and its supporting reports
and documents (Chartered Institute of Building 1983). Azzaro et al (1987)
interviewed 11 main contractors and 2 subcontractors whose average turnover
varied from less than £10 million to over £1,000 million and found that the
management at an adjudication meeting comprised a director, estimator(s) and
contract staff. They also concluded that there is virtually no difference between
sizes of contractors in the adjudication procedures they adopted.
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) state that in actually determining the bid price
companies start with the estimated costs and then take into consideration the scope
of the work, the likely risk, the likely competitors, the volume of work in hand,
the influence of the project on the future workload and their ability to provide all
necessary resources for the project. Apart from profit considerations some bidders
incorporate the estimated value of other considerations such as site overheads into
their mark-up. Since the number of bidders varies from competition to
competition, bidders typically adjust their bids to reflect the competition (Carr
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1983). Flanagan and Norman (1982a) state that the optimal mark-up for a
particular contractor will also be affected by the identities of other firms on the bid
list .
De Neufville and King (1991) identify two ways for compensating for risk when
developing a bid. One is to develop a standard cost estimate not considering risk
and varying the mark-up depending on the risk. The second method is to develop
a cost estimate that adjusts productivity factors or adds contingencies based on the
risk of each item being estimated and then applying a standard mark-up to this risk
compensated estimate. De Neufville and King (1991) found that in practice most
contractors used the latter method.
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) identify the following risk areas in the price
determination process:
(1) errors by the company itself eg. estimating mistake, poor management;
(2) difficulties arising with other parties to the process;
(3) technical risks of the job eg. ground conditions;
(4) financial risks of the job;
(5) onerous contract conditions;
(6) employment of unsuitable subcontractors.
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) state these risks bear little relation to the size of
contract so that it is difficult to put a percentage on to the mark-up for them.
They also state that in general a company which has a large number of smaller
projects is likely to be subject to less risk overall than a company of similar size
with a few large contracts. Broemser (1968), however, postulates that a large job
in relation to a contractor's capacity implies an increase in risk and that therefore
the contractor would add a higher mark-up to cover this. At the small end of work
the requirement of the management would be great, but at the same time the
management could be employed on larger jobs - hence its opportunity cost on
small jobs is high. Therefore the cost size relationship would be expected to be U-
shaped.
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In respect of pricing risk in relation to complexity, Hillebrandt (1985: 158) states
'it might be expected that the cost associated with risk would increase with
complexity of the project and therefore that the difference between the cost of all
inputs and cost would rise as the complexity of the product increases'.
Barnes and Lau (1974) point out that some contractors do not draw a clear
distinction between the factors which influence the profit margin to be sought and
risk allowances and cite the example that some contractors add a bigger mark-up
to estimates if the invitation documents do not show a high level of technical
competence, implying that a high incidence of scope of changes is likely.
Different bidders apply different mark-up policies which may be variable or fixed
(Skitmore 1989). This in turn influences mark-up levels and thus competitiveness.
Authors such as Chartered Institute of Building (1983), Harrison (1981), Marsh
(1987), Upson (1987) and Shash (1993) have suggested many different factors that
are considered in setting mark up values. For example factors identified by Upson
(1987) include work in hand, bids in hand, availability of staff, profitability, ability
of architect or other supervising officer, contract conditions, site conditions,
construction methods and programme, market conditions and identity of other
bidders. Shash (1993) conducted a review of American and British literature and
identified 55 potential factors affecting contractors' bidding and mark-22p size
decisions.
Each factor is likely to modify the bidding behaviour, and therefore affect the
competitiveness, of each contractor to varying degrees. Of these Flanagan and
Norman (1982a) identify five major factors which comprise size and value of
contract and construction or managerial complexity to complete it, regional market
conditions, current and projected workload of the bidder, type of client and type
of project.
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3.3.3.2.1 Bidding strategy
Bidding strategy is concerned with setting the mark up level to a value that is
likely to provide the best pay-off. Flanagan and Norman (1982b) state that bidding
strategy in general is affected by the type of project and by the value range.
McCall (1977) states 'different kinds of jobs require different cost structures for
materials, labour, subcontracts, equipment, and other direct costs. Most mark-up
policies do not recognise various proportions of overhead, which arise from shifts
in the ratios of types of direct costs or differing types of work. Once overhead for
different types of work is established, overhead cost information can be used to
increase profits. Job size is a factor that also influences how much mark-up a
particular job should bear. Assuming a consistency in the policy of cost
classification, jobs within each type of work should allow for the overhead mark-
up percentages to vary inversely with job size. A large job requires a lower
percentage mark-up than a small job if the two jobs are identical in size. Failure
to consider this principle causes many contractors to overprice large jobs and
underprice small jobs. Overcompensating for job size leads to the reverse -
overpricing small jobs and underpricing big jobs'. Hillebrandt (1985) makes
reference to an unpublished paper by Fine (1970) who found that, in general, the
larger the contract the smaller the percentage profit. Barnes (1972) found that the
majority of companies showed their highest profit in their dominant size range.
The strategic selection of mark-up values has been considered extensively in the
operations research literature (eg. Friedman 1956, Park 1966, Gates 1967, Morin
and Clough 1969, and Whittaker 1970). As pointed out by Male (1991a) standard
bidding models presume that bidders attempt to maximise their expected profit,
however, the bidder may be attempting to fulfil other objectives including
minimising expected losses, minimising profits of competitors or obtaining a
contract, even at a loss, in order to maintain production. Raftery (1991) identifies
the range of objectives which a contractor might hold at a particular moment or
with respect to a particular contract as including the following:
(1) maximise profit on each individual project;
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(2) maximise return on the capital invested in the firm;
(3) minimise losses;
(4) maintain production and the employment of the firm's labour force;
(5) enhance the personal status of the owners/managers by undertaking prestige
projects;
(6) to gain a foothold with a new client who is the potential source of much
future work;
(7) to gain a foothold in a new geographical area;
(8) not to offend a valued client by refusing to bid even though the firm does
not have the spare capacity to take on the contract should its bid be accepted.
Fine (1975) has identified several strategies including random bidding when work
is low, selective bidding, and severely competitive bidding with claim back
options within the limits of the contract. Stone (1983) has also suggested that
some firms aim at lower standards of work than others and that there are
differences in efficiency and therefore cost.
3.3.3.2.1 Constraint and preference driven bidding strategies
Factors that affect the bidding decision are shown to fall into three main categories
namely job characteristics, economic environment and competition condition (Carr
and Sandahl 1978). Based on this rationale, factors influencing bidding behaviour,
and therefore competitiveness, may be grouped into those affecting (1) group
behaviour, (2) individual behaviour, and (3) contract characteristics (see Figure
3.1). The degree to which these factors influence competitiveness levels is
dependent on the baseline estimates and levels of mark-up emanating from the
bidders' strategies or policies.
GROUP BEHAVIOUR
	
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR
FACTORS
	
FACTORS
eg.	 eg.
(1) Market conditions (1) Bidder size
(2) Number of bidders (2) Work in hand
(3) Identity of other (3) Tenders in hand
competitors (4) Availability of staff
of a bid (ie. mark-up)
determined by
BIDDING STRATEGY
Competitiveness
preferences
CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS FACTORS
• eg.
(1) Size of project
(2) Type of project
(3) Procurement method
(4) Client type
(5) Ability of consultants
(6) Contract conditions
(7) Location and site conditions
COMPETITIVENESS LEVEL
Competitiveness
constraints
Competitiveness
constraints
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Figure 3.1:	 Competitiveness factors in terms of constraints and preferences
In determining mark up levels, different bidders have differing degrees of
selectivity between contracts. Those who are more selective concentrate on
particular contract characteristics such as type and size. Those who are less
selective place less emphasis on contract characteristics than on other factors such
as workload or resources available. Bidders who carefully select contracts for
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which they enter serious bids may be regarded as 'market' or 'preference driven'.
Those bidders who place most emphasis on workload may be regarded as
'resource' or 'constraint driven'. These categories are neither exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive and some bidders may place equally high or low emphasis on
market and resource factors.
Separating selective from constraint based strategies is a reflection of the two
complementary approaches economists have developed in studying business
behaviour. One is to try to explain business behaviour through the goals of the
firm, the argument being that decision makers select the actions and strategies that
they perceive best contribute to reaching the firm's goals. The other holds that
market conditions and competition drives or constrains a firm's behaviour
(Thompson 1989: 251). It also effectively reflects Gabor's work on pricing
behaviour (Gabor 1977) that separates 'market oriented' from 'resource-based'
pricing approaches.
The idea of preference and constraint driven bidders can also be related to Porter's
work (Porter 1985) in which he identifies three strategies;
(1) cost leadership: firm aims for the lowest cost and achieves superior
profitability from an above average price margin.
(2) differentiation: firm strives to differentiate its products such that it can raise
price more than the cost of differentiating and thereby
achieve superior profitability.
(3) focus:	 firm concentrates on a particular segment of the market and
applies either a cost leadership or differentiation strategy.
Bidders who adopt a cost leadership strategy are likely to be constrained by their
ability to cut costs in an attempt to achieve superior profitability rather than be
selective towards certain contract characteristics. However, bidders who choose
a focus strategy are likely to place a greater emphasis on preference rather than
constraint.
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The ideas of preference or constraint driven is not directly applicable to bidders
who use a differentiation strategy. These bidders are hoping to win contracts
through, for example, reputation even though their bids may not be the lowest. It
is worth noting that such a strategy is likely to be more successful in the private
sector. This is because public accountability in the public sector normally means
that contracts have to be awarded to the lowest bidder only.
3.3.3.3	 Competitiveness relationships between baseline estimate and mark-
up
In practice the mark-up is normally constrained to be above the baseline estimate,
although on occasions, such as when there is a paucity of construction work and
competition is therefore extremely keen, it may overlap the baseline estimate. The
bidder has the choice of pitching the mark-up at one of three levels:
(1) at a loss;
(2) at neither a profit nor a loss (ie. break-even);
(3) at a profit.
A smaller baseline estimate and mark-up means a lower bid which indicates
greater competitiveness. Competitive advantage can be related to a bidder's
baseline with a smaller baseline being indicative of a greater competitive
advantage over other bidders. The size of mark-up can be regarded in terms of
competitive desirability with a smaller mark-up reflecting greater competitive
desirability.
3.3.3.4	 Serious and non serious bids
Skitmore (1982) introduces the concept of bidders having either constant and
variable mark-up policies through a contract desirability continuum. For example,
a bidder who has a variable cost estimate and mark-up has alternative options.
These have been outlined by Skitmore (1989) as follows:
(1) decline to bid;
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(2) return tender documents;
(3) submit a cover price;
(4) produce a rough estimate and add mark-up;
(5) add 'non price features'(ie. qualify the bid);
(6) produce a detailed estimate and add mark-up.
Opportunities to withdraw from the competition are identified in options (1) and
(2). Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) see the decision to tender as a three stage
process with options to withdraw at the pre-selection stage (for selective
tendering), after receiving the full contract documentation but before preparing the
bid and after the estimate has been prepared and the tender is ready to submit.
Upson (1987) points out that the decision to withdraw during the competition may
be because the contractor becomes overwhelmed with enquiries and/or has had a
number of recent successes.
Although contractors do not really want the work they may still bid because:
(1) clients and consultants may have given the impression to the contractor that
failure to submit a tender will prejudice future enquiries or resent the
contractor picking and choosing contracts for which tenders are submitted
(Upson 1987);
(2) they want to make it more difficult for competitors to determine their
strategy;
(3) they want to deny their competitors the chance of entering the competition
in their place.
In instances such as these bidders are more likely to want to minimise the cost of
preparing the bid by submitting a cover price or producing a rough estimate and
adding a high mark-up. Contractors may also add 'non price features' in instances
where:
(1) they do not want to undertake a particular section of work;
(2) they want to change certain contract conditions which they perceive as being
particularly onerous;
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(3) they want to create an opportunity for post contract competition negotiation
with the client.
According to Skitmore (1989), only bids derived from producing a detailed
estimate and adding mark-up with or without non-price features can be regarded
as a genuine competitive bid. Other actions could be regarded as less or
non-competitive in which it is less likely that the contractor will succeed in
undertaking the work. Bids submitted to the client, therefore, may be classified
into serious and non serious bids.
3.3.3.5	 Baseline estimate and mark-up variability
Differences in baseline estimates between bidders is considered by Beeston (1983)
to be the major component of bid variability. The variability of baseline estimates
has been attributed to three factors: (1) inherent unpredictability (eg. site
performance, weather conditions); (2) uncertainty due to incomplete design and
future cost levels; and (3) costing errors (Skitmore 1982). As bidders have only
an imperfect knowledge of the direct costs of a building contract, they allow
different contingency values according to their perception and attitude to the risks
involved.
The extent to which the mark-up affects variability in bidding is dependent on the
variability of the mark-up itself between contracts. This is directly related to
strategic considerations and includes whether the practice of submitting serious and
non-serious bids is adopted by the contractor.
3.4 Outcome of the strategic process
3.4.1	 Bidding performance
Bidding performance is concerned with the competitive relationships between bids
submitted by bidders in competition with each other to the client. Since a bid is
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an estimate of the (unknown) market price most bidders submitting a genuine bid
are attempting to submit a bid which is low enough to win the contract but high
enough to make a profit. In bidding for contracts awarded solely on the basis of
price competition only, the bidder is normally aiming to submit the lowest bid. In
bidding systems where the contract is awarded on the basis of initial competition
and subsequent negotiation a bidder normally aims to submit a bid so as to be 'in
the frame' for the negotiation stage.
3.4.2	 Maximum competitiveness and the market price
At the time of submitting the bid the maximum level of competitiveness can be
taken to be the lowest bid. All other bids, in terms of competitiveness, are relative
to the lowest bid. In the course of technically checking the lowest bid the bid price
will become the optimum bid. The optimum bid has been defined as 'the lowest
priced evaluated bid which has undergone a process of assessment to identify and,
where necessary, to price the consequences inherent in the submission' (Memer
and Smith 1990). In this assessment process the bid price may or may not change.
The optimum bid normally forms the market price. At the time of preparing the
bid the market price exists but nobody knows its value. Each bidder is trying to
estimate that price. It is only known when the client enters into a contract with the
successful bidder. The market price has been referred to as the 'winning bid'
(McCaffer and Thorpe 1991).
Market prices can be classified as true or false. True market prices occur where
the contract is awarded to the bidder with the optimum bid (ie. the lowest priced
evaluated bid).
False market prices occur when the contract is awarded to bidders who do not
have the optimum bid. Reasons for this include:
(1) price is not the most important factor in awarding the contract (Raftery
1991);
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(2) there may be political reasons for awarding the contract to a particular
contractor (Raftery 1991);
(3) favouritism towards a certain bidder;
(4) unfair post competition negotiation with bidders under a supposedly
competition only tendering system in which a bidder who did not have the
initial optimum bid wins the contract;
(5) where the optimum bid is disregarded because of problems with the bidder
rather than the bid itself. For example, at the time of awarding the contract
the client may consider that the bidder no longer meets the required
prequalification criteria; the bidder's current workload may have become too
high; the bidder has insufficient working capital. In such cases usually the
next lowest satisfactorily assessed bid forms the market price.
3.4.2.1	 Perceptions of the market price
Bidders' perceptions of the market price may be manifested in a small range of
bids being received for certain projects. This small range may be indicative of
collusion between bidders 3 or due to an existence of a perceived 'norm'.
A genuine bid may be interpreted as a reflection of the perceived 'norm' - that is
what contractors think the market price is for a particular contract at a certain
point in time. Since a bid is essentially an estimate of the (unknown) market price,
the consistency between bidders is an indication of the degree of consensus
concerning the value of market price which, in turn, is influenced by such factors
as the predictability of the market price and experience of the bidders.
The importance of the market in the context of pricing has been stressed on
different occasions. The first person to emphasize the importance of the market on
3 The little evidence that is available suggests that collusion with other bidders
is a rare occurrence in construction contract bidding and is generally restricted to
highly specialised work where bidders virtually monopolise the field (Skitmore
1986).
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building prices is Fine (1974) who proposed the term 'socially acceptable' prices
to represent the market price. Skitmore (1987a: 13) cites references to personal
communications which include `... prices are market driven ... prices vary
according to market conditions ... knowledge of the market is pretty important ...
tender prices are considered to be determined by market forces ... builders know
the going rate'.
Ferry and Brandon (1984) state that contractors will occasionally admit they can
write down the cost of the job before they start pricing it, or that they work out
the yardstick before pricing a goverment job ... many clients assist the building
contractor by naming the (approximate) value of the contract when enquiring if the
contractor is willing to tender ... the building grapevine of sub-contractors ensures
that the anticipated contract sum is well circulated.
Contractors in their bidding may also be influenced as to what the perceived
'norm' is for a particular building type. Fine (1974) claims that bids varied
dramatically between two projects in which the tender documentation was identical
in every respect except name and also found evidence to suggest that nurses'
homes cost the community about four times as much as almost identical student
hostels.
3.4.3	 Competitiveness in the construction market
The key aspect of the environment to the individual firm is the market or markets
within which it competes (Johnson and Scholes, 1993). Competitiveness has been
defined by Baker and Hart (1989: 5) as 'an advantage which may be derived from
price, quality, speed of delivery or design which enables a company to secure
work at the expense of its rivals'. Czepiel (1992: 18) states that 'competition
determines which of the competitors gets a larger share of the market value (and
that a) superior competitor, one able to more accurately and efficiently produce
and sell those satisfactions valued by customers, will obtain a larger share while
competitors with essentially equivalent products and resources should receive
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approximately equal shares'. For any given market or market sector firms will
assume differing positions of competitiveness. Baker (1985) and Kotler (1988)
identify the range of competitive positions that a firm will occupy as dominant,
strong, favourable, tenable, weak, non-viable. Newcombe et al (1990) suggest that
the competitive position of a contractor can be determined by considering:
(1) level of demand in the construction industry;
Bid prices will tend to be lower when general market conditions are slack
and higher when the construction market is buoyant. Thorpe and McCaffer
(1991) see that bidding efficiency is required in both depressed and buoyant
markets and state that in depressed markets the success rate declines with
more tenders need to be produced to maintain the companies turnover.
However, in buoyant markets the increased bidding opportunities need
evaluating to ensure that the company makes the best use of its
opportunities.
(2) the relevant competitors;
It should be noted that not all firms in a particular market are competitors.
Based on Newcombe's work (Newcombe 1976), Fellows et al (1983)
presents a method of mapping a particular strategic group of competitors
which illustrates that the degree of diversification of services and markets
covered, and geographical decentralisation are the two key ways of grouping
construction companies.
(3) the market leadership of the firm;
The usual source of power in a market is market share but, due to the
fragmentation of the construction industry, this is rarely achieved by
construction firms (Newcombe et al 1991a).
Stocks (1991) suggests that a firm's competitive position is established by a
combination of its market share and other factors resulting from past strengths and
weaknesses, and competitive economics. He also points out that small companies
or divisions of large firms may specialise in parts of a market where they are not
in competition with larger firms.
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3.4.4	 Competitive advantage
It is through the process of making strategic decisions that contractors will be
seeking to gain competitive advantage. Male (1991c) defines competitive
advantage as where a company has superiority over its competitors. Competitive
advantage arises from a firms choice of markets to serve, its distinctive
competencies, and pattern of resource deployment that give it an edge over
competitors in chosen markets (Kerin et al 1990). 'Each business firm, in order
to survive, must determine the boundaries of its particular position so that it does
not compete on identical terms' (Ramsay 1989: 27) therefore a company needs to
identify its competitive differential advantage (Stocks 1991). Stocks (1991) points
out that those strengths may lie in areas of competence which provide a
competitive edge, such as a particular skill, resource, facility, expertise or
combination of them.
Porter (1980) states that the primary objective of the business firm is to obtain and
sustain competitive advantage over other competitors. Porter (1985) also proposes
a value chain concept for identifying and exploiting competitive advantage. This
consists of all the value activities (which comprise both primary activities such as
line operations, and support activities, such as overheads) performed by firms plus
profit margin. Porter argues that every value activity embodies technology of some
kind. In linking them together, value activities become the 'discrete building
blocks of competitive advantage'.
Porter (1990) contends there are three conditions to sustain competitive advantage
and these relate to:
(1) a hierarchy of sources which are split into low order and high order. Low
order sources can be easily copied by competitors, high order sources require
more advanced skills to achieve them.
(2) the number of distinct sources of advantage a company possesses
(3) constant improvement and upgrading of advantage.
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Betts and Ofori (1992) promote the use of Porter's techniques in construction
strategic planning as part of a survival strategy. They also identify the following
reasons why construction offers little opportunity for the application of concepts
such as these in construction strategic planning:
(1) the contracting firm has little opportunity to differentiate its product as many
project parameters and variables are determined before the firm is engaged;
(2) most contractors are small and construction is a highly fragmented industry;
(3) each project is unique and few construction firms have a structured feedback
system;
(4) much construction work is relatively simple and the technological progress
is rather slow.
3.4.5	 Variability in competitiveness between bidders
Bidders entering consistently low value bids over a series of competitions are
considered to be more competitive than those entering consistently high value bids.
Bidders may also be inconsistently competitive. Distinct from mistake,
competitiveness variability has been ascribed to many factors including differences
in cost estimates (Beeston 1983), mark-up policies (Fine 1975, Stone 1983),
serious and non-serious bids (Sldtmore 1989), the effect of subcontracting
(Flanagan and Norman 1985) and the influence of perceived 'norms'.
There appears to be a relationship between bidding competitiveness and variability
since a bidder who is consistently competitive is by definition less variable in
bidding. It follows that less competitive bidders are likely to be more variable in
bidding otherwise they would fail to get any work. One explanation for differences
in bidding variability between bidders is for reasons just described. Another is that
through the strategic decision making process some bidders have preferred contract
types and sizes within the construction market for which they bid more
competitively.
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3.4.6	 The effect of contract type and size
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the bidding performance of a small,
medium and large bidder. They found that when bidding (1) the small bidder
considered both contract type and size, (2) the large bidder was more successful
in bidding for large contracts and (3) the medium bidder's competitiveness was not
related to either contract type or size. Flanagan and Norman's study suggests that,
in terms of competitiveness, competing contractors are influenced, to varying
degrees, by contract type and contract size. This degree of influence is reflected
in various strategic decisions made at the different levels and stages of the
strategic process.
At the corporate level contractors define a strategic domain which sets out the
market dimensions within which contractors plan to operate. This includes
deciding which types and sizes of contract to compete for within the different
market sectors of the construction market. It is at the business strategy level where
corporate strategy is implemented. From time to time, various bidding
opportunities for construction work arise from both inside and outside of the
contractor's strategic domain. Contractors need to make decisions on whether to
bid for the work and, if opting to bid, deciding on the appropriate bid level. If the
type and/or size of contract falls outside the contractor's strategic domain it seems
more likely that the contractor will either choose not to submit a bid, or submit
what is considered to be an uncompetitive bid. If, however, the contract falls
within the contractor's strategic domain it is more likely that the contractor will
seriously consider competing for the work.
It can be seen that decisions on whether to bid and bid level are influenced by a
multitude of factors. These have been classified into those affecting (1) group
behaviour (2) individual behaviour and (3) contract characteristics. Those
contractors who are more selective concentrate on particular contract
characteristics such as contract type and size. Contractors who display these
characteristics have been termed 'market' or 'preference driven'. Those who are
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less selective place less emphasis on the contract characteristics than on other
factors such as workload or resources available. These have been termed 'resource'
or 'constraint driven'. These categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually
exclusive and some bidders may place equally high or low emphasis on market
and resource factors.
It seems, therefore, that the effect of contract size and type on competitiveness in
construction contract bidding is influenced, to an extent, by the degree of
preference a contractor places on these variables. The competitiveness effect of
contract type and contract size on the bidding performance of preference driven
contractors is likely to be greater than that for constraint driven contractors.
Preference driven contractors are more likely to submit competitive bids
consistently for preferred types and sizes of contract and in doing so be less
variable in bidding between contracts than constraint driven contractors.
Flanagan and Norman's study also suggests that, in terms of competitiveness, there
is a relationship between bidder size and contract size. It seems that most
contractors gear themselves up to undertake a portfolio of contracts that fall within
a preferred contract size range. This contract size range appears to be related to
the size of the contractor. Smaller contractors, due to the influence of resource
constraints, are likely to have a smaller preferred contract size range than larger
contractors. This range would appear to be confined to the smaller end of the
contract size continuum. Larger contractors, however, have the flexibility to
undertake a wider range of contracts. It seems, however, that most larger
contractors prefer to work within a range of minimum and maximum contract
values.
Economic scale theory suggests that larger size contractors undertake larger
contracts with increased rates of efficiency. Economic value will therefore depend,
to some extent, on matching the size of contractor to the size of contract. Thus,
if the proposed contract size is within a contractor's preferred size range then it
is likely that the contractor will construct the work more efficiently and bid more
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competitively. Linked to this is Male's notion that the construction market is a
contract based-vertical market defined by contract size and complexity (Male
1991b). As one moves up the contract size continuum the total number of potential
competitors becomes fewer and fewer. Since the upper end of the contract size
continuum is likely to consist solely of larger bidders, larger bidders will almost
certainly become the lowest bidder for the larger contracts. Although smaller
contracts appear, prima facie, to favour the smaller bidder in becoming the lowest
bidder, either larger or smaller bidders have the potential of becoming the lowest
bidder.
It seems that contract type and size may serve respectively as proxies to
experience and resources. Experience appears to be a key factor that permeates
every stage of the strategic process. Managerial skills capacity gives the contractor
greater flexibility in the work it undertakes and is regarded by Hillebrandt and
Cannon (1990) as the most important determinant of the capacity and capability
of construction firms. Differing sizes of contracts require differing amounts of
resources. Economic efficiency appears, to some extent, to be dependent on
linking the right size of contractor with the size of contract.
Construction contract bidding is primarily concerned with the competitiveness
relationships between bidders and the contracts they are bidding for which can
vary considerably, particularly in terms of contract type and size, from one
contract to the next. As part of an effective planning and bidding strategy
contractors need to have sufficiently similar experience to execute the contract
efficiently and the ability to acquire the necessary resources efficiently to match
the requirements of a contract so as to maximise the chance of achieving the
expected profit margin.
3.5 Summary
Strategic decisions define the boundary between the firm and the external
environment. Contract bidding, like all other forms of pricing, is essentially about
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contractors making strategic decisions in respect of which contracts to bid for and
the bid levels necessary to secure them. Strategic decision making in construction
contracting is seen to occur at the corporate, business and strategy levels within
an organisation.
Most contractors recognise that they cannot undertake work in all sectors of the
market and as part of their corporate strategy define a strategic domain which sets
the parameters within which senior management chooses to operate. In other
words, the strategic domain establishes the market dimensions within which
contractors plan to operate. This includes making decisions on which contract type
and size of contracts to compete for and the extent of the geographical area within
which to undertake the construction work.
A contractor's strategic domain can be defined according to the number of contract
types and may comprise undertaking all or specialising in certain contract types
within one or more sectors of the construction market. The strategic domain may
also include only undertaking new build work or alteration work or both. A
contractor's strategic domain can also be defined according to the range of
contract size it wishes to undertake. Strategic domain differences in terms of
geographic area are likely to become less apparent in smaller, more densely
populated countries. In Hong Kong, for example, the influence of geographic area
appears to be minimal since most contractors tend to operate territory wide with
the exception of undertaking work on some of Hong Kong's more remote islands.
Hong Kong's construction market, therefore, appears to exist largely according to
two main market dimensions, that of contract size and type.
In the course of running the construction firm, it is at the business strategy level
where contractors are given numerous opportunities to bid for work both within
and outside of the strategic domain. Job desirability is influenced by many factors
including favoured contract types within the bidder's expertise area.
In deciding to bid the contractor has a two-stage decision process to make -
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whether to bid or not and the bid level to secure the contract. In deciding whether
to bid contractors are likely to consider both their current workload and future
available work in the construction market. Economic theory of the firm suggests
firms operate most efficiently when they are operating just under capacity of their
total resources. If the firm attempts to operate beyond this point the firm may run
into assorted bottlenecks making it less competitive. Achieving optimum efficiency
therefore becomes an issue of balancing the resources in hand with the size of the
proposed contract. Management, rather than fixed capital, has been identified as
the most important determinant of the capacity as well as the capability of
construction firms. The managerial skills capacity gives the contractor greater
flexibility in the work it undertakes. Contractors do not attach too much
importance to availability of resources since resource constraints can be easily
overcome by obtaining extra resources from alternative sources, such as hire, lease
and subcontracting, when those at the contractor's direct disposal cannot cope with
the work-in-hand.
If the contractor opts to submit a bid, the pricing of the bid normally comprises
a two stage formulation process comprising baseline estimate and mark-up. Long-
term differences between bidder's pricing are a reflection of their relative
efficiencies - more efficient bidders tending to enter lower bids, thereby over a
series of competitions being more able to achieve higher levels of competitiveness.
Four sources of cost efficiency have been identified as comprising economies of
scale, supply costs, product process design and experience.
The baseline estimate is combined with a mark-up to form the bid. Different
bidders apply different mark-up policies which may be variable or fixed which in
turn influence mark-up levels and thus competitiveness. Bidding strategy is
concerned with setting the mark up level to a value that is likely to provide the
best pay-off. Standard bidding models presume that bidders attempt to maximise
their expected profit. However, the bidder may be attempting to fulfil other
objectives including minimising expected losses, minimising profits of competitors
or obtaining a contract, even at a loss, in order to maintain production.
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As part of their bidding strategy, different bidders will have different degrees of
preference towards the individual contract characteristics, such as size, type and
location of proposed contracts. In determining mark up levels, different bidders
have differing degrees of selectivity between contracts. Those who are more
selective concentrate on particular contract characteristics such as type and size.
Those who are less selective place less emphasis on contract characteristics than
on other factors such as workload or resources available. Bidders who carefully
select contracts for which they enter serious bids may be regarded as 'market' or
'preference driven'. Those bidders who place most emphasis on workload may be
regarded as 'resource' or 'constraint driven'. These categories are neither
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive and some bidders may place equally high or
low emphasis on market and resource factors.
Bidding performance is concerned with the competitive relationships between bids
submitted by bidders to the client. Since a bid is an estimate of the (unknown)
market price most bidders submitting a genuine bid are attempting to submit a bid
which is low enough to win the contract but high enough to make a profit. At the
time of submitting the bid the maximum level of competitiveness can be taken to
be the lowest bid. All other bids, in terms of competitiveness, are relative to the
lowest bid. In the course of technically checking the lowest bid the bid price will
become the optimum bid.
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the bidding performance of a small,
medium and large bidder. They found that when bidding (1) the small bidder
considered both contract type and size, (2) the large bidder was more successful
in bidding for large contracts and (3) the medium bidder's competitiveness was not
related to either contract type or size.
Flanagan and Norman's study suggests that, in terms of competitiveness,
competing contractors are influenced, to varying degrees, by contract type and
contract size. It seems that the effect of contract size and type on competitiveness
in construction contract bidding is influenced, to an extent, by the degree of
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preference a contractor places on contract type and contract size. The
competitiveness effect of contract type and contract size on the bidding
performance of preference driven contractors is likely to be greater than that for
constraint driven contractors. Preference driven contractors are more likely to
submit competitive bids consistently for preferred types and sizes of contract and
in doing so be less variable in bidding between contracts than constraint driven
contractors.
Flanagan and Norman's study also suggests that, in terms of competitiveness, there
is a relationship between bidder size and contract size. It seems that most
contractors gear themselves up to undertake a portfolio of contracts that fall within
a preferred contract size range. This contract size range appears to be related to
the size of the contractor. Smaller contractors, due to the influence of resource
constraints, are likely to have a smaller preferred contract size range than larger
contractors. This range would appear to be confined to the smaller end of the
contract size continuum. Larger contractors, however, have the flexibility to
undertake a wider range of contracts. It seems, however, that most larger
contractors prefer to work within a range of minimum and maximum contract
values.
In describing the strategic process this chapter has highlighted the effect of
contract type and contract size on competitiveness in bidding. Contractor size also
appears to be an important related variable. Modelling competitiveness in bidding
is now discussed in Chapter 4 as a prelude to developing a suitable methodology
for measuring the effect of contract type and size on competitiveness in bidding.
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CHAPTER 4
Modelling bidding competitiveness
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4 MODELLING BIDDING COMPETITIVENESS
4.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the issues surrounding the effect of contract type and
size on competitiveness in contract bidding. This chapter, on modelling
competitiveness in bidding, is in three sections. The first section reviews the
bidding literature and highlights some of the complexities and difficulties in
modelling bids. The second section describes the different approaches to modelling
competitiveness in bidding, while the third section identifies and compares various
competitiveness measures.
4.2 Bidding models
Allocating resources by means of some auction process is widespread and ranges
from open auctions of works of art or property, to sealed bid auctions of oil
exploration rights or construction contracts. Specific auction methods include
sealed bid, progressive and Dutch (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1980).
Flanagan and Norman (1985) point out that it is only in recent years that a
coherent body of theory has been developed in which the pricing and efficiency
implications of bidding as a method of resource allocation have been examined.
Harris and McCaffer (1989), however, comment that although the subject of
competitive bidding has attracted investigations and research by both contracting
companies themselves and a variety of academics, disappointingly the results of
these investigations and efforts to remove some of the uncertainty are far from
conclusive. Skitmore (1991b) identifies part of the problem lies with an
understandable reluctance for commercial companies to publish their findings.
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4.2.1	 Bidding literature reviews
Reviews of bidding literature include those by;
(1) Stark and Rothkopf (1978) who produced a comprehensive bibliography
relating to bidding;
(2) Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) who provides a useful system for classifying a
wide variety of approaches to different types of bidding situations;
(3) King and Mercer (1988) who classify bidding approaches according to basic
probability, game theoretic, probabilistic strategy and non-price;
(4) Skitmore (1988) who discusses the development of bidding models and
classifies current work into contract opportunities, decision outcomes and
competitors' bidding patterns;
(5) Skitmore (1989) who builds up a conceptual model of the contract
selection/bidding environment by breaking down the decision making
problem into outcome environment, time related and non-deterministic
aspects and then defmes various options available to the decision maker. He
also describes the various statistical approaches that have been made to
aspects of the problem.
4.2.2	 Use and usefulness of bid modelling in practice
A model is an approximation of the real situation and the value of any model
depends on how good an approximation it is (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1980). There
are a variety of techniques that can be used in modelling. These include game
theory (analysis of reactionary competitors), decision theory (analysing situations
of uncertain outcomes), operations research (optimising outcomes of simultaneous
decisions), multi-criteria decision making (resolving conflicting objectives),
simulation, behavioural science (predicting human behaviour), statistical techniques
and economic analysis.
Models may be classified as longitudinal or cross-sectional. Longitudinal or time
series uses observations that have been recorded over time in a particular situation.
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Cross-sectional analysis uses different observations from different firms in the
same business environment at the same point or period of time. Hence, cross-
section analysis largely eliminates the problem of uncontrollable variables that
change over time, but it introduces other factors that may differ between and
among firms at a particular point in time (Douglas 1987).
Skitmore (1988) states that the task of fundamental research in bidding is to
produce a general model expressed in terms of well established laws, axioms or
propositions upon which future systems and techniques may be developed and
concludes that research in this area is progressing on three levels - systems,
techniques and models. Skitmore (1989) also points out that much of the literature
that deals with construction pricing concentrates on the formulation of optimal
pricing for contracts. For example, Friedman (1956) and subsequent researchers,
such as Park (1966), Gates (1967), Morin and Clough (1969) and Whittaker (1970)
treat the bid as an 'optimisation' problem. Optimisation is defined as 'the process
by which the best solution or result may be obtained'(Kempner 1980: 287). As
such, these models fall within the realms of operational research which is
concerned with the application of quantitative methods in decision making. In
more specific terms operational research is an approach that emphasizes optimal
managerial decision making, adopting the scientific method as a framework for
problem solving with emphasis on objective rather than subjective judgment and
with certain assumptions about organisations and participant behavioui \)'6ng made
by the operations researchers or management scientists (Kast and Rosenzweig
1985).
There appears to be a gap between theory and reality, and bidding models do not
seem to be much used or considered outside the research circles. For, example
Wong (1978), Stark (1976) and Lansley (1983) have found that contractors do not
favour the use of bidding models. Alunad and Minkarah (1988) found that less
than 11% of the top American contractors use some form of mathematical
modelling for determining proper mark-up size. Gates (1983) abandoned all
mathematical strategic models in favour of a non-mathematical approach, based
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on the Delphi technique, entitled Expert Subjective Pragmatic Estimate (ESPE).
Cusack (1981) suggests that although most contractors possess, or have access to,
extensive information in one form or another, most of them fail to make use of
this information to support or improve their decision processes. Skitmore (1986)
found there is little evidence of using feedback as a basis for decision making
being used in practice and, in citing previous work, identifies the reasons for lack
of use as including communication problems, lack of managerial skills, imperfect
knowledge about future markets, complexities of the construction process,
environment uncertainties and limited amount of time available to the decision
maker with which to make the decision. A conclusion reached by Skitmore (1989)
in later work is that the construction industry reveals no existence of any
substantive approach in producing a model that reflects the truly pivotal factors in
the environment being modelled, especially with regard to the types and amounts
of available data and the ability to process this information rapidly enough to be
useful to the decision maker.
Some researchers (eg. Spooner 1971, Barnes 1980) claim that all bidding models
that are based on statistical theory are not useful. Others advocate that the use of
bidding models will give the contractor a competitive advantage when bidding
against competitors (eg. Morin and Clough 1969, Wade and Harris 1976, Gates
1976, Carr and Sandahl 1978, Benjamin 1979). Others suggest that the
combination of managerial judgement with statistical bidding models is the best
approach (eg. Furest 1976, De Neufville et al 1977, Grinyer and Whittaker 1973,
Shaffer and Micheau, 1971).
Male (1991a) observes that although much effort is now spent in the development
of mathematical procedures and models towards defining the most effective
bidding strategy for contractor performance, bidding models may not, however,
reflect the true bidding situation, which is perhaps why contractors may not
display much interest in such procedures.
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Shash (1993) identifies the failure of mathematical models to be attributable to
five factors namely:
(1) models oversimplify the real world situation;
(2) models are incomplete;
(3) distraction of researchers' attention due to the Friedman \ Gates' model
controversy;
(4) models only consider number of bidders as the prevailing factor;
(5) models require excessive use of data.
Male (1991a) identifies the weaknesses of bidding models as follows:
(1) standard models purport to show how to make choices in a situation of risk
without accounting for both organisation and environment;
(2) standard models presume that bidders try to maximise their expected profit,
however, the contractor may be attempting to fulfil other objectives;
(3) different objectives require different strategies, but this diversity is not
closely reflected in standard models;
(4) standard models fail to consider the competitive situation of the firm and to
identify those factors which have an influencing impact on profit;
(5) standard models fail to consider constraints faced by the firm such as
geographic location, class of construction, equipment parameters, government
laws and regulations, building requirements and financial constraints.
Raftery (1991) identifies the limitations of bidding models as including the
following:
(1) the possibility of errors in bid models is almost certain;
(2) bid models are not dynamic;
(3) bid models are based on limited information and time frame;
(4) market conditions and competitors' behaviour constantly changing;
(5) bid models are based on the assumption that competition is purely on price
with no collusion among the bidders, no cartel and there is no revealing of
prices.
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4.2.3	 Difficulties in modelling bids
King and Mercer (1980) state that it is certainly difficult to build and exploit
models of bidding situations that are realistic, relevant and useful to those making
the key decisions and conclude that there is surprisingly little progress towards a
generally agreed approach which is practical and relevant in a range of situations.
It appears that the failure, weaknesses and limitations of bid models stem from the
complexities and uncertainties inherent in the bid process itself. Each bidding
event is unique. It is a non-deterministic process in which bidding events need to
be considered in terms of their probability of occurrence (Skitmore 1989) and in
which the lowest bid may be hypothesized to fall within a continuum of potential
lowest bids (Skitmore 1981). Benjamin (1972) states that the events taking place
are not truly random in the classical sense as the data are not generated from
repeated measures of the same experiment. Flanagan and Norman (1982b) observe
that when contractors are constantly in competition with one another the pattern
cannot be regarded as random. The strength of this observation is largely
dependent on competing bidders consistently conforming to some adopted bidding
strategy.
From the contractors' viewpoint Harris and McCaffer (1989) akin competitive
bidding to roulette: sometimes they win when they think the price is high;
sometimes they lose when their price is low. Ferry and Brandon (1983) state that
contractors take their place in the bidding order by chance and that in the long
term they appear to win contracts in direct proportion to the number of contracts
they are bidding against. The random nature of the bidding process 'ensures that
contracting companies will be unable to plan their companies' activities with much
certainty' (Harris and McCaffer 1989). However, bidders seek to have the best set
of contracts despite the limits to the number of contracts that can be handled at
any one time and that construction companies have multiple and conflicting
objectives such as meeting target profits, turnover, entering new markets, courting
new clients etc. (Skitmore 1988).
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Ahmad and Minkarah (1988) and Green (1989) consider that there are many
factors, other than pure economic, that are considered in bidding strategy
decisions. Barnes and Lau (1974) investigated the bidding policies of 16 plant
contractors and found that none of the contractors used a policy for determining
profit margins which excluded judgment or feel and that each considered the
combination of circumstances was so different from one bid to another that any
policy which eliminated flexibility would be harmful.
Couzens (1991) suggests that bidding decisions are largely heuristic in nature since
they are generally made based on experience, judgement and perception, therefore,
any model or system should focus on supporting, rather than replacing the
judgments and perceptions of the decision makers. Raftery (1991) takes this a
stage further by commenting that the problems of bidders will not be solved until
there is a comprehensive decision support model which can capture the full
complexity of the situation.
4.2.4	 Reliability of bidding models
One conclusion reached by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) is that bidding models
have seldom been analysed for their robustness with the question of how much
small changes in the model affect the analysis and resulting conclusions. King and
Mercer (1988) also stress in their review the need for developing models that are
reliable to assist those pricing contracts. This shortcoming has also been
recognized by Skitmore (1990) who points out that the biggest emphasis in
estimating research (of which bidding forms a part) today is in the reliability of
the techniques used. He also comments that statistical probability offers the
greatest potential for modelling reliability.
4.3 Modelling competitiveness in bidding
Much of bidding research is concerned with modelling bidding behaviour by
considering competitiveness relationships. Baker and Hart (1989) identify that
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competitiveness can be modelled at national, industry, company and product level
and can be measured using profit ratios, sales measures, market share and export
growth. Over recent years a multitude of techniques for modelling competitive
behaviour have been proposed. Pearce and Robinson (1991) have developed a
reference guide describing various general competitiveness analysis techniques
available to managers.
Competitiveness in bidding can be modelled by analysing (1) entire bid
distributions, (2) competitiveness within bids and (3) competitiveness between
bids.
4.3.1	 Modelling entire bid distributions
Studies on the distribution of bids by various researchers have produced
conflicting results. In a survey undertaken by Skitmore (1988) it was found that
out of 29 studies the distributions produced were: normal (9), lognormal (7),
uniform (4), gamma (3), positively skewed (3) and other types (3). Beeston (1983)
suggests that a typical distribution of competitive tenders for the same contract is
almost symmetrical. 'There is a very slight skewness to the right (ie. negatively
skewed) but this is so small that it can for practical purposes be ignored' (Beeston
1983: 110). He also acknowledges that the degree to which the distribution is
positively skewed will give an indication of the bidders' competitiveness, with a
greater positive skew indicating greater competitiveness. Skitmore (1987b) concurs
with this latter point. De Neufville et al (1977) and Skitmore (1982) found a
competitive relationship between the number of bids and market conditions but
have proposed no model.
4.3.2	 Modelling competitiveness within bids
With respect to modelling competitiveness within bids, Skitmore (1981), Fuerst
(1977) and Rothkopt (1980) suggest that a model containing both a variable cost
estimate and mark-up is a more realistic model than models in which either both
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or one of the variables is fixed. Much of the literature (starting with Friedman,
1956) is devoted to developing suitable bidding strategy models which focus on
setting the mark up level to a value that is likely to provide the best pay-off.
The majority of bidding strategy models are based on statistical theory and a pure
theoretical approach using historical data to assess the probability of winning the
job with a given amount assuming that competitors will follow the same bidding
patterns in the future that they have followed in the past. They differ from one
another either in the way of calculating the profit or in the mathematical form of
determining the probability of beating a specific competitor and how to combine
these probabilities to determine the probability of winning. The models have
developed from single variable (eg. Friedman 1956) to multivariate (eg. Broesmer
1968).
4.3.3	 Modelling competitiveness between bids
Modelling competitiveness between bids is concerned with analysing the bidding
performance of bidders by considering the relationship between bids submitted by
bidders in competition with each other. Benjamin (1969) found that the identities
of contractors vary with the type and size of project, location and client. When
modelling competitiveness longitudinally according to type, McCaffer (1976)
found that there are occasions when contractors who in the long term have equal
shares of high and low bids have phases of varying length when they display a run
of low or high bids.
Thorpe and McCaffer (1991) see no generally accepted way of quantifying the
effect of market conditions on tender price levels. McCaffer et al (1973)
demonstrated that changes in tender prices in response to market conditions could
be modelled using regression techniques.
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4.4 Measuring competitiveness in bidding
Competitiveness in construction contract bidding can be measured using discrete
or continuous scales. Discrete scales, such as nominal or ordinal, are regarded as
lower order scales in that only the frequency or percentage in predefined
competitiveness categories can be determined; with ordinal scales only the
competitiveness order is known. However, with continuous scales both the order
and distance between competitiveness values are known. Of the two continuous
scales the ratio scale has an advantage over the interval scale that the competitive
values are absolute rather than relative. By beginning at absolute zero, ratio scales
have absolute rather than relative quantities therefore comparisons of absolute
magnitude can be made (eg. a bidder with a competitiveness value of one is twice
as competitive as a bidder with a competitiveness value of two).
This thesis focuses on comparing the bidding performance of bidders. For most
practical purposes it is sufficient to consider the bids in relation to a baseline.
Baselines include the designer's estimate, a bidder's baseline estimate, or the
mean, median or lowest of the bids entered for a contract.
Apart from being based on an interval scale rather than a ratio scale, using the
designer's estimate as a competitiveness baseline has the disadvantage that the
information sources on which the estimate is based is likely to be historical rather
than current, making it not so responsive to changes in market conditions (De
Neufville et al 1975). Also the technique used in determining the bid is likely to
be different from that of the bidders.
Using baseline estimates of different bidders as a competitive baseline has the
disadvantage that the contents of various bidders' baseline estimates and mark-ups
is likely to be based on different sets of inclusions and exclusions. Also since the
breakdown of bids is regarded by most bidders as confidential, it is quite likely
that most bidders in the sample will be reluctant to co-operate in comparative
studies of this nature. Using the mean or median bid entered for a contact suffers
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from the disadvantage that it does not provide a maximum (or minimum) level of
competitiveness and as such can only be measured using an interval scale.
The lowest bid represents the maximum level of competitiveness and can,
therefore, be measured on a ratio scale. All competitiveness values will be absolute
and also easier to understand since all values will be positive (or negative). There
are good theoretical reasons for assuming that the expected value of the winning
bid is equal to the true value of the contract (eg. Milgrom 1981, Wilson 1979).
Beeston (1983) is of the opinion that it should be practicable to improve bidding
performance by studying one's own results in relation to the winning bid which
can be assumed to be the lowest bid.
4.4.1	 Competitiveness measures used by Flanagan and Norman (1982b)
Since this research sets out to develop a study undertaken by Flanagan and
Norman (1982b), each of the competitiveness measures used in Flanagan and
Norman's study is now considered in detail. Flanagan and Norman (1982b)
measured the competitiveness of each bidder in terms of success rates ie.
S	 =	 100 (s/n)	 (4.1)
where
S	 = success rate
s	 = number of successes
n	 = number of bidding attempts
A higher percentage denotes a higher success rate and vice versa.
Competitors' bids were also expressed by Flanagan and Norman as a percentage
relative to the bidder's bid ie.
C	 =	 100(c-x/x)	 (4.2)
where
107
C	 = measure of competitiveness
c	 = competitor's bid
x	 = bid value entered by the bidder
Greater negative values indicate greater competitiveness and vice versa, except in
those cases where the bidder's bid is the lowest bid. In these instances no negative
values are generated and therefore zero becomes the greatest competitiveness
value.
This measure is used to analyse the bidding performance of each bidder in
competitions in which the bidder had made a bidding attempt. Flanagan and
Norman (1982b) presented this measure diagrammatically in their paper (see
Figure 4.1). Each contract where the bidder had made a bidding attempt is
consecutively numbered and shown separately on the x axis. Each dot on the graph
represents a bid by a competitor. The bidder's bid line is drawn at zero percent.
Negative percentages are classed as low bids and positive percentages are classed
as high bids.
A measure of bid variability within the bidding distribution is determined by using
the coefficient of variation resulting from the aggregate mean percentage bidding
range for each of bidder. This is expressed as:
R	 =	 100(h-1/1)	 (4.3)
where
R = mean percentage bidding range
h	 = high bid
1	 = low bid
In the next chapter, which describes the methodology used in developing Flanagan
and Norman's study, these measures are compared with an alternative preferred
measure of competitiveness.
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Figure 4.1:	 Bidding performance of contractors (Flanagan and Norman 1982b)
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4.5 Summary
Although the subject of competitive bidding has attracted investigation and
research by both contracting companies themselves and a variety of academics,
disappointingly the results of these investigations and efforts to remove some of
the uncertainty are far from conclusive. There appears to be a gap between theory
and reality and bidding models do not seem to be much used or considered outside
research circles. It is certainly difficult to build and exploit models of bidding
situations that are realistic, relevant and useful to those making the key decisions
and conclude that there is surprisingly little progress towards a generally agreed
approach which is practical and relevant in a range of situations. It appears that
the failure, weaknesses and limitations of bid models stem from the complexities
and uncertainties inherent in the bid process itself. Part of the problem lies in the
fact that many factors, other than pure economic, are considered in bidding
strategy decisions.
Much of bidding research is concerned with modelling bidding behaviour by
considering competitiveness relationships. Competitiveness in bidding can be
modelled by analysing (1) entire bid distributions, (2) competitiveness within bids
and (3) competitiveness between bids.
Modelling competitiveness between bids is concerned with analysing the bidding
performance of bidders by considering the relationship between bids submitted by
bidders in competition with each other. This thesis focuses on comparing the
bidding performance of bidders. For most practical purposes it is sufficient to
consider bids in relation to a baseline. Baselines include the designer's estimate,
a bidder's baseline estimate, or the mean, median or lowest of the bids entered for
a contract. Of these measures the lowest bid appears to be the best measure of
competitiveness. The lowest bid represents the maximum level of competitiveness
and can, therefore, be measured on a ratio scale. All competitiveness values will
be absolute and also easier to understand since all values will be positive (or
negative). There are good theoretical reasons for assuming that the expected value
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of the winning bid is equal to the true value of the contract (eg. Milgrom 1981,
Wilson 1979). It should be practicable to improve bidding performance by
studying one's own results in relation to the winning bid which can be assumed
to be the lowest bid.
Having reviewed previous empirical studies and various approaches to modelling
competitiveness in bidding, the next chapter describes the methodology that was
used in this work to model competitiveness.
PART 2
EMPIRICAL WORK
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CHAPTER 5
Methodology
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5 METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introduction
This research is based on a study undertaken by Flanagan and Norman (1982b)
which examines the effect of contract type, contract size and bidder size on
contractors' bidding performance. This particular study was chosen as the starting
point for the research over other studies because it is considered to be the closest
study that examines the principal variables of interest. The overall approach to the
methodology is to replicate and develop this study. Replicating the study permits
direct comparisons to be made and provides a platform on which to develop the
work.
The methodology used to fulfil the aims and specific objectives of this research
is set out in three sections. The first section compares the measures of
competitiveness and variability in bidding used by Flanagan and Norman (1982b)
with an alternative preferred measure which is used in developing Flanagan and
Norman's study. The second section describes the method taken to classify the
bidding behaviour according to competitiveness and variability. The data and
regression methodology used to model the effect of contract type, contract size and
bidder size on competitiveness are described in the third section.
5.2 Measuring competitiveness and variability in bidding
The competitiveness measures used by Flanagan and Norman (1982b), described
in the previous chapter, are used for the purposes of replicating Flanagan and
Norman's study using Hong Kong data. In developing Flanagan and Norman's
study a preferred alternative competitiveness measure is offered. Competitiveness
(C), is measured by the ratio of lowest bid to bidder's bid ie.
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=	 )(mix	 (5.1)
where
C	 = measure of competitiveness
= bid value entered by an individual bidder
x(,) = value of lowest bid entered for the contract
Maximum and minimum competitiveness are respectively constrained between one
and zero'.
Each bidder's mean competitiveness (C') is determined from a series of past
competitions. Bidding variability is measured using the standard deviation (C").
Smaller standard deviations indicate smaller variability in bidding (and, therefore,
greater consistency) and vice versa.
This measure of competitiveness has an advantage over Flanagan and Norman's
measure shown in Equation 4.1 in that it is a continuous variable on a ratio scale.
Both the order and distance between competitiveness values is known. Success,
however, is a discrete variable and success rates are based on variables produced
from a nominal scale. Therefore the distance between values, in terms of
competitiveness, is not known.
This measure of competitiveness also has a number of advantages over Flanagan
and Norman's measure as shown in Equation 4.2. First, it is easier to calculate.
Second, all the values are positive with higher ratio values indicating greater
competitiveness and vice versa. Third, the competitiveness baseline is set at the
maximum level of competitiveness, a level common to all bidders. Fourth, as the
scale is logarithmic (ie. the log of this variable will be the same as log x (1) - log
x), competitive differences will become more pronounced nearer unity, the end of
'It should be noted that zero is a theoretical minimum. In reality no bidder
would be able to obtain this value as the bidder's bid would have to be
approaching infinity.
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the scale which is likely to be of greatest interest (ie. maximum competitiveness) 2.
The logarithmic scale will also dampen any possible non-constant variance (non-
constant variance, or heteroscedasticity as it is otherwise known, constitutes a
regression assumption violation). Fifth, it is more adaptable to transformation; log
transformations can be used since there will be no zero values and arcsin
transformation can be used since the scale is between one and zero. Sixth, both
competitiveness and variability in bidding can be derived from the same measure,
thus eliminating the need to use a separate measure of bid variability, shown in
Equation 4.3.
5.2.1	 Classifying bidders according to competitiveness and variability in
bidding
By considering C' together with C" various classes of bidding behaviour can be
measured and represented cross-sectionally (see Figure 5.1). The more competitive
bidders ie. bidders who attain higher C' values are likely to have submitted the
greatest proportion of serious bids in previous competitions. Bidders with high C'
and low C" values represent (from the client's viewpoint) sensible bidders, as they
are consistently competitive. In contrast, bidders with high C' values but high C"
values represent suicidal bidders as, besides being serious, they are also erratic -
fatal behaviour in competitive bidding. Conversely bidders with low C' values and
low C" values are non-serious as they are consistently uncompetitive.
Consequently bidders with low C' and high C" values (termed silly here) are
generally uncompetitive but erratic, not an uncommon characteristic in
construction contract bidders. Although a rather crude and insensitive classification
'This phenomenon is illustrated in the following example: Given that
maximum competitiveness is unity, in the case where the lowest bid is $10 million
and the bidder's bid is $11 million, the competitiveness score is 0.91 (ie. a
competitiveness difference of 0.09 per dollar difference $1 million); in the case
where the lowest bid is $10 million and the bidder's bid is $20 million the
competitiveness score is 0.50 (ie. a competitiveness difference of 0.50 per dollar
difference of $10 million). The competitiveness difference per $1 million dollars
in the latter case is only 0.05 as opposed to 0.09 as is shown in the former case.
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system, this does have considerable intuitive appeal in reflecting the underlying
pivotal characteristics of the actual behaviour of participants in competitive
bidding environments.
C" (STANDARD DEVIATION)
Figure 5.1:	 Classification of bidders according to competitiveness and
consistency in bidding
This four-way classification - sensible, suicidal, non-serious and silly is important
from the client's viewpoint. Sensible and non-serious are essentially low risk
bidders, whilst suicidal and silly are essentially high risk bidders. Non-serious and
silly on the other hand, are essentially high cost bidders. Which class of bidder is
to be prequalified ultimately depends on the client's attitude to risk and cost trade-
off. It is also important for bidders to be able to identify their competitors and
themselves in terms of these classes.
A bidder's likely classification can be deduced according to discrete variables such
as contract type, location or client. These variables can be analysed individually
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or, providing there is sufficient data, according to any desired combination. In this
analysis, bidders' competitiveness toward contract type is analysed.
The dividing axes are based on the mean competitiveness (C') and standard
deviation (C") of the bidders in the sample. The most frequent bidders, ie. those
who bid ten times or more in the sample, were selected for analysis as it is
considered that the results obtained would be more representative of their bidding
behaviour.
5.3 Measuring the effect of contract type, contract size and bidder size on
competitiveness in bidding using regression analysis
Although simple to apply, classifying the competitiveness of bidders according to
different contract types purely on the basis of competitiveness and variability is
limited in modelling competitive bidding behaviour. The predictive capability of
such a classification system is unknown. In addition bidders' competitiveness in
relation to contract size cannot be fully accounted for.
A major disadvantage of using this approach is that it does not account for
different size contractors bidding for different ranges of projects. As demonstrated
later in the analysis (see Table 6.1) smaller contractors are likely to attain smaller
average bid values than large contractors. Since this measure of competitiveness
will produce greater ratio differences for smaller contracts, it is likely to show
smaller contractors to be less competitive than the larger contractors and also more
variable in their bidding simply because they are more likely to have bid over a
narrower range of smaller projects. One approach in reducing this problem may
be to divide the contracts up into different bands of contract sizes and recalculate
the competitiveness of bidders according to each contract size band. Eliminating
this problem may be accomplished by modelling the competitiveness of bidders
using regression analysis. One of the assumptions in using this technique is that
the random error has a constant variance. If this assumption is violated the
competitiveness model needs to be transformed in order to satisfy the assumption.
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Since competitiveness and contract size are both continuous variables, a more
comprehensive approach to modelling competitiveness cross-sectionally between
bids, therefore, can be undertaken using multiple regression analysis. The effect
of contract type, contract size and bidder size on competitiveness can be measured
through building candidate models containing various combinations of predictor
variables. These candidate models can then be examined systematically to find the
model that best reflects competitiveness. Through the systematic building of
candidate models in which the respective candidate model utilities are examined,
the goal is to determine the best model that relates bidders' competitiveness (ie.
the dependent variable) to the independent variables of bidder, contract type and
contract size. By predicting the mean values and 95% prediction intervals the
reliability of the best model can also be examined. The model's utility and
reliability can then be used as a basis for testing future refinements.
The regression analysis in this research has followed the standard approach viz.
(1) data preparation and entry;
(2) development of models;
(3) selection of best model and predictor variables;
(4) transforming the model to satisfy regression assumptions;
(5) model verification, prediction and reliability.
5.3.1	 Data preparation and entry
Data from tender reports were collected from the Architectural Services
Department, Hong Kong Government on the basis of Flanagan and Norman's
study (Flanagan and Norman 1982b) and split into 5 contract types, ie. fire
stations, police stations, primary schools, secondary schools and hostels, according
to Cl/Sfb classification as described earlier.
5.3.1.1	 Public sector data
Using data from the public sector instead of private sector has the advantage that
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the design and specification of construction work and contracts procedures are
likely to be more standardised. Pressures of public accountability also give rise to
bidding procedures, particularly prequalification and award of contract procedures,
being more formalised and consistent.
In respect of the data source itself, the Architectural Services Department is one
of Hong Kong's largest construction employers. This enables sufficient bidding
data to be generated by one client instead of a variety of smaller clients, thus
eliminating the 'noise' effects of contractors having varying degrees of preference
towards different clients.
5.3.1.2	 Data sample
Flanagan and Norman's study is based on a sample of 39 contracts let between
1973 and 1980 for a county council located in southern England. Data from 190
tender reports were collected in Hong Kong from the Architectural Services
Department of the Hong Kong Goverment for the period 1981 to 1990 on the
basis of Flanagan and Norman's study (ie. all projects were (a) for one sector, the
public sector, (b) were of similar building type: mainly schools, fire and police
stations and hostels, (c) were in the same geographical region).
The criterion for part (a) was straight forward to comply with as all the data
collected came directly from the Architectural Services Department of the Hong
Kong Government. As Hong Kong comprises only approximately 400 square
miles, projects undertaken anywhere in Hong Kong have been interpreted as being
in the same geographical region, thereby satisfying part (c) criterion.
5.3.1.3	 Contract type definition
The terms used that make up similar building types as indicated in the part (b)
criterion are interpreted for the purposes of this research as follows :
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'School' is interpreted to exclude post secondary institutions, which are commonly
given the title of colleges, polytechnics or universities, and pre-primary which are
also known as kindergarten and nurseries. Schools therefore conveniently
subdivide into primary and secondary.
'Fire and police stations' have been taken to exclude ambulance facilities. The
collective term of protective services can be used to describe this set of data. Data
were also collected on police recreation and training facilities but later rejected on
the grounds that these fall outside the ambit of stations and therefore are excluded
from the research.
In the classification of building type, the term 'hostel' appears vague in its
meaning. It has been defined as 'house of residence for students or other special
class' (Sykes 1978). Also as 'house or extra-collegiate hall for the residence of
students; a place of residence not run commercially' (Hayward and Sparkes 1986).
The Construction Index Samarbetskommitem for Byggnadsfrager (Cl/Sfb)
classifies hostels as embracing YMCA, youth hostels and halls of residence (Ray-
Jones and Clegg 1976).
The term hostel could, therefore, be defined in the narrower sense and meaning
of house/hall of residence for youth/students. Equally it could be interpreted in
its broader sense to mean a place of 'residence for other special class; not run
commercially'. As no data could be found on the narrower interpretation it was
decided to define hostel for the purposes of this research in its widest sense.
Data on the following types of project have therefore been included in the hostel
category:
(1) Girls' home;
(2) Sheltered home;
(3) Halfway house;
(4) Refugee camp;
(5) Holiday camp (non-profit making);
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(6) Military married quarters;
(7) Civilian quarters (i.e. fire, police, ambulance, prison and railway).
5.4.1.4	 Contract type classification
The contract title given in the tender report was used as the basis for classifying
the building type. The contracts have been classified into contract types according
to the CUSfb building type classification (Ray-Jones and Clegg 1976), except
hostels which have been grouped as dwellings for special class of user. The
contracts are therefore classified into five contract types (ie. fire stations, police
stations, primary schools, secondary schools and hostels). Table 5.1 shows the
contract type breakdown based on the CUSfb classification.
CUS fb code Contract type No. of Contracts
Sub-total Total
Protective Services Facilities
372 Fire stations 29
374 Police stations 43 72
Educational Facilities
712 Primary schools 29
713 Secondary schools 39 68
Residential Facilities
848 Dwellings for special classes of
user
50 50
TOTAL 190
Table 5.1:
	 Contract type breakdown based on CUSfb building type
classification
It should be noted that some of the projects contain a mixture of more than one
type. These hybrid projects were classified according to which type had the
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largest percentage of the bid value. For example for projects comprising both fire
station and ambulance facilities, the fire station contained the greater percentage
of bid value therefore these projects were classified under fire stations.
5.3.1.4.1 Further classification according to contract type and contract size
To obtain a better understanding of the data, mainly for purposes of interpreting
the analysis, the data are further sub-divided according to the wording of the
contract title in an attempt to account for the nature of work (ie. new and
alteration work) and also to account for possible contract size differences.
An important aspect to consider under the contract type classification is the type
of work, that is to say whether work is new work or alteration work such as
extension, refurbishment or completion. If the project title contains the words
'construction of', this was classified as new work. Project titles containing the
words 'extension of, 'alterations and extension of', 'addition of, 'restoration of,
'improvement of', 'refurbishment of', 'conversion of', 'alteration of' and
`reprovisioning of were grouped under the title of alterations. Due to one bidder
becoming insolvent there is also one completion contract. This contract has also
been grouped under alterations.
It is also possible to use the contract title to break down the contracts in terms of
contract size. For example, there were some multi-school contracts. These
contracts have been sub-divided according to the number of schools included in
the contract. Police stations comprised three distinct sizes viz, a police substation,
police station and headquarters including police station. For the hostels category,
it was not possible to divide the projects according to the number of dwelling units
as this information was missing from the majority of project titles. However,
these have been subdivided into military quarters, protective services quarters and
miscellaneous. Table 5.2 gives a further contract breakdown according to nature
of work and contract size as suggested by the title.
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Contract type
No. of Contracts
New
Work
Alteration Sub-Total Total
Fire Station
Fire station and ambulance
depot
5 0 5
Fire station 22 2 24 29
Police
Police substation 1 0 1
Police station 17 18 35
Police headquarters
incl. police station
6 1 7 43
Primary
One primary school 23 6
Secondary 29 29
One secondary school 21 4 25
Two secondary schools 11 0 11
Four secondary schools 1 0 1
Two secondary and one
primary school
1 0 1
One secondary and one
primary school
1 0 1 39
Hostel
Miscellaneous; girls home,
sheltered home, halfway
house, refugee and holiday
camp
4
13
2
9
6
22
Military, police and fire
services residential
quarters
20 2 22 50
TOTAL 146 44 190
Table 5.2: Further contract type breakdown according to new and alteration work
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5.3.1.5	 Bidder coding
The sample contained 2395 bids from a total of 192 bidders. Each bidder was
assigned a code to preserve confidentiality. In the coding process it was found that
one bidder was not eligible to tender for Government work and therefore was
omitted from the sample. Also one bidder (bidder coded 13) had changed names
to bidder coded 14. All bids for this bidder were, therefore, credited to bidder
coded 14.
5.3.1.6	 Bidder size classification
The size of bidder measure in Flanagan and Norman's study is determined
according to area of operation, ie. small bidder is defined as working within
approximately a 20 mile radius of the county town, medium bidder is defined as
operating throughout the county and large bidder is defined as operating
throughout the country.
Given that Hong Kong only comprises approximately 400 square miles, it is not
really feasible to adopt these measures. Since Flanagan and Norman's rationale
behind the bidder size measure is that 'in most instances they would be tendering
in different project value ranges' the measure of bidder size adopted in this
analysis is based on Hong Kong Government classification.
The Hong Kong Government maintains a list of approved bidders which are
classified as Group A, B or C depending on their experience and financial status.
The financial criterion for entry or promotion into a Group is according to the
minimum employed capital. This varies from $1.1 million for Group A contractor
to $4.7 million for Group C contractor (Walker and Rowlinson 1991). The
maximum value of works for which approved contractors may tender is $6
million, $30 million and unlimited for Groups A, B and C respectively.
For analysing bidding performance according to bidder size, bidders are classified
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into these size groupings according to Government criteria (i.e. Group A: up to
HK$6 million (small), Group B: up to HK$30 million (medium), Group C:
unlimited (large)).
It should be noted that when classifying bidders according to this size, 18 bidders
received reclassification changes during the period in which the data were
collected. Eight bidders were promoted from Group A to Group B and eight from
Group B to Group C. One bidder was promoted from Group A to Group B before
moving into Group C. One bidder was demoted from Group C to Group A. The
bidders for these cases have been split into the small, medium and large bidder
size groupings according to when the bid was submitted. For example bidder 115
had 32 bidding attempts in the sample of which 30 were as a Group B contractor
and 2 as a Group C contractor. The bids from this bidder have been split into the
respective size groupings.
The number of bids breakdown in the sample based on this measure is 183 from
Group A, 1144 from Group B and 1068 from Group C.
5.3.1.7
	 Alternative measures of bidder size
Apart from classifying the size of bidders according to the above Government
criteria, there are a variety of potential measures that can and have been used to
measure the size of a bidder. These can be classified into financial and non-
financial measures.
Financial measures, based on definitions used by Hong Kong Government (1991),
include:
(1) Fixed assets;
(2) Net assets ie. (Fixed assets + Investments + Current assets) less (Current
liabilities + minority interests + long term liabilities);
(3) Working capital le. Current assets - current liabilities;
(4) Turnover ie. Gross value of work performed;
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(5) Gross profit ie. Total payments from clients or other sources less direct costs
which include all project overheads.
A measure of bidder size can also be determined by considering the size of
contracts recently undertaken by the bidders (eg. Russell and Skibneiwski 1990)
such as:
(1) Average contract size;
(2) Largest contract performed in past five years (as main contractor);
(3) Smallest contract performed in past five years (as main contractor).
Non-financial measures (Hong Kong Government 1991) include:
(1) Number of active sites as main contractor;
(2) Number of persons directly engaged;
(3) Number of manual workers engaged excluding subcontractors;
(4) Number of manual workers engaged including subcontractors;
(5) Total annual completed floor area (m 2) for new work (as main contractor).
Data on alternative measures of bidder size were sought from Government sources.
The data source (ie. Architectural Services Department, Hong Kong Government)
was approached for this information. They stated that they did not have this
information and suggested contacting two other Government departments, namely
the Department of Census and Statistics and also Business Registration
Department. Both Departments refused to disclose any information relating to an
individual company on the grounds of confidentiality.
Although data on other bidder size classifications could have been collected, for
example, by developing a questionnaire on bidder size measures directed at the
bidders themselves, it was decided to base the analysis concerned with measuring
the effect of bidder size solely on the bidder size classification according to
Government criteria. The decision to do this was influenced by the work of
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990: 11) who, in describing changes in the construction
industry (which includes the increasing use of subcontracting), comment 'one of
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the consequences of these changes is that there is no satisfactory measure of the
size of firms in the construction industry since neither numbers employed nor
turnover necessarily represent the amount of work actually carried out'.
5.3.1.8	 Updating
The bids were updated to a common base date (September 1990) based on tender
price indices published by the Architectural Services Department, Hong Kong
Government.
5.3.2	 Development of models
The development of candidate models and selection of the best model used here
are based on a chunkwise approach'. Candidate models using different chunk
combinations of predictor variables are built and the effect on competitiveness
determined for each candidate model. The candidate models are then
systematically compared using a forward chunkwise sequential variable selection
algorithm based on the F test (see next section for detailed explanation) to find the
best model (ie. chunk combination) that reflects competitiveness.
5.3.2.1	 Rationale behind selecting the chunkwise approach
The rationale for selecting the chunkwise approach over other approaches is as
follows:
(1) all subsets regression is too long winded, as to compare the 7 candidate
variables could have produced up to 2 = 128 models and up to 128!
combinations to compare for each added bidder;
(2) the forward sequential technique is chosen as this approach begins with the
simplest model to which additional candidate variables are progressively
'Detailed explanations of this approach can be found in most intermediate texts
on regression analysis such as Klienbaum, Kupper and Muller (1988) or Kelting
(1979).
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added and tested to find the best predictor variables;
(3) the chosen technique allows a measure of control and rationale over the
sequence of predictor variables so that the influence of each chunk of
predictor variables can be measured rather than relying on a technique such
as stepwise regression in which all theoretical considerations are removed;
(4) the chunkwise technique for selecting variables has substantial advantages
over single variable selection techniques. The chunkwise method allows sets
of variables for which there is prior scientific knowledge and preferences to
be incorporated into the analysis. If a chunk test is not significant and the
entire chunk of variables is deleted, then clearly no tests on individual
variables in that chunk are carried out. Kleinbaum et al (1988: 328) state that
'in many situations such testing for chunk significance can be more effective
and reliable than testing variables one at a time'.
5.3.2.2	 Contract size
Contract size (S), a quantitative independent variable, has been expressed in terms
of contract value. A quadratic term for this variable was added to allow the
regression line to reflect possible economies of scale between contract size and
bidder size. Relationships between competitiveness and contract size can be
observed by plotting the value of bids entered in past competitions against the
competitiveness measure (ie. Equation 5.1) with bidder's bid plotted at the lowest
bid value. Curvilinear regression analysis can be used to determine the line of
4The bid values that make up a bidding distribution, when plotted against
competitiveness and contract size, will follow a straight line relative to the lowest
bid. If the bids are plotted according to each bid value, the line will not be
perpendicular. This is because smaller contracts will produce greater ratio
differences between values (eg. a small contract which has a bid of $2 million and
a lowest bid of $1 million will generate competitiveness of 0.5 for a contract size
difference of $1 million; a large contract which has a bid of $110 million and the
lowest bid of $100 million will generate competitiveness of 0.91 for a contract
size difference of $10 million). The slopes of the bidding distributions will,
therefore, become progressively oblique as the contract size increases. To eliminate
this sloping effect and maintain perpendicularity all bidding attempts need to be
and have been plotted at the point of the lowest bid.
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best fit (eg. Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2:	 Competitiveness and contract size
Assuming the regression line represents a bidder's true competitiveness / contract
size relationship, then the bidder is most competitive where the regression line is
furthest from the X axis, ie. at the peak of the regression line. The corresponding
contract value at this point represents the bidder's preferred contract size. Smaller
bidders are expected to have smaller preferred contract sizes than large bidders.
A shallow mesokurtic regression curve indicates a wide preferred size range.
Conversely, a leptolcurtic regression curve indicates a narrow preferred range.
Small bidders are expected to have a narrower preferred size range than large
bidders due to obvious resource constraints. Thus it is anticipated that the
regression curves of increasing size contractors will become more mesokurtic and
shift to the right as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3:	 Competitiveness and bidder size
The notion that bidders have preferred size ranges implies that the shape of the
regression line will be convex, for no matter how small or large the contractor is
in size, in terms of contract size there will be upper and lower limits at which a
bidder is competitive. At these limits a bidder's competitors should become
relatively more competitive thereby increasing the slope of the regression line,
suggesting the quadratic functions shown.
Although it is expected that the shape of the regression line will be convex, this
may not always be the case and a concave curve may be due to the existence of
any one or some combination of the following:
two or more preferred size ranges;
weak or no preferred size range;
confounding effects of other preferences, eg. location;
'noise' effects caused by random fluctuations in bidding;
sampling effects eg. lack of data, spurious data and outliers.
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It should be noted that the inclusion of a quadratic term into the equation places
an important limitation on the use of prediction equations. The model will only be
valid over the range of x values that were used to fit the model (Mendenhall and
McClave 1981).
One way of assessing the extent to which a contract size equates to the preferred
size range is to measure the slope of the regression line at a given value. The
shallower the slope, the closer the value is to the contractor's absolute preferred
size (ie. the point where the regression line produces a horizontal tangent). The
steeper the slope the further away the value is from the contractor's preferred size.
It also follows that the steeper the regression line the greater is the influence of
contract size on bidding performance as the preferred size range will be smaller
(see Figure 5.4)
COMPETITIVENESS
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0
	
20	 40	 60	 80	 100
CONTRACT SIZE (HK$ MILLIONS)
Figure 5.4:
	
Degree of influence of contract size
The convex slope of the regression line is expressed by the equation:
Y = - ax2 + bx + c
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By differentiating the equation the slope of the line can be determined. Therefore
the differential:
- 2ax + b
indicates the slope of - 2a.
The influence of contract size on bidding performance can be measured by
considering the coefficient for the x squared term. The larger the coefficient the
steeper the slope of the regression line and thus the greater the correlation between
contract size and competitiveness.
In respect of size of contractor, due to the influence of resource constraints,
smaller bidders should have smaller preferred size ranges than larger bidders and
therefore larger coefficients for the x squared term.
5.3.2.3	 Contract type and bidder
Contract type (T) and bidder (B) are both qualitative variables. A single prediction
equation for each bidder and type can be found through the standard procedure of
using dummy variables.
5.3.2.4	 Building the candidate models
A chunk of predictor variables is required for each independent variable (ie. S, T,
B). A chunk of predictor variables is also required for each of the corresponding
two-way interactions (ie. ST, SB and TB) and three-way interaction (ie. STB).
Candidate models comprising up to seven chunks of predictor variables are
therefore considered. A total of 22 candidate models were developed according to
different chunk combinations (see Figure 5.5). The candidate models vary from the
simplest model (model 1) based on the sample mean to the seven chunk model
(model 22) which is taken to be the saturated model.
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Model
No.
No. of Chunks in
Model
Chunk Combination
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
0
1
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
5;
s
S + T
S + B
S + T + ST
S + B + SB
S + T + B
S + T + B + ST
S + T + B + SB
S + T + B + TB
S + T + B + STB
S + T + B + ST + SB
S + T + B + SB + TB
S + T + B + TB + ST
S + T + B + STB + ST
S + T + B + STB + SB
S + T + B + STB + TB
S + T + B + SB + ST + STB
S + T + B + SB + BT + STB
S + T + B + BT + ST + STB
S + T + B + BT + SB + ST
S + T + B + BT + SB + ST + STB
where
y = sample mean	 T = contract type
S = contract size	 B = bidder
The regression coefficients contained within these chunks are as follows:
1.	 S	 :	 bp( + b2x2
2.	 T	 :	 b3T1 + b4T2
 ... bnTn
3.	 B	 :	 b5B1 + b6B2 ... bnBn
4.	 ST	 :	 b7T1x + b 8T 1 x2 + b9T2x + b 1012x2 ... bnTnx + bnTnx2
5.	 SB	 :	 bliBix + b 12B 1 x2 + b 13B2x + b I4B2x2 ... bnB nx + bnBnx2
6.	 TB	 :	 1315BIT' + b16B2T 1
 + b 17B 1 T2 + b 18B2T2 ... bnBnTn
7.	 STB :	 b19B I T, x + b20B I T I x2 + b21 132TI x + b22B2T1 x2 + b23B 1 T2x
b24B 1 T2x2 + b25B2T2x + b26B2T2x2 + ... bnBnTnx + bnBnTnx2
where
x = contract size	 T1= contract type 1	 13 1 = bidder 1
T2 = contract type 2	 B2 = bidder 2
Tn = contract type n	 Bn = bidder n
Figure 5.5:	 Proposed candidate models for individual bidders
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5.3.2.4.1	 Main effects
As can be seen in Figure 5.5 there are three main effects terms, one for each
independent variable. The main effect for contract size will comprise two
coefficients due to the inclusion of the quadratic term. There will also be one main
effect term for every bidder and contract type included in the equation. The model
containing the main effects for one bidder and one type is as follows:
(Main effect	 (Main effect	 (Main effect
for S)	 for T)	 for B)
C(y) = Bo + B l x, + B2x12	 B3X2 	 + B4x3
5.3.2.4.2	 Interaction effects
Since there are three main effects terms there will be three two-way interaction
terms and one three-way interaction terms. For a 3 variable saturated model all
possible two way and three way cross products of the variables need to be
included. The two way and three way interaction terms which include contract size
(S) will require two sets of coefficients due to the inclusion of the quadratic term.
In addition there will also be one two-way interaction term for the qualitative
variables of bidder and contract type. The main effects and interaction terms for
a saturated model containing one bidder and one type is as follows:
(Main effect	 (Main effect
for T)	 for B)
B3X2	 B4x3
(Main effect
for S)
C(y) = Bo + B i xi + B2x12
(Interaction effect
for ST)
(Interaction effect
for SB)
B5x 1 x2
 + B6x12x2
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(Interaction effect 	 (Interaction effect
for TB	 for STB)
± B9X2X3
	 + B i ox, x2x3
 + 1311 X12X2X3
For every new contract type or bidder introduced into the equation there will be
one main effect term, two two-way interaction terms (ST and TB for contract type
or SB and TB for bidder) and one three-way interaction term (STB) will be
created and added to the equation making a total of six coefficients ie.
(Main effect	 (Interaction effect	 (Interaction effect
for T or B)	 for SB or ST)	 for TB)
+ B4x3	+ B5x 1 X2 ± B6x 1 2x2 + B9x2x3
(Interaction effect
for STB)
+ B i ox i x2x3 + B 11 x 12x2x3
Three further coefficients are needed for every subsequent contract type or bidder
added to this new type or bidder ie.
(Interaction effect	 (Interaction effect
for TB)	 for STB)
+ B9x2x3	+ B 1 ox, x2x3 + B il xi2x2x3
Figure 5.6 illustrates the SPSS-X codes that have been assigned to each of the
independent variables.
5.3.2.5	 Rationale behind the models
Each predictor variable therefore consists of a chunk of single variables. These sets
of predictor variables are logically related and of equal importance (within a
chunk) as candidate predictors.
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Chunk Variable SPSS-X Code Description
S bix BID Contract size
b2x2 BID2 Contract size x Contract size
T b3T1 J1 Fire Stations
b4T2 J2 Police Stations
b5T3 J3 Primary Schools
b6T4 J4 Secondary Schools
b7T5 J5 Hostels
B b8B 1 B1 Bidder 18
b9B2 B2 Bidder 142
b 10B 3 B3 Bidder 119
bl1B4 B4 Bidder 127
b 1 2B 5 B5 Bidder 122
b 13B 6 B6 Bidder 148
1)14137 B7 Bidder 45
bi5B8 B8 Bidder 52
b 1 6B 9 B9 Bidder 96
b 1 7B 10 B10 Bidder 71
1:018Bli B11 Bidder 109
bi9B12 B12 Bidder 69
b2OB
 13 B13 Bidder 20
b21 B 14 B14 Bidder 24
b22B 15 B15 Bidder 9
ST br,T„x JnBED Contract type x Contract size
bnT„x2 Jr,BID2 Contract type x Contract size x
Contract size
SB bnBroc B„BlID Bidder x Contract size
bnBnx2 B„BID2 Bidder x Contract size x Contract
size
TB bnTB. JnBn Contract type x Bidder
STB bnT„Bnx JnBn1D Contract type x Bidder x Contract
size
br,TnBnx2 JnBn11D2 Contract type x Bidder x Contract
size x Contract size
Figure 5.6 : SPSS-X coding of independent variables
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It should be noted that the models were constructed with the following rationale
in mind:
(1) all models must contain the contract size variable as this is the independent
quantitative variable;
(2) in accordance with normal procedures (eg. Glantz and Slinker 1990: 94)
models containing interaction terms without main effect variables have been
disregarded as they do not constitute a logical model build up and would not
give a meaningful interpretation in further analysis;
(3) models containing more interaction effects, eg. four way interaction effects,
could have been constructed. However, the literature (eg. Kerlinger 1986)
suggests that interaction effects of more than three way are difficult to
interpret in a meaningful way. Also there may be a data problem. It is
recognised (eg. Skitmore 1991) that models containing a ratio of more than
one third variables to data sample gives rise to the regression model
becoming less reliable.
As can be seen from Figure 5.5, the models have been logically developed so that
each candidate model includes and excludes different combinations of predictor
variable chunks. If the chunk is included in the model then the model assumes that
particular predictor variable chunk influences competitiveness. If it is excluded the
model assumes that the predictor variable chunk has no influence on
competitiveness. At one extreme there is model 1, the sample mean, which
assumes none of the predictor variable chunks influence competitiveness. This is
because model 1 is simply made up of the total SSE (which is the square of the
standard deviation) divided by the number of degrees of freedom minus one. At
the other extreme, model 22, the saturated model, assumes that each and every
predictor variable chunk for both the main effects and interaction effects influences
competitiveness.
5.3.2.6	 Bids selected for analysis
Since bids submitted by contractors are likely to be made up of both serious and
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non-serious bids an important aspect to consider is whether to include all the bids
submitted by contractors in the analysis. Some researchers have excluded non-
serious bids from their analysis by different means eg. Franks (1970) excluded the
upper 20% of bids, Morrison and Stevens (1980) excluded the highest two bids in
each set. However, in undertaking analysis it has been suggested (Skitmore 1989)
that all bids in the model should be retained because (1) some companies have
been found to have quite distinct bidding behaviour, and what appears to be an
unrealistic bid may be genuine in some cases (2) cover prices do not distort
market prices, therefore non-serious bidders are not likely to have any great effect
on low bid models (3) the non-serious bids are of great importance for determining
skewness and possible correlation with industry workload.
5.3.2.7	 Number of bidders
Ideally as many bidders as possible should be included in the analysis. However,
there are data limitations, and for reasonably robust results Skitmore (1991a)
recommends that the number of previous bidding attempts is three times the
number of variables in the model. To overcome this problem a standard procedure
for this type of analysis is to select bidders on the basis of most bidding attempts.
Bidders are ranked in descending order of bidding attempts and a cumulative
number of bidding attempts determined. Against this is compared the
corresponding number of variables generated by the saturated model to find a
reasonable minimum ratio cut off point. Table 5.3 shows the number of bidding
attempts/number of variable ratios per incremental increase in bidders for models
22 (ie. the saturated model), 18 (ie. a representative high order model) and 12 (ie.
a representative middle order model).
For this 5 contract type data set the cut off point is judged to be where 15 bidders
are included in the analysis. Although the ratio at this point for model 22 (ie. the
saturated model) is only 2.70 (ie. 776 bidding attempts / 287 variables), this is
considered reasonable since this ratio is only just less than three. With the
exception of two other models (ie. models 19 and 20), all other candidate models
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No. of
bidders
Total no. Model 22 Model 18 Model 12
of
bidding	 I No. of I Ratio
attempts	 vari-
ables	 I	 I
No. of
van-
ables	 I
Ratio I No. of
vari-
I	 ables
Ratio
1 72 35 2.05 30 2.40 20 3.60
2 135 53 2.54 43 3.14 23 5.87
3 193 71 2.72 56 3.45 26 7.42
4 251 89 2.82 69 3.64 29 8.66
5 306 107 2.85 82 3.73 32 9.56
6 360 125 2.88 95 3.79 35 10.29
7 412 143 2.88 108 3.82 38 10.84
8 464 161 2.88 121 3.84 41 11.32
9 513 179 2.86 134 3.83 44 11.66
10 562 197 2.85 147 3.82 47 11.96
11 608 215 2.83 160 3.80 50 12.16
12 652 233 2.80 173 3.77 53 12.30
13 695 251 2.77 186 3.74 56 12.41
14 736 269 2.74 199 3.70 59 12.47
15 776 287 2.70 212 3.66 62 12.52
16 812 305 2.66 225 3.61 65 12.49
17 848 323 2.63 238 3.56 68 12.47
18 883 341 2.59 251 3.52 71 12.44
19 917 359 2.55 264 3.47 74 12.39
20 951 377 2.52 277 3.43 77 12.35
Table 5.3: Bidding attempt / variable ratio per incremental increase in number of
bidders for models 22, 18 and 12.
have a ratio greater than three. It is quite likely, therefore, that the eventual best
candidate model will in fact have a ratio greater than three.
According to Mendenhall and McClave (1981: 222) the reasons for producing a
single model to represent all the response curves is so that:
(1) 'we can test to determine whether the curves are different',
(2) 'we obtain a pooled estimate of variance, the variance of the random error
component E'.
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5.3.3	 Selection of best model and predictor variables
The best model is found by determining the 'middle ground between an under-
specified model, which yields biased estimates of the regression parameters and
a high residual variance, and an over-specified model, which yields unbiased but
imprecise estimates of the regression parameters'(Glantz and Slinker 1990: 245).
5.3.3.1	 Forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm
The approach used in determining the best model is by using a forward chunkwise
sequential variable selection algorithm based on the F-test. The calculated F
statistic expressed in terms of the sums of squares error as:
F(DA,DB,)	 [(SSEA - SSEB) I (da - db)] / MSEB	 (5.2)
where
SSEA
 = Sum of Square Error for model A
SSEB
 = Sum of Square Error for model B
da = Explained degrees of freedom for model A
db = Explained degrees of freedom for model B
MSE = Mean square residual error for model B
is compared with the corresponding tabulated F distribution at the 5% significance
level where
ni = da - db degrees of freedom
n2 = residual degrees of freedom
When comparing models the null hypothesis is that the model with the explained
degrees of freedom is the best model. If the resulting calculated value for the F
statistic exceeds the tabulated F distribution at the 5% significance level the null
hypothesis is rejected and the best model then becomes the model represented in
the alternative hypothesis. In the case where the compared models contain an
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identical number of coefficients then the model with the smallest MSE (mean
squared error) is automatically chosen as the best model. This algorithm is
repeated until all the models have been compared.
The results from using this chunkwise algorithm are verified by checking the
utility statistics of the best model against the other candidate models. The utility
statistics referred to comprise adjusted R2, global F test and Mallows Cp
5.3.3.2	 Ordering of the candidate models for testing
Although the candidate models are developed according to the number of chunks
(as shown in Figure 5.5) the testing sequence to find the best model does not
strictly follow this order. This is because the sequence of testing was undertaken
according to the number of explained degrees of freedom contained in the models
which vary according to the numbers of bidders (and contract types) in the model.
For determining the best model by using the algorithm, the 22 models are,
therefore, ranked for comparison in ascending order of the number of explained
degrees of freedom contained in the model. Starting with two bidders, individual
bidders are added incrementally into the analysis up to the 15 bidder cut off point
and the best candidate model determined for each incremental increase. Such an
approach is taken so that the robustness of the best model can be observed.
A spreadsheet using Lotus 1-2-3 is developed to calculate the forward chunkwise
sequential variable selection algorithm and thereby determine the best model.
5.3.3.3	 Bidder size
The notion that different size bidders have different preferred size ranges (as
shown in Figure 5.3) is tested by observing the bidding behaviour of contractors
according to size. The preceding sections have set out the regression analysis
methodology for determining the best model based on the bidding performance of
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15 individual bidders. This methodology can be developed to measure the effect
that bidder size has on the competitiveness.
The effect of bidder size can be measured using the same approach, except that
contractors are grouped according to size (ie. small, medium and large) based on
the Hong Kong Government classification system and the bidder size behaviour
observed. Since bidder size is a qualitative variable, a single prediction equation
for each bidder size can be found by creating a dummy variable for bidder size
(see Figure 5.7). Since the bidder sizes are known for all bidders, the whole data
set is included in this part of the analysis.
The best model according to bidder size is determined using the same forward
chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm based on the F-test as shown in
Equation 5.2.
5.3.3.4	 Comparison of best models based on individual and grouped
bidder performance
So that a direct comparison can be made, the best model based on the bidding
performance of 15 individual bidders and the best model based on the bidding
performance of the same 15 bidders grouped according to size is compared by
using the same forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm based
on the F-test as shown in Equation 5.2.
In making the comparison, the model with the least number of explained degrees
of freedom (ie. the grouped bidder best model) will be treated as the null
hypothesis ie. that it is the best model. The 15 individual bidder best model will
be treated as the alternative hypothesis.
Therefore, if the resulting calculated value for the F statistic exceeds the tabulated
F distribution at the 5% significance level then the null hypothesis is rejected and
the best model then becomes the model represented in the alternative hypothesis.
Chunk Combination
Y1
S
S + T
S + G
S + T + ST
S + G + SG
S + T + G
S + T + G + ST
S + T + G + SG
S + T + G + TG
S + T + G + STG
S + T + 0+ ST + SG
S + T + G + SG + TG
S + T+ G+ TG + ST
S + T + G + STG + ST
S + T + G + STG + SG
S + T + G + STG + TG
S+T+G+SG+ST+ STG
S + T + B + SG + TG + STG
S + T + B + TG + ST + STG
S + T + B + TG + SG + ST
S + T + B + TG + SG + ST + STG
where
_
y = sample mean
S = contract size
T = contact type
G = bidder size
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Model
No.
No. of Chunks in
Model
1 o
2 1
3 2
4 2
5 3
6 3
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 4
11 4
12 5
13 5
14 5
15 5
16 5
17 5
18 6
19 6
20 6
21 6
22 7
The regression coefficients contained within these chunks are as follows:
1. S	 blx + b2x2
2. T	 b3T1 + b4T2
 ... bnTn
3. G	 b5G1+ b6G2 + b7G3
4. ST	 bsTlx + b9T 1 x2 + b l0T2x + b 11T2x2 ... b,Tx + b„Tnx2
5. SG :	 131201x + b 13G 1x2 + b 1402x + b 15G2x2 + b l6G3x + b17G3x2
6. TO :	 b15GITI + b16G2T1 + b 17G 1 T2 + b 18G2T2 ... bnGnTn
7. STG :	 b19GITIx + b20G IT Ix2 + b21 G2T lx + b22G2T 1 x2 + b23G IT2x +
b24G IT2x2 + b25G2T2x + b26G2T2x2 + ... bnG,ITnX + bnG„Tnx2
where
x = contract size T 1 = contract type 1 G I = small bidder
T2 = contract type 2 G2 = medium bidder
Tn = contract type n 03 = large bidder
Figure 5.7:	 Proposed candidate models for bidders grouped according to
bidder size (ie. small, medium and large)
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5.3.3.5	 Testing the robustness of the best model
The best model's robustness will be examined by using this same approach but
varying the combinations of contract types in the analysis. The robustness of the
best model resulting from the above comparison of best models is further
examined by:
(1) reanalysing the best model based on the forward chunkwise sequential
variable selection algorithm with the approximate values for F ol being taken
from the 1% points for the Distribution of F table (instead of 5% points);
(2) testing whether the second order terms contribute to the prediction of
competitiveness;
(3) excluding alteration work from the analysis;
(4) comparing the robustness of the ratio measure of competitiveness as shown
in Equation 5.1 with the ratio of bidder's bid to lowest bid ie.
xix(i)
	
(5.3)
where
C	 = measure of competitiveness
x	 = bid value entered by an individual bidder
X() = value of lowest bid entered for the contract
(Maximum and minimum competitiveness are respectively constrained between
one and infinity)
The resulting model, whether it be the 15 individual bidder or grouped bidder best
model, will then go forward to be tested and if necessary transform the model to
satisfy regression assumptions.
5.3.3.6	 Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
It should be noted that using regression analysis to obtain the necessary statistics
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for each candidate model on which to perform the forward chunkwise sequential
variable selection algorithm is very expensive in terms of computer CPU time due
to the matrix inversion that is required. This is particularly time consuming,
especially for the higher order models which contain many variables. A minimum
tolerance problem was also encountered in which some variables were left out of
the equations of some higher order models thereby producing inaccurate statistics
on which to apply the algorithm.
An alternative, more efficient and more accurate technique for supplying the
necessary statistics on which to determine the best model can be accomplished by
using the MANOVA technique which is based on the minimum variance approach
rather than the least squares approach. As MANOVA also overcomes the
regression analysis problem of minimum tolerance this technique is used to supply
the statistics on which to apply the algorithm for models 3 - 22.
The statistics needed for model 1 are univariate summary statistics, therefore these
have been derived from the descriptives procedure. As MANOVA needs two
predictor variables and only one predictor variable is generated by model 2 the
statistics for model 2 are based on the multiple regression.
5.3.4	 Transforming the model to satisfy regression assumptions
Having determined the best model, the residuals of the best model are then
examined to see if any of the standard least squares regression assumptions have
been violated. Each assumption is examined in turn and where necessary the
model is modified to accommodate the assumption to produce a final model which
is not only closest to satisfying these assumptions but also the best predictor of the
dependent variable, competitiveness. These assumptions are:
(1) Mean of the residuals equal to zero : It is impossible to violate the
assumption of the mean of the residuals equals zero as the method of least
squares guarantees that the mean of the residuals is equal to zero.
(2) Multicollinearity : For detecting multicollinearity, the variance inflation
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factors (VIFs) for the individual B parameters are used as indicators. A
severe multicollinearity problem can be assumed to exist if the largest
variance inflation factors is greater than 10 (Neter et al, 1983).
(3) Autocorrelation : To test that the observations are independent the residuals
are plotted against a sequence variable, the most usual being time. The
Durbin-Watson test is commonly used to test this assumption. However, in
bidding studies where more than one bidder is being analysed the potential
problem of 'artificial' autocorrelation is likely to occur if the data set is
arranged chronologically. The chronological order for contracts containing
more than one bidding attempt will produce clusters of similar value bids.
The clustering effect produces artificial dependency between succeeding bid
values for the same contract within the data set. This is likely to result in a
significant autocorrelation. To minimise this undesirable effect the ordering
of the bid values within the data set was therefore randomised at the
commencement of the analysis. By randomising the data, the data set can be
regarded as being cross-sectional. As autocorrelation in cross-sectional
studies is 'typically not an assumption of concern' (Dielman 1991: 135), the
testing of this assumption has not been reported.
(4) Normality : The normality aspect is formally tested using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (see eg. Kenkel 1989). This tests the null hypothesis that the
distribution of residuals is normal against the alternative hypothesis that the
distribution is not normal. The normality aspect is verified by referring to a
histogram and normal probability plot of the residuals.
(5) Homoscedasticity : The assumption of homoscedasticity is tested using a
scatterplot of the studentised residuals against the predicted values. In
addition each continuous and categorical variable in the model is respectively
tested using Szroeter's test (see eg. Dielman 1991) and Bartlett Box F test.
These both test the null hypothesis that variance of the residuals is constant
against the alternative hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is not
constant. Scatterplots of the residuals against each of the continuous and
categorical variables have also been examined.
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5.3.5	 Model verification, prediction and reliability
The best model, transformed to satisfy the regression assumptions, was then
retested against all other candidate models to verify whether it remains in its
modified state as the best model.
Having satisfied this procedure, the best model prediction equations were then
estimated and analysed. The best model prediction equations are estimated from
the regression analysis coefficients. The predictions were back checked by
estimating the predicted means obtained from MANOVA.
The reliability of the model is tested by checking the coefficients and by
constructing 95% confidence limits around the prediction equations. The SPSS-X
statistics software package is used to obtain all the statistics up to this point.
Unfortunately SPSS-X does not have the capability to produce confidence intervals
for prediction intervals for particular y values. As pointed out by Mendenhall and
Sinich (Mendenhall and Sinich 1993: 193) 'this is a rather serious oversight, since
the prediction intervals represent the culmination of model building efforts: using
the model to make inferences about the dependent variable y'. To overcome this
problem the SAS statistics software package is used to determine the prediction
intervals.
A spreadsheet using Lotus 1-2-3 was developed to estimate the prediction
equations and construct the 95% confidence limits around the prediction equations.
Summary
The methodology used to replicate and develop Flanagan and Norman's study is
set out in this chapter and the approach is described in three sections. The first
section compares the measures of competitiveness and variability in bidding used
by Flanagan and Norman (1982b) in their study with a preferred alternative
competitiveness measure which is used to develop the study. The second section
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describes the method taken to classify the bidding behaviour of bidders according
to competitiveness and variability. The regression analysis methodology used to
model the effect of contract type, contract size and bidder size on competitiveness
is presented in the third section.
Chapter 6 sets out the analysis for replicating Flanagan and Norman's study and
also analyses the relationship between competitiveness and variability. Chapters
7 to 11 are devoted to the regression analysis. Chapter 7 deals with the selection
of the best model and predictor variables. Chapter 8 is concerned with
transforming the best model to satisfy the regression assumptions. Chapter 9
describes the verification of the best model and model prediction and reliability.
This model is refined in Chapter 10 by grouping together bidders whose
competitiveness towards contract type and contract size are not significantly
different. Chapter 11 examines the effect of adding new bidders to the model.
The data set together with the principal SPSS-X and SAS command files are
shown in the appendices.
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CHAPTER 6
Competitiveness and variability between bids
149
6 COMPETITIVENESS AND VARIABILITY BETWEEN BIDS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section replicates Flanagan and
Norman's study (Flanagan and Norman 1982b) and in so doing compares the
bidding performances of three UK contractors with three Hong Kong contractors.
The second section develops the study by introducing an alternative preferred
measure of competitiveness (ie. Equation 5.1), and considers the variability in
competitiveness arising from this measure. This is further developed by examining
the relationship between competitiveness, C' and competitiveness variability, C".
From this a matrix is produced which can be used to identify various classes of
competitive bidding behaviour.
6.2 Replicating Flanagan and Norman's study
Three Hong Kong contractors (ie. bidders coded 64, 52 and 18) were selected for
analysis in accordance with Flanagan and Norman's criteria ie. they have tendered
consistently throughout the period in which the data are collected and 'in most
instances ... be tendering in different size ranges' (Flanagan and Norman 1982b).
To comply, as far as possible, with this latter criterion, the three classes of
contractors that make up the Hong Kong Government's list of approved
contractors are used as the basis for measuring contractor size (Hong Kong
Government 1981). Class A, B and C contractors are taken to represent small,
medium and large contractors respectively. One bidder has been selected from
each class and is correspondingly labelled A, B and C.
Table 6.1 shows the number of bidding attempts, average bid values and
variability of bid values for each of the three Hong Kong bidders (The bid values
for the UK bidders is not reported by Flanagan and Norman). Since Government
regulations specify that each class of contractor can bid only for contracts up to
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stipulated maximum contract values (Hong Kong Goverment 1981), it follows
that small contractors will have the least number of bidding opportunities and large
contractors the most bidding opportunities. It is not surprising, therefore, to see
that the number of bidding attempts made by the three bidders A, B, and C
following this trend. As expected bidder C, the large contractor, has the largest
average bid value and bidder A, the small contractor the smallest average bid
value. It is unexpected, however, to see that the coefficient of variation does not
also follow this trend. It is bidder A, the small contractor, who attained the largest
coefficient of variation. Upon further investigation it was found that this contractor
has bid for a few contracts beyond the maximum value stipulated for this class of
contractor.
Bidder
label
Number of
bidding
attempts
Bid Values
Average
contract bid
(HK$ millions)
Standard
Deviation
Coefficient
of
Variation
A
B
C
23
52
72
HK$ 5.84
HK$ 12.19
HK$ 21.54
6.80
8.53
17.88
116.44%
69.98%
83.01%
Table 6.1:	 Number of bidding attempts, average bid values and variability
of bid values for Hong Kong contractors A, B and C
6.2.1	 Comparison of bidding performances
Figure 6.1 illustrates the bidding performances of the three Hong Kong contractors
and also Flanagan and Norman's three UK contractors. The bidding performance
is based on a competitiveness measure adopted by Flanagan and Norman (ie.
Equation 4.2) in which each competitor's bid is expressed as a percentage of the
bidder's bid. The rationale behind the contract order, shown on the x-axis, is not
stated by Flanagan and Norman. The contract order shown for Hong Kong
contractors is chronological. When comparing the bidding performances of the
Hong Kong and UK contractors overall, what is particularly striking is that the
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CCNTRACTOR B BIDDING PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTOR C BIDDING PERFORMANCE
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Figure 6.1 a-c: Bid lines of UK bidders in relation to competitor bids (Source
Flanagan and Norman 1982b)
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CONTRACTOR 'A BIDDING PERFORMANCE CONTRACTOR 'B' BIDDING PERFORMANCE
Figure 6.1 d-e: Bid lines of Hong Kong bidders 'A' and `13' in relation to
competitor bids
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CONTRACTOR 'C' BIDDING PERFORMANCE
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Figure 6.1 f:	 Bid lines of Hong Kong bidder 'C' in relation to competitor bids
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Hong Kong contractors have had many more bidding attempts. The total number
of bidding attempts for Hong Kong bidders A, B and C (shown in Figure 6.1 d-f)
is 23, 52 and 72 respectively while the number of bidding attempts for the
corresponding UK bidders is only 12, 10 and 17. Hong Kong contractors are also
bidding, on average, against more competitors. The average number of bidders in
competition with Hong Kong bidders A, B and C is 12, 16 and 14 respectively.
The average numbers of bidders for the corresponding UK bidders is 8, 7 and 6.
In addition, the percentage differences between the bidder's bid and competitor's
bid, in many instances, are much larger than the UK counterparts. This can be
seen in Table 6.2 which shows a comparison of the mean bidding percentages for
contracts on which the three bidders made bidding attempts. It can be seen that the
resulting coefficient of variations for the Hong Kong bidders are approximately
double that of the UK bidders.
Bidder
label
Hong Kong UK
Mean
percentage
bidding range
Coefficient
of variation
Mean
percentage
bidding range
Coefficient
of variation
A
B
C
88.60%
60.63%
53.16%
81.03%
79.58%
87.70%
19.11%
19.21%
17.25%
40.92%
36.42%
45.67%
Table 6.2: Mean percentage bidding ranges for contracts on which the Hong Kong
and UK contractors made bidding attempts
The principal reason for all of above differences is probably because the UK data
are based on selective tendering, in which the contractor is invited to bid, whereas
the Hong Kong data is based on a restricted open tendering system, in which the
onus to bid lies with the contractor. The large percentage differences between
some Hong Kong bids is probably exacerbated by some contractors being
compelled to bid. There is a Government tendering regulation which stipulates that
contractors 'who over a reasonable period of time appear to be disinterested in
tendering for public works contracts ... may be removed from the approved list'
(Hong Kong Government 1981).
1 5 5
In considering the individual bidding performances of the three Hong Kong
contractors, it looks as though bidder B is the most competitive contractor overall.
6.2.2	 Overall success rates
Bidder B being the most competitive contractor is also reflected in the success
rates of the contractors as shown in Table 6.3. This shows this same contractor
attaining the highest success percentage out of the three Hong Kong contractors.
When compared against the UK contractors it can be seen that the resulting
success percentages are generally lower. This is likely to be because the Hong
Kong contractors are competing, on average, against more competitors. Competing
in this level of competition would seem to make it more difficult for contractors
to have control over the work they really want to undertake. This is likely to be
one reason why the three Hong Kong contractors are unable to attain a high
success percentage over all contracts.
Bidder
Hong Kong UK
Success Ratio Percentage Success Ratio Percentage
A
B
C
2 / 23
8 / 52
5 / 72
8.7%
15.4%
6.9%
9 / 12
1 / 10
2 / 17
75.0%
10.0%
11.8%
Table 6.3: Success rates of obtaining contracts for the Hong Kong and UK
contractors
6.2.3	 Success rates according to type and nature of work
Having examined the overall differences, the success percentages for the three
Hong Kong contractors were split into the 5 contract types according to the Cl/Sfb
classification and also according to nature of work (ie. new work and alteration
work). This shown in Table 6.4. In respect of the contract type breakdown it can
be seen that bidder B obtained a success percentage of 40% for primary schools.
Although the success percentage is not as high as UK bidder A, who bid only for
school contracts, it may be taken to be comparable given the larger number of
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Hong Kong competitors per competition. This inclination toward schools may be
due to the fact that schools may be very similar or identical in design. Another
possibility is that some Hong Kong contractors at least, have to specialise in the
work they undertake in order to compete successfully in this level of competition.
It would seem, therefore, that experience is a key factor. Although the success
percentage is lower, both of bidder A's only successes are also confined to one
contract type, namely police stations. These two bidders' successes are in contrast
to bidder C's successes which are spread over three types. This is also reflected
in the nature of work. All of bidder B's successes are for new work contracts
whereas both of bidder A's successes are for alteration work contracts. Bidder C's
successes are split between alteration and new work. It can be seen that bidder C's
success ratio is over three times higher for alteration work contracts.
Contract type Nature of work
Fire stations Police stations Primary Secondary Hostels New work Alteration work
Bidder
label
schools Schools
Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
% Success
ratio
%
A 0 / 3 0.0 2 / 9 22.2 0 / 8 0.0 0 / 1 0.0 0 / 2 0.0 0 / 6 0.0 2 / 17 11.8
B 0/ 8 0.0 1/ 8 12.5 6 / 15 40.0 0 /7 0.0 1 / 14 7.1 8 /40 20.0 0 / 12 0.0
C 2 / 15 13.3 1 / 14 7.1 0 / 19 0.0 0 / 13 0.0 2 / 11 18.2 3 / 60 5.0 2 / 12 16.7
Table 6.4 Success rates of obtaining contracts for Hong Kong contractors A, B
and C according to contract type and nature of work
6.2.4	 Success and contract size
The size of and range of contracts on which the UK contractors were successful
is not fully reported by Flanagan and Norman for those UK contractors. They
merely state that for bidder A 'no contract was over £500,000' and that bidder C
'was successful in obtaining contracts on the two occasions when the project value
exceeded £1,500,000'. Details of the size and range of contracts on which the
Hong Kong contractors are successful is given in Table 6.5. As expected the
average size of contracts on which the bidders were successful corresponds to the
size of bidder with the large bidder achieving the largest range of successes and
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the small contractor achieving the smallest range. The large contractor also
achieved the largest coefficient of variation.
Bidder
label
Average
bid value
(HK$
Standard
Deviation
Coefficient
of
variation
Contract Size Range
Minimum Maximum
Millions)
A HK$ 1.84 1.11 60.33% HK$ 0.73 HK$ 2.95
B HK$ 8.98 3.40 37.84% HK$ 1.93 HK$ 11.42
C HK$ 13.73 11.44 83.33% HK$ 1.07 HK$ 30.38
Table 6.5: Size and range of contracts on which Hong Kong contractors A, B and
C are successful
6.2.5	 Overall comparison
For the UK contractors, Flanagan and Norman concluded that bidder B, the
medium bidder, showed no bidding trend while bidder A, the small bidder, works
only within a well defined range and sticks to a well defined product, and bidder
C, the large bidder, appears to bid more competitively on the large projects.
By comparison, none of the Hong Kong contractors appears to restrict their
bidding to one type. However, bidder B, (the medium contractor) is successful on
six contracts of the same type (ie. primary schools) and all eight contracts are new
works contracts. Both of bidder A's (the small contractor) only successes are for
the same type (ie. police stations) and both are for alteration works contracts.
Bidder C (the large contractor) five successes are over a range of both new works
and alteration works.
It would seem, therefore, that bidder C shows no particular bidding trend while
both bidder A and B's successes, at least, are for a well defined product and
within a well defmed range. None of the three Hong Kong bidders appeared to be
more competitive on the larger contracts.
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6.3 Developing Flanagan and Norman's study
6.3.1	 Competitiveness and bidding performance
Flanagan and Norman's conclusions on the bidding performance of bidders appear
to rest largely on the relationship between the size of bidders and their success
rates relative to type and size of project. The competitive bidding performances
of the bidders is also measured by expressing each competitor's bid as a
percentage of the bidder's bid and shown in Figure 6.1. Although this gives an
overall picture of a contractor's bidding performance it is difficult to observe the
relative degree of competitiveness of each of the bidders.
Although success and expressing each competitors bid as a percentage of the
bidder's bid are both indicators of competitiveness, it is not possible to determine
the relative degree of each bidder's competitiveness towards contract type and
size. Since success is a discrete variable and success rates are based on a nominal
scale, the distance between values, in terms of competitiveness, is not known.
Using each bidder's bid as the baseline has a disadvantage when comparing the
bidding performance between bidders in that each bidders baseline is likely to be
different. Although this gives an overall picture of a contractors bidding
performance it is difficult to observe and compare the relative degree of
competitiveness between each bidder.
Bidding performance analysis is concerned with the relationships between bids
entered by different contractors in competition. As bidding performance is the
product of competitive tendering for projects of different types and sizes contracts
a suitable measure is needed to reflect the competitiveness of bids for all contracts.
The preferred measure offered is the ratio of the bidders bid to the lowest bid (ie.
Equation 5.1). This is now used in developing Flanagan and Norman's study.
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6.3.2	 Overall competitiveness
Table 6.6 shows the average competitiveness for each of the three Hong Kong
bidders over all projects together with the competitiveness variability. It can be
seen that bidder B appears to be the most competitive and bidder overall with least
competitiveness variability. In contrast bidder A is the least competitive, but the
most variable in terms of competitiveness.
Bidder label
Competitiveness
Average
competitiveness
Standard
Deviation
Coefficient
of
Variation
A
B
C
0.7893
0.8875
0.8652
0.1512
0.1110
0.1163
19.16%
12.51%
13.58%
Table 6.6: Overall competitiveness vs variability for Hong Kong contractors A, B
and C
6.3.3	 Competitiveness according to contract type
Table 6.7 shows the competitiveness of these bidders according to type. It can be
seen that bidder A appears to be the most competitive bidder towards fire stations,
bidder B the most competitive toward primary schools and bidder C the most
competitive towards the three remaining contract types. Bidder B's proclivity
towards primary schools, referred to earlier in the analysis is borne out in the
competitiveness value of 0.9539. This is considerably higher than any of the
remaining competitiveness values. With the exception of fire stations, bidder B
appears to be most consistent in competitiveness. (The relatively high variability
for police stations is caused by one very poor bidding attempt which was 175%
above the lowest bid).
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Bidder according to
contract type
Competitiveness
Average
Competitiveness
Standard
Deviation
Coefficient
of
Variation
Fire stations (372)
A 0.9073 0.0625 0.89%
B 0.8937 0.0476 5.33%
C 0.8494 0.0961 11.31%
Police stations (374)
A 0.7638 0.1866 24.43%
B 0.8206 0.2067 25.18%
C 0.8350 0.1589 19.02%
Primary schools (712)
A 0.7590 0.1487 19.59%
B 0.9539 0.0644 6.75%
C 0.8325 0.1204 14.46%
Secondary schools (713)
A 0.8595 -
B 0.8896 0.0868 9.76%
C 0.9011 0.0983 10.91%
Hostels (848)
A 0.8129 0.0300 3.69%
B 0.8497 0.0820 9.65%
C 0.8804 0.0870 9.88%
Table 6.7: Competitiveness according to type for Hong Kong contractors A, B and
C
6.3.4	 Competitiveness and variability in bidding
There appears to be a correlation between competitiveness C' and the
corresponding standard deviation C". Comparing the average competitiveness and
standard deviation in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 it can be seen that in many instances a
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lower average competitiveness value attracts a higher standard deviation and vice
versa. This appears to be a logical outcome as a bidder with a low average
competitiveness ratio and low standard deviation would fail to get any work.
Conversely, a bidder with a high average competitiveness ratio would eventually
become bankrupt. This logic is developed in the methodology chapter from which
a four way classification system is proposed (see Chapter 5). Bidders are
classified, according to the client's perspective, as Sensible (high C' and low C"
values), Suicidal (high C' and C" values), Non-serious (low C' and C" values) and
Silly (low C' and high C" values).
6.3.4.1	 All bidders
Using data for all the bidders in the sample, the overall mean competitiveness, C',
was correlated with the standard deviation, C". This produced a negative
correlation coefficient of - 0.2858 (n=149, p=0.000) for bidders having more than
one bidding attempt.
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Figure 6.2:	 Scatterplot of competitiveness and variability for all the bidders
in the sample
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Figure 6.2 shows the scatterplot of all the coded bidders in the sample (bidders
entering only one bid have been assigned a zero standard deviation). The central
cluster of bidders represents the typical bidders performance in terms of C' and
C". It is also interesting that no bidder has a high C' and high C". This has been
denoted in Figure 6.2 as the 'impossible region'. Clearly this phenomenon is
symptomatic of the measure used, for as competitiveness is constrained to be at
a maximum value of one, large C" values are hardly possible for greater values of
C'. It could also, however, be because there are few Suicidal bidders in the
sample.
6.3.4.2	 Most frequent bidders
The most frequent bidders (ie. those who bid ten times or more in the sample)
were selected for analysis as it was considered that the results obtained would be
more representative of their bidding behaviour. The C' and C" values of this
subset of 75 bidders were found to have a much stronger correlation of -0.6290
p---0.000).
Figure 6.3 shows the overall bidding performance broken down into the four
competitiveness classification quadrants, the axes of the quadrants being
determined according to the mean C' and C" of this grouping of bidders. Due to
the strong negative correlation, most bidders fall in the Sensible-Silly quadrants,
37 being classified as Sensible and 16 as Silly. Of the 22 remaining, 16 were Non-
Serious while 6 were Suicidal. There appears to be some evidence of a lengthy
Sensible-Silly continuum, with several bidders reaching towards the extremities.
The Non-Serious-Suicidal continuum, on the other hand is much shorter -
indicating fewer extreme differences between the bidders on this scale.
The objective of submitting a bona fide competitive bid is to become the lowest
bidder and thereby win the contract. The next part of the analysis therefore
examines the question 'which of the four groups is most successful at becoming
the lowest bidder and thereby securing the contract?' In terms of success at
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becoming the lowest bidder, the logical sequence should rank in descending order
of Suicidal, Sensible, Silly and Non-Serious. To answer this question, therefore, the
number of lowest bids was expressed as a proportion to the total number of
bidding attempts to produce the success ratio for each quadrant. This yielded the
following success ratios; Suicidal = 0.168, Sensible = 0.108, Silly = 0.047, Non-
Serious = 0.038 against an overall average of 0.084. The result therefore concurs
with the above stated proposition.
SENSIBLE BIDDERS
	
SUICIDAL BIDDERS
015
3	 134	 1363711
	
44
16
144 65
1517
0	 001 002	 am	 004	 003	 006	 007	 003 009	 01
C (STANDARD DEVIATION)
NON-SERIOUS BIDDERS
124
'Si 63	 1 fl
QS
x142	 14,
143
SILLY BIDDERS
Figure 6.3:	 Scatterplot of competitiveness and variability for bidders with 10
or more bidding attempts
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Bidders were then considered in terms of contract type groupings, within each
classification, and tabulated according to their overall performance classification.
Table 6.8 shows the classification for each bidder across contract types, single
bidding attempts being shown separately.
Bidder
code
Contract type code Bidder
code
Contract type code
372 374	 712 713 848 372 374	 712	 713 848
SENSIBLE BIDDERS SUICIDAL BIDDERS
1 SE S SE SE S 52 SE SI	 SE SE SE
3 - SE - NS SE 58 SE SI	 SE - SE
6 S	 S SE SE SE 84 NS SE SE N
7 S SE N - SE 129 SU SE	 SI SE S
9 SE SE SE SI SE 141 NS N	 S SE SU
11 S SE N SE S 152 SE NS	 SI SU SE
16 SE NS N SE NS SILLY BIDDERS
21 SE SE SE SE S 2 SI SE	 N SI SE
26 SI SE N SE NS 10 S NS NS SI
36 - SI SE NS SE 18 SI SI	 SI SU SE
37 SE SE NS N SE 24 SE NS	 S SI SI
40 SI SE SE SI SE 33 - SE	 N NS SI
48 SE SI SE SE NS 43 SI SI	 SI SI SI
49 SE SI SE SE SE 45 NS SI	 NS NS SI
51 N SE - SI SE 50 SE N	 SI SI NS
65 _ SE N SU SE 61 NS SE	 NS SI SI
69 NS SU SE SE SE 64 SE SI	 SI N NS
72 SE SE S S S 68 SE N	 SI SI SE
74 SE - SE SI S 71 SI SI	 SI NS NS
75 SE SE NS SI S 79 SE N	 SE SE SI
88 S SE - N SE 94 NS S	 NS SI
96 SE SU SE SE SE 105 N NS S SI
104 S SU NS NS NS 114 N N	 NS - SI
108 SE SE N N SE NON-SERIOUS BIDDERS
109 N NS S SE SE 20 SE SI	 SE NS NS
115 SE NS SE SE SI 27 NS NS	 SE SI NS
118 NS SU SE SU SE 30 NS SI	 NS N NS
119 S NS SI SE SE 60 SI NS	 S N NS
122 SE SE SE SE NS 92 NS SI	 SI SI NS
127 SE NS SE NS NS 99 SI SE	 SE SI NS
133 SE SE NS SE NS 121 NS SE	 SE NS SU
134 SE NS N SE 124 N SE NS NS
136 NS S SE SU SE 126 N NS	 SE NS SE
148 NS SE S SE SE 135 NS SE N SI
150 SE SE SE SE SE 140 SI SU	 SI NS SE
154 SE - SI SE SE 142 NS NS	 NS SI NS
178 SU SE SE 143 N NS	 N SI N
146 NS	 N SI NS
149 NS S	 NS SI SI
151 NS NS	 NS S SE
Table 6.8: Bidder classification according to type
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Consider first the Sensible group of bidders. Some bidders are clearly consistently
Sensible over all contract types (eg. bidders 1, 6, 21, 72, and 150). It could be
argued that this group of bidders is of unfocused cost leaders as they appear to be
competitive over all contract types, and that clients can be assured of receiving a
competitive bid irrespective of contract type. Those border line cases who just fall
into the Sensible competitive quadrant (eg. bidders 16, 26, 40, 84, and 119) show
a mixed classification over the various contract types. In this case it could be
argued that these bidders are focused. In general then it seems that this Sensible
group of bidders can be regarded as lying on an unfocused-focused continuum.
This corresponds to a C'-C" diagonal line running from top left to bottom right
through the Sensible quadrant in Figure 6.3. Based on this model, we would
therefore consider bidders 11 and 75 for instance also to be unfocused cost leaders
despite the lack of available direct evidence.
Of the few bidders classified as Suicidal over all five contract types, three are
classed as Suicidal for individual contract types. Apart from three exceptions, these
bidders are classed as either Sensible or Silly for each type. This suggests that they
are focused but, as implied by the class, are rather more risky in their bidding than
the bidders in the Sensible group. In the Non-Serious group, some of the bidders
(eg. bidders 121 and 140) may be considered focused, whilst others in the group
are clearly Non-Serious over all contract types. Similar but weaker traits to the
Sensible bidders are reflected in the results for the Silly group of bidders. Bidder
43 is unique in that this bidder is classified as Silly over all contract types while
bidders 30, 45, 71, 92, 114, 142 and 143 have shown themselves to be either Silly
or Non-Serious over all contract types.
Table 6.9 gives a breakdown of the total number of bidding attempts and successes
for the various contract types. As indicated in Table 6.9, the number of successes
is not evenly distributed over the different contract types (eg. bidder 96 has a
success ratio of 0.47 for contract type 848 compared a success ratio of 0.09 for the
remaining contract types). Again, this appears to support the existence of focusing
strategies.
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Bidder
code
All
types
Contract type code Bidder
code
All
types
Contract type code
372	 374 712	 713 848 372	 374	 712	 713 848
SENSIBLE BIDDERS SUICIDAL BIDDERS
1 25 4 631- 9	 1 8- 1 52 52 8 8	 81	 156	 7- 141
3 12 - --6- 3- 3 58 20 3 7	 1	 4	 62	 -- 3-
6 14 2 11	 1 61 3- 3- 84 10 3 2---	 41	 32 1
7 16 6 11 	 4 -- 115 129 18 3 5	 1	 2	 1	 5-	 51 1
9 40 1 4	 81 9 11- 8- 141 13 2 2	 1	 -	 1-	 2- 72
11 12 2 1-	 21 1 71 1- 152 30 5 41	 5-	 6-	 134 2
16 21 1 8-	 2 1 51 5- SILLY BIDDERS
21 27 2 71 	 4	 - 71 8- 1- 2 23 - 9	 2	 -	 1-	 3- 8
26 22 - 4-	 -- 4 9- 3 10 19 - 1	 5	 -	 5 8-
36 22 1 3- 6 3- 101 18 72 5 15 	 2	 14	 1	 19	 13 11	 2
37 16 1 2-61 3 1- 4- 24 42 1 3	 101	 1	 12 16	 -
40 36 1 6-	 41 9 11- 6 33 10 - 2-	 1	 2 5	 -
48 34 3 7	 51 82 10- 4 43 35 2 6	 4-	 61	 101 9-
49 25 3 931- 6 5 3	 - 45 52 1 12 	 10	 -	 7	 5 181
51 16 2 1	 4	 2 2 9	 - 50 20 - 9	 1-	 5	 2 3	 -
69 44 5 4	 -	 82 6 10 163 61 32 3 6	 -	 2-	 7	 143 3-
72 10 1 4	 -	 3	 - 1 Ii 1- 64 23 2 3-92 	 8	 1 2-
74 30 3 91 	 -	 - 11 91 11 65 13 1 --51 	 2 6-
75 15 3 6231 2 3 1	 - 68 24 4 31 	 1	 -	 51	 2 132
88 10 - 1	 -	 6	 - 1 2	 - 79 18 1 411- 	 6	 2 5	 -
96 50 11 16	 2	 41 2 9 178 92 26 1 4	 -	 2	 1	 8	 4 8	 -
99 33 2 61	 5- 91 6 7	 - 94 16 - 3	 -	 1	 -	 5	 7 --
104 17 - 1	 -	 3- 3 8 2 105 12 1-3 	 1 7	 -
108 16 1 3	 -	 9	 - 1 1- 2	 - 114 10 1	 -	 1	 3 5	 -
109 443 1	 -	 12- 1 141 162 NON-SERIOUS BIDDERS
115 32 4 82	 6- 62 9- 2	 - 20 41 2 9-	 6-	 8-	 61 121
118 32 7 3	 -	 72 31 51 143 27 33 2 4	 -	 11	 1	 3	 -	 7	 1 8
119 58 11 31	 152 5 123 235 30 13 - 5	 -	 2	 -	 2-	 1- 3
122 54 2 9-	 8- 7 171 131 60 19 1 61	 3-	 1-	 5- 4
127 58 1 16-	 4- 201 14- 4	 - 71 49 4 13	 1	 13	 2	 10	 1	 5 8
133 31 1 4	 -	 7 4 71 9	 - 121 16 - 1	 -	 5	 -	 2-	 6
134 15 1 3	 3	 - 1 81 124 24 2 1-82 	 6 9
136 31 2 8	 1	 - 9 92 4	 - 126 20 - 1	 -	 4	 -	 5	 5 5
148 54 9 5	 195 1 163 131 135 19 - -	 -	 7	 -	 --	 1 9
150 36 7 3-71 2 91 155 140 34 2 3	 -	 7-	 3-	 91 121
154 19 1 3	 -	 - 2 50 91 142 63 - 15-	 10-	 9-	 12 17
178 10 2 2151 3	 - 143 11 - 1	 -	 3	 -	 1-	 5 1
146 17 1 -	 -	 1-	 1	 51 9
149 30 1 6	 -	 1	 -	 9	 1	 4 10
151 10 - 2	 -	 2	 -	 2	 1 3
Table 6.9: Number of bidding attempts/successes overall and according to contract
type
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 together show that all bidders who had 5 or more successes at
a particular type were classified as Sensible for that particular type. Although
those bidders who had between 1 and 4 successes at one particular type came from
the different classification groupings, the dominant grouping in terms of success
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is the Sensible group of bidders. The most successful bidders from the Sensible
group are bidders 7, 96, 118, 119, 148, and 150 who had a bid/success ratio of
0.38, 0.22, 0.22, 0.19, 0.17 and 0.19 respectively. The principal reason for the
comparatively high success ratios may be that in all instances these bidders were
more competitive on particular contract types. For example, bidders 7, 96, 119 and
150 had success ratios of 0.45, 0.47, 0.22 and 0.33 respectively for contract type
848. Bidder 148 had a success ratio of 0.26 for contract type 374. Of the Suicidal
bidders, bidder 52 with a success ratio of 0.15 in total, was classified as Sensible
for contract type 712 with a success ratio of 0.40.
Apart from bidder 61, who had three successes (ie. a success ratio of 0.21) on
contract type 713, those classified as Silly on individual types were restricted to
1 or 2 successes on each type. All the Non-Serious bidders were restricted to either
1 or 2 successes on each contract type. The least successful Non-Serious bidder
was bidder 142 who did not win a single contract in 63 bidding attempts. Bidders
who were successful more than once were found in all five contract types.
6.4 Summary
In replicating Flanagan and Norman's study (Flanagan and Norman 1982b), some
similarities are found when comparing the bidding performance of three Hong
Kong and UK contractors. UK bidder A, a small contractor only bid for one
particular contract type, namely schools, and was found to be very successful. By
comparison none of the three Hong Kong contractors restricted their bidding to
just one type, although in terms of successes, Hong Kong bidder A's only two
successes are restricted to one type (ie. police station alteration contracts) while
all eight of Hong Kong bidder B's (a medium contractor) successes are for new
works. Six of these are for primary school contracts. This inclination towards
schools may be due to the fact that Government schools are very similar in design.
It would seem therefore, that experience is a key factor. In contrast, Hong Kong
bidder C's (a large contractor) five successes are spread over three contract types
and are for contracts of varying sizes. Three successes are for new works contracts
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and the remaining two for alteration contracts. This bidder, similar to UK bidder
B, appears to show no particular bidding trend as far as contract size and type is
concerned. Unlike UK bidder C, a large contractor, none of the Hong Kong
contractors appear to be more competitive on larger contracts.
Flanagan and Norman's conclusions on the bidding performance of bidders appear
to rest largely on the relationship between the size of bidders and their successes
rates relative to type and size of contract. Since success is a discrete variable and
success rates are based on a nominal scale, the distance between values, in terms
of competitiveness, is not known. The bidding performances of the bidders is also
measured by expressing each competitor's bid as a percentage of the bidders bid.
Although this gives an overall picture of a contractor's bidding performance it is
difficult to observe and compare the relative degree of competitiveness between
each bidder.
In using the competitiveness measure of bidder's bid to lowest bid (ie. Equation
5.1), it is found that of the three Hong Kong contractors, bidder B appears to be
the most competitive and bidder with least competitiveness variability. In contrast
bidder A is the least competitive, but the most variable in terms of
competitiveness.
There appears to be a correlation between competitiveness C' and the
corresponding standard deviation C". This appears to be a logical outcome as a
bidder with a low average competitiveness ratio and low standard deviation would
fail to get any work. Conversely, a bidder with a high average competitiveness
ratio and high standard deviation would eventually become bankrupt. This logic
is developed in the methodology chapter and a four way bidder classification
system is proposed. Bidders are classified as Sensible (high C' and low C" values),
Suicidal (high C' and C" values), Non-serious (low C' and C" values) and Silly
(low C' and high C" values).
The most frequent bidders, ie. those who bid ten times or more in the sample,
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were selected for analysis as it was considered that the results obtained would be
more representative of the bidders' bidding behaviour. The C' and C" values of
this subset of 75 bidders were found to have a strong negative correlation of -
0.6290 (n=75, p=0.000). The significant negative correlation between
competitiveness and consistency resulted in most bidders being classified as
Sensible or Silly. More extreme cases of Sensible and Silly bidders were found
than in the Suicidal and Non-Serious categories, where bidders were much less
differentiated. In terms of success at becoming the lowest bidder, the success rates
ranked in descending order of Suicidal, Sensible, Silly and Non-Serious.
A major disadvantage of using this particular approach is that it does not account
for different size contractors bidding for different sizes of contract. Since this
measure of competitiveness will produce greater ratio differences for smaller
contracts, it is likely to show smaller contractors to be less competitive than the
larger contractors and also more variable in their bidding simply because they are
more likely to have bid over a narrower range of smaller contracts. One approach
in reducing this problem may be to divide the contracts into different bands of
contract sizes and recalculating the competitiveness of bidders according to each
contract size band. This, however, requires more data. Eliminating this problem
may be accomplished by modelling the competitiveness of bidders using regression
analysis. One of the assumptions in using this technique is that the independent
variables have a constant variance. If this assumption is violated the
competitiveness model is required to be transformed in order to satisfy the
assumption.
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CHAPTER 7
Determining the best model
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7 DETERMINING THE BEST MODEL
7.1 Introduction
The approach taken in selecting the best model was first to determine the best
candidate model according to the individual bidding performance of bidders.
Starting with two bidders, individual bidders were added incrementally into the
analysis up to the 15 bidder cut off point and the best candidate model determined
(using the forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm as previously
described in Chapter 5) for each incremental increase.
The bidders were then grouped, using the Hong Kong Government classification
system according to bidder size (ie. small, medium and large) and the best model
determined using the same algorithm. Since bidder sizes are known for all bidders,
the whole data set was used.
Sensitivity tests were undertaken for both the individual and grouped bidder
analysis by varying the combination of contract types.
The best model for the individual bidding performance of 15 bidders was then
compared with the grouped bidding performance to determine whether bidders
modelled individually or grouped is the best predictor of competitiveness. In
making the comparison, the model with the least number of explained degrees of
freedom (ie. the grouped bidder best model) was treated as the null hypothesis (ie.
that it is the best model). The 15 individual bidder best model was treated as the
alternative hypothesis. The robustness of the best model resulting from this
comparison was then further examined.
Development of the candidate models, details of the rationale behind this approach
and examining robustness of the best model is described in Chapter 5.
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7.2 Individual bidder analysis
The individual bidding behaviour was analysed by incrementally adding bidders
into the sample up to the predetermined 15 bidder cut off point and the best model
determined for each incremental increase.
7.2.1	 Utility of the candidate models
Table 7.1 shows a summary of the values (rounded) of SSE, MSE, df, global F
values and adjusted R2 for the candidate models. For the sake of brevity starting
with six bidders these are shown in incremental stages of three bidders.
As can be seen in Table 7.1 the model order is based on the number of explained
degrees of freedom. As expected, in most cases, the MSE (Mean square error)
gradually decreases as the number of explained degrees of freedom increases.
Significant global F values for each of the candidate models indicate that at least
one of the coefficients in the model differs from zero and therefore the model is
of some use in predicting competitiveness.
The adjusted R2 statistics, as shown in Table 7.1 are small, and therefore indicate
that the data do not fit the candidate models very well. When comparing the
incremental analysis of the models overall, for 6, 9, 12 and 15 bidder data sets, it
can be seen that the adjusted R2 statistics show an improvement up to the 9 bidder
data set, after which there is a slight deterioration in this statistic for both the 12
bidder and 15 bidder data sets.
Turning to the utility of the individual models themselves, in terms of adjusted R2
and global F-values, it would appear that models 8, 12, 21, 18 and 22 out perform
the other models in the 3, 6 and 9 bidder data sets. For the 12 and 15 bidder data
sets, with the exception of model 8, the same set of models appear to be the better
models together with models 19 and 20.
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6 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 9 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res
df
SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
1 0 360 3.25 0.009028 0.00 0.00 1 0 513 5.62 0.010955 0.00 0.00
2 3 357 3.07 0.008599 10.47 0.05 2 3 510 5.37 0.010529 11.87 0.04
3 7 353 2.97 0.008414 5.55 0.07 3 7 506 5.23 0.010336 6.29 0.06
4 8 352 2.83 0.008040 7.46 0.11 4 11 502 4.42 0.008805 13.63 0.20
7 12 348 2.76 0.007931 5.62 0.12 5 15 498 4.98 0.010000 4.57 0.09
5 15 345 2.76 0.008000 4.38 0.11 7 15 498 4.31 0.008655 10.81 0.21
6 18 342 2.71 0.007924 4.01 0.12 8 23 490 4.03 0.008224 8.79 0.25
8 20 340 2.53 0.007441 5.09 0.18 6 27 486 4.15 0.008539 6.62 0.22
9 22 338 2.63 0.007781 3.79 0.14 9 31 482 4.05 0.008402 6.23 0.23
12 30 330 2.45 0.007424 3.72 0.18 12 39 474 3.82 0.008059 5.88 0.26
10 32 328 2.51 0.007652 3.12 0.15 10 47 466 3.96 0.008498 4.25 0.22
13 40 320 2.36 0.007375 3.09 0.18 13 55 458 3.73 0.008144 4.30 0.26
14 42 318 2.40 0.007547 2.75 0.16 14 63 450 3.75 0.008333 3.62 0.24
21 50 310 2.27 0.007323 2.73 0.19 21 71 442 3.56 0.008054 3.65 0.26
11 52 308 2.44 0.007922 2.00 0.12 11 79 434 3.73 0.008594 2.82 0.22
15 60 300 2.17 0.007233 2.53 0.20 15 87 426 3.38 0.007934 3.28 0.28
16 62 298 2.25 0.007550 2.17 0.16 16 95 418 3.45 0.008254 2.80 0.25
18 70 290 2.08 0.007172 2.36 0.21 18 103 410 3.22 0.007854 3.00 0.28
17 72 288 2.07 0.007188 2.31 0.20 17 111 402 3.28 0.008159 2.61 0.26
20 80 280 2.00 0.007143 2.22 0.21 20 119 394 3.12 0.007919 2.68 0.28
19 82 278 1.97 0.007086 2.23 0.22 19 127 386 3.10 0.008031 2.49 0.27
22 90 270 1.92 0.007111 2.10 0.21 22 135 378 3.00 0.007937 2.46 0.28
12 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 15 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Mod Exp Res SSE M S F Adj Mod Exp Res SSE M S F Adj
No. df df Error Value R2 No. df df Error Value R2
1 0 652 6.89 0.010567 0.00 0.00 1 0 776 8.38 0.010799 0.00 0.00
2 3 649 6.58 0.010139 15.29 0.04 2 3 773 8.01 0.010362 17.85 0.04
3 7 645 6.46 0.010016 7.16 0.05 3 7 769 7.79 0.010130 9.71 0.06
4 14 638 5.59 0.008762 11.41 0.17 5 15 761 7.53 0.009895 6.14 0.08
5 15 637 6.17 0.009686 5.31 0.08 4 17 759 6.80 0.008959 11.02 0.17
7 18 634 5.22 0.008233 11.93 0.22 7 21 755 6.64 0.008795 9.89 0.19
8 26 626 5.50 0.008786 6.33 0.17 8 29 747 6.39 0.008554 8.31 0.21
6 36 616 5.21 0.008458 5.68 0.20 6 45 731 6.20 0.008482 5.84 0.21
9 40 612 5.13 0.008382 5.38 0.21 9 49 727 6.06 0.008336 5.80 0.23
12 48 604 4.84 0.008013 5.44 0.24 12 57 719 5.80 0.008067 5.71 0.25
10 62 590 5.04 0.008542 3.55 0.19 10 77 699 6.03 0.008627 3.58 0.20
13 70 582 4.82 0.008282 3.62 0.22 13 85 691 5.83 0.008437 3.60 0.22
14 84 568 4.72 0.008310 3.15 0.21 14 105 671 5.50 0.008197 3.38 024
21 92 560 4.51 0.008054 3.25 0.24 21 113 663 5.29 0.007979 3.46 0.26
11 106 546 4.76 0.008718 2.33 0.18 11 133 643 5.67 0.008818 2.33 0.18
15 114 538 4.42 0.008216 2.66 0.22 15 141 635 5.30 0.008346 2.64 0.23
16 128 524 4.39 0.008378 2.35 0.21 16 161 615 5.13 0.008341 2.44 0.23
18 136 516 4.09 0.007926 2.62 0.25 18 169 607 4.78 0.007875 2.72 0.27
17 150 502 4.07 0.008108 2.33 0.23 17 189 587 4.73 0.008058 2.41 0.25
20 158 494 3.96 0.008016 2.33 0.24 20 197 579 4.63 0.007997 2.39 0.26
19 172 480 3.90 0.008125 2.15 0.23 19 217 559 4.52 0.008086 2.21 0.25
22 180 472 3.81 0.008072 2.13 0.24 22 225 551 4.43 0.008040 2.19 0.26
Table 7.1: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled
individually (for 6, 9, 12 and 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
Since the basic objective of the best model selection is to find the best model
which has a combination of the least number of variables and smallest MSE,
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overall it would appear that models 8 and 12 are good contenders for the best
candidate model.
7.2.2	 Results of the forward chunkwise sequential variable selection
algorithm
The calculated F-test value for the candidate models was derived from applying
the forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm as shown in Chapter
5, Equation 5.2. This algorithm is based on the explained and residual degrees of
freedom, SSE statistics and MSE. The F-test value has been calculated for each
of the 22 candidate models in the 6, 9, 12 and 15 model data sets. Each model
was tested in order of explained df (see Table 7.1). The model with the least
number degrees of freedom was regarded as the null hypothesis and tested against
the model with the next highest number of degrees of freedom which was regarded
as the alternative hypothesis.
The chunkwise algorithm as applied to the 15 bidder analysis is shown here as an
example of how the best model is determined. Starting with the model with the
least number of explained df (ie. model 1) the models are tested. Compare model
1 with model 2. The F-statistic based on 3 and 773 df is
F = [(8.38 - 8.01) / (3)] / 0.010362
F= 11.90
The approximate tabulated value for F 05 based on 3 and 773 df obtained from the
F-distribution is 2.61. Since the calculated F-value exceeds the tabulated F-value
the null hypothesis is rejected. The conclusion is therefore that the variables in
model 2 (ie. contract size) contribute to the prediction of competitiveness. Model
2, therefore, goes forward to be tested against the next model with the least
number of explained degrees of freedom. This algorithm is repeated for all the
candidate models.
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Table 7.2 shows the resulting tabulated and calculated F values for the 15 bidder
data set after applying the chunkwise algorithm to the Table 7.1 statistics. It
appears that model 12 is the best model. Table 7.2 also shows the resulting
tabulated and calculated F values together with the best model for the 6, 9 and 12
bidder data sets.
It should be noted that the vast majority of cases appear to follow the expected
trend whereby models with more explained degrees of freedom have a lower MSE,
thereby necessitating the use of the chunkwise algorithm to fmd the best model.
There are, however, instances where models with more explained degrees of
freedom also have a higher MSE than models with fewer degrees of freedom. For
example, in respect of the 15 bidder data set, compare model 12 with model 10.
With 57 explained degrees of freedom model 12 has a MSE of 0.008067, yet
model 10 with 77 degrees of freedom has a MSE of 0.008627. Since the goal of
the best model analysis is to find the model that produces the best combination of
least number of explained variables coupled with a low MSE, a model with less
explained degrees of freedom and a lower MSE must be better than a model with
more explained variables and a larger MSE. In such cases the model with the least
number of variables and lower MSE automatically qualifies as the best model.
It should be further noted that there are instances in which the number of
explained degrees of freedom are identical for both the null and alternative
hypotheses. Although there is not an example of this in the 15 bidder data set, an
example can be seen in the 9 bidder data set with models 5 and 7. Both models
have 15 explained degrees of freedom. In these instances due to the difference of
number of degrees of freedom equalling zero it is not possible to compute the
calculated F value. The best model for cases such as these can be found simply
by comparing the MSE. The model with the smaller MSE is taken to be the best
model. Model 5 has an MSE of 0.01000 as compared with model 7's MSE of
0.008655. Therefore in the comparison of these two models, model 7 goes forward
as the best model and is then compared with the model with the next highest
degrees of freedom.
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6 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 9 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model
No.
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model
No.
1 / 2 6.98 2.63 2 1 / 2 7.91 2.62 2
2 / 3 2.97 2.40 3 2 / 3 3.39 2.39 3
3 / 4 17.41 3.88 4 3 / 4 23.00 2.39 4
4 / 7 2.21 2.40 4 4 / 5 - 2.39 4
4 / 5 1.25 1.97 4 4 / 7 3.18 2.39 7
4 / 6 1.51 1.97 4 7 / 8 4.26 1.96 8
4 / 8 3.36 1.75 8 8 / 6 - 1.51 8
8 / 9 - - 8 8 / 9 - 1.96 8
8 /12 1.08 1.50 8 8 /12 1.63 1.67 8
8 / 10 0.22 1.47 8 8 / 10 0.34 1.54 8
8 / 13 1.15 1.44 8 8 / 13 1.15 1.45 8
8 / 14 0.78 1.43 8 8 / 14 0.84 1.41 8
8 / 21 1.18 1.40 8 8 / 21 1.22 1.38 8
8 / 11 0.36 1.40 8 8 / 11 0.62 1.37 8
8 / 15 0.59 1.37 8 8 / 15 1.28 1.35 8
8 / 16 0.88 1.37 8 8 / 16 0.98 1.32 8
8 / 18 1.26 1.36 8 8 / 18 1.29 1.30 8
8 / 17 1.23 1.34 8 8 / 17 1.04 1.30 8
8 / 20 1.24 1.33 8 8 / 20 1.20 1.28 8
8 / 19 1.28 1.33 8 8 / 19 1.11 1.28 8
8 / 22 0.86 1.32 8 8 / 22 1.16 1.26 8
12 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 15 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Compared Calculated Tabulated Accepted Compared Calculated Tabulated Accepted
Models Value Value Model Models Value Value Model
No. No.
1 / 2 10.19 2.61 2 1 / 2 11.90 2.61 2
2 / 3 3.00 2.38 3 2 / 3 5.43 2.38 3
3 / 4 14.19 2.03 4 3 / 5 3.28 1.95 5
4 / 5 - - 4 5 / 4 40.74 3.01 4
4 / 7 11.23 2.39 7 4 / 7 4.55 2.38 7
7 / 8 - - 7 7 / 8 3.65 1.96 8
7 / 6 0.07 1.44 7 8 / 6 1.40 1.48 8
7 / 9 0.49 1.59 7 8 / 9 1.98 1.59 9
7 / 12 1.58 1.48 12 9 / 12 4.03 1.96 12
12 / 10 - - 12 12 / 10 - 1.59 12
12 / 13 0.11 1.58 12 12 / 13 - 1.48 12
12 / 14 0.40 1.35 12 12 / 14 0.76 1.37 12
12 / 21 0.93 1.40 12 12 / 21 1.14 1.35 12
12 / 11 0.16 1.36 12 12 / 11 0.19 1.31 12
12 / 15 0.77 1.34 12 12 /15 0.71 1.29 12
12 / 16 0.67 1.31 12 12 / 16 0.77 1.27 12
12 / 18 1.08 1.30 12 12 / 18 1.16 1.26 12
12 / 17 0.93 1.28 12 12 / 17 1.01 1.25 12
12 / 20 1.00 1.27 12 12 / 20 1.05 1.24 12
12 / 19 0.93 1.26 12 12 /19 0.99 1.23 12
12 / 22 0.97 1.26 12 12 / 22 1.01 1.23 12
Table 7.2: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values for
bidders modelled individually (for 6, 9, 12 and 15 bidders based on 5
contract types)
177
As expected, Table 7.2 also shows the eventual best model varying more where
there are fewer bidders in the data sample (ie. 9 or less bidders) before settling
down to be more constant in the best model prediction. The reason for this is that
the impact of adding more bidding attempts to the analysed data set decreases as
the numbers of bidders are added to the analysis.
Depending on the number of bidders, models 8 and 12 are shown in Table 7.2 to
be the best models. Model 8 comprises the three main effects (ie. S,T and B) with
the contract type-contract size two-way interaction (ie. ST). Model 12 is closely
related to this model in that it is made up of the same chunks as model 8, but with
the addition of the contract size-bidder 2-way interaction (ie. SB). The results
indicate that model 8 is the best model where the data sample contains fewer
bidders. However, model 12 quite clearly becomes the dominant model when more
bidders are added.
It is interesting to note that when comparing the calculated and tabulated F-values
for model 8 and 12 in the 9 bidder data set it can be seen that the respective
values are 1.63 and 1.67. The closeness of these values reflects that the
significance is only marginal.
Turning to the 15 bidder data set, it can be seen that when comparing the
calculated and tabulated F-values, the two models closest to model 12 in being the
best model are models 21 and 18. These are closely related to the 12 bidder model
in that they are made up of terms but also include one extra term. Model 21
includes the remaining 2-way interaction of bidder contract type (ie. BT). Model
18 include the 3-way interaction of bidder-contract type-contract size (ie. STB).
Model 12 appears to be the overall best model. The two principal contract type-
bidder interaction chunks (ie. ST and STB) are eliminated. This indicates that
competitiveness differences between contract types is not so influential as the
contract size differences which are retained in the equation.
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7.2.3	 Mallow's Cp
To verify the F-test results, Mallow's Cp was computed and plotted for each of
the subset regression models against the line Cp = p + 1 (see Figure 7.1). When
comparing the 6, 9, 12 and 15 bidder models, it can be that the Cp scores fit more
tightly around the line Cp = p + 1 as more bidders are included in the model. The
closeness to the line implies that the models have a small total mean square and
a negligible bias. It appears, therefore, that the best predicted models for the 6
bidder data set are somewhat bias since they are not close to the line Cp = p + 1.
The global F-values, adjusted R2 and chunkwise algorithm results and Mallow's
Cp scores all provide supporting evidence that model 12 is the best overall
candidate model. This is particularly so where 12 or more bidders included in the
data set.
7.2.4	 Sensitivity tests
Sensitivity tests were carried out by varying the contract type combination. The
data was reanalysed first with the omission of fire stations and second with the
omission of hostels. Fire stations were left out because this contract type has the
least amount of data. Hostels were also omitted because, prima facie, this type
appears to be most dissimilar. It is the only 'residential' contract type and the
contract size appears to be more variable because the size of contract is largely
dependent on the number of dwelling units contained within the contract.
The analysis with fire stations omitted produced a similar set results as the five
contract data set. However, there are some interesting differences. The global F-
values and adjusted R2 statistics are slightly lower than the 5 contract type
analysis (see Table 7.3). The F-test results show the best model to be model 12
(see Table 7.4). Mallows Cp results appear to verify the F-test results and also
show the models having a better overall fit around the line Cp = p + 1 when
compared to the 5 contract data set (compare Figure 7.1 with Figure 7.2).
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4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING FIRE STATIONS)
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING HOSTELS)
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res
df
SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res
df
SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
1 0 634 6.66 0.010505 0.00 0.00 1 0 576 5.57 0.009670 0.00 0.00
2 3 631 6.30 0.009984 18.03 0.05 2 3 573 5.40 0.009424 9.02 0.03
3 6 628 6.19 0.009857 9.54 0.06 3 6 570 5.31 0.009316 5.58 0.04
5 12 622 5.97 0.009598 6.54 0.09 5 12 564 5.10 0.009043 4.73 0.06
4 17 617 5.54 0.008979 7.80 0.15 4 17 559 4.52 0.008086 8.12 0.16
7 20 614 5.44 0.008860 7.25 0.16 7 20 556 4.46 0.008022 7.28 0.17
8 26 608 5.22 0.008586 6.71 0.18 8 26 550 4.25 0.007727 6.83 0.20
6 45 589 5.13 0.008710 3.99 0.17 6 45 531 4.14 0.007797 4.17 0.19
9 48 586 5.03 0.008584 4.04 0.18 9 48 528 4.09 0.007746 4.07 0.20
12 54 580 4.82 0.008310 4.18 0.21 12 54 522 3.90 0.007471 4.22 0.23
10 62 572 5.01 0.008759 3.09 0.17 10 62 514 4.01 0.007802 3.28 0.19
13 68 566 4.83 0.008534 3.20 0.19 11 68 508 3.86 0.007598 3.36 0.21
14 90 544 4.62 0.008493 2.70 0.19 14 90 486 3.66 0.007531 2.85 0.22
21 96 538 4.45 0.008271 2.81 0.21 21 96 480 3.50 0.007292 2.99 0.25
11 104 530 4.68 0.008830 2.18 0.16 11 104 472 3.72 0.007881 2.28 0.18
15 110 524 4.41 0.008416 2.45 0.20 15 110 466 3.52 0.007554 2.49 0.22
16 132 502 4.30 0.008566 2.10 0.18 16 132 444 3.30 0.007432 2.33 0.23
18 138 496 4.08 0.008226 2.29 0.22 18 136 438 3.03 0.007032 2.58 0.27
17 146 488 4.10 0.008402 2.10 0.20 17 146 430 3.11 0.007233 2.35 0.25
20 152 482 3.98 0.008257 2.15 0.21 20 152 424 3.03 0.007146 2.35 0.26
19 174 460 3.84 0.008348 1.95 0.21 19 174 402 2.89 0.007189 2.15 0.26
22 180 454 3.81 0.008392 1.90 0.20 22 180 396 2.85 0.007197 2.11 0.26
Table 7.3: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled
individually (for 15 bidders based on 4 contract types)
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING FIRE STATIONS)
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING HOSTELS)
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model No.
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model No.
1/ 2 12.02 2.61 2 1 / 2 6.01 2.62 2
2 / 3 3.72 2.61 3 2 / 3 3.22 2.62 3
3 / 5 3.82 2.10 5 3 / 5 3.87 2.12 5
5 / 4 9.58 2.23 4 5 / 4 14.35 2.23 4
4 / 7 3.76 2.62 7 4 / 7 2.49 2.62 4
7 / 8 4.27 2.12 8 4 / 8 3.88 1.90 8
8 / 6 0.54 1.40 8 8 / 6 0.74 1.40 8
8 / 9 1.01 1.57 8 8 / 9 0.94 1.57 8
8 / 12 1.72 1.51 12 8 / 12 1.67 1.51 12
12 / 10 - - 12 12 /10 - - 12
12 / 13 - - 12 12 / 13 0.38 1.72 12
12 / 14 0.65 1.45 12 12 / 14 0.89 1.45 12
12 / 21 1.07 1.41 12 12 / 21 1.31 1.41 12
12 / 11 0.32 1.38 12 12 / 11 0.46 1.38 12
12 / 15 0.87 1.36 12 12 / 15 0.90 1.36 12
12 / 16 0.78 1.32 12 12 / 16 1.03 1.32 12
12 / 18 1.07 1.30 12 12 / 18 1.39 1.30 18
12 / 17 0.93 1.30 12 18 / 17 - - 18
12 / 20 1.04 1.28 12 18 / 20 0.50 1.72 18
12 / 19 0.98 1.25 12 18 / 19 0.73 1.45 18
12 / 22 0.96 1.25 12 18 / 22 0.76 1.41 18
Table 7.4: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values for
bidders modelled individually (for 15 bidders based on 4 contract
types)
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Figure 7.1 a:
	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
individually (for 6 and 9 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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Figure 7.1 b:
	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
individually (for 12 and 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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Figure 7.2:
	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
individually (for 15 bidders based on 4 contract types)
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The analysis with the hostels omitted produced a better set of results in terms of
the global F-values. The adjusted R2 statistics are similar when compared to the
5 contract type bidder analysis (compare Table 7.1 with Table 7.3). In applying
the F-test model 18 is adjudged to be the best model (see Table 7.4) and not
model 12. However, the calculated and tabulated F-values for model 12 and 17 are
close (1.39 and 1.30) which indicates that the significance is marginal. Mallows
Cp results appear to concur with the F-test results and also show the models
having a better overall fit around the line Cp = p + 1 when compared to the 5
contract data set (compare Figure 7.1 with Figure 7.2).
With fire stations omitted, the best model concurs with that in the five contract
data set. However, with hostels omitted the best model is shown to be model 18.
An explanation for model 18 and not model 12 being the best model may be that
with hostels being left out of the data set the distribution of bidding attempts is
less dispersed thereby making the differences between bidders for the remaining
contract types more marked. The difference is enough for the three way interaction
to be important thereby making model 18 the best model. The results are
consistent in so far that the significance difference is only marginal and that model
18 is closely related to model 12. On balance the results support the evidence
shown in the five contract type data set and, therefore, model 12, based on the
bidding performance of 15 bidders, will go forward to the next stage of the
analysis as the best model for the individual bidders.
7.3 Grouped bidder analysis
Using the Hong Kong Government classification system bidders were grouped into
large, medium and small and the best model determined.
7.3.1	 Utility of the candidate models
Table 7.5 shows the summary of the values (rounded) of SSE, MSE, df, global F
values and adjusted R2 for the 22 candidate models.
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Model no. Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE M S Error F
Value
Adj
R2
1 0 2395 28.72 0.011992 0.00 0.00
2 3 2392 27.21 0.011375 66.37 0.05
4 5 2390 27.00 0.011297 38.06 0.06
3 7 2388 26.59 0.011135 31.88 0.07
6 9 2386 28.13 0.011790 6.26 0.02
7 9 2386 26.14 0.010956 29.44 0.09
9 13 2382 25.96 0.010898 21.10 0.09
5 15 2380 25.95 0.010903 18.15 0.09
8 17 2378 25.68 0.010799 17.59 0.10
10 17 2378 25.89 0.010887 16.25 0.09
12 21 2374 25.63 0.010796 14.31 0.10
14 21 2374 25.78 0.010859 13.54 0.09
13 25 2370 25.53 0.010772 12.34 0.10
11 25 2370 25.69 0.010840 11.65 0.10
21 29 2366 25.47 0.010765 10.78 0.10
16 29 2366 25.48 0.010769 10.74 0.10
15 33 2362 25.4g Q.Q /0754 9,65
17 33 2362 25.42 0.010762 9.58 0.10
18 37 2358 25.34 0.010746 8.74 0.10
19 37 2358 25.58 0.010848 8.94 0.10
20 41 2354 25.15 0.010684 8.35 0.11
22 45 2350 25.14 0.010698 7.61 0.11
Table 7.5: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled according
to size (for all bidders based on 5 contract types)
As expected MSE shows the same characteristics as that in the individual bidder
models. The adjusted R2 samples are poorer in comparison to the models based
on individual bidders. The poor fit indicates that different size bidders appear not
to behave in a similar way competitively as previously hypothesised - see Chapter
5, Figure 5.3. A possible alternative reason to explain the poor results is that
Government criteria is a poor measure of bidder size. However, it is interesting to
note that all the global F-values are significant and that the F-values are higher
than the individual bidder model. The likely reason for this is that the individual
bidder analysis is only based on a sub-set of the whole data set and, therefore, the
number of degrees of freedom and corresponding F-values are smaller.
In respect of comparing the adjusted R2 values for the individual models it can be
seen that there is a trend in which the adjusted R2 statistic slightly improves with
the higher order models. From models 7 through to 22 the improvement is in fact
very slight. Taking account the small differences in terms of numbers of variables
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and SSE between models, indications are that a higher order model is likely to be
the eventual best model.
7.3.2	 Results of the forward chunkwise sequential variable selection
algorithm
The calculated F-test values for the candidate models, derived from applying the
forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm, are shown in Table 7.5.
The same procedural approach was used in determining the best model as that
shown in the individual bidder analysis.
Table 7.6 shows a summary of the F-test calculated and tabulated values resulting
from the compared models together with the best model which is model 20. Only
the contract size-bidder two-way interaction (ie. SB) is excluded. As all but one
of the interaction variables remain in the best model, this would tend to suggest
that different size bidders do not behave competitively in a similar way, at least
according to this measure of bidder size, for each of the five contract types.
Compared Models Calculated Value Tabulated Value Accepted Model No.
1 / 2 44.25 2.60 2
2 / 4 9.29 2.99 4
4 / 3 18.41 2.99 3
3 / 6 - - 3
3 / 7 20.54 2.99 7
7 / 9 4.13 2.37 9
9 / 5 0.92 1.69 9
9 / 8 6.48 2.37 8
8 / 10 - - 8
8 / 12 1.16 2.37 8
8 / 14 - - 8
8 / 13 1.74 1.94 8
8 / 11 0.00 0.00 8
8 / 21 1.63 1.75 8
8 / 16 1.55 1.75 8
8 / 15 1.63 1.64 8
8 / 17 1.51 1.64 8
8 / 18 1.58 1.57 18
18 / 19 - - 18
18 / 20 4.45 2.37 20
20 / 22 0.23 2.37 20
Table 7.6: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values for
bidders modelled according to size (for all bidders based on 5 contract
types)
Grouped\ 5 building types
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7.3.3	 Mallow's Cp
To verify the chunlcwise algorithm results, Mallow's Cp was computed and plotted
for each of the subset regression models against the line Cp = p + 1 (see Figure
7.3). As can be seen the chunkwise algorithm results appear to concur with
Mallow's Cp as the variables up to model 20 for the lowest bid combinations fall
consistently above the line. This suggests that all of the preceding models are
biased.
Figure 7.3:	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
according to size (for all bidders based on 5 contract types)
The results indicate that bidders do not behave competitively in a similar way
according to contract type and size when the bidder sizes are grouped as small,
medium and large. Evidence of this can be seen from observing the low adjusted
R2 and also because a high order model is shown to be the best model.
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7.3.4	 Sensitivity tests
Sensitivity tests are also carried out for the bidders grouped according to size by
omitting fire stations and hostels. This produced much the same results as the five
contract type data set in that the global F-values are significant and the adjusted
R2 statistics are of approximately the same magnitude (see Table 7.7). The
chunkwise algorithm results also follow a similar pattern. Model 19 is shown to
be the best predicted model where fire stations are omitted and model 20 where
hostels are omitted (see Table 7.8). Mallow's Cp results are also consistent in that
all the preceding models to these best predicted models are shown to be biased
(see Figure 7.4).
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING FIRE STATIONS)
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING HOSTELS)
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res
df
SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
1 0 1994 24.78 0.012427 0.00 0.00 1 0 1798 19.83 0.011029 0.00 0.00
2 3 1991 23.21 0.011657 67.34 0.06 2 3 1795 18.82 0.010485 48.17 0.05
4 5 1989 22.71 0.011418 45.32 0.08 4 5 1793 18.34 0.010229 36.42 0.07
3 6 1988 22.61 0.011373 38.16 0.08 3 6 1792 18.63 0.010396 23.09 0.06
7 8 1986 22.20 0.011178 32.97 0.10 7 8 1790 18.22 0.010179 22.60 0.08
6 9 1985 22.54 0.011355 24.66 0.09 6 9 1789 18.19 0.010168 20.16 0.08
9 12 1982 22.06 0.011130 22.22 0.10 9 12 1786 18.07 0.010118 15.81 0.08
5 12 1982 22.03 0.011115 22.49 0.11 5 12 1786 18.00 0.010078 16.51 0.09
8 14 1980 21.81 0.011015 20.74 0.11 8 14 1784 17.76 0.009955 15.99 0.10
10 14 1980 22.06 0.011141 18.78 0.10 10 14 1784 17.98 0.010078 14.12 0.09
12 18 1976 21.77 0.011017 16.07 0.11 12 18 1780 17.73 0.009961 12.40 0.10
14 18 1976 21.91 0.011088 15.23 0.11 14 18 1780 17.88 0.010045 11.42 0.09
13 20 1974 21.71 0.010998 14.69 0.12 13 20 1778 17.62 0,009910 11,74 0,1 0
11 20 1974 21.83 0.011059 14.04 0.11 11 20 1778 17.76 0.009989 10.91 0.09
21 24 1970 21.64 0.010985 12.43 0.12 21 24 1774 17.55 0.009893 10.02 0.10
16 24 1970 21.59 0.010959 12.66 0.12 16 24 1774 17.59 0.009915 9.82 0.10
15 26 1968 21.58 0.010965 11.67 0.12 15 26 1772 17.52 0.009887 9.35 0.10
17 26 1968 21.62 0.010986 11.51 0.12 17 26 1772 17.52 0.009887 9.35 0.10
18 29 1965 21.51 0.010947 10.67 0.12 18 30 1768 17.47 0.009881 8.24 0.10
19 30 1964 21.38 0.010886 10.77 0.12 19 30 1768 17.45 0.009870 8.32 0.11
20 32 1962 21.39 0.010902 10.03 0.12 20 32 1766 17.29 0.009790 8.37 0.11
22 36 1958 21.35 0.010904 8.99 0.12 22 36 1762 17.28 0.009807 7.43 0.11
Table 7.7: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled according
to size (for all bidders based on 4 contract types)
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4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING FIRE STATIONS)
4 CONTRACT TYPES
(EXCLUDING HOSTELS)
Compared Calculated Tabulated Accepted Compared Calculated Tabulated Accepted
Models Value Value Model Models Value Value Model
No. No.
1 / 2 44.89 2.60 2 1 / 2 32.11 2.60 2
2 / 4 21.90 2.99 4 2 / 4 23.46 2.99 4
4 / 3 8.79 3.84 3 4 / 3 - - 4
3 / 7 18.34 2.60 7 4 / 7 3.93 2.60 7
7 / 6 - - 7 7 / 6 2.95 3.84 7
7 / 9 3.14 2.37 9 7 / 9 3.71 2.37 9
9 / 5 - - 5 9 / 5 - - 5
5 / 8 9.99 1.69 8 5 / 8 12.05 1.69 8
8 / 10 - - 8 8 / 10 - - 8
8 / 12 0.91 2.37 8 8 / 12 0.75 2.37 8
8 / 14 - - 8 8 / 14 - - 8
8 / 13 1.52 2.09 8 8 / 13 2.35 2.09 13
8 / 11 - - 8 13 / 11 - - 13
8 / 21 1.55 1.83 8 13 / 21 1.77 2.37 13
8 / 16 2.01 1.83 16 13 / 16 0.76 2.37 13
16 / 15 0.46 1.94 16 13 /15 1.69 2.09 13
16 / 17 - - 16 13 / 17 0.00 2.09 13
16 / 18 1.46 2.21 16 13 / 18 1.52 1.83 13
16 / 19 3.22 2.09 19 13 / 19 0.00 1.83 13
19 / 20 - - 19 13 / 20 2.81 1.75 20
19 / 22 0.46 2.09 19 20 / 22 0.25 2.37 20
Table 7.8: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values for
bidders modelled according to size (for all bidders based on 4 contract
types)
With hostels omitted, the best model concurs with that in the five contract data set.
However, with fire stations omitted the best model is shown to be model 19. The
likely reason for the inconsistency in best model prediction is due to the poor fit
of the data to the models. It seems that there is very little difference in terms of
predictive capability between the higher order models. The results are consistent
with the five contract type data set in so far that they show a higher order model
of at least six chunks to be the best model.
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Figure 7.4	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
according to size (for all bidders based on 4 contract types)
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7.4 Comparison of grouped and individual bidder behaviour
The next stage of the analysis was to compare the results of the grouped and
individual bidders to find which of the two models is the best predictor of
competitiveness. This is accomplished by comparing the grouped bidder best
model with the individual best model, based on the 15 bidder data set, using the
same F-test methodology as previously described.
To make the data sets identical for comparative purposes, the same 15 bidders
were grouped into large, medium and small according to the same criteria as
previously described and the best model found. As can be seen from Table 7.9 the
model utility statistics are poor. This is consistent with the group bidder analysis
based on the whole data set (compare Table 7.5 with Table 7.9). Table 7.10, which
displays the F-test results after applying the chunlcwise algorithm, shows model
17 to be the eventual best model. The Cp results also indicate that all preceding
models are biased (see Figure 7.5).
Model no. Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE M S Error F Value Adj
R2
1 o 776 8.38 0.010799 0.00 0.00
2 3 773 8.01 0.010362 17.85 0.04
4 5 771 7.84 0.010169 13.28 0.06
3 7 769 7.79 0.010130 9.71 0.06
6 9 767 7.77 0.010130 7.53 0.06
7 9 767 7.65 0.009974 9.15 0.08
9 13 763 7.58 0.009934 6.71 0.08
5 15 761 7.53 0.009895 6.14 0.08
10 16 760 7.49 0.009855 6.02 0.09
8 17 759 7.40 0.009750 6.28 0.10
12 21 755 7.33 0.009709 5.41 0.10
14 21 755 7.45 0.009868 4.71 0.09
13 24 752 7.27 0.009668 4.99 0.10
11 25 751 7.28 0.009694 4.73 0.10
21 28 748 7.24 0.009679 4.36 0.10
16 29 747 7.25 0.009705 4.16 0.10
17 32 744 7.12 0.009570 4.25 0.11
15 33 743 7.18 0.009664 3.88 0.11
18 35 741 7.15 0.009649 3.75 0.11
19 37 739 7.08 0.009581 3.77 0.11
20 41 735 6.99 0.009510 3.65 0.12
22 45 731 6.98 0.009549 3.33 0.12
Table 7.9: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled according
to size (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted Model
No.
1 / 2 11.90 2.61 2
2 / 4 8.36 3.00 4
4 / 3 2.47 2.61 4
4 / 6 1.73 2.38 4
4 / 7 4.76 2.38 7
7 / 9 1.76 2.38 7
7 / 5 1.83 1.69 5
5 / 10 4.06 1.64 10
10 / 8 9.23 3.85 8
8 / 12 1.80 2.38 8
8 / 14 - 8
8 / 13 1.92 2.02 8
8 / 11 1.55 1.95 8
8 / 21 1.50 1.80 8
8 / 16 1.29 1.76 8
8 /17 1.95 1.67 17
17 / 15 - - 17
17 / 18 - - 17
17 / 19 0.84 2.22 17
17 / 20 1.52 1.89 17
17 / 22 1.13 1.73 17
Table 7.10: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values
for bidders modelled according to size (for 15 bidders based on
5 contract types)
Grouped X15 bidders 15 building types
Figure 7.5:
	 Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
according to size (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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When viewing the best and individual model comparison summary, as shown in
Table 7.11, it is perhaps no surprise to find that the individual best model is
substantially better than the grouped best model.
MODEL ORDER BASED ON EXPLAINED DF
Model
No.
Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE MS Error
17
12
32
57
744
719
7.12
5.80
0.009570
0.008067
GROUPED
INDIVIDUAL
SUMMARY OF MODEL COMPARISON TO DETERMINE THE BEST MODEL
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model No.
17 / 12 6.55 1.52 12 INDIVIDUAL
Table 7.11: Summary of best model statistics for bidders modelled
individually and according to size, and corresponding best model
summary of calculated and tabulated F values (for 15 bidders
based on 5 contract types)
The likely reason for the poor results of the grouped bidder model is that the
individual bidders contained within each bidder size group have different
competitive performance patterns. Evidence of this can be seen by referring to
Figure 9.4 (see Chapter 9), which illustrates the extent to which contract type and
contract size affects the competitive performance of each of the 15 bidders.
Another possible reason for the poor results may be that the data set comprised
contracts that were nearly all small to medium in size. A data sample with a
greater diversity of contract sizes may have produced a different set of results. A
set of larger contracts included in the sample is only likely to have a minimal
effect on the small and medium bidders, as according to their definition, it is
unlikely they would have enough resources to bid for these larger contracts. (In
this instance they would in fact not be permitted to bid for the larger projects due
to Government regulations). However, the impact of including larger contracts into
the sample is likely to have an effect on the large bidders as it would produce a
wider range of bidding attempts. If these bidders are more competitive on the
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larger contracts this would most likely influence the results. It would seem
therefore that these results are inconclusive at providing evidence that large
contractors are more competitive on larger contracts and vice versa.
The poor grouped bidder model utility statistics coupled with a high order 6 term
model indicates that, in terms of competitiveness, there is little difference between
large, medium and small bidders bidding for different sizes of contract types such
as that contained in the data set. The results also show that a better
competitiveness model is obtained by analyzing competitiveness according to
individual bidding behaviour rather than that of grouped behaviour.
7.5 Testing the robustness of the individual best model
Up to this point in the analysis the robustness of the best model based on the
individual behaviour of bidders has been tested by:
(1) adding bidders incrementally into the analysis up to and including the 15
bidder cut off point and determining the best model for each incremental
increase;
(2) applying sensitivity tests by varying the combinations of contract types;
(3) comparing the best model based on individual bidding behaviour with the
best model based on grouped bidding behaviour.
The robustness of the individual best model 12 was further tested by:
(1) recalculating the F-test results at 1% significance level;
(2) testing to see if the second order terms contribute to the prediction of
competitiveness;
(3) determining the best model by excluding the alteration work contracts;
(4) comparing the measure of competitiveness shown in Equation 5.3 with
another competitiveness measure.
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7.5.1	 F-test results at 1% significance level
The 5 contract type 15 bidder data set modelling individual bidders was reanalysed
with the approximate values for F 01 being taken from the 1% Points for the
Distribution of F table to further test the robustness of model 12. As can be seen
from Table 7.12, the best model still appears to be the best model thereby
providing further support for using this model 12.
Compared Models Calculated Value Tabulated Value Accepted Model No.
1 / 2 2.03 3.80 1
1 / 3 5.32 3.34 3
3 / 5 4.54 2.53 5
5 / 4 23.55 4.62 4
4 / 7 4.30 3.34 7
7 / 8 4.75 2.53 8
8 / 6 1.40 1.72 8
8 / 9 0.87 1.89 8
8 / 12 2.23 1.73 12
12 / 10 - - 12
12 / 13 0.08 1.73 12
12 / 14 0.49 1.56 12
12 / 21 0.94 1.52 12
12 / 11 - - 12
12 / 15 0.55 1.44 12
12 / 16 0.61 1.41 12
12 / 18 1.09 1.41 12
12 / 17 0.81 1.37 12
12 / 20 0.95 1.35 12
12 / 19 0.95 1.34 12
12 / 22 1.03 1.34 12
Table 7.12: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values
at 1% significance level for bidders modelled individually (for 15
bidders based on 5 contract types)
7.5.2	 Testing whether second order terms contribute to the prediction of
competitiveness
The best model based on the 5 contract type 15 bidder data set was found for the
straight line interaction model by omitting all the squared terms and using the
same F-test methodology as previously described. The linear and quadratic best
model summary shown in Table 7.13 shows the calculated F-value exceeding the
tabulated model in both cases. It can be concluded, therefore, that quadratic terms
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do contribute to the prediction of competitiveness and therefore should be retained
in the best model.
MODEL ORDER BASED ON EXPLAINED DF
Model
No.
Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE MS Error
9
12
34
57
742
719
6.36
5.80
0.008571
0.008067
LINEAR
QUADRATIC
SUMMARY OF MODEL COMPARISON TO DETERMINE THE BEST MODEL
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model No.
9 / 12 3.02 1.53 12 QUADRATIC
Table 7.13: Summary of best linear and quadratic model statistics for bidders
modelled individually, and corresponding summary of calculated
and tabulated F values (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
7.5.3	 New work only
The hypothesis that the best model, based on individual bidding behaviour, could
be improved by omitting the alteration work from the analysis is tested using the
15 bidder 5 contract type data set. As can be seen from looking at model 1 in
Table 7.14 the data set is reduced from 776 df to 640 df (approximately 20%).
However, the SSE is more almost halved when compared to the analysis that
includes alteration work (compare Table 7.14 with Table 7.1). Since contracts for
alteration work are likely to be more smaller in terms of average contract size than
that for new work this, perhaps, is not surprising. The likely reason for this
outcome is that there are greater differences in the competitiveness measure for
smaller contracts than that for larger contracts (see Chapter 5, Footnote 5 for
explanation). What, however, is surprising is that the adjusted R2 is lower for the
new work only sample of data when compared to the data that compares both new
work and alteration work. The reason for this, can clearly be seen by viewing the
estimated prediction equations shown later in the analysis (see Chapter 9, Figures
9.3 and 9.4). By comprising mainly smaller contracts of greater competitiveness
differences, the bidding attempts for alteration work is actually supporting a better
fit of the quadratic regression line to the data.
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Model no. Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE M S Error F Value Adj
R2
1 0 640 4.91 0.007672 0.00 0.00
2 3 637 4.82 0.007567 5.95 0.01
3 7 633 4.58 0.007235 7.60 0.06
5 15 625 4.53 0.007248 3.74 0.06
4 17 623 4.13 0.006629 7.35 0.14
7 21 619 3.91 0.006317 7.92 0.18
8 29 611 3.85 0.006301 6.01 0.18
6 45 595 3.86 0.006487 3.68 0.15
9 49 591 3.62 0.006125 4.39 0.20
12 57 583 3.55 0.006089 3.99 0.21
10 77 563 3.53 0.006270 2.90 0.18
13 85 555 3.47 0.006252 2.74 0.19
14 105 535 3.23 0.006037 2.68 0.21
21 113 527 3.16 0.005996 2.61 0.22
11 133 507 3.10 0.006114 2.24 0.20
15 141 499 3.05 0.006112 2.17 0.20
16 161 479 2.84 0.005929 2.18 0.23
18 169 471 2.78 0.005902 2.15 0.23
17 189 451 2.61 0.005787 2.11 0.25
20 197 443 2.55 0.005756 2.09 0.25
19 217 423 2.48 0.005863 1.92 0.24
22 225 415 2.46 0.005928 1.85 0.23
Table 7.14: Summary of candidate model statistics with bidders modelled
individually for new work only (for 15 bidders based on 5
contract types)
Table 7.15 shows the eventual best predicted model based on the F-test as model
20. However, the difference between this and model 9 in terms of significance is
only very marginal. It can be seen that the respective tabulated and calculated
values are 1.25 and 1.26 respectively.
Mallow's Cp for the subset regression models (see Figure 7.6) shows a poorer fit
than to that of the data set which contains both new work and alteration work
(compare Figure 7.6 with Figure 7.4). One of the purposes of analyses of this kind
is to attempt and find a good model which can be fitted to similar sets of data.
It is only to be expected that by dividing the data up different best models will
prevail because of different data set characteristics. There is no apparent evidence
that dividing the data set up in this way improves the likely predictive ability of
the model. It is for these reasons that the data set containing both new and
alteration work will be continue to be further analysed rather than using a data set
that contains new work only.
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It should be noted that due to the data limitations, it is not possible to undertake
a study of solely alteration work.
Compared Models Calculated Value Tabulated Value Accepted Model No.
1 / 2 3.96 2.62 2
2 / 3 8.29 2.39 3
3 / 5 0.86 1.95 3
3 / 4 6.79 1.84 4
4 / 7 8.71 2.39 7
7 / 8 1.19 1.95 7
7 / 6 0.91 1.40 7
7 / 9 1.69 1.51 9
9 / 12 1.44 1.95 9
9 / 10 0.51 1.49 9
9 / 13 0.67 1.45 9
9 / 14 1.15 1.35 9
9 / 21 1.20 1.34 9
9 / 11 1.01 1.30 9
9 / 15 1.01 1.29 9
9 /16 1.17 1.27 9
9 / 18 1.19 1.26 9
9 / 17 1.25 1.25 9
9 / 20 1.26 1.25 20
20 / 19 0.60 1.60 20
20 / 22 0.54 1.52 20
Table 7.15: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values
with bidders modelled individually for new work only (for 15
bidders based on 5 contract types)
15 bidders \ 5 building types (New work only)
0	 50	 100	 150
	
200
	
250
Number of predictors, p
Figure 7.6: Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores with bidders
modelled individually for new work only (for 15 bidders based
on 5 contract types)
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7.5.4	 Comparison of competitiveness measures
The measure of competitiveness used in this analysis, based on the ratio of lowest
bid to bidder's bid (see Equation 5.1), was compared with the ratio of bidder's bid
to lowest bid (see Equation 5.3) to determine measure which is the better predictor
of competitiveness.
The model utility statistics resulting from this measure are presented in Table 7.16.
The statistics are slightly inferior to those based on the original competitiveness
measure (compare Table 7.1 to 7.16). This indicates a poorer fit to the data.
Table 7.17 shows a comparison of the calculated and tabulated F-values from
comparing the chunkwise algorithm and shows model 12 to be the eventual best
model thereby supporting the previous findings. Mallow's Cp results, shown in
Figure 7.7 support this finding.
Model no. Explain
df
Residual
df
SSE M S Error F Value Adj
R2
1 0 776 24.33 0.031353 0.00 0.00
2 3 773 23.27 0.030103 17.61 0.04
3 7 769 22.63 0.029428 9.63 0.06
5 15 761 21.75 0.028581 6.45 0.09
4 17 759 20.28 0.026719 9.47 0.15
7 21 755 19.83 0.026265 8.57 0.16
8 29 747 18.97 0.025395 7.54 0.19
6 45 731 18.35 0.025103 5.41 0.20
9 49 727 17.98 0.024732 5.35 0.21
12 57 719 17.10 0.023783 5.43 0.24
10 77 699 18.04 0.025808 5.21 0.18
13 85 691 17.40 0.025181 3.28 0.20
14 105 671 16.31 0.024307 3.17 0.22
21 113 663 15.66 0.023620 3.28 0.25
11 133 643 17.46 0.027154 1.92 0.13
15 141 635 16.15 0.025433 2.30 0.19
16 161 615 15.49 0.025187 2.19 0.20
18 169 607 14.35 0.023641 2.51 0.25
17 189 587 14.03 0.023901 2.29 0.24
20 197 579 13.77 0.023782 2.27 0.24
19 217 559 13.56 0.024258 2.06 0.23
22 225 551 13.34 0.024211 2.03 0.23
Table 7.16: Summary of candidate model statistics for bidders modelled
individually using competitiveness measure of bidder's bid to
lowest bid (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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Compared Models Calculated Value Tabulated Value Accepted Model No.
1 / 2 11.74 3.01 2
2 / 3 5.44 2.22 3
3 / 5 3.85 1.95 5
5 / 4 27.51 3.01 4
4 / 7 4.28 2.38 7
7 / 8 4.23 1.96 8
8 / 6 1.54 1.40 6
6 / 9 3.74 1.40 9
9 / 12 4.63 1.96 12
12 / 10 - - 12
12 / 13 - - 12
12 / 14 0.68 1.37 12
12 / 21 1.09 1.37 12
12 / 11 - - 12
12 / 15 0.44 1.29 12
12 / 16 0.61 1.27 12
12 / 18 1.04 1.26 12
12 /17 0.97 1.25 12
12 / 20 1.00 1.24 12
12 / 19 0.91 1.23 12
12 / 22 0.92 1.23 12
Table 7.17: Summary of candidate model calculated and tabulated F values
for bidders modelled individually using competitiveness measure
of bidder's bid to lowest bid (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract
types)
15 bidders \ 5 building types (Bidder's bid to lowest bid)
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Figure 7.7: Candidate model plot of Mallow's Cp scores for bidders modelled
individually using competitiveness measure of bidder's bid to
lowest bid (for 15 bidders based on 5 contract types)
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7.6 Summary
The foregoing analysis provides evidence that the candidate models based on
individual bidder behaviour fits the data considerably better than those based on
grouped bidder behaviour. This can be seen by referring to the candidate model
utility statistics and best model analysis based on the F-test.
With regard to grouped bidder behaviour, in both the five contract data set and
sensitivity analysis, based on four contract data sets, a high order 6 term model
was selected as the best model. This, together with the poor model utility statistics,
indicates that small, medium and large bidders do not behave in the manner that
was originally hypothesised ie. smaller bidders are more competitive on smaller
contracts and vice versa. Bidder size, therefore, appears to have little influence,
in terms of competitiveness, on contract size. The suspected reason for the poor
results of the grouped bidder model is that the individual bidders contained within
each bidder size group have different performance patterns. However, this may
be due to a possible data sampling error in that the sample contains almost
exclusively small and medium contracts, thereby constraining the range of bidding
attempts made by large bidders.
In respect of the candidate model based on individual bidder behaviour, model 12
is shown to be the best candidate model overall and is reasonably robust when
bidders are added incrementally into the analysis. In addition to performing well
in the 4 contract type sensitivity analysis, it out performed the grouped behaviour
model.
When the 5 contract type 15 bidder data sample is reanalysed at 1% significance
level model 12 is also found to be the best model.
However, when the data set was reduced to new work only it was found that the
overall candidate model utilities were poorer than that contained in the data set
which comprised both new work and alteration work and that model 17 prevailed
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as the best model. It is only to be expected that when subdividing the data set
other best models will prevail because of different data set characteristics. As there
is no apparent evidence that dividing the data set up in this manner improves the
predictive ability of the model and since one of the main purposes of analyses this
kind is to attempt to find a reasonably robust model to fit similar sets of data, on
the evidence shown it seems that model 12 is the best model and also to work
with the data set which comprises both new and alteration work.
The second order terms in the model appear to contribute to the prediction of
competitiveness. The measure of competitiveness used in this analysis, based on
the ratio of lowest bid to bidder's bid (ie. Equation 5.1), when compared with the
ratio of bidder's bid to lowest bid (ie. Equation 5.3) is found to be a better
predictor of competitiveness.
The candidate models based on the lowest bid to bidder's bid (ie. Equation 5.1)
appear to fit slightly better than those based the ratio of bidder's bid to lowest bid
(ie. Equation 5.3). This is probably due to the logarithmic nature of the former
scale in which outliers have less of an adverse influence on the model prediction.
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CHAPTER 8
Satisfying the regression assumptions
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8 SATISFYING THE REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS
8.1 Introduction
The best candidate model was determined in the previous chapter by using a
forward chunkwise sequential variable selection algorithm based on the F-test. The
results were verified by using Mallow's Cp and also by referring to the model
utility statistics (ie. global F-value and adjusted R2 statistics). It was concluded
that the best model to be selected for further analysis is model 12. This model is
based on the individual bidding performance of 15 bidders towards 5 contract
types using an inverse ratio measure of competitiveness. The robustness of this
best model was also tested according to a variety of different procedures.
Having selected the best model, this chapter considers the reliability of this model
by examining the residuals to see if one or more of the standard least squares
assumptions is violated. Each assumption is examined in turn and where necessary
the model is modified to accommodate the assumption to produce a final model
which is not only closest to satisfying these assumptions but also the best predictor
of the dependent variable, competitiveness.
Although the reliability of other candidate models could have been tested,
examining the residuals of best model was considered sufficient. As demonstrated
in the previous chapter, this model appears to be a reasonably robust. Another
consideration for not testing the other candidate models was because of time
constraints. Examining the residuals of every candidate model and adjusting it so
as to satisfy all of the regression assumptions would be a very time-consuming and
labourious process.
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8.2 Regression assumptions
8.2.1	 Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity (ie. excessive interdependency between independent variables)
can be detected in several ways. An obvious approach is to examine the large
coefficients in a pairwise correlation matrix - values of over 0.9 usually signalling
the presence of multicollinearity (Glantz and Slinker 1990: 531). One of the most
frequently used indicators of interdependency is the tolerance (ie., the proportion
of variability in an independent variable not explained by other independent
variables) between independent variables. It is possible for a variable not in the
equation to have an acceptable tolerance level but when entered to cause the
tolerance of other variables already in the equation to become unacceptably small.
Thus, as a matter of routine, the tolerances of all the variables in the equation are
recomputed at each step. A popular approach is to check out the situation more
carefully if either the tolerance of the variable or the tolerance of any variable
already in the equation is less than 0.0001 (Norusis 1988: 176).
One reason why the t-tests on the individual B parameters are non-significant is
because the standard errors of the estimates are inflated in the presence of
multicollinearity. Thus a more formal method for detecting multicollinearity
involves the calculation of variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the individual B
parameters. In practice, a severe multicollinearity problem can be assumed to
exist if the largest of the VIFs is greater than 10 (Neter et al, 1983).
A pairwise correlation matrix was produced for all 56 variables. For the vast
majority of cases the sample correlation coefficients between variables were small.
It is the high correlations that are of interest and for the sake of brevity only those
correlations that exceed 0.70 have been reported in Table 8.1. As can be seen the
correlations exceeding 0.70 were found either in the pairwise correlations between
the corresponding interactions with and without the squared term or between the
categorical variables and their corresponding interactions with the continuous
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independent variable, bid. The one exception was the correlation between BID2
and J2BID2. The highest pairwise correlation was 0.942 for B14BID and
B14BID2. Those with pairwise correlations over 0.90 are particularly indicative
of severe multicollinearity in the model.
Variables Correlation Variables Correlation
BID v BID2 0.884 B1BID v B1BID2 0.919
B1 v B1BID 0.756 B2BID v B2BID2 0.921
B2 v B2BID 0.798 B3BID v B3BID2 0.886
B3 v B3BID 0.732 B4BID v B4BID2 0.861
B4 v B4BID 0.815 B5BID v B5BED2 0.926
B5 v B5BID 0.755 B6BID v B6BID2 0.873
B6 v B6BID 0.801 B7BID v B7BID2 0.937
B7 v B7BID 0.853 B8BID v B8BID2 0.876
B8 v B8BID 0.812 B9BID v B9BED2 0.881
B9 v B9BED 0.810 BlOBID v B1OBED2 0.931
B11 v B11BID 0.773 B11BED v B11BID2 0.873
B12 v B12BID 0.806 B12BED v B12BED2 0.914
B13 v B13BID 0.860 B13BED v B13BID2 0.928
B14 v B14BID 0.881 B14BID v B14BED2 0.942
J1 v J1BID 0.815 J1BID v J1BID2 0.890
J3 v J3BED 0.892 J2BID v J2BED2 0.842
J4 v J4BID 0.826 J3BID v J3BID2 0.901
BID2 v J2BID2 0.769 J4BID v J4BID2 0.924
Table 8.1 :	 Pairwise correlation matrix between variables with correlations
over 0.70
Mendenhall and Sinich (1993: 276) point out that when fitting a polynomial
regression model, such as the model being analyzed, the independent variables will
often be correlated due the relationship between the variables with a squared term
and those corresponding first order variables. Evidence of this can clearly be seen
in the pairwise correlation matrix. It can be seen from Figure 8.1 that all of the
variables have been successfully entered into the regression equation indicating
that the analyzed model does not have any excessive computational problems
caused by variables having extremely small tolerances of less than 0.0001.
However, the tolerance values for most of the independent variables do still tend
to be rather small. This indicates that a potentially troublesome situation exists and
may cause the variances of the estimators to be inflated.
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**** MULTIPLE •REGRESSION •	 •
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable .. DEP
Multiple R .55509
R Square .30812
Adjusted R Square .25024
Standard Error .08981
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 56 2.58284 .04162
Residual 719 5.79967 .00807
F = 5.71789 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Tolerance VIF
14BID2 1.97596E-05 2.1964E-05 .180359 .023941 41.770
B2 .122896 .066453 .322950 .031555 31.690
B8BID2 2.84589E-04 1.6296E-04 .241125 .050476 19.1t1 I
B3B1D2 1.01748E-04 1.1706E-04 .409633 .004332 230.820
BI3BID2 3.19022E-04 2.5621E-04 .193852 .039702 25.187
B7BID2 -6.88147E-05 3.9164E-04 - .026678 .041743 23.956
B9BID2 2.66231E-04 1.4750E-04 .281263 .039630 25.234
JIBID2 -844920E-05 9.3640E-05 - .135819 .042470 23.546
12B1D2 2.86203E-05 1.6224E-05 .390135 .019673 50.830
B12 .142977 .072009 .318148 .037480 26.681
B4B1D - .005745 .096718 - .260190 .010396 96.191
B14 .340967 .079591 .750552 .031350 31.898
BIO .035682 .063778 .083503 .043198 23.149
B5BID2 7.99980E-05 1.2539E-04 .209884 .008891 112.476
33 .105935 .038144 .374687 .052867 18.215
BIBID2 1.48761E-04 1.2011E-04 .484592 .006286 159.093
811 .041340 .067313 .093928 .041139 24.308
B6 .071123 .067415 .175607 .034732 28.792
32 .027759 .018858 .105199 .188396 5.308
B I OB1D2 -4.25291E-05 1.2209E-04 - .119673 .008153 122.658
B3 .100655 .063550 .254679 .037218 26.868
88 .115403 .067625 .277624 .036356 27.506
B5 .065898 .066879 .161331 .035894 27.860
BI2BID2 1.00811E-04 1.1786E-04 .539985 .002415 414.143
B2B1D2 3.27209E-05 1.2144E-04 .102179 .006691 149.450
B9 .051427 .068081 .120347 .037910 26.378
31 - .059039 .034517 - .214068 .061435 16.277
13B1D2 7.28725E-04 1.5721E-04 .612274 .055151 18.132
B1 .143786 .063813 .401376 .030326 32.975
34 - .002080 .031148 - .008153 .064571 15.487
B14BID2 1.60167E-04 1.2335E-04 .579094 .004838 206.683
B13 .173122 .074958 .372623 .036968 27.050
BlIBID2 4.77197E-05 1.1594E-04 .491686 6.743E-04 1482.956
137 .115672 .071584 .278278 .032446 30.820
84 .060978 .067416 .154287 .033071 30.238
B6BID2 6.21594E-05 1.1595E-04 .667166 6.213E-04 1609.417
B4BID2 9.96254E-05 1.2795E-04 .165799 .021221 47.123
BIO .004244 .005916 .745886 8.903E-04 1123.180
B3BID - .007934 .006143 - .539722 .005510 181.492
J2BID - .002988 .001286 - .422618 .029106 34.358
B8BID - .014005 .007426 - .452407 .016722 59.802
B9BID - .011493 .007157 - .411352 .014663 68.199
B1OBID .003294 .006504 .173403 .008209 121.823
BlIBID - .002243 .006097 - .235132 .002355 424.612
BIBID - .010386 .006312 - .696392 .005067 197.368
B5BID - .004318 .006657 - .248571 .006552 152.630
B2BID - .003198 .006424 - .218412 .004998 200.065
B13BID - .016672 .009166 - .489116 .013308 75.141
B12BID - .008904 .006370 - .720649 .003620 276.216
B7BID .003563 .010303 .089064 .014511 68.913
B6B1D - .004334 .006091
- .499845 .001950 512.767
J3BID - .023121 .005128 -1.028039 .018510 54.026
JIBID .004822 .004170 .266023 .018177 55.016
BI4BID - .014993 .006777 -1.124853 .003722 268.661
34BID
- .001719 .001880
- .256712 .012205 81.936
BID2 -7.30274E-05 1.1501E-04 -1.218821 2.612E-04 3829.179
(Constant) .086010 .059658
Figure 8.1	 Tolerance values and variance inflation factors of variables entered
into the equation
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Evidence of severe multicollinearity being present in the model can be found when
referring to the VIF column in Figure 8.1 which shows all but one of the 56
variables attaining a VIF greater than 10. Thus there would appear to be severe
multicollinearity present and this needs to be rectified before proceeding to test the
model against the other regression assumptions.
8.2.1.1	 Correcting multicollinearity
To correct multicollinearity Glantz and Slinker (1990) suggest that, if the
multicollinearity is structural, it can often be dealt with by centring the measured
independent variables on their mean values before computing the power (ie squared)
terms and interaction (ie. cross-product) terms specified by the regression equation).
Another approach to overcoming the multicollinearity problem is to drop one or
more of the independent variables. This can be done by using a sequential variable
selection technique such as backward, forward or stepwise regression. These
techniques 'often avoid producing a model with serious multicollinearity among the
independent variables by sequentially selecting candidate independent variables
based on how much independent information each one contains about the dependent
variable, allowing for the information contained in the variables already in the
regression equation' (Glantz and Slinker 1990: 262). Backward stepwise regression
is considered a more conservative approach in variable selection than forward
stepwise regression because by starting off with all the variables in the equation it
avoids the problem of occasionally stopping too soon.
To correct multicollinearity in polynomial regression models Mendenhall and Sinich
(1993: 277) recommend transforming the x variable in such a way that the
correlation between the x- and x2 is substantially reduced.
It will be seen in the subsequent analysis that a combination of all three approaches
is used to bring multicollinearity down to an acceptable level.
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To reduce the severity of the multicollinearity the measured independent variable
bid was centred to zero by deducting the sample mean bid value of HK$19.910
million. Figure 8.2 shows that there is a definite improvement in that all the VIF
values have been reduced. However, severe multicollinearity still prevails as 21 of
the 56 variables have a VIF above the critical value of 10.
To diminish the effect of multicollinearity further, backwards stepwise regression
was used to delete all of the insignificant independent variables from the equation.
As can be seen from Figure 8.3 the number of independent variables was reduced
from 56 to 29. Once again this produced a reduction in multicollinearity. Now only
three of the remaining 29 variables have a VIF greater than 10. Aside from
reducing multicollinearity it should be noted that when comparing the adjusted R2
values of 0.25424 (with 56 variables) and 0.26267 (with 29 variables) there is a
marginal improvement in the predictive power of the model.
To further reduce multicollinearity to an acceptable level the x-variable was
transformed by applying various exponential functions ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.
Transforming the x-variable by the natural log was also used. In order that the
equations remain centred at zero, the sample mean bid value of the exponential or
natural log value was deducted for each transformation.
Table 8.2 shows the largest VIF obtained by a variable in the equation, the number
of variables left in the equation together with their respective R2 and adjusted R2
values according to each x-variable transformation. As can be seen the x-variable
transformations to which all variables in the equation have acceptable VIF in which
all the variables are below 10 are the exponentials of 0.90, 0.75, 2/3, 1/3, 0.25, 0.1
and the natural log.
Of these, the transformation with the best predictive capability as judged by the
adjusted R2 is where the x-variable has been transformed using the exponential
function of 2/3. Figure 8.4 shows the improved VIF and tolerance levels for all of
the remaining variables using this x-variable transformation.
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""MULTIPLE REGRESSION ""••
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable .. DEP
Multiple R .55509
R Square .30812
Adjusted R Square .25424
Standard Error .08981
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 56 2.58284 .04162
Residual 719 5.79967 .03807
F = 5.71789 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Tolerance V1F
J4BID2 1.97596E-05 2.1964E-05 .092673 .090680 11.028
135 .011638 .028993 .028493 .190997 5.236
B3BID - .033882 .001987 -.179906 .113503 8.810
B9B1D2 2.66231E-04 1.4750E-04 .121028 .214031 4.672
B13B1D2 3.19022E-04 2.5621E-04 .102039 .143294 6.979
.12BID2 2.86203E-05 1.6224E-05 .276352 .039209 25.505
B8BID2 2.84589E-04 1.6296E-04 .123424 .192651 5.191
JIBID .001457 .001156 .061142 .408751 2.446
84B1D2 9.96254E-05 1.2795E-04 .070289 .118076 8.469
B7BID2 -6.88147E-05 3.9164E-04 -.030295 .032371 30.892
B12 .005658 .026844 .012591 .269703 3.708
B14BID - .008615 .002398 -.361145 .095244 14.499
BIO .084402 .031865 .197515 .173051 5.779
B2BID - .001895 .002063 -.078046 .133236 7.505
B1BID - .004163 .001991 -.188803 .117983 8.476
B5BID - .001132 .002133 -.043183 .145446 6.875
B3 - .016974 .026215 -.042948 .218116 4.572
.13BID .005897 .002343 .216560 .129970 7.694
B2 .072203 .026483 .189737 .198687 5.033
B11 .015604 .027285 .035454 .250376 3.994
B4BID - .001778 .002222 -.052384 .224594 4.452
BIOBID .001600 .002127 .067319 .120180 8.321
12 - .020397 .011610 -.077298 .497040 2.012
B1 .001939 .026765 .005414 .172388 5.801
B9BID -8.91352E-04 .002287 -.024408 .245405 4.075
JIB1D2 -8.44920E-05 9.3640E-05 -.047680 .344611 2.902
BI2BID - .004890 .002241 -.255634 .070112 14.263
B6 .009467 .026905 .023374 .218058 4.586
14 - .028470 .011696 -.111580 .457958 2.184
B14 .105946 .027690 .233213 .259019 3.861
BI 1BID -3.42526E-04 .001990 -.025874 .042603 23.473
B8B1D - .002673 .002419 -.076736 .199426 5.014
B3BID2 1.01748E-04 1.1706E-04 .222516 .014682 68.109
84 - .013920 .028579 -.035221 .184025 5.434
B6BID - .001859 .001973 -.151413 .037262 26.837
B13 - .032354 .032213 -.069637 .200171 4.996
BIB1D2 1.48761E-04 1.2011E-04 .208374 .033995 29.416
B2B1D2 3.27209E-05 1.2144E-04 .042095 .039424 25.365
B9 - .071856 .030924 -.168156 .183741 5.442
B5B1D2 7.99980E-05 1.2539E-04 .085325 .053796 18.589
BIOB1D2 -4.25291E-05 1.2209E-04 -.056940 .036013 27.768
B7 .159338 .041568 .383330 .096222 10.393
J2BID - .001849 7.5581E-04 -.196077 .149770 6.677
33 - .065525 .019290 -.231759 .206716 4.838
B8 - .050626 .032053 -.121794 .161832 6.179
II .003465 .018867 .012565 .205629 4.863
BI4BID2 1.60167E-04 1.2335E-04 .238465 .028533 35.048
.1381D2 7.28725E-04 1.5721E-04 .336200 .182914 5.467
B13BID - .003969 .003657 -.091674 .134807 7.418
BI2B1D2 1.00811E-04 1.1786E-04 .299314 .007859 127.245
BlIBID2 4.77197E-05 1.1594E-04 .343999 .001378 725.882
14BID -9.32026E-04 .001100 -.089067 .087078 11.484
B6B1D2 6.21594E-05 1.1595E-04 .458007 .001318 758.481
B7BID 8.23095E-04 .037418 .024365 .019957 50.197
BID .001336 .001783 .234860 .009805 101.998
81D2 -7.30274E-05 1.1501E-04 -.803075 6.015E-04 1662.498
(Constant) .141567 .023217
Figure 8.2	 Tolerance values and variance inflation factors of variables entered
into the equation after centring the independent continuous variable
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1 	 Dependent Variable .. 	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
83..	 B4BID2
Multiple R	 .53875
R Square	 .29026
Adjusted R Square	 .26267
Standard Error	 .08930
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 29	 2.43308	 .08390
Residual	 746	 5.94944	 .00798
F = 10.52011	 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable	 B	 SE B	 Beta
	
Tolerance	 VIF
B3B1D	 -.002476	 9.4868E-04
	 -.114723	 .492255	 2.031
B9BID2	 2.50096E-04
	 9.4418E-05
	
.113693	 .516419	 1.936
B13BID2	 3.35149E-04	 1.0022E-04
	 .107197	 .925841	 1.080
B8BID2	 3.06837E-04
	 1.1374E-04
	 .133073	 .391030	 2.557
J1BID	 .001626	 7.8889E-04
	 .068237	 .868225	 1.152
B14BID	 - .007944	
.001654	 -.332988	 .197871	 5.054
B10	 .062571	
.016163	 .146428	 .665043	 1.504
B1B1D	 - .003202	 9.0046E-04
	
-.145244	 .570350	 1.753
J3BID	 .005504	
.002096	 .202125	 .160554	 6.228
B2	 .075829	
.012814
	 .199264	 .839055	 1.192
BlOBID	 .001547	 9.0390E-04
	
.065074	 .657985	 1.520
B12B1D	 - .003976	
.001440	 -.207879	 .167976	 5.953
J4	 - .022922	
.008724	 -.089839	 .813745	 1.229
B14	 .104700
	
.017119	 .230470	 .670011	 1.493
B3BID2	 8.46878E-05
	 2.7257E-05
	
.185207	 .267746	 3.735
B6BED	 - .001610	 7.5848E-04
	
-.131091	 .249329	 4.011
B1BID2	 1.43813E-04
	 3.3514E-05
	
.201443	 .431731	 2.316
B9	 - .071845	
.018371
	 -.168131	 .514749	 1.943
B5BID2	 8.16311E-05
	 3.4663E-05
	
.087067	 .696063	 1.437
B7	 .126965	
.013682	 .305448	 .878175	 1.139
J2BID	 -9.12454E-04
	 4.2897E-04
	 -.096770	 .449671	 2.175
J3	 - .059731	
.016962	 -.211267	 .264319	 3.783
B8	 - .040277	 .020471
	 -.096896	 .392265	 2.549
B14BID2	 1.62341E-04
	 4.9776E-05
	
.241702	 .173226	 5.773
J3BED2	 6.73716E-04
	 1.5126E-04
	
.310821	 .195354	 5.119
B12B1D2	 1.01323E-04	 3.1755E-05
	
.300832	 .107030	 9.343
B11BED2	 6.38962E-05
	 1.9995E-05	 .460611	 .045793	 21.837
B6BID2	 7.85980E-05
	 2.1372E-05
	
.579131	 .038364	 26.066
BID2	 -6.09158E-05
	 1.9522E-05	 -.669885	 .020644	 48.440
(Constant)	 .135391	 .005852
Figure 8.3 Tolerence values and variance inflation factors of variables entered
into the equation after (1) centring the independent continous
variable, bid and (2) backwards stepwise regression
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1	 Dependent Variable .. 	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
86..	 B11
Multiple R	 .55923
R Square	 .31274
Adjusted R Square	 .28888
Standard Error
	 .08770
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 26	 2.62155	 .10083
Residual	 749	 5.76096	 .00769
F = 13.10908	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation
	
Variable	 B	 SE B	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VIF
B10	 .079240	 .020111	 .185434	 .414263	 2.414
B3BID	 - .006187	 .002564	 -.076284	 .918248	 1.089
B13BID2	 .003481	 .001103	 .097574	 .960211	 1.041
B9BID2	 .002822	 .001276
	 .093099	 .518205	 1.930
J2BID2	 3.34026E-04
	 1.2969E-04	 .112955
	 .477218	 2.095
B8BID2	 .002713	 .001147	 .101766	 .495860	 2.017
B14BID	 - .021166
	 .003908
	 -.207052
	
.627920	 1.593
B1BID	 - .009256	 .003062	
-.101074	 .820818	 1.218
B2	 .081119	 .014740
	 .213167	 .611556	 1.635
B1B1D2	 .001431	 4.9804E-04
	 .093387	 .868558	 1.151
J3	 - .042175	 .015849	 -.149172	 .291983	 3.425
BlOBID	 .007231	 .003516	 .075467	 .681520	 1.467
J2	 - .018464	 .009681	 -.069973	 .681743	 1.467
B14	 .123084	 .017513
	 .270939
	
.617441	 1.620
J3BID2	 .007191	 .001576	 .319058	 .187584	 5.331
J4	 - .031613	 .009104	 -.123900
	
.720659	 1.388
B1OBID2	 - .001882	 6.8199E-04	 -.122605	 .464704	 2.152
B8	 - .039205	 .017893	 -.094317	 .495204	 2.019
B9	 - .076932	 .018222	 -.180033	 .504629	 1.982
B2BID2	 - .001420
	 6.9720E-04
	 -.077442	 .634949	 1.575
J1BID2	 - .002013	 9.4793E-04	 -.071654	 .806257	 1.240
J2BID	 - .007550	 .001948
	 -.177164
	
.439237	 2.277
B7	 .148705	 .020704
	 .357749	 .369861	 2.704
B12BID	 - .007917	 .002552	 -.095750	 .963181	 1.038
J3BID	 .022575	 .009320	 .217630	 .113657	 8.798
B7BID	 .012649	 .005964	 .105610	 .369981	 2.703
(Constant)	 .140395
	 .006474
Figure 8.4 Tolerence values and variance inflation factors of variables entered
into the equation after (1) centring the independent continuous
variable, bid and (2) backwards stepwise regression (3)
transforming the x-variable according to the exponential function
of 2/3
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**0.90 **0.75 **2/3 **0.5 *11/3 **0.25 **0.1 Natural
Log
R Square 0.29688 0.30821 0.31274 0.31611 0.30164 0.28719 0.24310 0.31085
Adjusted 0.27248 0.28420 0.28888 0.29048 0.27740 0.25784 0.21787 0.28791
R Square
Number of
variables in
equation
26 26 26 28 26 25 25 25
Largest
variance
inflation
factor
6.377 7.441 8.798 15.726 6.956 6.510 3.648 4.166
Table 8.2 Regression summary statistics and largest variance inflation factor
in the equation after (1) centring the independent continuous
variable (2) using backwards stepwise regression and (3)
transforming the x-variable according to expotential functions of
0.9, 0.75, 2/3, 0.5, 1/3, 0.25, 0.1 and natural log
Variables Correlation Variables Correlation
BID v BID2 - B1BID v B1BID2 0.203
B1 v BUM) - B2BLD v B2BID2 -
B2 v B2BLD 0.092 B3BID v B3BID2 -
B3 v B3BED - B4BID v B4B1D2 -
B4 v B4BID - BSBID v B5BID2 -
BS v BSBID - B6BLD v B6BID2 -
B6 v B6BID - B7BID v B7BID2 -
B7 v B7BLD -0.789 B8BID v B8BID2 -
B8 v B8BID - B9BID v B9B1D2 -
B9 v B9BID - BlOMD v B1OMD2 -0.117
B11 v B11BID - BUBB) v B11B1D2 -
B12 v B12BID - B12BID v B12BID2 -
B13 v B13BID - B13BID v B13BID2 -
B14 v B14BID -0.600 B14BID v B14B1D2 -
J1 v J1B1D - JIBED v J1BID2 -
J3 v J3BID - J2BID v J2B1D2 0.644
J4 v J4BID - J3BID v J3B1D2 -0.870
B1D2 v J2BID2 - J4BID v J4BID2 -
Table 8.3: Pairwise correlation matrix between variables left in the equation
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Further evidence of improvement in multicollinearity can also be seen when
comparing the pairwise correlation matrix in Table 8.3 with that of Table 8.1.
Observe that all of the remaining pairwise correlations have been reduced. It can
be seen that the highest pairwise correlation is -0.870 which is for J3BID and
J3BID2. As this amended model appeared to be reasonably satisfactory, it was
next checked against the remaining regression assumptions.
8.2.2	 Normality
A further assumption of regression analysis is that the members of the underlying
population are normally distributed about the regression plane. This assumption
can be tested by examining the distribution of the residuals. The simplest
procedure is to plot the frequency distribution of the residuals to see if the
distribution looks normal. However, according to Glantz and Slinker (1990) it is
difficult for the inexperienced eye to determine visually whether the distribution
of the residuals significantly deviates from normality and a better graphical test
may be undertaken by constructing a normal probability plot of the residuals, as
normal probability plots are regarded as a more sensitive qualitative indicator of
deviations from normality than a frequency distribution.
Although it is suggested that looking at the normal probability plot is probably
more informative than testing (Glantz and Slinker 1990: 130), the normality aspect
can be formally tested by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Kenkel 1989: 932).
This tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of residuals is normal against the
alternative hypothesis that the distribution is not normal.
Figure 8.5 shows a histogram of the standardised residuals with a superimposed
outline of the normal distribution. The distribution of the residuals appears to be
fairly normal, though it is a bit more 'peaked' than would be expected. Also, there
are five outliers (residuals with standardized residual values greater than 3),
appearing on the negative side, suggesting that the distribution is slightly skewed.
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Figure 8.5:	 Histogram of standardised residuals
The degree of skewness can be seen with more clearly with the aid of the normal
probability plot (Figure 8.6) which shows the residuals displaying very light tailed
errors, so light in fact that the errors may, in this instance, be interpreted as
normal.
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Figure 8.7) shows the sample mean of the
residuals to be zero with a sample standard deviation of 0.0862177. The maximum
distance between the observed cumulative distribution and the theoretical normal
distribution having a mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 0.0862177
is D = 0.03832. The two tailed probability value associated with D = 0.03832 is
0.205. Thus, using a 5% level of significance the null hypothesis would not be
rejected because this probability value exceeds the level of significance. Although
the probability value is close to the 5% critical value, as it exceeds 5% the
distribution can be regarded as being normal, thereby satisfying this assumption.
* * * * KOLMOGOROV - SMIRNOV GOODNESS OF FIT TEST * * * *
RES	 Residual
Test Distribution - Normal 	 Mean:	 .0000000
Standard Deviation: 	 .0862177
Cases: 776
Most extreme differences
Absolute	 Positive	 Negative	 K-S Z	 2-Tailed P
.03832	 .03832	 -.02540	 1.067	 .205
Figure 8.7	 Kolomogorov-Smirnov test statistics
8.2.3	 Homoscedasticity
To satisfy the assumption that the variance appears to be constant, scatterplots of
the residuals may be observed. For this assumption to be met the residuals need to
be randomly distributed in a rectangular band about the horizontal straight line
through 0. As studentised residuals (ie., the residual divided by an estimate of its
standard deviation that varies from point to point, depending on the distance of Xi
from the mean of X) reflect more precisely differences in the true error variances
from point to point these are often preferred in residual plots of continuous
variables (Norusis 1988).
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A commonly used plot is that of studentised residuals against the predicted values
and each individual independent variable. For each continuous variable a random
distribution signifies compliance with this assumption. For categorical variables two
vertical residual bands of the approximately the same spread indicates that this
assumption has been met.
Each continuous variable can be formally tested using Szroeter's test. Szroeter's test
is used to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is constant
against the alternative hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is not constant.
This test was found by Griffiths and Surekha (1986) to be the most powerful test
for detecting non-constant variance when compared with other similar tests.
Szroeter's test statistic is:
Q=	 6n 0.5	 t	 n + 1
	 )	 (-
r?-1	 b	 2
where n is the sample size, and t is the sum of the squared residuals multiplied by
the integer i (ranked in order of increasing variance) and b the sum of the squared
residuals.
The decision rule for the test using a 5% level of significance is:
Reject Ho if Q > Z alpha
Accept Ho if Q < or = Z alpha
where alpha is the level of significance for the test, and Z alpha is chosen from the
standard normal table with an upper-tail area alpha.
Since the number of cases for this data set is constant (n = 776), the formula can
be simplified to:
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6 * 776 0.5	 t	 776+ 1
	 )
7762-1	 b	 2
Q =	 0.0879316	 (---- - 388.5 )
Since b will be constant for each and every continuous variable to which the test is
applied, by substituting the critical value of 1.645 in place of Q, the confidence
intervals for t can be determined by rearranging the formula as follows:
1.645 = 0.0879316	 (---- - 388.5 )
The upper confidence interval would become:
+1.645
)	 388.5
	
t= b ( 
0.0879316
For example, if b = 2.00, the upper confidence interval for t would be 814.42
The lower confidence interval would become:
-1.645
t= b (	 )	 388.5
0.0879316
For example, if b = 2.00, the lower confidence interval for t would be 739.58
If the computed t value falls on or between the confidence intervals then the null
hypothesis is accepted, otherwise the null hypothesis is rejected.
It was found that, since the values of t and b can be directly computed,
constructing a table of confidence intervals was particularly useful in the practical
application of the test. This is time saving in analyses of this kind where there are
many independent variables and to which many transformations maybe
subsequently applied. Appendix D shows the table of confidence intervals t for
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Szroeter's test statistic based on 5% level of significance acc -rding to different
values of b for 776 cases.
The homogeneity of variance for categorical variables can be formally tested using
the Bartlett Box F test (Norusis 1988: 317). If the test probability is less than 5%
then the null hypothesis of non-constant variance is rejected. The maximum
variance / minimum variance ratio can also be calculated to assess the degree of
non-constant variance.
Figure 8.8 shows a scatterplot of the studentised residuals against the predicted
values. Although the residuals are quite evenly spread a 'megaphone' shape can
clearly be seen indicating the presence of a heteroscedastic trend. The spread of
residuals increasing adds further evidence to the suspicions raised in the earlier
scatterplot analysis.
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Figure 8.8:	 Scatterplot of studentised residuals against the predicted values
Figure 8.9 a - z shows the scatterplot for each of the independent variables left in
the equation. For the continuous variables the majority of residuals form the shape
of a vertical band with the remaining residuals falling both sides for those
variables without the squared term and constrained to the positive side for
219
variables with the squared term. The reason for this constraint is that when squared
the independent variables cannot take on negative values. For most scatterplots it
is not possible to pick out any particular pattern. However, a distinct megaphone
shape can be seen in Figure 8.9b (*sresid B1BID2). Figure 8.9n (*sresid J2BID)
also shows signs of heteroscedasticity in that there appears to be an uneven spread
of residuals either side of the vertical band. Of the categorical scatterplots the two
vertical bands of residuals appear to be of approximately the same spread
indicating homoscedasticity. The exceptions appear to be Figure 8.9r (*resid B2)
and Figure 8.9v (*resid B10) which show signs of non-constant variance.
It is difficult to observe visually from the individual variable scatterplots which
independent variables are in fact heteroscedastic. To obtain further evidence each
of the independent variables were formally tested.
Table 8.4 shows the results of Szroeter's test for continuous variables and the
Bartlett Box test for categorical variables. As can be seen, 6 of the 17 continuous
variables attain a Szroeter's Q test statistic greater than 1.645 indicating non-
constant variance and 5 of the 9 categorical values attain a Bartlett Box probability
value of less than 5%. Therefore 11 of the 26 variables exhibit a non-constant
variance.
In respect of the magnitude of non-constant variance it can be seen that the
variables with the highest degree of heteroscedasticity are J2BID for continuous
variables and B7 for the categorical variables with a respective Szroeter's Q value
= - 3.7916 and Bartlett Box probability value = 0.003.
Based on a 5% (ie., 1 in 20 chance) level of significance, for 26 variables it is
expected that on average only one or two variables would have a statistically
significant non-constant variance. Clearly, 11 out of 26 variables being
significantly heteroscedastic is not acceptable. There is, therefore, strong evidence
that this assumption has been violated and needs to be corrected.
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Figure 8.9 a - j:
	 Scatterplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation
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Figure 8.9 k - t:
	 Scatterplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation (cont.)
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Figure 8.9 u - z:
	 Scatterplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation (cont.)
Szroeter's test Bartlett Box test
Variable
Test
statistic Variable
Test
statistic Variable
Test
statistic
Prob.
Value
Minimum/
maximum
variance
B1BID 1.7594 B12BID 0.5532 B2 1338 0.247 1.251
B1BID2 33320 BI3BID2 -0.0507 B7 8.700 0.003 1.748
B2BID2 2.1035 B14BID 0.7028 B8 0.572 0.450 1.164
B3BID 2.2039 J1BID2 -0.9286 B9 1.581 0.209 1.319
B7BID -2.2145 J2BID -3.7916 BIO 4.138 0.042 1.500
B8BID2 0.9918 .12B1D2 1.5138 B14 2.447 0.118 1398
B9B11)2 -0.0447 J3BID 2.7204 J2 8.800 0.003 1.448
BlOBID -0.7607 J3B1D2 -0.6577 J3 5.838 0.016 1.418
B1OBID2 13921 J4 8.980 0.003 1.477
Table 8.4: Szroeter's test for continuous variables and Bartlett Box test for
categorical variables
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8.2.3.1	 Correcting heteroscedasticity
To correct heteroscedasticity one approach is to use power (or Box-Cox)
transformations where:
y = x)`
for some choice of constant power lambda. According to Cryer and Miller (1991)
it is possible to proceed by considering a series of power transformations ranging
from lambda equalling -1 to +2. It should be noted that Lambda equalling -1
corresponds to the inverse ratio measure of competitiveness used in the model. It
will be seen in the subsequent analysis that the negative power transformations of
-0.5 and -1 produce better results in terms of satisfying this assumption, therefore
further negative transformations ranging from Lambda equalling -1.5 to -5 were
also tested.
Another approach to correcting heteroscedasticity is to use the arcsin
transformation (Norusis 1988: 164). Kenkel (1989: 785) recommends correcting
heteroscedasticity of error terms by using weighted least squares.
Transforming the dependent variable, competitiveness, and using weighted least
squares regression forms the next stage of the analysis.
8.3 Transformation
The principal aim of this section of the analysis is to reduce the number of
heteroscedastic variables to an acceptable number by transforming the dependent
Y variable competitiveness. It should, however, be noted that the use of
transformations has wider benefits other than simply trying to reduce the number
of heteroscedastic variables. Seigal (1988) states 'one of the great benefits of
transformation is that it simplifies the search for structure in the data ... when
motives are exploratory transformation is certainly ethical and its use should
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always be considered ... to see trends and exceptions'. He also goes on to say that
'important facets of the data can be missed if they are not used'.
Table 8.5 shows the summary statistics for the regression equations according to
the different Box-Cox transformations which range from lambda equalling 2 to -5.
In terms of predictive power the best adjusted R2 value occurs where lambda is
set at 0. Decreasing trends occur either side of this position. The number of
outliers produced by the model are also recorded in Table 8.5. There is a
decreasing trend in the number of outliers from where lambda is 2 to -5. Lambda
settings of -3 to -5 produced no outliers in the model.
LAMBDA
2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 -3 -3.5 -4 -4.2 -4.5 -5
R Square 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 028 0.27
Adjusted 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25
R Square
Number
of
variables
in
equation
27 27 28 28 28 27 26 26 26 26 26 25 25 24 25 25
Number
of
outliers
8 8 8 7 7 5 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Largest 8.95 8.95 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.81 8.78 8.80 8.80
VIF in
equation
K-S
prob.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.64 0.94 0.98 0.88 0.54 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.04
Table 8.5: Regression summary statistics for lambda settings ranging from 2 to -5
In respect of satisfying the regression assumptions other than that of
heteroscedasticity, it can be seen from Table 8.5 that the largest VIF attained for
a variable in the equation has been recorded for the purposes of assessing
multicollinearity. As the largest VIF in the equation is less than 10 for all
transformations, it therefore appears that this assumption has not been violated. In
respect of normality, lambda settings above -0.5 and at or below -5 fail the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test probability of 0.5.
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Turning to the homoscedasticity assumption, Tables 8.6 and 8.7 respectively show
the results according to each transformation of Szroeter's test for continuous
variables and Bartlett Box test for categorical variables. It can be seen that the
magnitude of heteroscedasticity in each of the individual variables decreases with
the change in lambda setting from 2 to -5. The fewest number of heteroscedastic
variables occur in the lambda setting range of -4 to -5.
LAMBDA
1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5	 I -I	 I -1.5	 I 2	 I -2.5 3 -3.5 -4 -4.2 -4.5
BID -12.4 -10.5 -8.56 -7.21 -6.07 -5.19
BID2 1.780 1.924
B1BID 2.106 1.772 1.766 1.825 1.769 1.865 1.759 1.754 1.760 1.805 1.768 1.822 1.812 1.271 1.469
BIBID2 5.775 5.033 4.559 4 199 3.847 3.617 3.332 3.17 3.067 3.038 2.948 2.905
B2BID 5.252 4.269
B2BID2 3.331 2.792 2.566 2.371 2.103 1.927 1.787 1.708 1.563 1.520 1.482 1.388 1.025 1.135
B3BID 3.284 2.938 2.827 2.638 2.507 2.395 2.204 2.101 2.030 2.016 1.678 1.964 2.006 1.951 1.497 1.659
B3BID2
B4BID
B4BID2
B5BID
B5BID2
B6BID
-1.43 -0.98 0.712 1.025
B6BID2 -4.51 -3.81 -3.02 -2.35
B7B1D
-2.Zt -t.75 -Z.33 -0.93 -0.65 -0.30
-0.05 -0.09 -0.23 013
B7BID2
B8BID
j
J0B8BID2 6.011 4.507 3.431 2.566 1.969 1.454 0.99203% 0.653 0.6SO 0.520 0.564 .566 .34,3{ .3 In O. 44S
B9BID 0.036 -0.09
B9BID2 3.350 2.108 1.300 0.708 0.373 0.091 -0.04 -0.03 0.042 0.190 0.280 0.470 0.420 0.322 0.495 0.813
B I OBID
-0.76 -0.78 -0.73 -0.60 -0.54 -0.42 -0.47 -0.56 -0.47 -0.18
B1OBID2 2.998 2.301 1.878 1.660 1.565 1.454 1.392 1.469 1.568 1.711 1.770 1.935 1.834 1.707 1.834 2.101
BI I BID
BI 1 BID2 1.028 0.610 0.566 0.614 0.650 0.741 1.835 2.154
B I 2BID 0.110 -0.15 -0.11 0.027 0.127 0.249 0.533 0.771 1.004 1.258 1.447 1.582 1.533 1.442 1.584 1.920
BI2BID2 451
BI 3BID
B13BID2 -1.60 -1.52 -1.17 -0.83 -0.57 -0.39 -0.05 0.190 0.407 0.632 0.754 0.857 0.762 0.625 0.704 1.003
B I 4BID 2.900 2.179 1.779 1.407 1.046 0.773 0.703 0.616 0.572 0.590 0.543 0.511 0.309 0.070 0.280
B I 4BID2 4.44 3.634 3.041 2.458 1.868
-0.26
JI BID,
JIBID2 -0.40 -0.61 -0.71 -0.78 -0.93 -0.95 -0.93 -1.00 -1.05 -1.04 -1.11
J2BID -11.7 -9.73 -8.04 -6.55 -5.46 -4.51 -3.79 -3.25 -2.80 -2.39 -2.11 -1.71 -1.48 -1.62 -1.61 -1.26
J2BID2 9.361 7.237 5.228 3.854 2.823 1.967 1.514 1.061 0.752 0.579 0.395 0.387 0.557 0.367
J3BID 9.340 7.486 5.796 4.637 3.798 3.125 2.720 2.339 2.084 1.946 1.778 1.758 1.845 1.599 1.504 1.631
J3BID2 4.804 3.297 1.824 0.874 0.181 -0.45 -0.66 -0.91 -1.05 -1.08 -1.13 -1.04 -0.74 -0.81 -1.07 -0.85
J4BID
J4BID2
Table 8.6: Szroeter's test for continuous variables for lambda settings ranging
from 2 to -5
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LAMBDA
2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 -3 -3.5 - -4 -4.2 -4.5 -5
B2
BARTLETT 6.83 3.56 2.42 1.60 1.08 0.99 1.34 1.51 1.79 2.18 2.14 2.73 3.39 3.71 3.48 4.15
P= 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04
M1N/MAXV 1.70 1.45 1.36 1.28 1.22 1.21 1.25 1.27 1 30 1.34 1.36 1.38 1.44 1.46 1.45 1.50
B7
BARTLETT 19.9 20.9 19.7 17.7 15.1 12.1 8.70 6.44 4.57 3.08 1.95 1.02 0.52 0.35 0.27 0.06
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.31 0.47 0.55 0.61 0.81
MIN/MAXV 2.26 2.30 2.25 2.17 2.05 1.92 1.75 1.63 1.51 1.41 1.32 1.22 1.16 1.13 1.11 1.05
B8
BARTLETT 84.3 48.7 26.9 13.1 5.92 2.28 0.57 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.45 0.74 094 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99
MIN/MA XV 4.53 3.32 2.53 1.96 1.60 1.35 1.16 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00
B9
BARTLETT 28.9 20.1 13.4 8.78 5.56 3.47 1.58 0.75 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.50 0.81
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.39 0.60 0.83 0.95 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.48 0.37
MIN/MA XV 3.93 3.02 2.40 2.00 1.71 1.52 1.32 1.21 1.12 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.16 1.20
BIO
BARTLETT 0.19 0.14 0.83 1.99 2.95 3.77 4.14 4.53 4.71 4.73 4.64 4.58 4.37 4.28 4.04 3.81
P= 0.67 0.71 0.36 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
MIN/MA XV 1.10 1.08 1.21 1 33 1.41 1.47 1.50 1.53 1.54 1.54 1.53 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.49 1.48
B14
BARTLETT 32.2 25.1 18.2 12.2 7.44 5.05 2.45 0.92 0.19 0.00 0.18 0.53 1.04 1.25 1.95 2.62
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.34 0.67 0.98 0.68 0.47 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.11
MIN/MA XV 2.95 2.64 2.33 2.03 1.76 1.60 1.40 1.23 1.10 1.01 1.10 1.18 1.27 1.30 1.39 1.47
.12
BARTLETT 43.6 28.1 18.7 11.9 8.80 6.36 4.83 3.85 3.21 2.66 3.35 2.96
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.09
M1N/MA XV 2.21 1.91 1.70 1.54 1.45 1.37 1.32 1.28 1.25 1.23 1.26 1.24
13
BARTLETT 20.9 15.9 12.5 9.90 8.01 7.06 5.84 4.87 4.08 3.44 2.89 2.45 1.95 1.65 1.68 1.41
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.24
MIN/MAXV 1.99 1.81 1.69 1.59 1.51 1.47 1.42 1.37 1.34 1.30 1.28 1.25 1.22 1.12 1.20 1.18
.14
BARTLETT 56.5 41.7 27.3 20.8 15.6 12.0 8.98 6.99 5.54 4.45 3.63 3.09 2.67 2.46 2.98 2.59
P= 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.11
M1N/MA XV 2.85 2.42 2.02 1.83 1.68 1.57 1.48 1.41 1.35 1.31 1.28 1.25 1.23 1.22 1.25 1.23
Table 8.7 :	 Bartlett Box test for categorical variables for lambda settings
ranging from 2 to -5
Since the range of lambda settings between -4 to -5 produced the fewest number
of heteroscedastic variables, the settings between these values was tested in 0.1
incremental stages in an attempt to find the optimal lambda setting. It was found
that the optimal transformation was with lambda at a setting of -4.2. The
individual variable scatterplots shown in Figure 8.10 a-x provide reassurance that
this transformed model is appropriate because it is not possible to pick out any
particular pattern. When tested formally it was found that only three of the 24
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	 Scatterplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation for lambda setting of 4.2
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	 Scatterplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation for lambda setting of 4.2 (cont.)
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	 Scattetplot of each of the independent variables left in the
equation for lambda setting of 4.2 (cont.)
variables remained heteroscedastic. It can be seen from Figures 8.6 and 8.7 that
two of these were for the continuous variables of B1BID and B1OBlED2 and for
the categorical value B10. With respective Szroeter's test Q values of 1.951 and
1.707 and Bartlett Box test probability of 4%, all three variables fail the test albeit
marginally.
The probability of obtaining three out of 24 variables being significantly
heteroscedastic is :-
(3 significant = (24) (0.05) 3 (0.95)21
variables)	 ( 3)
= 24 * 23 * 22 * 0.000125 * 0.340562
1 * 2 * 3
= 0.086162
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Although it is expected that on average only one or two variables should have
non-constant variance, the probability of 0.086162 exceeds the critical 0.05 value,
therefore having three out of 24 variables heteroscedastic appears to be acceptable.
Visual evidence of stabilizing the variance can be seen in Figure 8.11 which shows
the scatterplot of the studentised residuals against the predicted values. A greater
negative residual value along the x-axis indicates greater competitiveness and vice
versa. There is a slight indication that the variance for the most competitive
bidders is smaller where the studentised residuals fall between -2 and -3. This is
probably symptomatic of the measure used in where extreme cases of
competitiveness give rise to smaller variability. However, compare Figure 8.11
with 8.8 and note the improvement in the behaviour of the residuals. The residuals
now appear more randomly scattered.
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Scatterplot of studentised residuals against the predicted values
for lambda setting of -4.2
SZROETER'S Q' VALUE
+5
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Further graphical evidence of variance stabilisation can be seen in Figures 8.12
and 8.13. With regard to the continuous independent variables, Figure 8.12 shows
a heteroscedasticity plot for Szroeter's Q test statistic relative to the 5% confidence
interval according to lambda settings +2 to -5. When the variables are observed
in relation to the confidence intervals of 1.645, it can be clearly seen that there is
a convergence up to the approximate lambda setting of -4.2. This indicates that
there is a gradual improvement toward homoscedasticity. After this setting there
appears to be a slight kink causing a deterioration in homoscedasticity.
-4.2
+2
	
+1	 -1	 -2	 -3	 -4	 -5
LAMBDA SE1TING
Figure 8.12: Confidence intervals for Szroeter's test statistic for continuous
independent variables according to lambda settings between +2
and -5
Turning to the categorical variables, Figure 8.13 shows a probability plot for the
Bartlett Box test statistic relative to the 5% confidence intervals according to
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lambda settings +2 to -5. It can be seen that the number of variables in the
significant region of 5% or less decreases as the negative settings of lambda
increase.
PROBABILITY
+2
	
+1	 -1	 -2	 -3	 4 -4.2
LAMBDA SETTING
Figure 8.13: Probability values for Bartlett Box test statistic for categorical
independent variables according to lambda settings between +2
and -5
As for remaining regression assumptions, at a lambda setting of - 4.2, a largest
recorded VIP of 8.777 and Kolmogorov- Smirnov test probability value of 0.16
shows that both the respective assumptions of multicollinearity and normality have
been met.
Figure 8.14 provides a summary of the regression model where lambda is set at -
4.2. Improving the model in terms of heteroscedasticity from 11 to 3
heteroscedastic variables has meant a slight reduction in the overall capability of
the model. The adjusted R square statistic has dropped from 0.28888 to 0.25392
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(compare Figures 8.4 and 8.14). However, this transformed model is still
statistically useful for predicting competitiveness as can be seen by referring to the
global F values (F = 11.99027, p = 0.0000).
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1
	
Dependent Variable ..	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
88..	 B1BID
Multiple R	 .52633
R Square	 .27703
Adjusted R Square	 .25392
Standard Error	
.05090
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 24	 .74564	 .03107
Residual	 751	 1.94595	 .00259
F = 11.99027	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation 	
Variable
	 B	 SE B	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VIF
B10	 .044678
	
.011645
	 .184513	 .416241	 2.402
B3BID	 - .003869
	
.001482	 -.084180	 .926319	 1.080
B13BID2	 .001603
	 6.3808E-04	 .079277	 .966278	 1.035
B9BID2	 .002266
	 8.5808E-04
	 .131902	 .385807	 2.592
J2BID2	 1.84505E-04
	 7.4295E-05	 .110088
	
.489889	 2.041
B8BID2
	 .001263	 6.6421E-04
	 .083631	 .497799	 2.009
B14BID	 - .009123
	
.002266	 -.157495
	 .628896	 1.590
B2	 .046624
	
.008524	 .216217	 .616060	 1.623
J3	 - .025030
	
.009048	 -.156230	 .301856	 3.313
BlOBID	 .005548
	
.002021	 .102196
	 .694663	 1.440
J2	 - .011214
	
.005380	 -.074997
	 .743579	 1.345
B14	 .055662	
.010134
	 .216228
	
.621131
	 1.610
J3BID2	 .003888
	 9.0530E-04
	 .304454	 .191582	 5.220
34	 - .018339
	 .005082	 -.126844
	 .779257
	
1.283
B9BID	 .006071
	 .003486	 .079935
	 .456917	 2.189
B1OBID2	 - .001245	 3.9433E-04
	 -.143149	 .468274	 2.136
B8	 - .026861	 .010369	 -.114042	 .496745	 2.013
B9	 - .048195
	 .010822	 -.199038	 .481934
	 2.075
B2BID2	
-9.15487E-04 4.0451E-04
	 -.088090	 .635448	 1.574
J2BID	 - .004336
	 .001093
	 -.179579
	 .469617	 2.129
B7	 .077189
	 .012002
	 .327712	 .370794	 2.697
B12BID	 - .005511	 .001479	 -.117635	 .965964	 1.035
J3BID	 .010761
	 .005403
	 .183080
	 .113938	 8.777
B7BID	 .008211
	 .003458
	 .120991	 .370805	 2.697
(Constant)	 .103058	 .003399
Figure 8.14	 Regression model summary at a lambda setting of -4.2
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Other x-variable transformations, comprising exponential funGtions of 0.9, 0.75,
1/3, 0.25, 0.1 and natural log, were tried and tested according to different settings
of lambda in an attempt to try and improve upon the above model. The results were
similar to that of above in that transformations with lambda settings between -4 to -
5 being the closest at satisfying the regression assumptions. However, in all cases
no fewer than three heteroscedastic variables could be found. Since the adjusted R2
values were found to be inferior in these other transformations it appears that the
above model may still be regarded as the best model that is closest to satisfying all
of the regression assumptions.
8.4 Arcsin transformation
An arcsin transformation of the Y variable based on the x-variable exponential of
2/3 was also undertaken in attempt to improve the above model. With regard to the
multicollinearity assumption the largest VIF was 8.818. However, this failed the test
for normality with Kolmogorov-Smirnov test probability value of 0.008. In addition
10 of the remaining 27 variables were found to be heteroscedastic. This
transformation also produced an inferior adjusted R2 value of 0.24026. Other arcsin
transformations produced similar results.
8.5 Weighted least squares
Attempts were also made using weighted least squares regression based on different
settings of lambda ranging from 2 to -5. The relationship between the residual
variances and different functions of x need to be found in order to determine
appropriate weights. This is achieved by splitting the regression residuals (obtained
from using the least squares regression) into several groups of approximately equal
size based on the value of the independent variable x. The variance of the observed
residuals in each group is then calculated.
When applied to this data set, it was found that when the data was split into groups
of approximately the same size it was not possible to determine any suitable
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functional relationships. The reason for this could be due to the specification of the
model which is polynomial and contains many independent variables. Mendenhall
and Sinich (1993: 439) point out that it may not be easy to identify the appropriate
groupings in which to apply the weights, if first more than one independent variable
is included in the regression (as is the case in this analysis) and second that the
relationship between the residual variance and some preselected function of the
independent variables may not reveal a consistent pattern over the groups.
8.6 Summary
In order to comply with the regression assumptions the best model requires
transforming by applying a series of statistical corrections. By centring the x-
variable, deleting insignificant variables using backwards stepwise regression and
transforming the x-variable based on the exponential 2/3, the selected model is able
to satisfy all of the regression assumptions except that of homoscedasticity. It was
found that 11 out of 26 variables were significantly heteroscedastic. The approach
taken in attempting to satisfy the homoscedasticity assumption is to transform the
y-variable systematically using a sequence of Box-Cox transformations according
to different settings of lambda. When applying the various Box-Cox transformations
to the selected model it was determined that the transformation that best satisfied
the homoscedasticity assumption was where lambda was set at -4.2. This was found
using a combination of Szroeter's test for continuous variables and Bartlett Box test
for categorical variables. Three out of the 24 remaining independent variables were
significant.
Ideally with 24 variables remaining in the equation, at a 5 % level of significance,
it is expected that on average one or two should be heteroscedastic. However, it is
still admissible to have three significantly heteroscedastic variables out of a total of
24 variables. This is considered acceptable because the combined probabilities of
the three heteroscedastic variables out of 24 exceeds 5%. The magnitude of
heteroscedasticity in terms of significance of the three variables is a determining
factor in this result - with Szroeter's Q test statistic of 1.9510 and 1.7075 and a
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Bartlett Box probability of 0.039 none of these three outstanding cases show signs
of severe heteroscedasticity.
Visual evidence of the homoscedasticity assumption being satisfied can be seen in
Figure 8.18 which shows the scatterplot of the studentised residuals against the
predicted values. This shows the residuals apparently randomly scattered in a
rectangular band about the horizontal straight line through 0.
In respect of the remaining assumptions, with all independent variables having a
VIF of less than 10 and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test probability greater than 5%,
both the multicollinearity and normality assumptions have been satisfied.
Testing different Box-Cox transformations on a systematic basis against other x-
variable transformations (ie. exponential functions of 0.9, 0.75, 1/3, 0.25, 0.1 and
natural log) eventually produced models that satisfied all the regression assumptions
to virtually the same degree. In respect of other transformations, the arcsin
transformation was found to be unsuitable in that the assumptions of autocorrelation,
normality and homoscedasticity were all violated. The use of weighted regression
did not appear to be a suitable solution either. It was not possible to determine any
suitable functional relationships between the residual variances and the different
functions of x. A possible reason for this is that the model is polynomial and
contains many independent variables. This makes it more difficult to apply
appropriate groupings. Also the relationship between the residual variance and some
preselected function of the independent variables may not reveal a consistent pattern
over the groups.
The transformed model at a lambda setting of -4.2 is closest to satisfying all of the
regression assumptions. Also no outliers were generated using this transformation.
Given the general robustness of regression technique, it was contended that this
transformed model may be treated as one that satisfies all regression assumptions.
237
CHAPTER 9
Model verification, prediction and reliability
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9 MODEL VERIFICATION, PREDICTION AND RELIABILITY
9.1 Introduction
The previous chapter considered the reliability of the best model (ie. model 12)
by examining the residuals to see if one or more of the regression assumptions
were violated. Each assumption was examined in turn. If an assumption was
violated the model was corrected by transforming it in such a way that it no longer
violates the assumption. It was found that the model violated the regression
assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity and was transformed
accordingly.
This chapter is in three sections. The first section examines the transformed
version of model 12 to verify whether it as the best model in its transformed state
remains as the best model. The second section observes the individual bidder
competitiveness predictions according to contract type, contract size and bidder
size. The third section considers the model's reliability by constructing 95%
prediction intervals.
9.2 Model verification
To verify that model 12 in its transformed state remains as the best model, ideally
each and every candidate model needs first to be transformed in such a way that
it satisfies all the regression assumptions. Since the approach needed to satisfy all
the regression assumptions is very time consuming and time constraints make it
impractical to attempt to transform every model, attempts were made to transform
the closest challengers to model 12 (ie. models 18 and 20).
Models 18 and 20 were selected from Table 7.2 which shows a summary of
calculated and tabulated F values for all the candidate models based on 15 bidders
and 5 contract types. Given that a smaller positive difference between the
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tabulated and calculated values is indicative of a better model, it can be seen that
models 18 and 20 are the closest challengers to model 12. The difference between
values is 0.10 (ie. 1.26 - 1.16) for model 18 and 0.19 (ie. 1.24 - 1.05) for model
20. The differences between tabulated and calculated values for all the other
remaining candidate models are larger, indicating that these other models are
inferior to models 18 and 20.
Models 18 and 20 are both high order models containing 6 chunks. In line with
previous procedures, multicollinearity was the first regression assumption to be
tested and, as to be expected with high order models, both failed this assumption
and, therefore, required correcting. It was, however, not possible to bring
multicollinearity down to an acceptable level, despite trying different combinations
of correction procedures which comprised centring, backwards stepwise regression
and x-variable transformations. The number of significant variables remaining in
the equation for both models were too many. Since no suitable transformation to
reduce multicollinearity to an acceptable level for either model could be found, lilt
approach taken in the verification process was to analyse all other candidate
models using the same transformation that was used for model 12.
It is recognised that this is not the most ideal transformation with which to verify
model 12. However, apart from being an acceptable transformation for model 12,
this transformation does at least dampen the severity of regression assumption
violations for the other candidate models. Although other suitable transformations
could have been found and tried and tested for lower order models, Table 7.2
shows these models to be even more inferior than the higher order models. Given
this, coupled with the time consuming process in transforming the model to satisfy
all the regression assumptions, there appears to be little point in attempting to
verify model 12 against these lower order models.
The verification analysis is in two parts. Using the 15 bidder, 5 contract type data
set, the first part of this section of the analysis assesses the degree to which the
transformation used for model 12 satisfies the regression assumptions pertaining
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to the other candidate models. The second part considers analyzing the candidate
models so as to verify whether model 12 in its transformed state remains as the
best model. In accordance with previously adopted procedures, bidders have been
added incrementally into the sample up to the predetermined 15 bidder cut off
point. For each bidder added into the analysis the candidate models have then been
tested using a forward sequential candidate model selection technique based on the
F-test to see if model 12 in its transformed state continued to be the best model.
9.2.1	 Regression assumption assessment for candidate models
Table 9.1 shows the regression assumption statistics relating to the candidate
models. This is based on the same transformation that was used for model 12.
Since backwards stepwise regression was used the number of variables left in the
equation have been recorded for comparison purposes. The statistics for models
17, 19, 20 and 22 were unobtainable due to what is believed to be an error in the
SPSS program relating to integer overflow. In addition, insufficient virtual
memory prevented the determination of the number of heteroscedastic variables
for models 15, 16 and 18.
Commenting on each of the regression assumptions, starting with multicollinearity,
for 13 models the largest VIF factor obtained by a variable was less than 10
thereby satisfying this assumption. All these models had 28 or less variables left
in the equation after using the backwards stepwise procedure. Those models that
failed this assumption had 36 or more variables remaining. Since multicollinearity
is concerned with interdependency between variables, a probable reason why those
remaining models failed therefore relates to the large number of variables
remaining in the equation.
For normality, all the models tested achieved a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
probability greater than 5% thereby satisfying this assumption. However, in respect
of the homoscedasticity assumption only models 5, 12, and 14 achieved a
probability of greater than 5% in terms of number of heteroscedastic variables
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relative to total number of variables in the equation. The high failure rate for this
assumption is likely to be attributed to model 12's transformation not being
suitable for the other candidate models.
Model
no.
Multicollinearity Normality Homoscedasticity
Largest VIF left in
equation
K - S test
statistic /
Probability
No. of heteroscedastic
variables/Total no.
of variables in equation
1 N/A N/A N/A
2 1.000 1.264 / 0.082 1 / 1
3 1.168 1.290 / 0.072 1 / 3
4 1.784 0.875 / 0.429 3 / 9
5 8.810 1.133 / 0.153 1 / 9
6 4.346 0.940 / 0.340 6 / 20
7 1.843 0.764 / 0.604 3 / 10
8 8.874 1.076 / 0.197 4 / 15
9 4.372 0.986 / 0.286 10 / 23
10 1.769 0.869 / 0.438 4 / 20
11 109.209 1.160 / 0.136 29 / 36
12 8.777 1.124 / 0.160 3 / 24
13 4.071 1.067 / 0.205 7 / 24
14 6.008 1.162 / 0.135 3 / 25
15 109.204 1.055 / 0.216 SPSS Computational
problem: insufficient
virtual memory / 46
16 108.916 1.098 / 0.210 ditto / 49
17 Not known/error in SPSS Program: integer overflow
18 108.923 1.146 / 0.144 SPSS Computational
problem: insufficient
virtual memory / 46
19 Not known/error in SPSS Program; integer overflow
20
21 5.494 1.119 / 0.163 6 / 28
22 Not known/error in SPSS Program; integer overflow
Table 9.1: Regression assumption statistics for candidate models 1 to 22 (based
on model 12 transformation)
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Turning to the degree to which the candidate models themselves satisfy the
regression assumptions, models 2 to 4, 6 to 10, 13 and 21 fail only one regression
assumption, that of homoscedasticity. Model 11 fails both the assumptions of
multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. Models 15, 16 and 18 fail the
multicollinearity assumption. The homoscedasticity findings are unknown for these
three models due to there being insufficient virtual memory in the main frame
computer. The results for models 17, 19, 20 and 22 are also unknown due to a
likely error in the SPSS program.
9.2.2	 Best model verification
In testing the transformed model 12 against all other candidate models to venfy
whether model 12 in its transformed state remains as the best model, all variables,
rather than just the significant variables, were retained within the transformed
candidate models. This approach was taken due to the rationale underlying the
chunkwise model building process. Candidate models have been built and analysed
on the basis of collective groups (or chunks) of variables in preference to using
individual significant variables.
To satisfy the regression assumption of multicollinearity, backward stepwise
regression was used in conjunction with other correction techniques to reduce
multicollinearity to an acceptable level. This procedure was considered appropriate
because the large number of variables in model 12 contributed to producing
excessive multicollinearity. Backwards stepwise regression helped to solve this
problem by deleting all non-significant variables from the equation.
However, eliminating variables from the equation in this manner means that the
chunks no longer remain intact as complete sets of variables. Only the significant
variables within the chunk remain. This drastically alters the make-up of the chunk
from a complete one that contains both significant and insignificant variables to
an incomplete one that contains only significant variables. The proportion of
variables left within a chunk after the backwards stepwise procedure is dependent
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on the number of significant variables contained within that particular chunk.
By retaining only the significant variables it follows that the greater the number
of significant variables left in the model after the backwards stepwise regression
procedure the better the likely predictive ability of the model. In the model
verification process the higher order models are likely to outperform other the
models, such as model 12, as they have a wider array of individual variables from
which significant variables can be retained. For this reason is not logical to
attempt to verify using models containing only significant variables as this goes
against the principles of the chunkwise approach in which variables are considered
in collective groups and not on an individual basis.
Table 9.2 shows the model order based on the number of explained degrees of
freedom for the incremental increase in terms of numbers of bidders up to the
predetermined 15 bidder cut off point (For the sake of brevity this has been
reported in three bidder increments). The global F values for all candidate models
are significant, indicating that the transformed models are useful in predicting
competitiveness. The vast majority of transformed models also show a slightly
improved adjusted R2 statistic when compared to their untransformed versions (see
Table 7.1) indicating a better fit to the data.
A summary of model comparison using a forward sequential candidate model
selection technique based on the F-test can be seen in Table 9.3. The respective
best transformed models for the 6 bidder, 9 bidder, 12 bidder and 15 bidder data
sets are models 19, 12, 12 and 12. Although the best model prediction is not
consistent for the smaller data set, transformed model 12 does pull through as
being the best model where there are 9 or more bidders. These findings are
consistent with the adjusted R2 values in Table 9.2 where the same very same
models obtain comparatively high adjusted R2 scores for the respective
combination of bidders. These results are also borne out with Mallow's Cp scores
shown in Figure 9.1. It can be seen that model 12's performance in terms of bias
improves as the number of bidders increases.
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6 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 9 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res
df
SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
Mod
No.
Exp
df
Res SSE M S
Error
F
Value
Adj
R2
1 0 360 1.14 0.003171 0.00 0.00 1 0 513 1.86 0.003617 0.00 0.00
2 3 357 1.07 0.002992 12.32 0.06 2 3 510 1.78 0.003490 10.80 0.03
3 7 353 1.03 0.002918 6.38 0.08 3 7 506 1.74 0.003439 5.59 0.05
4 8 352 0.98 0.002784 8.30 0.12 4 11 502 1.46 0.002908 13.59 0.20
5 12 348 0.96 0.002759 5.99 0.13 5 15 498 1.66 0.003333 4.19 0.08
7 15 345 0.98 0.002841 4.07 0.10 7 15 498 1.43 0.002871 10.58 0.21
6 18 342 0.94 0.002749 4.32 0.13 8 23 490 1.34 0.002735 8.57 0.24
8 20 340 0.90 0.002647 4.81 0.17 6 27 486 1.35 0.002778 7.00 0.23
9 22 338 0.91 0.002692 4.10 0.15 9 31 482 1.32 0.002739 6.52 0.24
12 30 330 0.87 0.002636 3.55 0.17 12 39 474 1.26 0.002658 5.89 0.27
10 32 328 0.88 0.002683 3.15 0.15 10 47 466 1.30 0.002790 4.33 0.23
13 40 320 0.84 0.002625 2.95 0.17 13 55 458 1.23 0.002686 4.31 0.26
14 42 318 0.84 0.002642 2.79 0.17 14 63 450 1.21 0.002689 3.87 0.26
21 50 310 0.81 0.002613 2.59 0.18 21 71 442 1.17 0.002647 3.70 0.27
11 52 308 0.82 0.002662 2.37 0.16 11 79 434 1.17 0.002696 3.26 0.25
15 60 300 0.79 0.002633 2.26 0.17 15 87 426 1.11 0.002606 3.33 0.28
16 62 298 0.78 0.002617 2.27 0.17 16 95 418 1.09 0.002608 3.12 0.28
18 70 290 0.75 0.002586 2.20 0.18 18 103 410 1.05 0.002561 3.08 0.29
17 72 288 0.74 0.002569 2.20 0.19 17 111 402 1.07 0.002662 2.68 0.26
20 80 280 0.71 0.002536 2.16 0.20 20 119 394 1.02 0.002589 2.73 0.28
19 82 278 0.70 0.002518 2.17 0.21 19 127 336 1.01 11002617 2.56 COB
22 90 270 0.68 0.002519 2.06 0.21 22 135 378 10.98 0.002593 1 2.52 1 0.28
12 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 15 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Mod Exp Res SSE M S F Adj Mod Exp Res F Adj
No. df df Error Value R2 No. df df
SSE1	 M S
Error Valve R2
1 0 652 2.32 0.003553 0.00 ' 0.00 1 0 776 2.69 0.003470 0.00 0.00
2 3 649 2.23 0.003430 13.16 0.03 2 3 773 2.59 0.003351 15.37 0.03
3 7 645 2.19 0.003395 6.20 0.04 3 7 769 2.53 0.003290 8.26 0.05
4 14 638 1.90 0.002978 10.75 0.16 5 15 761 2.45 0.003219 5.39 0.07
5 15 637 2.10 0.003297 4.69 0.07 4 17 759 2.21 0.002912 10.37 0.16
7 18 634 1.86 0.002934 9.15 0.17 7 21 755 2.16 0.002861 9.32 0.18
8 26 626 1.78 0.002843 7.54 0.20 8 29 747 2.09 0.002798 7.70 0.19
6 36 616 1.74 0.002825 5.83 0.20 6 45 731 2.00 0.002736 5.76 0.21
9 40 612 1.70 0.002778 5.69 0.22 9 49 727 1.95 0.002682 5.77 0.23
12 48 604 1.62 0.002682 5.52 0.25 12 57 719 1.88 0.002615 5.55 0.25
10 62 590 1.70 0.002881 3.51 0.19 10 77 699 1.95 0.002790 3.50 0.20
13 70 582 1.63 0.002801 3.55 0.21 13 85 691 1.89 0.002735 3.50 0.21
14 84 568 1.56 0.002746 3.32 0.23 14 105 671 1.78 0.002653 3.31 0.24
21 92 560 1.51 0.002696 3.29 0.24 21 113 663 1.72 0.002594 3.35 0.25
11 106 546 1.50 0.002747 2.83 0.23 11 133 643 1.68 0.002613 2.94 0.25
15 114 538 1.45 0.002695 2.84 0.24 15 141 635 1.65 0.002598 2.87 0.25
16 128 524 1.41 0.002691 2.65 0.24 16 161 615 1.59 0.002585 2.67 0.26
18 136 516 1.36 0.002636 2.69 0.26 18 169 607 1.56 0.002570 2.62 0.26
17 150 502 1.36 0.002709 2.37 0.24 17 189 587 1.53 0.002606 2.37 0.25
20 158 494 1.32 0.002672 2.37 0.25 20 197 579 1.51 0.002608 2.31 0.25
19 172 480 1.30 0.002708 2.19 0.24 19 217 559 1.47 0.002630 2.15 0.24
22 180 472 1.27 0.002691 2.17 0.24 22 225 551 1.45 0.002632 2.11 0.24
Table 9.2: A summary of candidate model 1 to 22 statistics based on 6, 9, 12 and
15 bidders
When comparing the adjusted R2 values for the candidate models in Table 9.2,
turning to the summaries of model comparisons in Table 9.3 and looking at
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Mallow's Cp scores in Figure 9.1, it was concluded that there appears to be
sufficient evidence to verify that the transformed version of model 12 is still the
best model.
6 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 9 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model
No.
Compared
Models
Calculated
Value
Tabulated
Value
Accepted
Model
No.
1/ 2 8.21 2.63 2 1 / 2 7.20 2.62 2
2 / 3 3.26 2.39 3 2 / 3 2.91 2.39 3
3 / 4 17.96 3.86 4 3 / 4 24.07 2.39 4
4 / 7 1.81 2.40 4 4 / 5 - - 4
4 / 5 - - 4 4 / 7 2.61 2.39 7
4 / 6 1.46 1.85 4 7 / 8 4.11 1.96 8
4 / 8 2.52 1.79 8 8 / 6 - - 8
4 / 9 1.86 1.73 9 8 / 9 0.91 1.96 8
9 /12 1.90 1.96 9 8 / 12 1.88 1.67 12
9 / 10 1.12 1.86 9 12 / 10 - - 12
9 / 13 1.48 1.64 9 12 / 13 0.70 1.47 12
9 / 14 1.33 1.61 9 12 / 14 0.77 1.54 12
9 / 21 1.37 1.51 9 12 / 21 1.06 1.48 12
9 / 11 1.13 1.50 9 12 / 11 0.83 1.42 12
9 / 15 1.20 1.43 9 12 / 15 1.20 1.38 12
9 / 16 1.24 1.43 9 12 / 16 1.16 1.36 12
9 / 18 1.29 1.40 9 12 / 18 1.28 1.35 12
9 / 17 1.32 1.38 9 12 / 17 0.99 1.32 12
9 / 20 1.36 1.36 9 12 / 20 1.16 1.31 12
9 / 19 1.39 1.36 19 12! 19 1.09 1.30 12
19 / 22 0.99 1.97 19 12 / 22 1.12	 1.28 12
12 BIDDERS 5 TYPES 15 BIDDERS 5 TYPES
Compared Calculated Tabulated Accepted Compared Calculated Tabulated	 Accepted
Models Value Value Model Models Value Value Model
No. No.
1 / 2 8.78 2.61 2 1/2 10.25 2.61 2
2 / 3 2.65 2.39 3 2/3 4.56 2.38 3
3 / 4 13.91 2.03 4 3/5 3.11 1.95 5
4 / 5 - - 4 5/4 41.21 3.01 4
4 / 7 3.41 2.39 7 4/7 4.37 2.38 7
7 1 8 3.52 1.96 8 7/8 3.13 1.96 8
8 / 6 1.42 1.85 8 8/6 2.06 1.66 6
8 / 9 2.06 1.71 9 8/9 2.61 1.59 9
9 / 12 3.73 1.96 12 9/12 3.35 1.96 12
12 / 10 - - 12 12/10 - - 12
12 / 13 - - 12 12/13 - - 12
12 / 14 0.61 1.45 12 12/14 0.79 1.37 12
12 / 21 0.93 1.40 12 12/21 1.10 1.37 12
12 / 11 0.75 1.35 12 12/11 1.01 1.31 12
12 / 15 0.96 1.34 12 12/15 1.05 1.29 12
12 / 16 0.98 1.31 12 12/16 1.08 1.27 12
12 / 18 1.12 1.30 12 12/18 1.11 1.26 12
12 / 17 0.94 1.28 12 12/17 1.02 1.25 12
12 / 20 1.02 1.27 12 12/20 1.01 1.24 12
12 / 19 0.95 1.26 12 12/19 0.97 1.23 12
12 / 22 0.99 1.26 12 12122 0.97 1.23 12
Table 9.3: Summary of calculated and tabulated F values for candidate models 1
to 22 based on 6, 9, 12 and 15 bidders
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Figure 9.1 a:	 Plots of Mallow's Cp scores for candidate models 1 to 22 based
on 6 and 9 bidders
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Figure 9.1 b:	 Plots of Mallow's Cp scores for candidate models 1 to 22 based
on 12 and 15 bidders
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9.3 Model prediction
After transforming the best model to satisfy the assumptions and verifying that the
transformed version is still the best model as described above, the model's utility
was examined (see Figure 9.2). The global F test statistics are found to be
significant (F 05 = 11.99, p = .0000, df= 24, 751). This means that at least one of
the model coefficients is non-zero and, therefore, the model is useful at predicting
competitiveness. The model achieves an adjusted R square statistic of 0.25392
which indicates that 25% of competitiveness variation is explained by the model.
To satisfy the regression assumptions model 12 was modified by centring and also
transforming the x-variable to exponential 2/3 and transforming the y-variable to
a lambda setting of -4.2. This transformed the competitiveness prediction equation
as follows:
ST = [(-4.2) [ a + b, (x2/3 -7.68) + b2 (x2/3-7.68)2
+ b3T 1 + b4T2 + bnTn + b513 1 + b6B + INT„
+ b7T 1 (x2/3-7.68) + b8T1 (x21'3-7.68)2 ...
+ bTn (x213-7.68) + bnTr, (x3-7.68)2
+ b913 1 (x213-7.68) + 13 10B 1 (x2/3-7.68)2 ...
+ bnBn (x213-7.68) + bnBn (x25-7.68)2] +1 ]-1/4.2
where
= predicted competitiveness
x = contract size
T = contract type
B = bidder
Figure 9.2 illustrates the computer generated output relating to this model. Before
transformation the model contained 56 variables. The backwards stepwise
regression procedure (used to bring multicollinearity down to an acceptable level)
eliminated all the insignificant variables and thereby reduced this number to 24
significant variables. Consequently all the predictor variables were deleted for fire
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1 	 Dependent Variable .. 	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
88..	 B1BID
Multiple R	
.52633
R Square
	
.27703
Adjusted R Square
	
.25392
Standard Error
	 .05090
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression
	 24	
.74564	 .03107
Residual	 751	 1.94595	 .00259
F = 11.99027	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation
	
Variable	 B	 SE B	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VIF
BIO	 .044678	 .011645
	 .184513
	
.416241	 2.402
B3BID	 - .003869	
.001482	 -.084180
	 .926319	 1.080
B13BID2	 .001603	 6.3808E-04	 .079277	 .966278	 1.035
B9BID2	 .002266	 8.5808E-04
	 .131902	 .385807	 2.592
J2BID2	 1.84505E-04 7.4295E-05
	 .110088	 .489889	 2.041
B8BID2	 .001263	 6.6421E-04
	 .083631	 .497799	 2.009
B14BID	 - .009123	 .002266	 -.157495
	
.628896	 1.590
B2	 .046624	 .008524	 .216217	 .616060	 1.623
J3	 - .025030	 .009048	 -.156230	 .301856	 3.313
BIOBID	 .005548	 .002021
	 .102196
	
.694663	 1.440
J2	 - .011214	
.005380	 -.074997
	
.743579
	
1.345
B14	 .055662
	 .010134
	 .216228
	
.621131
	
1.610
J3BID2	 .003888	 9.0530E-04
	 .304454	 .191582	 5.220
J4	 - .018339	 .005082	 -.126844	 .779257	 1.283
B9BID	 .006071	 .003486	 .079935	 .456917	 2.189
B1OBID2	 - .001245	 3.9433E-04
	 -.143149
	 .468274	 2.136
B8	 - .026861	 .010369
	 -.114042	 .496745	 2.013
B9	 - .048195
	 .010822	
-.199038	 .481934	 2.075
B2BID2	 -9.15487E-04 4.0451E-04
	 -.088090	 .635448	 1.574
J2BID	 - .004336	 .001093	 -.179579	 .469617
	
2.129
B7	 .077189	 .012002
	 .327712
	 .370794	 2.697
B12BID	 - .005511	 .001479	 -.117635	 .965964
	
1.035
J3BID	 .010761	 .005403
	 .183080	 .113938
	
8.777
B7BID	 .008211	 .003458
	 .120991
	 .370805	 2.697
(Constant)	 .103058	 .003399
Figure 9.2	 Regression model summary at a lambda setting of -4.2
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stations and bidders coded 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148. The coefficients of these
variables are given in the B column under the section of 'Variables in the Equation'.
Since it is standard regression procedure to base the predictor variables on the last
set of dummy variables in the equation (ie. hostels and bidder coded 9) this means
that bidders' competitiveness toward fire stations is not significantly different to
hostels. Also bidders' 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148 competitiveness is not
significantly different from each other.
Differences in the values of the dummy variable coefficients represent vertical shifts
in competitiveness. A negative coefficient means that the bidder or contract type
is more competitive than bidder 9 or hostels and vice versa. The interaction
variables show differences in the slope of the line relative to the bidder 9 - hostels
equation. Negative values mean the slope is less steep than that in this equation and
vice versa. The size of the coefficient represents the steepness of the line. In respect
of the interaction squared terms, the size of the coefficient in the squared term
represents the difference in the degree of curvature relative to the bidder 9-hostels
equation. A positive value indicates a convex curve and vice versa.
The backwards stepwise regression procedure deleted all the non-significant
variables. For bidders coded 18, 127, 122, 148 and 109 the dummy variables
(denoted in the output as B 1 , B4, B5, B6 B11), interaction (denoted in the output
as B1BID, B4BID, B5BID, B6BID and B11BID) and interaction squared terms
(denoted in the output as B1BID2, B4BID2, B5BID2, B6BID2 and B11BID2) are
no longer in the equation. The deletion indicates that the competitiveness of these
bidders is not significantly different from bidder 9, the 15th bidder. The model will
show all these bidders as having an identical competitiveness over all the different
contract sizes. Similarly for fire stations the dummy variable (ie. J1), interaction
(ie. J1BID) and interaction squared term (ie. J1BID2) have all been deleted from
the equation. This indicates that competitiveness towards fire stations is not
significantly different from that of hostels. The model will show these two contract
types as having identical competitiveness.
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It should be noted that the contract size main effect variables (ie. BID and BID2)
have been eliminated from the equation by the backwards stepwise procedure as
being insignificant.
To predict the competitiveness the values of the predictor variables are multiplied
by the b coefficients remaining in the equation and added together with the a
coefficient (ie. the constant). For example, the competitiveness model for bidder 96
(denoted as 139' in the output shown in Figure 9.2) on police stations (denoted as
12' in the output shown in Figure 9.2) is as follows:
= [(-4.2) [ a + J2 + B9 + J2BID (x2' -7.68)
+ J2BID2 (x2" -7.68)2 + B9BID (x2' -7.68)
+ B9BID2 (X213 -7.68)2] +1]-1/4.2
For a contract size of $20 million, coefficients from the output in Figure 9.2 can
be entered into the equation as follows:
= [(-4.2) [0.103058 - 0.011214 - 0.048195
- 0.004336 (202'3-7.68) - 1.84505E-4(2025-7.68)2
- 0.006071 (20213-7.68) - 0.002266(2025-7.68)2]+1y 1/4.2
= 0.962
Assuming the model represents the true relationship between competitiveness and
contract size, bidder 96's predicted competitiveness for a police station of $20
million is 0.962.
With the aid of a standard spreadsheet package the competitiveness prediction
equations were estimated for each of the 15 bidders according to each of the five
types, thus producing a total 75 curvilinear regression lines. As expected the model
shows bidders coded 9, 18, 109, 127, 122, and 148, and also fire stations and
hostels as having identical competitiveness. The curvilinear regression lines are
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grouped first, according to types and second, according to individual bidders.
9.3.1	 Contract type
Figure 9.3 a - d shows the competitiveness predictions for each of the bidders
according to the five types. In respect of the shape of the curves for fire stations
and hostels, it can be seen that six lines are of the expected convex shape, 3 are
concave and one line is straight and horizontal. The straight and horizontal line
represents the competitiveness of the six bidders (ie. bidders coded 9, 18, 109, 122,
127 and 148) whose competitiveness is not significantly different from each other.
It should be noted that the reason for the straight and horizontal line is that all the
coefficients except the constant have been deleted from the equation. The
horizontal line suggests that the competitiveness of these bidders is unaffected by
contract size.
Thirteen of the competitiveness curves are convex for police stations. Six of these
are identical in shape (ie. for bidders 18, 127, 122, 148, 109 and 9) for reasons
previously described. The remaining two curves are concave. Each of the curves
is shaped similarly to that of fire stations and hostels. Comparing police stations to
fire stations and hostels, it can be seen that bidders look to be slightly less
competitive on the smaller police station contracts, but more competitive on the
larger contracts. The difference is probably attributable to the contract type make
up. The data sample for police stations contained a higher proportion of smaller
alteration contracts plus some comparatively large new works projects.
For secondary schools the shape of the curves is identical to that of fire stations and
hostels. The reason for this is that the interaction (ie. J1BID and J4BID) and
squared interaction variables (ie. J1BID2 and J4BID2) have been deleted for these
types. The difference is in the secondary school dummy variable (ie. J4) which has
remained in the equation causing an upward vertical shift in the competitiveness
predictions. The vertical shift of the regression lines toward unity mean that the bids
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Figure 9.3:	 Competitiveness prediction models according to contract type
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received for secondary schools are slightly more competitive than those for fire
stations and hostels. A possible reason for this may be that there is a greater
building type standardisation in secondary schools.
For primary schools all 15 bidders displayed the expected convex shape. As
expected the competitiveness curves were identical for the same six bidders (ie.
bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148).
9.3.2	 Contract size
A major difference between primary schools and the other four contract types is the
range and distribution of contract sizes. The data sets for the other four contract
types are made up of a wider, more evenly distributed range of contract sizes
whereas the majority of primary school contracts fall into a very narrow
concentrated band. The probable reason why all 15 curves are concave in shape is
the make up of this particular sample in which nearly all of the primary schools are
of a standard size. It appears that in being a standard size, bidders from past
experience can be more confident in predicting what the market price is likely to
be and bid accordingly at the market price, thereby making the bids between bidders
less variable and more competitive. An important contributory factor to this is that
the sample for this type also contained a few smaller alteration contracts and a few
larger primary school contracts in which the bids are more variable and overall less
competitive. It would seem that the combination of the wider dispersion of bids for
the smaller alteration work and larger primary school contracts combined with the
narrower dispersion of bids for the standard new work primary school contracts has
produced convex curves for every bidder. It seems that there are likely to a few
bidders who dominate the construction of primary schools because of the effect of
the learning curve, enabling bidders to produce more competitive bids, coupled with
the degree of building type standardisation.
The essential difference, therefore, between primary schools and the other four
contract types comprising fire stations, police stations, secondary schools and
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hostels is the contract size distribution and range. Since primary schools consists of
only smaller contracts bidders' competitiveness is confined to small contracts.
However, since the other four contract types contain both smaller and larger
contracts, bidders' competitiveness is not so restricted.
The expected shape of the bidders' competitiveness curves appears to be dictated,
to a large extent, by any one or combination of the following:
(1) the degree of contract type standardisation;
(2) the inclusion/exclusion of alteration work in the data sample;
(3) the inclusion/exclusion of non-standard size contracts in the data sample;
(4) the range of contract sizes contained in a particular type grouping;
The influence (1) - (3) has on the shape of bidders' curves can clearly be seen with
the primary schools. The high degree of contract size standardisation coupled with
the inclusion of smaller alteration work contracts and Jarger BM-Standard size
contracts results in the curvilinear regression lines for all the bidders being convex.
The effect (4) has on competitiveness can be seen in the remaining four contract
types in which some bidders' were more competitive on the smaller contracts and
vice versa whilst other bidders competitiveness appears unaffected by contract size.
9.3.3	 Individual bidder performance
The same competitiveness predictions for the five contract types were regrouped
according to each of the individual bidders (see Figure 9.4 a 
-j). Bold lines indicate
the fit within the recorded data values and dashed lines show the curve extrapolated
outside the data values.
The shape of the curvilinear regression line indicates the degree of competitiveness.
A convex shape points to bidders having a preferred size range at which they are
more competitive. A straight horizontal line shows that bidders do not have a
preferred size range at which they are competitive. A concave shape is an indication
of non-competitiveness at a particular contract size range. It also signifies two or
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Figure 9.4:	 Competitiveness prediction models according to bidder
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more preferred size ranges (Other possible reasons for concavity are given in
Chapter 5).
Those bidders whose curves are convex, and therefore have a preferred size range
for all five types, are bidders coded 20, 24, 52, 69, 96, 119. Of these bidders 20,
52 and 96 prefer smaller contracts and bidders 24, 69 and 119 prefer larger
contracts. Those bidders whose bidding performance was not significantly different
from each other (ie. bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148) have a preferred
contract size for two contract types (ie. fire stations and primary schools) but, on
account of the horizontal competitiveness prediction line, look not to have a
preferred size range at which they are competitive for three contract types (ie. fire
stations, secondary schools and hostels). Of the remaining bidders, bidders 45, 71
and 142 have a preferred contract size range for primary schools. Bidders 71 and
142 look to be uncompetitive on the smaller contracts but more competitive on the
larger contracts of the other four contract types. Bidder 45, however, looks to be
less competitive on the larger contracts of these other contract types.
Competitiveness performances of the 15 bidders can, therefore, be split into five
main groupings:
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size range
for smaller contracts (ie. bidders 24, 52 and 96);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size range
for larger contracts (ie. bidders 20, 69, 119);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidders 71 and
142);
(4) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by contract size (ie.
bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148);
(5) bidders who are less competitive on larger contracts (ie. bidder 45).
It should be noted that the distinction between (2) and (3) is in the shape of the
competitiveness curves which are respectively concave and convex. The
competitiveness consistency of a bidder influences the shape of the curve. The
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analysis indicates that a bidder who is consistently competitive towards a particular
type is more likely to acquire the expected convex curve. However, a bidder who
is either inconsistently competitive or consistently uncompetitive is less likely to
attain the expected convex curve.
9.3.4	 Contract type and size
The regression analysis indicates that bidding performances according to contract
type can be split into two contract size competitiveness groupings. One for the four
contract types comprising fire stations, police stations, secondary schools and
hostels which look to be made up of smaller and larger contracts, the other for the
single contract type of primary schools, made up of only smaller contracts.
Evidence of the two contract type groupings can clearly be seen in Figure 9.4 a-j
which shows competitiveness predictions for the four contract types falling roughly
into a parallel band. This indicates that bidders' competitiveness does not appear to
differ very much between these types. It looks as Ahough compeÜt‘Neness peciktioas
for primary schools appear different simply because they only contain smaller
contracts. It is suggested that all five contract types are part of the same market
sector because it is the same bidders who show preferred contract sizes for the
smaller contracts for all five contract types (ie. bidders 20, 52 and 96). It appears
those bidders who have a preferred contract size range for larger contracts (ie.
bidders 24, 69, 119) or are more competitive towards larger contracts (ie. bidders
71 and 142) in the four contract type grouping do not appear to be competitive
toward primary schools simply because there are no large contract sizes pertaining
to this type.
9.3.5	 Bidder size
Each contract type and bidder is interrelated to contract size. Each contract type
will generate a range of contract sizes in the form of bidding attempts. Similarly
each bidder will produce a range of contract sizes in the form of bids. The effect
contract size has on contract type and the effect contract size has on the bidder can
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be measured by considering the effect of the coefficient of the x squared term. The
larger the coefficient the steeper is the slope of the regression line and thus the
greater the correlation between contract size and competitiveness.
In respect of the effect contract size has on contract type, the x squared coefficients
in Figure 9.2 show primary schools (J3BID2 = 0.00388) as being affected the most
followed by police stations (J2BID2 = 1.84505E-4). The respective x squared
coefficients for fire stations and secondary schools have been deleted from the
equation so it would seem that these types are not significantly affected. As for the
effect contract size has on bidder, the x squared coefficients in Figure 9.2 show the
following bidders are affected in decreasing order of influence; bidder 96 (B9BID2
= 0.002266), bidder 20 (B13BID2 = 0.001603), bidder 52 (B8BID2 = 0.001263),
bidder 71 (B 10BID2 = -0.001245), bidder 142 (B2BID2 = -9.15487E-4). The
remaining bidders have been deleted from the equation, therefore, it would seem
that they are not significantly affected by contract size.
9.3.6	 Bidder size, contract type and size
Flanagan and Norman's study is based on the bidding performance of a small,
medium and large bidder. Using the Government classification system (see
Methodology, Chapter 5) the 15 bidders can be grouped into smaller and larger
bidders. The smaller bidders are those coded 9, 20, 45, 52, 96, 122 and 127. The
larger bidders are those coded 18, 24, 69, 71, 109, 119, 142 and 148.
For the four contract type grouping comprising fire stations, police stations,
secondary schools and hostels, it can be seen that the strongest competitors for the
smaller contracts are the smaller bidders (ie. bidders 52 and 96) and for the larger
contracts the larger bidders (ie. bidders 69 and 119). Also, four of the larger
bidders (ie. bidders 69, 71, 119 and 142) appear to be less competitive on the
smaller contracts and more competitive on the larger contracts. Bidder 45 (classified
as a smaller bidder) was less competitive toward the larger contracts. For primary
schools, which consists of only smaller contracts, the smaller bidders (ie. bidders
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52 and 96) are the strongest competitors. All of this evidence supports the
economies of scale theory in that larger bidders undertake larger contracts with
increased rates of efficiency.
Evidence that neither supports nor contradicts this theory is that of the six bidders
(ie. bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148), whose bidding performance did not
differ significantly from each other. It seems their bidding performance was largely
unaffected by contract type and contract size.
Competitiveness differences in bidding performance in relation to bidder size
perhaps explain why the bidder model in which bidders were grouped into small,
medium and large performed so badly during the best model selection process. It
would seem that the findings from the individual bidding performances do support
the economies of scale theory that relates size of contract with size of bidder. A
corollary, however, to this finding is the possible undue influence of using the
Government bidder classification system to measure bidder size as it is the same
classification system which determines the range of contract sizes a bidder can bid
for. Therefore in using this measure it seems logical that smaller bidders who are
restricted only to bidding on smaller contracts should be more competitive in this
range contract sizes. Also that the larger bidders should appear to be more
competitive on the larger contracts because they are not competing with the smaller
bidders. It would seem the essential difference between this and any 'natural' bidder
size-contract size selection process is that the Government selection process is more
formalised. Therefore it is acknowledged that using such a measure may unduly
influence these findings.
9.4 Reliability
The reliability of the model is examined by comparing the predicted values with the
95% upper and lower prediction intervals according to contract type and bidder.
Since it appears that bidders fall into five competitiveness groupings, and contract
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types into two, for the sake of brevity, a representative sample made up of bidders
96, 69, 71, 45 and the 6 bidder grouping (ie. bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148)
for primary and secondary schools is shown in Figure 9.5. This figure shows a
scatterplot of the predicted values (denoted by squares), 95% upper and lower
prediction intervals (respectively denoted by diamonds and triangles) and actual
bidding attempts (denoted by crosses). As can be seen, due to the logarithmic nature
of the scale, the upper and lower prediction intervals are not equidistant from the
predicted values. As expected, the distances between the predictions and prediction
intervals form a relatively wide band which signifies that the competitiveness
predictions are not very reliable.
Despite the competitiveness predictions not being very reliable, Figure 9.5 ,does
show which bidders are likely to have the potential of submitting the lowest bid.
This can be observed by comparing the 95% upper interval predictions with the
competitiveness value of unity (ie. equivalent to the lowest bid). If the upper
interval prediction falls directly on a competitiveness value of unity (ie. equivalent
to the lowest bid) then it is predicted that the bidder has a 1 in 20 chance of
submitting the lowest bid. If this interval prediction is greater than unity then this
probability prediction increases.
The competitiveness model shown in Figure 9.5 predicts that bidder 96 becomes the
lowest bidder for smaller primary school contracts as high. A similar forecast is
given in respect of bidder 69 for larger secondary school contracts. However, the
probability that bidder 45 chance becomes the lowest bidder appears very remote.
Bidder 71 chances of becoming the lowest bidder seems to improve with the larger
contracts. In comparison, bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148 likelihood of
providing the lowest bid looks only to be moderate.
Although the prediction intervals reveal that the model is quite limited at predicting
competitiveness, it seems that the model does, at least, give an indication of
whether a bidder's competitiveness is likely to be above, below or just average in
relation to other bidders. Table 9.4 suggests the competitiveness grouping of the 15
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Figure 9.5:	 Scatterplot of the 95% upper and lower prediction intervals,
predicted values and actual bidding attempts according to bidder
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bidders for the 5 contract types, according to smaller and larger contracts and
according to the three levels of competitiveness just described.
Fire Stations, Police Stations
Competitiveness Primary Schools Secondary Schools & Hostels
Smaller Larger
Above average 52, 96 52, 96 69, 119, 142
Average 9, 18, 20, 69, 71, 109,
119, 122, 127, 142,
148
9, 18, 20, 69, 71,
109, 119, 122, 127,
142, 148
9, 18, 24, 71, 109,
122, 127, 148
Below average 24, 45 24, 45
Table 9.4:	 Competitiveness of bidders according to five contract types
9.5 Summary
To attempt to transform every candidate model to satisfy the regression
assumptions for the purposes of verification would be too time consuming clue to
the approach used in testing each assumption. Attempts were made, therefore, to
transform the closest challengers to model 12. However, suitable transformations
to reduce multicollinearity to an acceptable level for the closest challengers could
not be found. Hence, the approach taken in the verification process has been to
analyse all other candidate models using the same transformation that was used for
model 12.
In assessing the degree to which the candidate models satisfied the regression
assumptions it was only possible to obtain statistics for 17 of the 21 models due
to computer related problems. Of the assessed models it was found that only three
models satisfied the homoscedasticity assumption. The high failure rate is likely
to be attributable to model 12's transformation not being suitable for the other
candidate models. It was the higher order models that failed the multicollinearity
assumption. A probable reason for failing this assumption was because of the large
number of variables left in the equation. No candidate model, for which statistics
were produced, failed the normality assumption.
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In testing the transformed model 12 against all other candidate models to verify
whether model 12 in its transformed state remains as the best model, all variables,
rather than just the significant variables, were retained within the transformed
candidate models. This approach was taken due to the rationale underlying the
chunkwise model building process. Candidate models have been built and analysed
on the basis of collective groups (or chunks) of variables in preference to using
individual significant variables.
Bidders were added incrementally into the sample and for each bidder added into
the analysis the candidate models were tested using a forward sequential candidate
model selection technique based on the F-test. It was found that model 12 in its
transformed state continued to be the best model.
The model's utility statistics, when examined, shows the global F test statistic to
be significant (F 05 = 11.99, p = .0000, df= 24, 751). This means that at least one
of the model coefficients is non-zero and, therefore, the model is useful at
predicting competitiveness. The model achieves an adjusted R square statistic of
0.25392 which indicates that approximately 25% of competitiveness variation is
explained by the model.
Competitiveness predictions for the four contract types of fire stations, police
stations, secondary schools and hostels fall roughly into a parallel band. This
indicates that bidders' competitiveness does not appear to differ very much
between these types. The essential difference between primary schools and these
other four contract types is in the distribution and range of contract sizes. These
two groupings appear to be part of the same market sector since it is the same
bidders who have preferred contract sizes for the smaller contracts in both
groupings.
The analysis shows that the competitiveness of the 15 bidders can be classified
into five distinct groupings:
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size
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range for smaller contracts (ie. bidders 24, 52 and 96);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size
range for larger contracts (ie. bidders 20, 69, 119);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidders 71 and
142);
(4) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by contract size (ie.
bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148);
(5) bidders who are less competitive on larger contracts (ie. bidder 45).
There is some evidence that supports the economies of scale theory in that larger
bidders undertake larger contracts with increased rates of efficiency. However, it
is acknowledged that using such a bidder size measure based on Government
classification may unduly influence these findings.
Although the prediction intervals reveal that the model is quite limited at
predicting competitiveness, it seems that the model does, at least, give an
indication of whether a bidder's competitiveness is likely to be above, below or
just average in relation to other bidders.
The model presented in this chapter is based on a matrix inversion with hostels
and bidder 9 as last dummy variables. Based on this particular matrix inversion
and using the backwards stepwise procedure, bidders' competitiveness towards
hostels and fire stations are found not to be significantly different. Likewise
bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148 are also not significantly different. Using
other contract types and bidders as last dummy variables and iterating the
regression procedure, the next chapter examines the possibility of other contract
types and bidders not being significantly different in terms of competitiveness. In
instances where this occurs, the model is refmed by grouping these contract types
and bidders together.
.71.
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CHAPTER 10
Refining the model
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10 REFINING THE MODEL
10.1 Introduction
The regression model in Chapter 9 shows that bidders' competitiveness towards
hostels and fire stations are not significantly different. Likewise, the
competitiveness of bidders coded 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148 are also not
significantly different. The reason the model shows this is that all the coefficients
pertaining to these contract types and bidders are deleted from the regression
equation. This is the result of inverting the regression matrix with hostels and
bidder 9 as last dummy variables, using the chunkwise algorithm (which deleted
the non-significant chunks) and the backward stepwise procedure (which has
deleted the remaining non-significant coefficients) for these contract types and
bidders.
The coefficients making up the regression equation are computed on the last
dummy variables entered into the equation (ie. hostels and bidder 9). The closer,
in terms of competitiveness, the other contract types and bidders are in relation to
these last dummy variables, the smaller the difference in the resulting coefficients.
If the computed difference is not significant the coefficient will, through the
backwards stepwise procedure, be deleted from the equation. With hostels and
bidder 9 as the last dummy variables, all coefficients pertaining to fire stations and
bidders 18, 109, 122, 127 and 142 were deleted from the equation.
By iterating the regression analysis on the last dummy variables of other contract
types and bidders, the competitiveness model can be refined by identifying which
other contract types and bidders are also not significantly different from each
other. A fundamental goal of model building is to find the best prediction model
containing the least number of predictor variables. Since the competitiveness
predictions between fire stations and hostels and bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and
142 are not significantly different, the approach taken in this part of the analysis
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is to recode fire stations and hostels as one combined contract type and bidders 9,
18, 109, 122, 127 and 142 as one combined bidder.
The recoding reduces the number of contract types in the model from five to four
and the number of bidders from 15 to 10. Using these four contract types and 10
bidders together with last dummy variables from other contract types and bidders,
the regression procedure was repeated to determine if other contract types and
bidders can be grouped together. If other contract types and bidders were found
to be not significantly different these were recoded as one combined contract type
or bidder and the process iterated until all variables displaying non-significant
characteristics were found and combined together.
Model 12 in its present transformation was used as the starting point for refining
the model. It would seem reasonable to start with this particular model and
transformation because, after extensive testing, model 12 is shown in Chapters 7
and 9 to be the best model and the present transformation is shown in Chapter 8
to be one that satisfies all the regression assumptions. At each iteration the
regression assumptions were tested. In instances where the model no longer
satisfies the assumptions other more suitable transformations were considered.
This chapter comprises three sections. By swapping the last contract type dummy
variables and iterating the model, the first section examines the extent to which
bidder behaviour differs significantly toward contract type. Whilst adopting the
same procedure but swapping the last bidder dummy variables, the second section
identifies which groups of bidders do not differ significantly in terms of
competitiveness. Competitiveness predictions and reliability of the refined model
is presented in the third section.
10.2 Contract type iterations
The following contract type iteration is based on 4 contract types and 10 bidders
with fire stations and hostels being recoded as contract type FSH and bidders 9,
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18, 109, 122, 127 and 142 being recoded as bidder M. With secondary schools
(contract type 713) and bidder 24 being put into the position of last dummy
variable, Figure 10.1 shows the regression model summary statistics based on four
contract types and 10 bidders. Compared with the previous 5 contract type 15
bidder regression model (see Figure 9.2) it can be seen that there is a slight drop
in the adjusted R2 statistic (from .25392 to .24823), however, there is a slight
increase in the global F test statistic (from 11.99027, Signif F =.0000 to 12.12594,
Signif F =.0000). The reason for the slight increase in this latter statistic is that the
variables remaining in the equation has dropped from 24 to 23.
In respect of satisfying the regression assumptions, Figure 10.1 also shows that the
multicollinearity assumption is satisfied since none of the variance inflation factors
exceed 10. The normality (K-S prob = 0.205) and homoscedasticity assumptions
are also satisfied; using Szroeters test for continuous variables and the Bartlett Box
test for categorical variables it is found that three variables are heteroscedastic (ie.
BID, BID2 and J3BID). The probability of three variables out of 23 being
heteroscedastic is 0.079. Since this exceeds the critical value 0.05, the iterated
model can be accepted as one that satisfies all the regression assumptions.
The remaining contract type coefficients shown in Figure 10.1 are presented again
in Table 10.1, but in a different format to demonstrate more clearly the effect of
the contract type coefficients on the regression equation. It can be seen that for fire
stations and hostels (coded FSH) the dummy variable J1 and interaction variable
J1BID were retained. The competitiveness difference between this variable and the
last dummy variable, secondary schools (coded 713), is a vertical shift and change
in slope in the regression line. For primary schools (coded 712) the dummy
variable J3 was deleted while both the interaction variable J3BID and squared
interaction variable J3BID2 were retained in the equation. The deletion of the
dummy variable means that the level of competitiveness is not significantly
different, however, the slope and shape of the regression line is significantly
different. These findings appear to conform with the previous findings reported in
Chapter 9 and shown in Figures 9.3 and 9.4.
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1	 Dependent Variable .. 	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
53..	 B3BID
Multiple R	
.52013
R Square	
.27054
Adjusted R Square
	
.24823
Standard Error
	
.05110
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 23	 .72818	 .03166
Residual	 752	 1.96341	 .00261
F = 12.12594
	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation
	
Variable	 B	 SE B	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VIF
J3BID2	 .004252
	 8.5180E-04
	 .332968
	
.218055	 4.586
B1	 - .045233	
.006123
	 -.378919	 .368721	 2.712
B2BID	 .006292	
.002535
	 .106966	 .522519	 1.914
B6BID	 .012822	
.003607	 .168835	 .429980	 2.326
B5BID	 .007944	
.003700
	 .113038	 .350015	 2.857
B7BID	 .011714	
.002087
	 .215761
	 .656605	 1.523
B8	 - .037984	
.009417
	 -.149159
	 .709395	 1.410
B7BID2	 - .001156	 3.1041E-04
	 -.132903
	 .761442	 1.313
B3	 - .051911	
.008651
	 -.231794	 .650032	 1.538
B1BID	 .005856	
.001139
	 .296704	 .291020	 3.436
B6	 - .094035	
.011825
	
-.388346	 .406721	 2.459
B9	 - .051881	
.009995	 -.197065	 .673051	 1.486
B5	 - .072742	
.011809	
-.308829	 .385894	 2.591
B6BID2	 .002235	 8.4645E-04
	 .130092	 .382862	 2.612
J1	 .010644	 .004256
	 .089642	 .755216	 1.324
B2BID2	 -8.51008E-04 4.4679E-04
	 -.081886
	 .524855	 1.905
B4	 .031416	 .012918
	 .133379	 .322508	 3.101
B5BID2	 .001602	 7.9780E-04
	 .106040	 .347675	 2.876
J1BID	 .002700	 .001027	 .114554
	 .511292	 1.956
J3BID	 .020160	 .004106
	 .342968	 .198836	 5.029
B4BID	 .014777	 .003636	 .217743	 .337926	 2.959
BID2	 1.45854E-04 6.0227E-05
	 .108559
	 .482729	 2.072
BID	 - .009313	 .001163	 -.672248	 .137713	 7.261
(Constant)	 .136352	 .005832
Figure 10.1: Regression model summary at a lambda setting of -4.2, based on
4 contract types and 10 bidders with 713 (secondary schools) and
bidder 24 as last dummy variables.
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LAST DUMMY VARIABLE: SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Contract type code Jn JnBID InBID2
Fire stations and hostels (FSH)
Police stations (374)
Primary schools (712)
.11
-
-
J1BID
-
J3BID
-
-
J3BID2
Table 10.1: Contract type variables remaining in the equation at lambda
setting of-4.2, based on 4 contract types and 10 bidders with 713
(secondary schools) and bidder 24 as last dummy variables.
With respect to police stations (coded 374) it can be seen in Table 10.1 that the
dummy, interaction and squared interaction variables were all deleted. This means
that bidders' competitiveness towards police stations and secondary schools is not
significantly different and therefore these two variables can be grouped together
in subsequent iterations. This non-significant difference was verified by swapping
the last dummy variables with bidders other than bidder 24 and repeating the
regression procedure. With every bidder iteration the dummy, interaction and
squared interaction variables for police stations were deleted. Also when the last
dummy variable for secondary schools was swapped with police stations, the
dummy, interaction and squared interaction variables for secondary schools were
also all deleted with the resulting regression model summary being identical to that
shown in Figure 10.1.
To complete the contract type iterations, primary schools (coded 712) and bidder
24 were placed in the position of last dummy variable. The results were as
expected. 28 variables remained in the model (Five more variables than the
iteration shown in Figure 10.1). The larger number of variables remaining in the
equation is because primary schools was the last dummy variable, and as can be
seen in Figures 9.3 and 9.4 bidders' competitiveness towards primary schools is
quite different when compared to the other contract types. This greater difference
between types leads to more significant coefficients being retained in the model.
The model achieved an adjusted R2 of 0.25008 (slightly higher than that shown
in Figure 10.1) and a global F test statistic of 10.22995, Signif F =.0000 (slightly
lower than that shown in Figure 10.1). The model failed to satisfy the regression
assumption of multicollinearity (largest VIF for a variable in the model is 175.05)
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but passed the assumptions of normality (K-S prob = .218) and homoscedasticity
(Two out of 28 variables are heteroscedastic). The likely reason why this iteration
failed the assumption of multicollinearity is that of the larger number of variables
remaining in the equation which creates excessive interdependency between the
independent variables.
The foregoing results indicate that the original five contract types can be broken
down into three contract type competitiveness groupings of (1) fire stations and
hostels, (2) police stations and secondary schools and (3) primary schools. It seems
the formation of these three groupings is primarily due to the different means and
distribution of contract sizes for each contract type. These appear to fall into Aree
distinct contract size bands. This can be seen in Table 10.2 which illustrates a
contract size by contract type breakdown table for this 15 bidder data sub-set.
Observe that primary schools has the smallest mean bid value and standard
deviation, fire stations and hostels has the second and third smallest mean bid
value and standard deviation while police stations and secondary schools have the
second largest and largest mean bid values and standard deviation. The fIndings
in Chapters 7 and 9 indicate that contract size is more important than contract
type. The formation of the contract type groupings appear to be dictated by the
size and distribution of contracts within the contract type.
Contract type Mean bid value
(HKSmillion)
Standard
Deviation
Cases
Primary schools (712) 12.79 6.38 125
Fire stations (372) 14.72 9.82 133
Hostels (848) 20.26 18.09 206
Police stations (374) 28.51 27.26 149
Secondary schools (713) 35.61 21.23 163
Overall
._
22.92 20.38 766
Table 10.2 :	 Breakdown tables; contract size by contract type
For subsequent iterations the number of contract types in the model was reduced
from four to three with the combined variable of police stations and secondary
schools being recoded as PSS.
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10.3 Bidder iterations
It was established in Chapter 9 that six of the 15 bidders' competitiveness toward
contract type and size does not differ significantly from each other. This part of
the analysis focuses on determining which of the other bidders are not significantly
different. The first round of iterations is based on 3 contract types (ie. FSH, 712
and PSS) and 10 bidders (ie. bidders 20, 24, 45, 52, 69, 71, 96, 142 and M).
10.3.1
	 First round of bidder iterations
With FSH as the last contract type dummy variable, 10 different bidder iterations
were computed, each with a different bidder as the last dummy variable. Table
10.3 shows the model utility statistics resulting from these iterations. It can be
seen that, depending on the last bidder dummy variable, the number oS Nariables
remaining in the equation varies from 20 to 29. As expected, those iterations
which contain the most number of variables were for bidders with more extreme
bidding performances (ie. bidders' 96 and 45). Table 10.4 shows the regression
assumption statistics for these iterations. It can be seen that tour iteradans satisey
all the regression assumptions (ie. where bidders 24, 69, 119 and M were last
dummy variables), two failed the assumption of multicollinearity (ie. where
bidders 52 and 142 were last dummy variables) and four failed the assumptions
of both multicollinearity and homoscedasticity (ie. where bidders 20, 96, 71 and
45 were last dummy variables).
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 24 69 20 119 96
No. of variables in equation 24/751 21/754 27/748 20/755 29/746
Adjusted R2 0.25046 0.24711 0.25385 0.24717 0.25160
F / Signif F 11.79/0.000 13.11/0.000 10.77/0.000 13.72/0.000 9.98/0.000
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 52 142 71 45 M
No. of variables in equation 27/748 26/749 27/748 29/746 23/752
Adjusted R2 0.25275 0.25451 0.25283 0.25215 0.25442
F / Signif F 10.71/0.000 11.17/0.000 10.71/0.000 10.01/0.000 12.50/0.000
Table 10.3 :	 Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2, based on 3
contract types and 10 bidders
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 24 69 20 119 96
Largest VIP
K-S prob
8.984
0.411
8.949
0.376
103.435
0.265
8.938
0.293
128.083
0.086
No. of hetro vari/prob 2/0.223 1/0.358 4/0.034 1/0.377 5/0.011
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 52 142 71 45 M
Largest VIP 111.341 36.540 41.625 47.375 8.778
K-S prob 0.229 0.229 0.107 0.160 0.241
No. of hetro vari/prob 3/0.107 3/0.100 4/0.034 5/0.011 2/0.215
Table 10.4 :	 Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 based on
3 contract types and 10 bidders
Table 10.5 shows the bidder variables remaining in the equation with each bidder
being in the position of last dummy variable. Consider the iteration where bidder
24 was the last dummy variable and compare the bidder coefficients remaining in
the equation for each of the other bidders. Under this iteration it can be seen that
the bidding performances of each of the other bidders differ significantly in some
way to that of bidder 24. Also the bidders whose bidding performances were most
similar to bidder 24 were bidders 119, 69 and 20, where the only difference
between bidding performances was a vertical shift in the dummy variable. When
seen in the light of the competitiveness predictions shown in Figures 9.3 and 9.4
this would seem reasonable with the exception of bidder 20 who, in Chapter 9, was
classed as a bidder who has a preferred contract size range for smaller contracts.
It appears that under this previous iteration bidder 20 may be wrongly classified.
The suspected reason for this apparent misclassification is that bidder 20 has only
bid over a comparatively small range of contracts (this can be seen in Figures 9.3
and 9.4 where dashed lines show the regression curve extrapolated outside the data
values) thereby making the predictor coefficients less reliable. The bidders whose
bidding performances were most dissimilar to bidder 24 were bidders 52 and 96.
For these bidders the dummy, interaction and interaction squared variables were all
retained in the equation.
275
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 24 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 69
Bidder code Bn BrIBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
142
119
45
52
96
71
69
20
131
-
83
B4
B5
B6
-
B8
B9
B1BID
B2BID
-
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
-
B2BID2
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
-
M
142
119
45
52
96
71
24
20
-
B2
-
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
-
B I BID
-
-
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
-
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
-
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 20 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 119
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID Bn131D2
M
142
119
45
52
96
71
69
24
B1
B2
-
B4
B5
86
B7
B8
B9
-
-
B3BID
-
-
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
B9BID
BIBID2
B2BID2
83BID2
B4BID2
-
-
B7BID2
B8BID2
B9BID2
M
142
24
45
52
96
71
69
20
-
B2
B3
B4
135
86
B7
-
-
BIBID
-
B3BID
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BED
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
-
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 96 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 52
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
142
119
45
52
24
71
69
20
B1
B2
B3
B4
135
B6
87
B8
B9
B1BID
B2BID
B3BED
-
-
B6BID
-
B8BID
-
B1BID2
B2BID2
B3BED2
B4BID2
-
B6BED2
137131112
B8BED2
-
M
142
119
45
24
96
71
69
20
B1
B2
B3
84
B5
-
87	 1
B8
B9
-
-
B313113
-
B5BID
B6BID
B7BCO
B8BED
-
1
B1BID2
B2BID2
B3BED2
841311)2
B5BID2
-
878(0 2
B8BID2 
-
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 142 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 71
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnB1D2 Bidder code Bn BnBED BnBED2
M
24
119
45
52
96
71
69
20
BI
-
B3
84
B5
B6
-
88
89
-
B213113
B3BLD
-
-
B613111
B7BED
B8131D
-
B1BLD2
-
B3BLD2
B4BID2
B5BID2
1168102
-
B8BID2
B9BID2
M
142
119
45
52
96
24
69
20
B1
-
B3
84
135
Bb
-
88
B9
B IBID
B2BID
B3BID
-
-
-
B7BID
B8BED
-
131131D2
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
,	 136131D2
B7BID2
B8BID2
B9BID2
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 45 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
142
119
24
52
96
71
69
20
131
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
87
B8
B9
B1BID
B2BID
B3BID
1341311)
-
-
-
B8BID
-
B1BID2
-
B3BID2
B4BID2
B5BID2
B6131132
-
B8131D2
B9BID2
24
142
119
45
52
96
71
69
20
B1
B2
-
84
135
B6
B7
-
-
131131D
-
B3BED
B4BID
-
B6BID
B713ID
B8BED
-
-
B2BID2
-
-
B5B1D2
136811)2
B7BED2
-
B9BED2
Table 10.5:	 Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -4.2
based on 3 contract types and 10 bidders
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Moving on to the iterations where bidders 69, 119 and 20 were placed in the position
of last dummy variable, it can be seen in Table 10.5 that for bidder 69 the dummy,
interaction and interaction squared variables for bidders 119 and 20 were all deleted.
This deletion was reciprocated where bidder 119 was the last dummy variable whereby
the same three variables pertaining to bidders 69 and 20 were deleted. However, where
bidder 20 was the last dummy variable, some of the dummy and iteration variables
were retained in the equation. The suspected reason for bidder 20's variables not being
consistent with bidders 69 and 119 was explained in the last paragraph (ie. bidder 20
has only bid over a comparatively small range of contracts thereby making the
coefficients for this bidder less reliable). On balance, however, with all the variables
pertaining to bidder 20 being deleted where bidders 69 and 119 were the last dummy
variables, there appears to be sufficient evidence and justification to group these three
bidders together in the next round of iterations.
In respect of the remaining iterations, where bidders 96, 52, 142, 71, 45 and M are
the last dummy variables it can be seen in Table 10.5 that the results are similar to that
of bidder 24 in that the bidding performances of each of the other nine bidders is
significantly different in someway to that of the other bidders. The first round of
iterations indicate that there is not further scope to group any more bidders together
other than bidders 20, 69 and 119.
10.3.2	 Second round of bidder iterations
For the second round of bidder iterations, bidders 20, 69 and 119 were recoded and
combined as bidder 'N', thereby reducing the number of bidders remaining in the
model from ten to eight. Tables 10.6 and 10.7 show the respective model utility
statistics and regression assumption statistics. Both these tables display the models as
having similar characteristics as those contained in the corresponding iterations
described in the previous round of iterations. In respect of the regression assumption
statistics note that three iterations satisfy all the regression assumptions (ie. where
bidders 24, M and N were last dummy variables), two failed the multicollinearity
assumption (ie. where bidders 52 and 142 were last dummy variables) and three failed
the assumptions of both multicollinearity and homoscedasticity (ie. where bidders 96,
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71 and 45 were last dummy variables).
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 24 96 52 45
No. of variables in equation 22/753 25/750 23/752 24/751
Adjusted R2 0.25070 0.25044 0.25052 0.25092
F / Signif F 12.78/0.000 11.35/0.000 12.26/0.000 11.82/0.000
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 142 71 M N
No. of variables in equation 21/754 21/754 21/754 20/755
Adjusted R2 0.25316 0.24992 0.25369 0.24717
F / Signif F 13.51/0.000 13.30/0.000 13.55/0.000 13.72/0.000
Table 10.6 :	 Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2, based on 3
contract types and 8 bidders
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 24 96 52 45
Largest VIF
K-S prob
8.951
0.335
160.348
0.268
151.615
0.273
47.251
0.259
No. of hetro vari/prob 1/0.375 5/0.006 3/0.079 6/0.001
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 142 71 M N
Largest VIP 36.413 38.376 8.792 8.938
K-S prob 0.193 0.289 0.303 0.293
No. of hetro vari/prob 2/0.198 5/0.003 2/0.198 1/0.377
Table 10.7 :	 Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of-4.2 based on
3 contract types and 8 bidders
Table 10.8 identifies the bidder variables remaining in the equation in which each
bidder was placed in the position of last dummy variable. It can be seen that the
bidding performance of each bidder was significantly different. Although there
appears not to be further scope for grouping more bidders together, this may be
because of the current transformation setting (ie. where lambda is set at -4.2 and
the x-variable is set at 2/3) which restricts further groupings. However, a new
transformation setting may enable more bidders to be grouped together. For
example, consider bidders 142 and 71. Figures 9.3 and 9.4 show the bidding
performances of both of these bidders as being very similar and as such they fall
into the same competitiveness grouping (ie. they are classed as bidders who are
more competitive on larger contracts). It can be seen in Table 10.8 that where
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bidder 142 was the last dummy variable, the dummy variable and interaction term
of bidder 71 were retained in the model. Likewise where bidder 71 was the last
dummy variable the interaction term of bidder 142 were retained in the model.
Under the current transformation, where bidders 142 and 71 were last dummy
variables, these iterations fail one or more of the regression assumptions. Perhaps
when a suitable transformation is found to satisfy the all the regression assumptions
for both models, the transformed version of the models will show that the
competitiveness of these bidders are not significantly different.
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 24 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 96
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
N
142
45
52
96
71
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
-
B IBID
-
B3BID
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
M
N
142
45
52
24
71
B1
B2
83
84
B5
B6
B7
B1BID
B2BID
B3BID
-
-
B6BID
-
B1BID2
B2BID2
B3BID2
B4BID2
-
B6BID2
B7BID2
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 52 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 45
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
N
142
45
24
96
71
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
-
B7
-
B2BID
-
-
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
B1BID2
B2BID2
B3BID2
B4BID2
B5BED2
-
B7BED2
M
N
142
24
52
96
71
B1
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
B7
B I BID
B2BID
B3BID
B4BID
-
-
-
B1BID2
B2BID2
-
B48ID2
B5BID2
B6BID2
-
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 142 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 71
Bidder code Bn BnBID BrIBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
N
24
45
52
96
71
BI
B2
-
84
B5
B6
B7
-
B2BID
B3BID
-
-
B6B1D
B7BID
B1BED2
B2BED2
B3BED2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
-
M
N
142
45
52
96
24
B1
B2
-
84
B5
B6
-
BIBID
B2BID
B3BID
-
-
-
B7BID
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BED2
-
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE M LAST DUMMY VARIABLE N
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
83
84
B5
86
B7
B1BED
B2BID
-
B4BED
-
B6BED
B7BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
M
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
87
B1BID
B2BID
-
848ID
_
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
-
-
-
B6BID2
B7BID2
Table 10.8:	 Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 based on 3 contract types and 8 bidders.
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This was tested with bidders 142 and 71 in the position of last dummy variables.
To correct excessive multicollinearity, in accordance with previous procedures, the
x-variable (ie. contract size) was transformed according to various exponential
functions including natural log. It can be seen from Table 10.9 that the best x-
variable transformation was at the setting of natural log. The largest variance
inflation factor (VIP) remaining in the equation was only 2.089 and 6.703 for
bidders 142 and 71 respectively. Since both these values are less than the critical
VIF value of 10, the multicollinearity assumption appears to be satisfied for both
models.
**0.90 **0.75 **2/3 **0.5 **1/3 **0.25 **0.1 Natural
Log
Bidder 71 57.604 43.761 38.376 31.524 8.422 8.570 15.017 6.703
Bidder 142 55.255 42.090 36.413 26.401 2.177 1.959 3.473 2.089
Table 10.9: Largest variance inflation factor (VIF) remaining in the equation
after (1) centering the independant continuous variable k2) using
backwards stepwise regression and (3) transforming the x-variable
according to exponential functions of 0.90, 0.75, 2/3, 0.5, 1/3,
0.25, 0.1 and natural log at lambda setting of -4.2
The model utility statistics are shown in Table 10.10. For bidders 142 and 71 it can
be seen that the number of variables remaining in the equation has dropped from
each having 21 variables (see Table 10.6) to 16 and 17 respectively. Likewise the
adjusted R2 has dropped from 0.25316 and 0.24992 to 0.23736 and 0.23760
respectively. Turning to the regression assumption statistics, as can be seen in Table
10.11, that apart from multicollinearity both the normality and homoscedasticity
assumptions were satisfied. This new transformation therefore appears to satisfy all
the regression assumptions. However, when looking at the bidder variables
remaining in the equation, as shown in Table 10.12, it can be seen that the
interaction coefficient remained in the equation where bidder 142 was last dummy
variable and similarly where bidder 71 was last dummy variable. Since this signifies
that the equation slopes for each bidder are significantly different, these bidders
cannot be grouped together.
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 142 71
No. of variables in equation 16/759 17/758
Adjusted R2 0.23736 0.23760
F / Signif F 16.08/0.000 15.21/0.000
Table 10.10:	 Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
natural log based on 3 contract types and 8 bidders
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 142 71
Largest VIF 2.089 6.703
K-S prob 0.260 0.268
No. of hetro vari/prob 2/0.157 2/0.132
Table 10.11: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at natural log based on 3 contract types and 8 bidders
LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 142 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 71
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBED2
M
N
71
45
52
96
24
81
B2
-
B4
85
B6
-
-
B2BID
B3BID
Et4BID
-
-
B7BID
-
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
-
M
N
142
45
52
96
24
B1
B2
-
B4
B5
B6
-
B1BID
B2BID
B3BID
-
-
-
B7BID
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
-
Table 10.12: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at natural log based on 3 contract types and 8
bidders
When trying further transformations with other bidders as last dummy variables
similar results to that described above were also found. No further instances of the
dummy, interaction and interaction squared variables being deleted for reciprocating
bidders could be found. It appears, therefore, that the regression model cannot be
refined any further through swapping the last dummy variables.
10.4 Competitiveness predictions and reliability of the refined model
The regression summary of the final refined model based on three contract types
(ie. contract types coded FSH, 712, PSS) and eight bidders (ie. bidders M, N, 24,
45, 52, 71, 96, 142) is presented in Figure 10.2 with the corresponding SPSS-X
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1	 Dependent Variable .. 	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
37..	 B1BID2
Multiple R	 .52337
R Square	 .27392
Adjusted R Square	 .25369
Standard Error
	 .05091
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 21	 .73727	 .03511
Residual	 754	 1.95432	 .00259
F = 13.54519
	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation 	
Variable
	 B	 SE B	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VIP
J2BID2
	 .003906	 9.0375E-04	 .305869	 .192297	 5.200
B6BID	 .006639	
.003482	 .087418	 .458021	 2.183
B4BID	 .008388	
.003465	 .123593	 .369494	 2.706
B2	 .054024	
.010120
	 .209863	 .623056	 1.605
B5BID2	 .001369	 6.6094E-04
	
.090630	 .502894	 1.988
B3	 .045184	
.008532
	
.209540	 .615057	 1.626
B7	 .043526	
.011626	 .1'79'754	 .411-121	 2.194
B1BID	 - .004733	
.001009
	 -.154231	 .891480	 1.122
J1	 - .011910	
.004314	 -.099153	 .746465	 1.340
B7BID	 .005666
	
.002028
	 .104357	 .689836	 1.450
B2BID	 - .008636	
.002279	 -.149086	 .622063	 1.608
B6	 - .048907	
.010811
	
-.201977	 .483113	 2.070
J2	 - .024061	
.009034
	
-.150185	 .302876	 3.302
J1BID	 - .003782	 9.1729E-04
	
-.201389	 .403524	 2.478
B5	 - .028459	 .010364	 -.120823	 .497360	 2.011
B7BID2	 - .001120	 3.9312E-04	 -.128780	 .471308	 2.122
B6BID2	 .002351	 8.5783E-04	 .136848	 .386143	 2.590
B3BID2
	 -7.91501E-04
	 4.0932E-04
	 -.076160	 .620797	 1.611
B4	 .076707	 .011999
	
.325666	 .371063	 2.695
J1BID2	 1.78966E-04 6.7822E-05
	
.118438	 .478003	 2.092
J2BID	 .011411	 .005408	 .194122	 .113744	 8.792
(Constant)
	
.103502	 .003314
Figure 10.2: Regression model summary at lambda setting of -4.2, based on 3
contract types and 8 bidders with FSH (Fire stations and hostels)
and bidder M (bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148) as last
dummy variables
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Chunk Variable SPSS-X Code Description
T
B
biT,
b2T2
b3T3
b4B1
b5B2
b6B3
b7B4
b8B5
b9B6
b 10B 7
1) 1 ,13 8
J1
J2
J3
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
Police Stations and Secondary
Schools
Primary Schools
Fire Stations and Hostels
Bidder N
Bidder 24
Bidder 142
Bidder 45
Bidder 52
Bidder 96
Bidder 71
Bidder M
Figure 10.3 SPSS-X coding of dummy variables for refined model at lambda
setting of -4.2, based on three contract types and eight bidders
with FSH (Fire stations and hostels) and bidder M (bidders 9, 18,
109, 122, 127 and 148) as last dummy variables
codes of the dummy variables shown in Figure 10.3. So that direct comparisons
can be made between the model before refinement shown in Chapter 9 and the
refined model, fire stations and hostels (FSH) and bidder M were placed in the
position of last dummy variables. The estimates of the final refined model (shown
in Figure 10.2) can be substituted into the equation as follows:
5, = [(-4.2) [ 0.103502 - 0.011910T 1 - 0.024061T2 + 0.054024B2
+ 0.045184B3 + 0.076707B4 - 0.028459B 5 - 0.048907B6
+ 0.043526B7 - 0.003782T 1 (x25-7.68)
+ 0.000178966T 1 (x213-7.68)2 + 0.011411T2 (x25-7.68)
+ 0.003906T2 (x2/3-7.68)2 - 0.004733B 1 (x213-7.68)
- 0.008636B2 (x2/3-7.68) - 0.000791501B 3 (x25-7.68)2
+ 0.008388B4 (x25-7.68) + 0.001369B 5 (x25-7.68)2
+ 0.006639B6 (x25-7.68) + 0.002351B 6 (x25-7.68)2
+ 0.005666B 7 (x25-7.68) - 0.001120B 7 (x25-7.68)1+11' 1/4.2
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where
= predicted competitiveness
x = contract size
T = contract type
B = bidder
By substituting the appropriate values of the contract type and bidder variables
into the equation and combining like terms, the prediction equation for each
contract type and bidder can be found. For example:
Police Stations and Secondary Schools (T, = 1, T2 = 0, T3 = 0)
Bidder N (B, = 1, B2 = 0 ... B 8 = 0)
= [(-4.2) [ 0.103502 - 0.011910T 1 - 0.003782T 1 (x1'3-7.68)
+ 0.000178966T 1 (x213-7.68)2 - 0.004733B 1 (x2/3-7.68)]+11 11'4.2
In comparing the model utility statistics of the model before refinement (see
Figure 9.2) with the refined model it can be seen that the adjusted R2 is almost
identical (from 0.25392 to 0.25369). The biggest difference is the drop in the
variables remaining in the equation (from 24 to 21) which produced an increase
in the global F test statistic (from F = 11.99027, Signif F = 0.0000 to F =
13.54519, Signif F = 0.0000).
There is also a slight overall improvement in the regression assumption statistics.
In respect of multicollinearity, the largest variance inflation factor remaining in the
equation is approximately equal (from 8.777 to 8.792). For the normality
assumption there is a slight improvement in the normality probability statistic
(from K-S prob = 0.160 to K-S prob = 0.303). The number of heteroscedastic
variables remaining in the equation has also dropped from three to two (the
probability of 3 out of 24 variables being heteroscedastic is 0.086, whilst the
probability of 2 out of 21 variables being heteroscedastic is 0.198).
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Table 10.13 compares the contract type and bidder variables remaining in the
equation for the model before refinement and the refined model. In making an
overall comparison between the these models, it can be seen that the number of
non-significant contract type and bidder coefficients has dropped from 30 to 6. In
respect of the contract type variables, it can be seen that all the coefficients for the
refined model are now retained. This indicates that the level of competitiveness,
slope and degree of curvature of the regression line of the three remaining contract
types are significantly different. Regarding the bidder variables, with the exception
of bidder N, more than one coefficient is retained in the refined model which also
indicates quite significant competitive differences between these eight remaining
bidders.
CONTRACT TYPE VARIABLES REMAINING IN THE EQUATION
UNREFINED MODEL (Last dummy variable 848) REFINED MODEL (Last dummy variable FSH)
Contract type
code
in JnBID JnBID2 Contract type
code
in JnBID JnBID2
372
374
712
713
-
J2
13
J4
-
J2BID
J3BID
-
-
J2BED2
13BID2
- 
PSS
712
I
J1
J2
J1BID
J2BID
JIBID2
J2BID2
BIDDER  VARIABLES REMAINING IN THE EQUATION
UNREFINED MODEL (Last dummy variable 9) REFINED MODEL (Last dummy variable M)
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBED	 ' BnBID2
18
142
119
127
148
122
45
52
96
71
109
69
24
20
-
B2
-
-
-
B7
B8
B9
B10
-
-
B14
-
-
B3BED
-
-
B7BID
B9BID
BlOBED
B12BID
B14BID
-
B2BID2
-
-
-
-
B8BID2
B9BID2
B1OBID2
-
B13BID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B1BID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7B1D
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
Table 10.13:	 Unrefined and refined model comparison of contract type and
bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -4.2
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10.4.1	 Competitiveness of bidders toward contract type and size
The competitiveness predictions of the refined model according to contract type is
presented in Figure 10.4 (The coefficients upon which these competitiveness
predictions are based are scheduled according to contract type and bidder in Table
10.14). The essential difference between this and the model before refinement (see
Figure 9.3) is that, in addition to the model before refinement finding of bidders'
competitiveness toward fire stations and hostels not being significantly different, the
process of refining the model reveals that bidders' competitiveness toward police
stations and secondary schools are also not significantly different. In the discussion
of the model before refinement it is suggested that there are two major contract type
groupings (see Section 9.3.4). However, the process of refining model identifies
more clearly that the competitiveness of bidders towards the five contract types may
in fact be classified into three contract type groupings. The formation of these type
groupings appear to be dictated by the size and distribution of contracts within the
contract type.
In considering the refined model, it can be seen in Figure 10.3 that the level of
competitiveness, slope and degree of curvature of the regression lines for (1) fire
stations and hostels, (2) police stations and secondary schools and (3) primary
schools are significantly different. However, consider the overall shape of the
regression lines for (1) fire stations and hostels and (2) police stations and secondary
schools. Although they are shown to be significantly different they do appear to be
somewhat similar in shape. The probable reason for this similarity is that in using
the chunkwise algorithm (see Chapter 7) the major contract type - bidder interaction
chunks (ie. TB and STB) are deleted, also both of these contract type groupings
contain small and large contracts. As observed in Chapter 9 primary schools appear
to be the most dissimilar contract type simply because they do not contain any large
contracts and judging from the narrow distribution of bidding attempts between
contracts, appear to be highly standardised in terms of contract size. This apparent
standardisation has led to an overall increase in bidders' competitiveness towards
this type when compared with the other types. Of the remaining two types, bidders
1.1
1.05
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
1.05
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
20	 40	 60	 80
	
'l0C1
20	 40	 60	 80	 100
1.05
1
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0.9
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0.8
BIDDER 24
BIDDER 71
BIDDER 45
BIDDER 96
BIDDER 52
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BIDDER 9.18,109,122.127.141
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Figure 10.4:	 Refmed model competitiveness predictions according to contract
type
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POLICE STATIONS
AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS
BIDDER
CHUNK SPSS-X BI B2 B3 B4 135 B6 B7 B8
CODE
Constant .103502 .103502 .103502 .103502 .103502 103502 103502 .103502
T
B
ST
3,
13,
I,BID
-011910
-003782
-011910
054024
-003782
-011910
.045184
-003782
-.011910
076707
-003782
-011910
-028459
-003782
-011910
-048907
-003782
-011910
043526
-.003782
-011910
-003782
J,B1D2 1 78966E-4 1 78966E-4 1 78966E-4 1 78966E-4 1.78966E-4 1 78966E-4 1 78966E-4 1 78966E-4
SB BAID -004733 -008636 008388 006639 .005666
B,BID2 -7 9150E-4 001369 002351 -001120
PRIMARY SCHOOLS BIDDER
CHUNK SPSS-X 131 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
CODE
) )
Constant 103502 103502 103502 103502 .103502 103502 103502 103502	 (
T
B
ST
I,
13,
1,131D
-024061
011411
-024061
054024
011411
-02406!
045184
011411
-02406!
076707
011411
-.024061
-.028459
011411
-024061
-.048907
.011411
-024561
043526
011411
-024061
011411
J5BID2 003906 003906 003906 003906 003906 003906 003906 .003906
-,.
SB 13.131D -004733 -008636 008388 006639 .005666
13.131D2 -7 9150E-4 001369 002351 -001120
FIRE STATIONS BIDDER
AND HOSTH/S
. ..„4.
CHUNK 1PSS-X B1 B2 B3 B4 115 B6 B7 B8
CODE
Constant .103502 103502 103502 103502 103502 103502 .103502 .103502
T
B
1,
Ii„ 054024 045184 076707 -028459
.,
-048907 .043526
ST J,B1D
.	 J,B1D2
SB 13.131D -004733 -008636 008388 .006639 005666
13,131132 -79150E-4 .001369 .002351 -001120
I
Table 10.14:	 Regression coefficient breakdown for refined model according to
contract type and bidder
appear to be more competitive toward police stations and secondary schools than
fire stations and hostels. This apparent difference may be explained by the fact that
there are a greater number of larger police station and secondary school contracts
than fire station and hostel contracts. It would seem, therefore, that bidders are
more competitive on larger contracts than smaller contracts (These competitiveness
differences between types may be seen more clearly in Figure 10.5 which shows
the bidding performances individual bidders towards these types).
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The above findings therefore provide evidence that bidders competitiveness
towards contract type is affected by (1) the degree of contract type standardisation
and (2) the sizes of contract contained within a contract type. The greater the
degree of contract type standardisation and also the larger the sizes of contract
within the contract type, the greater the likely competitiveness of bidders towards
the contract type and vice versa.
10.4.2	 Competitiveness of bidders
The competitiveness predictions of the refined model according to bidder is
presented in Figure 10.5. In addition to the finding in Chapter 9 of bidders 9, 18,
109, 122, 127 and 148 competitive bidding performances not being significantly
different, the process of refining the model reveals that the competitive bidding
performances of bidders 20, 69 and 119 are also not significantly different.
When comparing the model before refinement (see Figure 9.4) with the refined
model it can be seen that the competitiveness predictions of the bidders are similar
for all bidders with the exception of bidder 20. The model before refinement
shows bidder 20 being classified as a contractor who has a preferred contract size
range for smaller contracts. However, during the process of refining the model (see
Section 10.3.1) it was shown that bidder 20 may be wrongly classified and there
appears to be sufficient evidence to reclassify this bidder as one who has a
preferred contract size range for larger contracts. The reclassification of this one
bidder does not affect the original five bidder competitiveness groupings identified
in Chapter 9. The refined model shows the 15 bidders falling into the following
competitiveness groupings:
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size
range for smaller contracts (ie. bidder 96 and 52);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size for
larger contracts (ie. bidder 20, 24, 69 and 119);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidders 71 and
142);
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Figure 10.5:	 Refined model competitiveness predictions according to bidder
290
bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by size (ie. bidders 9, 18,
109, 122, 127 and 148);
bidders who are less competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidder 45).
In considering the bidding performances of bidders who fall into the same
competitiveness grouping but whose competitiveness performance is significantly
different it can be seen that of the two contractors who have a preferred contract
size range for smaller contracts bidder 96 appears to be significantly more
competitive than bidder 52. Likewise in respect of contractors who have a preferred
contract size range for larger contracts bidders 20, 69 and 119 appear to be
significantly more competitive than bidder 24. In respect of the two bidders who are
more competitive on the larger contracts the essential difference seems to be that
bidder 71 is more competitive than bidder 142 at the smaller end of the contract size
continuum whereas bidder 142 looks to be more competitive at the larger end of the
contract size continuum.
10.4.3	 Reliability of the refined model
The predicted values together with the 95% upper and lower prediction intervals
according to contract type and bidder is presented in Figure 10.6. The degree of
reliability is almost identical to that of the model before refinement (see Figure 9.5).
The extent to which the reliability differs between the refined and unrefined model
can be more clearly seen in Table 10.15 which shows five typical cases which
extracted from the data. For example, case number 1 shows the competitiveness
prediction of bidder 148 for secondary schools with a contract size of HK$17.37
million (in the refined model bidder 148 is shown as bidder M and secondary
schools are grouped with police stations). The actual competitiveness of this bidder
is unity, however, the predicted competitiveness for the unrefined model is 0.9301,
yet for the refined model is 0.9253. The upper and lower prediction intervals are
1.0163 and 0.8721 for the refilled model and 1.1063 and 0.8687 for the unrefined
model.
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Figure 10.6: Scatterplot of 95% upper and lower prediction intervals, predicted
values and actual bidding attempts according to bidder for the
refined model
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Case No. 1 2 22 183 333
Model Unrefined Refined Unrefined Refined Unrefined Refined Unrefined Refined Unrefined Refined
Contract type 713 PSS 712 712 848 FSH 374 PSS 372 FSH
Bidder 148 M 18 M 69 N 45 45 96 96
Contract size (HK$) 17.37 17.37 10.13 10.13 20.05 20.05 5.20 5.20 13.83 13.83
Actual
competitiveness
1 1 0.9189 0.9189 0.9119 0.9119 0.8522 0.8522 0.9660 0.9660
Predicted
competitiveness
0.9301 0.9253 0.9388 0.9387 0.9205 0.9199 0.8867 0.8887 0.9549 0.9555
Upper prediction
interval
1.0163 1.0086 1.0303 1.0302 1.0010 1.0001 0.9520 0.9548 1.0588 1.0599
Lower prediction
interval
0.8721 0.8687 0.8782 0.8781 0.8652 0.8648 0.8396 0.8412 0.8887 0.8891
Table 10.15:	 Competitiveness prediction and reliability comparison of unrefined
and refined models using selected cases
In comparing the five cases overall it can be seen that the competitiveness
predictions are almost identical. As expected the biggest differences in the predicted
competitiveness between refined and unrefined models occur where either bidders
and/or contract types have been grouped together. Also as expected in some cases
the unrefined model shows a better competitiveness prediction whilst in other cases
the refined model shows a better competitiveness prediction.
10.5 Summary
The competitiveness model in the previous chapter shows that bidders'
competitiveness towards fire stations and hostels are not significantly different.
Likewise, the competitiveness of bidders coded 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148 are
also not significantly different. This non-si%,ttiftcant diffeteace is due to all the
regression coefficients pertaining to these contract types and bidders being deleted
from the equation. The reason why these particular contract type and bidder
coefficients are deleted from the equation is the result of inverting the regression
matrix on the last dummy variables of hostels and bidder 9, using the chunkwise
algorithm (to delete non-significant chunks) and backward stepwise procedure (to
delete non-significant variables).
The competitiveness model was refmed by iterating the regression analysis on the
last dummy variables of other contract types and bidders to identify which other
contract types and bidders are also not significantly different from each other. Since
293
a fundamental goal of model building is to find the best prediction model containing
the least number of predictor variables the contract types and bidders which were
not significantly different were grouped together in subsequent iterations. Model 12
in its present transformation was used as the basis for refinement because this model
appears to be the best model and the present transformation is one that satisfies all
the regression assumptions.
Iterating the competitiveness model on the last dummy variable of different contract
types shows, that in addition to fire stations and hostels, bidders' competitiveness
towards police stations and secondary schools is not significantly different. The five
original contract types appear to fall into the three significantly different
competitiveness groupings of (1) fire stations and hostels, (2) police stations and
secondary schools and (3) primary schools. It seems the formation of these three
groupings is primarily due to the different means and distribution of contract sizes
for each contract type which appear to fall into three contract size bands.
The level of competitiveness, slope and degree of curvature of the regression line
of the three remaining contract types appear to be significantly different. Although
they are shown to be significantly different the overall shape of the regression lines
for (1) fire stations and hostels and (2) police stations and secondary schools do not
appear to be too dissimilar. The reason for this appears to be that both these
groupings contain both small and large contracts. Primary schools appears to be the
most dissimilar contract type simply because it does not contain any large contracts
and judging by the narrow distribution of bidding attempts between contracts would
seem to be highly standardised in terms of size. This apparent standardisation has
lead to an increase in bidders competitiveness towards this type when compared
with the other types. Bidders appear to be more competitive toward police stations
and secondary schools than fire stations and hostels. The apparent difference may
be explained by the fact that there are a greater number of larger police station and
primary school contracts than fire station and hostel contracts. It would appear,
therefore, that bidders are more competitive on larger contracts than smaller
contracts.
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These findings indicate that bidders' competitiveness towards a contract type is
affected by (1) the degree of contract type standardisation and (2) the sizes of
contract contained within a contract type. The greater the degree of contract type
standardisation and also the larger the sizes of contract within a contract type, the
greater the likely competitiveness of bidders towards the contract type and vice
versa.
Iterating the competitiveness model on the last dummy variable of different bidders
shows that in addition to bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148, bidders 20, 69 and
119 are also not significantly different. By running two sets of iterations the number
of bidders is reduced from 15 to eight. During the process of refining the model it
is shown that bidder 20 may be wrongly classified and there appears to be sufficient
evidence to reclassify this bidder as a contractor who has a preferred contract size
range for larger contracts. The reclassification of this one bidder does not affect the
original five bidder competitiveness groupings identified in Chapter 9. The final
refined model shows the 15 bidders falling into the following competitiveness
groupings:
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size range
for smaller contracts (ie. bidder 96 and 52);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size for
larger contracts (ie. bidder 20, 24, 69 and 119);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidders 71 and
142);
(4) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by size (ie. bidders 9, 18,
109, 122, 127 and 148);
(5) bidders who are less competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidder 45).
In comparing the model utility and regression assumption statistics of the refmed
model with the model before refining, the refined model looks to be a slightly better
model overall. Since this improvement is only very marginal the degree of
reliability as shown by the prediction intervals is almost identical to that of the
unrefined model.
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CHAPTER 11
Adding new bidders to the model
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11 ADDING NEW BIDDERS TO THE MODEL
11.1 Introduction
The refined model in the previous chapter is based on the bidding performances
of 15 bidders towards five contract types. Through refining the model it is shown
that of the five contract types, bidders' competitiveness towards three contract
types is significantly different. Likewise, eight out of 15 bidders appear to be
significantly different in terms of competitiveness. The analysis also shows that
the bidding performance of the 15 bidders can be classified into five
competitiveness groupings.
Using the refined model as the starting point, this chapter explores the effect of
progressively adding new bidders to the model in an attempt to find other
competitiveness groupings. In accordance with previous procedures bidders were
selected on the basis of number of bidding attempts. Two iterations were carried
out for each new bidder entered into the equation. First, where the new bidder is
the last dummy variable to see the effect on the bidder variables left in the
equation. Second where bidder M is the last dummy variable so that direct
comparisons can be made with the refined model.
Although the transformation was the same as the refmed model (ie. lambda is -4.2
and the x-variable at 2/3), for the purposes of centering the x-variable at zero,
where a new bidder was entered into the analysis, the x-variable was re-centered
to account for the difference in the mean bid value. Also since the number of
cases in the model was increased, new confidence intervals were calculated for the
purposes of applying Szroeter's test to identify the number of heteroscedastic
variables.
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11.2 Adding the 16th bidder to the model
Bidder 150 was first added into the analysis since this bidder has the 16th largest
number of bidding attempts in the sample (ie. 36 bidding attempts). The x-variable
was re-centered by deducting the sample mean bid value of HK$ 7.76 million (at
the exponential function of 2/3).
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show the model utility statistics where this bidder was the
last dummy variable and also where bidder M was the last dummy variable. It can
be seen that there is little difference in the statistics between this and the refined
model.	
43
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 150 M
No. of variables in equation 22/789 23/788
Adjusted R2 0.24832 0.25529
F / Signif F 13.18/0.000 13.08/0.000
Table 11.1: Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data set with"(1) bidder 150
and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 150 M
Largest VIF 9.993 9.796
K-S prob 0.324 0.262
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0. 4/0.132
Table 11.2: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data set with (1)
bidder 150 and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
Table 11.3 shows the bidder variables remaining in the equation. It can be seen that
where bidder 150 was the dummy variable all the three variables for bidder N were
deleted from the equation. It seems, therefore, that the competitiveness of bidder
150 is not significantly different from bidder N (ie. a bidder, who in terms of
competitiveness, has a preferred range for large contracts).
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LAST DUMMY VARIABLE 150 LAST DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
-
-
-
B3BID
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
150
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
-
B1BID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
B8BID2
Table 11.3: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at 2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data
set with (1) bidder 150 and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
Bidder 150 was, therefore, pooled with bidder N. The model utility statistics,
regression assumption statistics and bidder variables remaining in the equation can
be seen in Tables 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6 respectively. Note that where bidder 150 was
the last dummy variable, the regression model was identical before pooling (ie. in
Tables 11.1 to 11.3) and after pooling (ie. in Tables 11.4 to 11.6). The reason for
this is that all three variables were deleted before pooling.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE
I
N M
No. of variables in equation 22/789 21/790
Adjusted R2 0.24832 0.25/96
F / Signif F 13.18/0.000 14.08/0.000
Table 11.4: Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data set and bidder 150
pooled into bidder N with (1) bidder 150 and (2) bidder M as last
dummy variables
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE N M
Largest VIF 9.993 9.791
K-S prob 0.324 0.318
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0. 3/0.066
Table 11.5: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data set and
bidder 150 pooled into bidder N with (1) bidder 150 and (2) bidder
M as last dummy variables
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE N LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
M
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
87
BIBID
-
B3BID
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
-
-
85BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
82
B3
B4
B5
B6
87
BIBID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
86BID2
B7BID2
Table 11.6: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at 2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data
set and bidder 150 pooled into bidder N with (1) bidder 150 and
(2) bidder M as last dummy variables
Compare the refined model based on 15 bidders (see Tables 10.6 - 10.8, where
bidder M is the last dummy variable) and 16 bidders (see Tables 11.4 - 11.6 where
bidder M is the last dummy variable). It can be seen that the number of variables
remaining in the equation are identical. There is a only slight decrease in the
adjusted R2 (from 0.25369 to 0.25296). However, the global F test statistic has
increased. (The reason for this is that the data set is increased from 776 cases to
812 cases). Turning to the regression assumption statistics, it can be seen that
despite there a slight deterioration in terms of multicollinearity (largest VIF
remaining in the equation has increased from 8.792 to 9.791) and homoscedasticity
(the number of heteroscedastic variables has increased from 2, probability of 0.198,
to 3, probability of 0.066) the new model based 16 bidders satisfies all the
regression assumptions. The same transformation can therefore be kept for when
the 17th bidder is added into the regression model.
11.3 Adding the 17th bidder to the model
Bidder 40, ranked 17th in terms of number of bidding attempts, is now added to the
model. When comparing the model utility statistics based on 16 bidders (see Table
11.4) and 17 bidder (see Table 11.7), overall it can be seen that there was a slight
deterioration in terms of the model utility statistics. The 17 bidder model also failed
the assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity (see Table 11.8).
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 40 M
No. of variables in equation 21/826 23/824
Adjusted R2 0.24410 0.24721
F / Signif F 14.03/0.000 13.09/0.000
Table 11.7: Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data set with (1) bidder 40
and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 40 M
Largest VIP 10.158 10.177
K-S prob 0.419 0.261
No. of hetro varilprob 403. i 44. i
Table 11.8: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data set with (1)
bidder 40 and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
When referring to the bidder variables left in the equation (see Table 11.9) it can
be seen that all the variables were deleted for bidder M where bidder 40 was the
last dummy variable and likewise where M was the last dummy variable. It seems
therefore that bidder 40 is a bidder whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by
contract size and can therefore be grouped with those bidders pooled into bidder M.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 40	 ii	 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N - B 'BID - N B! BIBID B1BID2
24 B2 B2BID - 24 B2 B2BID -
142 B3 - B3BED2 142 B3 - B3BID2
45 B4 B4BID - 45 B4 B4BID -
52 B5 - B5BID2 52 B5 - B5BED2
96 B6 B6BED B6BID2 96 B6 B6BED B6BID2
71 B7 B7BID B7BID2 71 B7 B7BID B7BID2
N4 _ _	 _ - ao - - -
Table 11.9: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at 2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data
set with (1) bidder 40 and (2) bidder M as last dummy variables
Tables 11.10 shows the model utility statistics where bidder 40 was pooled into
bidder M. Compared with the refined model based on 16 bidders (see Table 11.4)
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it can be seen that there is slight deterioration in terms of the model utility statistics.
Likewise when referring to the model utility statistics in Table 11.11 it can be seen
that this model fails the assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity
signifying that a new transformation is needed. The probable reason for the failure
of these regression assumptions is the affect of increasing the number of cases
contained in the data set, thereby changing the character of the data set. Table 11.12
shows the competitiveness of each bidder being significantly different after pooling.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
No. of variables in equation 23/824
Adjusted R2 0.24721
F / Signif F 13.09/0.000
Table 11.10: Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data set and bidder 40
pooled into bidder M with bidder M as last dummy variable
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Largest VIP 10.177
K-S prob 0.261
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0.
Table 11.11: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data set and
bidder 40 pooled into bidder M with bidder M as last dummy
variable
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
B1
52
B3
54
B5
B6
B7
B1BED
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BID
B1131D2
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BED2
Table 11.12: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at 2/3 based on 17 bidder/3 contract type data
set and bidder 40 pooled into bidder M with bidder M as last
dummy variable
	(Lambda=-4.2\	 (Lambda=-4.4\
	
x-variable=**0.0	 x-varia6(e=41VR
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE
Largest VIF 5.114 S 114
K-S prob 0.123 0.090
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0. 4/0.
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To correct multicollinearity the x-variable is changed from 2/3 to 0.5 and re-
centered accordingly. The first transformation shows lambda at the original setting
of -4.2, the second transformation shows lambda at a new setting of -4.4. Tables
11.13 - 11.15 illustrate the model utility statistics, regression assumption statistics
and bidder variables remaining in the equation. It can be seen that the number of
variables remaining in the equation has dropped to 19. There is, however, a further
deterioration in the adjusted R2 statistic. It can be seen that in changing the x-
variable the multicollinearity and normality assumptions are both satisfied.
However, both transformations fail the homoscedasticity assumption as four out of
19 variables are heteroscedastic.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M (Lambda=-4.2\x-
variable=**0.5)
M (Lambda=-4.4\x-
variable= "0.5)
No. of variables in equation 19/828 19/828
Adjusted R2 0.23808 0.23606
F / Signif F 14.93/0.000 14.77/0.000
Table 11.13:	 Model utility statistics at (1) lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable
at 0.5 (2) lambda setting of -4.4 with x-variable at 0.5, based on
17 bidder/3 contract type data set and bidder 40 pooled into bidder
M with bidder M as last dummy variable
Table 11.14: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at (1) lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at 0.5 (2)
lambda setting of -4.4 with x-variable at 0.5, based on 17 bidder/3
contract type data set and bidder 40 pooled into bidder M with
bidder M as last dummy variable
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
(Lambda=-4.2\x-variable=**0.5)
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
(Lambda=-4.4\x-variable=**0.5)
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B I BID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
-
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
BIBID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
-
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
Table 11.15: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -
4.2 and x-variable at (1) lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
0.5 (2) lambda setting of -4.4 with x-variable at 0.5, based on 17
bidder/3 contract type data set and bidder 40 pooled into bidder M
with bidder M as last dummy variable
Other lambda transformations were tried on a trial and error basis in an attempt to
find a suitable transformation that satisfies all the regression assumptions. At
lambda settings less than -4.2 a greater proportion of the variables were found to
be heteroscedastic. At settings greater than -4.7 the model failed the normality
assumption. In addition other x-variable transformations were tested where the x-
variable exponential is less than 0.5. It was found that in doing this the number of
x-variables remaining in the equation were reduced, resulting in a lower adjusted
R2 statistic.
It appears therefore that the maximum number of bidders that can be retained in a
model which usefully satisfies the regression assumptions is 16 bidders. Figure 11.1
shows the regression model summary based on 16 bidders.
11.4 An alternative approach
Since it appears not to be possible to proceed further with the approach of
combining all the bidders in the one model, another approach was used to identify
the bidding performance of bidders who were ranked 16th or below. Using the 15
bidder/5 contract type refuted model shown in Chapter 10 as the starting point, a
series of iterations are undertaken by adding each of the new bidders into the model
separately as the 16th bidder. In other words, each of the new bidders was entered
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**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1
	
Dependent Variable ..	 DEP
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
37..	 BIBID2
Multiple R	 .52183
R Square	 .27230
Adjusted R Square	 .25296
Standard Error	 .05082
Analysis of Variance
DF	 Sum of Squares	 Mean Square
Regression	 21	 .76340	 .03635
Residual	 790	 2.04009	 .00258
F = 14.07703
	 Signif F = .0000
	 Variables in the Equation
	
Variable	 B	 SE B
	 Beta	 Tolerance	 VW
J2BID2	 .003924	 9.0172E-04
	 .312681
	
.178370	 5.606
B6BID	 .006943	
.003544	 .091008	 .426737	 2.343
B4BID	 .008371
	
.003457
	 .123191
	
.355884	 2.810
B2	 .054130	
.009972
	 .206306	 .637660	 1.568
B5BID2	 .001335	 6.4643E-04
	 .088979	 .495994	 2.016
B3	 .046185	
.008541
	 .210273	 .609165	 1.642
B7	 - .044810	
.011655
	 .181598	 .412896	 2.422
J1	 - .011416	
.004187
	
-.095336
	
.753406	 1.327
B1BID	 - .004771	 9.1074E-04
	
-.167943
	
.896080	 1.116
B7BID	 .005502
	
.002006
	 .100060
	
.692386	 1.444
B2BID	 - .008653	
.002274
	
-.144874
	
.635674	 1.573
J2	 - .022431	
.009270	
-.138665
	
.280517	 3.565
B6	 - .047628
	
.010833
	 -.193018
	
.477968	 2.092
J1BID	 - .003791	 8.9884E-04
	 .198241
	
.416879
	
2.399
B5	 - .027852	
.010388
	 -.116047
	
.491692
	
2.034
B7BID2	 - .001127	 3.9222E-04
	 -.127452	 .467803	 2.138
B3BID2	 -8.10711E-04 4.1722E-04
	 -.075303
	
.613325
	
1.630
B6BID2	 .002350	 8.5620E-04	 .137680
	
.366102	 2.731
B4	 .078126	 .012176	 .325519
	
.357921	 2.794
J1BID2	 -1.80858E-04
	 6.7328E-05
	 .116415
	
.490450	 2.039
J2BID	 .012142	 .005505
	 .209482
	 .102135	 9.791
(Constant)	 .102369	 .003186
Figure 11.1: Regression model summary at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3 based on 16 bidder/3 contract type data set and
bidder 150 pooled into bidder N with bidder M as last dummy
variables
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into the analysis as if it were the 16th bidder. Although it is recognised that this
approach is inferior to the previous approach in that all the new bidders are not
incorporated into the one model, the bidding performance of each of the new
bidders can at least be seen and identified to determine the competitiveness grouping
of the new bidder.
Five bidders (ie. bidder 150, 40, 43, 48 and 140), ranked 16th to 20th in terms of
number of bidding attempts, were considered in this part of the analysis. Table
11.16 shows the that there is very little variability in terms of the model utility
statistics between the bidders.
Table 11.17 shows the regression assumption statistics for each of bidders. Where
each of these new bidders are the last dummy variables, it can be seen that of the
five bidders, three fail the assumption of multicollinearity (ie bidders 43, 48 and
140) and three fail the assumption of homoscedasticity (ie. bidders 150, 43 and 48).
Where bidder M was the last dummy variable one bidder just fails the assumption
of multicollinearity (ie. bidder 140), however, four bidders fail the assumption of
homoscedasticity.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 150 40 43 48 140
No. of variables in equation 221789 21/790 24/786 21/788 22/787
Adjusted R2 0.24832 0.24473 0.24252 0.23495 0.24496
F / Signif F 13.18/0.000 13.51/0.000 11.81/0.000 12.83/0.000 12.93/0.000
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M M M M M
No. of variables in equation 23/788 21/790 23/787 21/788 23/786
Adjusted R2 0.25529 0.24473 0.24837 0.23930 0.24977
F / Signif F 13.09/0.000 13.51/0.000 12.64/0.000 13.12/0.000 12.71/0.000
Table 11.16: Model utility statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-variable at
2/3, based on 16 bidder 3 contract type data set with (1) bidder
150 and bidder M, (2) bidder 40 and bidder M, (3) bidder 43 and
bidder M, (4) bidder 48 and bidder M and (5) bidder 140 and
bidder M as last dummy variables
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 150 40 43 48 140
Largest vrF 9.993 9.220 103.435 30.355 10.210
K-S prob 0.324 0.386 0.265 0.205 0.197
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0. 3/0. 6/0. 5/0. 2/0.
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M M M M M
Largest VIP 9.796 9.220 8.465 8.747 10.06
K-S prob 0.262 0.386 0.404 0.232 0.267
No. of hetro vari/prob 4/0. 3/0. 5/0. 5/0. 4/0.
Table 11.17: Regression assumption statistics at lambda setting of -4.2 and x-
variable at 2/3, based on 16 bidder 3 contract type data set with
(1) bidder 150 and bidder M, (2) bidder 40 and bidder M, (3)
bidder 43 and bidder M, (4) bidder 48 and bidder M and (5)
bidder 140 and bidder M as last dummy variables
Table 11.18 shows the bidder variables remaining in the equation. Where bidder
150 was the last variable it can be seen that all the bidder N variables were deleted
from the equation. However, where bidder M was the last dummy variable it can
be seen that two variables for bidder 150 were retained in the equation. Judging
from these results it would seem that bidder 150 can be at least classified as one
who has a preferred contract size for larger projects.
Where bidder 40 was the last dummy variable it can be seen that all the bidder M
variables are deleted from the equation. Likewise where bidder M is the last dummy
variable all the bidder 40 variables are deleted from the equation. This suggests that
bidder 40 can be classified as a bidder whose competitiveness is unaffected by
contract size.
Where bidder 43 and bidder M was the last dummy variable at least one variable
is retained in the equation for each of the bidders. The closest bidder appears to be
bidder N, however one variable is retained in both iterations. On balance it would
seem that bidder 43's competitiveness is significantly different from all the other
bidders considered so far.
The results of bidder 48 are very similar to that of bidder 40, it would seem,
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LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 150 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
-
82
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
-
-
-
B3BID
B4BID
B5BID
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
150
-
B2
83
B4
B5
B6
B7
-
B I BID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
B8BID2
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 40 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
-
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
-
BIBID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BED
-
-
-
B3BID2
-
85BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
40
B1
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
87
-
BIBID
B2BID
-
B4BID
-
B6B/D
B7BED
-
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 43 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBED2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
-
82
B3
B4
135
86
B7
-
-
-
B3BID
B4BID
B5BED
B6BID
B7B1D
B8BID
B1BID2
B2BID2
B3BID2
-
-
-
B7BID2
B8BID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
43
-
B2
B3
84
B5
86
B7
-
B1BID
B2BED
-
B4BID
-
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BLD2
B8BED2
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 48 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBED BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
-
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
B7
-
8113ID
B2BID
-
-
-
B6BED
B7BID
-
13113ID2
B2BID2
-
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
-
B8BID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
48
-
B2
B3
84
135
B6
B7
-
BlBID
B2BED
-
B4BED
-
B6BID
B7BID
-
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
B6BID2
B7BID2
-
LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE 140 LAST BIDDER DUMMY VARIABLE M
Bidder code Bn BnBID BnBID2 Bidder code Bn BnBED BnBID2
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
M
B1
B2
-
84
135
B6
B7
-
-
B2BID
-
B4BID
B5BED
B6BID
B7BID
B8BID
-
-
-
-
B5BLD2
B6BID2
-
-
N
24
142
45
52
96
71
140
-
B2
B3
84
B5
B6
B7
B8
B1BED
B2BED
-
84811)
-
B6BID
B7BED
B8BID
-
-
B3BID2
-
B5BID2
86BID2
B7BID2
-
Table 11.18: Bidder variables remaining in the equation at lambda setting of -4.2
and x-variable at 2/3, based on 16 bidder 3 contract type data set
with (1) bidder 150 and bidder M, (2) bidder 40 and bidder M, (3)
bidder 43 and bidder M, (4) bidder 48 and bidder M and (5) bidder
140 and bidder M as last dummy variables
BIDDER 40
..----___-_-_.-„---®i	 --..,,	 a,
..
„
0	 20	 40	 60	 50	 100
CONTRACT SIZE MKS MILLIONS)
1.1 1.1
BIDDER 150
1.01 1.01
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0.1
021 0.1115
.
.....,
S •03 0.11
0	 20 40 60 SO 100
CONTRACT SIZE PIKS WILUONSI
LDS
1
035
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Figure 11.2: Competitiveness predictions according to (1) bidder 150, (2) bidder
40, (3) bidder 43, (4) bidder 48 and (5) bidder 140 at lambda
setting of -4.2 and x-variable at 2/3, based on 16 bidder/3 contract
type data set with bidder M as last dummy variables
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therefore, that bidder 48 can be classified as a bidder whose competitiveness is
unaffected by contract size.
Where bidder 140 was the last dummy variable all the bidder 119 variables are
deleted from the equation. However, where bidder M was the last dummy variable
two of bidder 142's variables were retained in the equation. On balance it would
seem that this bidder is a bidder who is more competitive on the larger contracts.
Figure 11.2 shows the competitiveness predictions for each of these bidders
according to type. It can be seen that no new competitiveness grouping were found.
The competitiveness of these bidders fall into four of the five groupings as before
described ie.
(1) bidders who in terms of competitiveness have a preferred contract size range
for smaller contracts (ie. bidder 43);
(2) bidders who in terms of competitiveness have a preferred contract size range
for larger contracts (ie. bidder 150);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidder 140);
(4) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by contract size (ie.
bidders 40 and 48).
11.5 Summary
Using the 15 bidder refined model as the starting point, this chapter explored the
effect of progressively adding new bidders to the refined model.
When the 16th bidder (ie. bidder 150) was added to the model this increased the
number of cases from 776 to 812. Although there was a slight deterioration in the
overall regression assumption statistics, the refined model transformation was still
able to satisfy all of the regression assumptions. The bidding performance of this
bidder was not significantly different from bidder N (ie. a bidder who, in terms of
competitiveness, has a preferred range for large contracts). This bidder was,
therefore, grouped with bidder N.
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When the 17th bidder was added to the model, this increased the number of cases
from 812 to 848. It was found that the transformation no longer satisfied all the
regression assumptions. Although other transformations were tried in an attempt to
find a suitable transformation. No satisfactory transformations could be found. The
probable reason for the failure of these regression assumptions is the effect of
incrementally increasing the number of cases contained in the data set, thereby
changing the character of the data set. It appears, therefore, that the maximum
number of bidders that can be retained in a model which usefully satisfies the
regression assumption is 16 bidders.
Since it appears not to be possible to proceed further with the approach of
combining all the bidders in one model, an alternative approach was used to identify
the bidding performances of five bidders ranked 16th to 20th (ie. bidder 150, 40,
43, 48 and 20). Each of these bidders was entered into the analysis as if it were the
16th bidder. Although it is recognised that this approach is inferior to the previous
approach in that all the new bidders are not incorporated into the one model, the
bidding performance of each of the new bidders can at least be seen and identified
to determine the competitiveness grouping of the new bidder. No new
competitiveness groupings were found. These five new bidders fell into four of the
five groupings as before described ie.
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size range
for smaller contracts (ie. bidder 43);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size range
for larger contracts (ie. bidder 150);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidder 140);
(4) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by contract size (ie.
bidders 40 and 48).
PART 3
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
12.1 Introduction
By considering the relationships of bids submitted to the client, this thesis focuses
on the bidding behaviour of contractors who are in competition with each other
for various packages of construction work. The aim of this work is to demonstrate
through statistical modelling that competing contractors are influenced, to varying
degrees, by contract type and contract size and that a competitiveness relationship
exists between contractor size and contract size.
A brief review of management and economic theory indicates that management
theory is more comprehensive at modelling strategic behaviour within construction
firms, while economic theory seems to be more developed at modelling
competitive performance between construction firms. Since competitive
relationships between firms are based on the outcome of management decisions
that have taken place within a firm, the approach taken in the theoretical
development of this research is to view the bidding behaviour of construction
firms as the outcome of strategic management decisions undertaken in an
economic setting.
The construction industry environment within which contractors operate is seen
to consist of general environmental factors as well as competitive environmental
factors. Since contracting is demand driven the competitive environment can be
defined in terms of markets. Definitions of the construction market indicate that
it exists in three main dimensions: (1) contract type and nature (2) contract size
and complexity (3) geographic area. The total number of firms interested in
undertaking construction work according to these three dimensions is affected by
prevailing and perceived future market conditions.
The type and nature of construction work undertaken within the construction
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market is diverse, producing a series of market sectors within which contractors
compete for work. Contract size and complexity is an important dimension in the
construction market because of the wide range of contract sizes that exists within
the construction market. Contract size is regarded as the major determinant of the
number of firms able to undertake the work. A readily available measure that
reflects, to a degree, both contract size and complexity is the bid price submitted
by the contractor.
The nature and form of the competitive arena for the contractor in construction
contracting is largely determined by the client and/or advisors. The choice of
bidding system coupled with bidder selection practices has a direct bearing on the
degree of competition since it affects both the number and identities of bidders
competing for a particular contract. An addition in numbers of bidders above four
or five has only a marginal impact on competitiveness. The identities of individual
bidders are important since different bidders are able to achieve different levels of
competitiveness.
Contractors respond to the construction market by making strategic decisions at
different levels and stages of the strategic process. Strategic decisions define the
boundary between the firm and the external environment. At the corporate strategy
level contractors define a strategic domain. The strategic domain establishes the
market dimensions within which contractors plan to operate and compete for work.
Larger contractors are likely to develop a larger strategic domain than smaller
contractors. Contractors make decisions on which contacts to bid for at the
business strategy level. If opting to bid, the baseline estimate is formulated at the
operational strategy level and then fed back to the business strategy level where
senior management decides the appropriate bid level at an adjudication meeting.
The bid, which can be regarded as the outcome of the strategic decision process,
is then submitted to the client.
A contractor's strategic domain can be defmed according to a number of contract
types and may comprise undertaking all or specialising in certain contract types
3 14
within one or more sectors of the construction market. The strategic domain may
also include undertaking new build work or alteration work or both. A contractor's
strategic domain can also be defined according to the range of contract sizes it
wishes to undertake. Strategic domain differences in terms of geographic area are
likely to become less apparent in smaller, more densely populated countries. In
Hong Kong for example, the influence of geographic area seems to be minimal
since most contractors operate territory wide with the exception of undertaking
work on some of Hong Kong's more remote islands. Hong Kong's construction
market, therefore, appears to exist largely according to two main market
dimensions, that of contract type and size.
Contract bidding, like all other forms of pricing, is essentially about contractors
making strategic decisions in respect of which contracts to bid for and the bid
levels necessary to secure them. In the course of running the construction firm it
is at the business strategy level where contractors are given numerous
opportunities to bid or work both within and outside of the strategic domain. Job
desirability is influenced by many factors including favoured contract types within
the bidder's expertise area.
In deciding to bid contractors are likely to consider both their current workload
and future available work in the construction market. Economic theory of the firm
suggests firms operate most efficiently when they are operating just under capacity
of their total resources. If the firm attempts to operate beyond this point the firm
may run into assorted bottlenecks making it less competitive. Achieving optimum
efficiency therefore becomes an issue of balancing the resources in hand with the
size of contract. Management (and not fixed capital) is regarded as the most
important determinant of the capacity as well as the capability of construction
firms. Managerial skills capacity gives the contractor greater flexibility in the work
it undertakes. Contractors do not attach too much importance to availability of
resources since resource constraints can be overcome by obtaining extra resources
from alternative sources.
3 1 5
If the contractor opts to submit the bid, the pricing of the bid normally consists of
a two stage formulation process comprising baseline estimate and mark-up. The
baseline estimate is combined with a mark-up to form the bid. Bidding strategy
is concerned with setting the mark-up level to a value that is likely to provide the
best pay-off.
As part of their bidding strategy, different bidders will have different degrees of
preference towards the individual contract characteristics such as size, type and
location. Those who are more selective concentrate on particular contract
characteristics such as type and size. Those who are less selective place less
emphasis on contract characteristics than on other factors such as w orkload or
resources available. Bidders who carefully select contracts for which they enter
serious bids may be regarded as 'market' or 'preference driven'. Those bidders
who place most emphasis on workload may be regarded as 'resource' or
'constraint driven'. These categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive
and some bidders may place equally high or low emphasis on market and resource
factors.
Bidding performance is concerned with the competitive relationships between bids
submitted to the client. Since a bid is an estimate of the (unknown) market price,
most bidders submitting a genuine bid are attempting to submit a bid which is low
enough to win the contract but high enough to make a profit. At the time of
submitting the bid the maximum level of competitiveness can be taken to be the
lowest bid. All other bids, in terms of competitiveness, are relative to the lowest
bid.
There appears to be a gap between theory and reality and bidding models do not
seem to be much used or considered outside research circles. It appears that the
failure, weaknesses and limitations of bid models stem from the complexities and
uncertainties inherent in the bid process itself. Part of the problem lies in the fact
that many factors, other than pure economic, are considered in bidding strategy
decisions. Much of bidding research is concerned with modelling bidding
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behaviour by considering competitiveness relationships. Competitiveness in
bidding can be modelled by analysing (1) entire bid distributions, (2)
competitiveness within bids and (3) competitiveness between bids.
This thesis focuses on the bidding performance of bidders by comparing
competitiveness relationships between bids. For most practical purposes it is
sufficient to consider bids in relation to a baseline. Baselines include the
designer's estimate, a bidder's baseline estimate, or the mean, median or lowest
of the bids entered for a contract. Of these measures the lowest bid appears to be
the best measure of competitiveness between bids, since when submitted the
lowest bid represents maximum competitiveness.
The approach to the methodology is to develop a particular study undertaken by
Flanagan and Norman (Flanagan and Norman 1982b). Data from tender reports
was collected from the Hong Kong Government on the basis of Flanagan and
Norman's study and divided into 5 contract types (ie. fire stations, police stations,
primary schools, secondary schools and hostels) according to the CUSfb
classification.
12.2 Replicating Flanagan and Norman's (1982b) study
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) compared the bidding performance of three
different UK contractors who were classified as being small, medium and large,
and labelled A, B and C respectively. In replicating Flanagan and Norman's study,
three Hong Kong bidders were selected according to Flanagan and Norman's
rationale and some similarities are found when comparing the bidding performance
of three Hong Kong contractors with three UK contractors.
UK bidder A, a small contractor only bid for one contract type, namely schools,
and was found to be very successful. By comparison none of the three Hong Kong
contractors restricted their bidding to just one type, although in terms of successes,
Hong Kong bidder A's only two successes are restricted to one type (ie. police
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station alteration contracts) while all eight of Hong Kong bidder B's (a medium
contractor) successes are for new works. Six of these are for primary school
contracts. This inclination towards schools by both a UK and Hong Kong
contractor may be due to the fact that Government schools are very similar in
design. It would seem, therefore, that experience is a key factor influencing
competitiveness. In contrast, Hong Kong's bidder C's (a large contractor) five
successes are spread over three contract types and are for contracts which are
diverse in size. Three successes are for new works contracts and the remaining two
for alteration contracts. This bidder, similar to UK bidder B, appears to show no
particular bidding trend. Unlike UK bidder C (a large contractor), none of the
three Hong Kong contractors appear to be more competitive on larger contracts.
Flanagan and Norman's conclusions on the bidding performance of bidders appear
to rest largely on the relationship between size of bidders and their success rates
relative to size and type of contract. Since success is a discrete variable and
success rates are based on a nominal scale, the distance between values in terms
of competitiveness, is not known. The bidding performances of the bidders is also
measured by expressing each competitors bid as a percentage of the bidders bid.
Using each bidder's bid as a baseline has a disadvantage when comparing the
bidding performance between bidders in that each bidders baseline is likely to be
different. Although this gives an overall picture of a contractor's bidding
performance it is difficult to observe and compare the relative degree of
competitiveness between each bidder.
12.3 Competitiveness and variability in bidding
Bidding performance analysis is concerned with the relationships between bids
entered by contractors in competition. As bidding performance is the product of
bidding for contracts of different types and sizes, a suitable comparative measure
is needed to reflect the competitiveness of bids between contracts.
In developing Flanagan and Norman's study a preferred alternative
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competitiveness measure is offered. Competitiveness (C) is measured by the ratio
of the lowest bid. Each bidder's mean competitiveness (C') is determined from a
series of past competitions. Bidding variability is measured using the standard
deviation (C"). Smaller standard deviations indicate smaller variability in bidding
(and, therefore, greater consistency) and vice versa.
In using this measure it is found that of the three Hong Kong contractors, bidder
B, appears to be the most competitive bidder and is least variable in bidding. In
contrast, bidder A is the least competitive and is also the most variable in bidding.
This suggests that there is a correlation between mean competitiveness C' and the
corresponding standard deviation C". It would seem logical to suggest that there
is a relationship between bidding competitiveness and variability in bidding since
a bidder who is consistently competitive is by definition less variable in bidding.
It follows that less competitive bidders are likely to be more variable in their
bidding otherwise they would fail to get any work. Conversely, a bidder who is
very competitive and highly variable in bidding would eventually become
bankrupt. Based on this logic, a four way classification system is proposed in
which bidders are classified (from a client's perspective) as Sensible (high C' and
low C" values), Suicidal (high C' and C" values), Non-serious (low C' and C"
values) and Silly (low C' and high C" values). Bidders are analysed according to
this classification system by initially comparing the bidding performance of
bidders over all five contract types and then according to each building type.
The most frequent bidders (ie. those who bid ten times or more in the sample), are
selected for analysis as it is considered that the results obtained would be more
representative of the bidders' bidding behaviour. The C' and C" values of this
subset of 75 bidders are found to have a strong negative correlation of -0.6290
(n=75, p=0.000). The significant correlation between competitiveness and
consistency leads to most bidders being classified as Sensible or Silly. More
extreme cases of Sensible and Silly bidders were found than in the Suicidal and
Non-serious categories, where bidders are not so clearly differentiated.
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The average success ratios for the four groups of bidders indicated that the
Suicidal bidders had the most success in winning contracts. This was followed,
as expected, by the Sensible, Silly, and Non-Serious groups. Analysis of the
Sensible group, identified bidders who are consistently Sensible (ie. unfocused cost
leaders) over all contract types, and bidders who are Sensible (ie. focused cost
leaders) over only some contract types. The latter group consists of specialists
whose competitiveness is likely to have been developed over a period. Specialists
are distinguished by their unequal distribution of successes across different
contract types. Specialists who had been successful more than once for a
particular contract type were found to exist for all the five contract types under
study. The position of these bidders in the Sensible quadrant suggested the
existence of an unfocused-focused continuum and this was used to identify further
unfocused bidders. Bidders classed as Suicidal were also thought to be focused
but, as implied by the class name, rather more risky in their bidding. Some
evidence of focusing was also found in the Non-Serious and Silly groups, but on
a much reduced scale.
Bidders who met with five or more successes for a particular contract type were
invariably classified as Sensible for that type. Bidders classified as Silly or Non-
Serious were, with one exception, restricted to one or two successes per contract
type. An interesting inference from this observation might be that those Sensible
bidders winning more than one contract for a particular type did so more by
judgement than luck. Silly bidders winning more than one contract for a particular
type, on the other hand, could be said to do so more by luck than judgement.
A major disadvantage of using this particular approach is that it does not account
for different size contractors bidding to different ranges of contract size. Since this
measure of competitiveness will produce greater ratio differences for smaller
contracts, it is likely to show smaller contractors to be less competitive than the
larger contractors and also more variable in their bidding simply because they are
more likely to have bid over a narrower range of contracts. One approach in
reducing this problem may be to divide the contracts up into different bands of
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contract sizes and recalculating the competitiveness of bidders according to each
contract size band. Eliminating this problem may be accomplished by modelling
the competitiveness of bidders using regression analysis with bidder size as the
continuous independent variable. One of the regression analysis assumptions is that
the independent variables have a constant variance. If this assumption is violated
the competitiveness model is required to be transformed in order to satisfy this
assumption.
12.4 The effect of contract type and contract size
When Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the competitiveness of three
bidders they found that when bidding (1) one bidder considered contract size and
type, (2) one bidder was more successful in bidding for large contracts and (3) one
bidder's competitiveness was not related to either contract type or size. Flanagan
and Norman's study suggests that competing contractors are influenced to varying
degrees by contract type and size.
To measure the effect of contract type and contract size on competitiveness in
bidding, 15 bidders were selected for analysis on the basis of most bidding
attempts and a suitable regression methodology developed. 22 candidate models
were proposed and the best model found using a forward chunkwise sequential
variable algorithm based on the F-test to determine the best model. Model 12 was
found to be the best model and the robustness of this model was tested extensively
before transforming the model to satisfy the regression assumptions. The best
model, transformed to satisfy the regression assumptions, was then also retested
against other transformed candidate models and was found still to be the best
model. The prediction equations were then estimated and the reliability of the
model tested by checking the coefficients and constructing 95% prediction
intervals around the prediction equations.
Although Flanagan and Norman's findings neatly link together the variables of
contract type and contract size, there is no indication of the relative effect of these
321
relationships. The regression model in this analysis not only shows this effect but
also provides a powerful technique for predicting competitiveness and testing the
reliability of the competitiveness predictions. The best model is found to be
statistically useful as indicated by the global F test statistics (F .05 = 13.55, p =
.0000, df= 21, 754) and adjusted R square statistic of 0.25369.
The analysis in this thesis clearly indicates that, in terms of competitiveness,
contract size is more influential than contract type. In other words, differences in
competitiveness are greater for different contract sizes than different contract
types. Evidence of this can be seen by reviewing the findings firstly in the
predictor selection process and secondly in the competitiveness predictions
themselves.
The selection of predictor variables is in two stages. A chunkwise approach was
used in the first stage to determine the best candidate model. In the second stage
backwards stepwise regression was used and the best model was refmed by
iterating the regression analysis on the last dummy variables of each contract type
and bidder to identify which contract types and bidders are not significantly
different from each other. Since a fundamental goal of model building is to find
the best prediction model containing the least number of variables, those contract
types and bidders that were found not to be significantly different were pooled
together in subsequent iterations.
The chunkwise approach eliminated the two principal bidder-contract type
interaction variables (ie. TB and STB). The deletion of these variables indicates
that the contract type-bidder interactions are less influential than the contract size-
contract type and contract size-bidder interactions (ie. ST and SB).
Backwards stepwise regression eliminated the insignificant variables remaining in
the equation. In using backwards stepwise regression and iterating the model on
the last dummy variable of each contract type it was found that bidders'
competitiveness did not differ significantly between fire stations and hostels and
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also between police stations and secondary schools. The original five contract
types were therefore grouped into the three significantly different competitiveness
groupings of (1) fire stations and hostels, (2) police stations and secondary schools
and (3) primary schools. It seems the formation of these groupings is primarily
influenced by the different means and distribution of contract sizes for each
contract type which appear to fall into three contract size bands. Primary schools
had the smallest mean bid value and standard deviation and in ascending rank
order this was followed by fire stations and hostels, police stations and secondary
schools.
Of the five contract types, competitiveness towards primary schools appeared to
differ the most. A major factor appears to be that the sample of primary schools
does not contain any large contracts and judging by the narrow distribution of bid
values seems to be highly standardised in terms of contract size. This apparent
standardisation has lead to an increase in bidders' competitiveness towards this
type when compared with other types. Bidders appear to be more competitive
toward police stations and secondary schools than fire station and hostel contracts.
The apparent difference may be explained by the fact that There are a greater
number of larger police station and secondary school contracts than fire station and
hostel contracts. This indicates that bidders are more competitive on larger
contracts than smaller contracts.
These findings indicate that bidders' competitiveness towards a contract type is
affected by (1) the degree of contract type standardisation and (2) the sizes of
contract contained within a contract type. The greater the degree of contract type
standardisation and also the larger the sizes of contract within a contract type, the
greater the likely competitiveness of bidders towards the contract type and vice
versa.
The three contract type groupings appear to be part of the same market sector
since it is the same bidders who have preferred contract sizes for the smaller
contracts in all groupings. It seems those bidders who have a preferred contract
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size range for larger contracts or are more competitive towards larger contracts do
not appear to be competitive toward primary schools simply because there are no
large contract sizes pertaining to this type. Perhaps it is not surprising to find that
contract size is more important than contract type in this analysis, since a Flanagan
and Norman criterion (Flanagan and Norman 1982b) was that the data was made
up of similar contract types.
Of the 15 bidders, eight were found to be significantly different in terms of
competitiveness. The notion that bidders have preferred size ranges at which they
are more competitive appears to hold as the shape of regression lines are mostly
the expected convex shape. The exceptions tend to be with bidders who are less
competitive. The effect of contract size on bidder's competitiveness varies
considerably between some bidders. The analysis shows that the competitiveness
of the 15 bidders can be classified into five distinct groupings:
(1) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size
range for smaller contracts (ie. bidders 52 and 96);
(2) bidders who, in terms of competitiveness, have a preferred contract size
range for larger contracts (ie. bidders 20, 24, 69, 119);
(3) bidders who are more competitive on the larger contracts (ie. bidders 71 and
142);
(4) bidders who are less competitive on larger contracts (ie. bidder 45);
(5) bidders whose competitiveness is largely unaffected by contract size (ie.
bidders 9, 18, 109, 122, 127 and 148);
The distinction between (3) and (4) is in the shape of the competitiveness curves
which are convex and concave respectively. A simplified representation of these
five competitiveness groupings is shown in Figure 12.1. With the exception of
bidder groupings (4) and (5), the shapes of the competitiveness lines are shown as
convex. This conforms to the notion that bidders have a preferred contact size at
which they are more competitive.
In addition to the 15 bidders, the bidding performances of five other bidders were
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also examined to see if other competitiveness groupings could be identified.
However, no new groupings could be identified.
CONTRACT SIZE (HK$ MILLIONS)
Figure 12.1:	 Simplified representation of competitiveness groupings
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) found in their study that one bidder was more
competitive on larger contracts while another bidder's competitiveness was largely
unaffected by contract size. Bidders displaying the same characteristics are found
in this analysis ie. in groups (3) and (5). In addition it can be seen that three new
competitiveness groupings are identified ie. (1), (2) and (4). The most competitive
bidders appear to be those who have preferred contract sizes, either for smaller or
larger contracts ie. those bidders who appear in groups (1) and (2).
Flanagan and Norman (1982b) also concluded that one of the bidders they
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analysed was influenced by both contract size and type. However, the relative
influence of contract size and type was not reported. The analysis in this thesis
indicates that contract size is more influential than contract type. A suggested
reason why contract type differences do not greatly influence competitiveness is
because all the five contract types are from the same market sector.
The results indicate that contractors, in terms of competitiveness, are influenced
to varying degrees by contract size and contract type. Although the 95% prediction
intervals reveal that the model is somewhat limited at predicting competitiveness,
the best model does, at least, give an indication of whether a bidder's
competitiveness is likely to be above, below or average in relation to other
bidders.
12.5 The effect of bidder size
When Flanagan and Norman (1982b) examined the bidding performance of a large
contractor they found that the large bidder was more successful in bidding for
large contracts. This suggests that there is a relationship between bidder size and
contract size.
The effect of bidder size on competitiveness can be measured using the same
regression analysis methodology as for individual bidders, except that bidders are
grouped according to size (ie. small, medium and large) and the size behaviour
observed. Since bidder size is a qualitative variable, a single prediction equation
for each bidder size can be found by creating a dummy variable for bidder size.
Flanagan and Norman measured bidder size according to area of operation. Given
that Hong Kong only comprises approximately 400 square miles it is not really
feasible to adopt this measure. Since Flanagan and Norman's rationale behind the
bidder size measure is that 'in most instances they would be tendering in project
value ranges' the measure of bidder size adopted in this analysis is based on the
Hong Kong Government classification system. Contractors are classified as small,
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medium and large. Although data on other bidder size classifications could have
been collected, it was decided to base this part of the analysis solely on the bidder
size classification according to Government criteria. The decision to do this was
influenced by the work of Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) who conclude that the
shift towards the high use of subcontracting within the construction industry means
there is no satisfactory measure of the size of firms. Since bidder sizes are known
for all bidders, the whole data set is included in the first part of this analysis.
The best model is found to be statistically useful as indicated by the global F test
statistics (F 05 = 8.35, p = .0000, df= 41, 2354) and adjusted R square statistic of
0.11. The chunkwise approach only eliminated the contract size - bidder
interaction variable (ie. SB). As only one of the interaction variables has been
deleted from the best model, this would tend to suggest that different size bidders
do not behave competitively in a similar way. Further evidence of this can be seen
by referring to the adjusted R square statistic which implies that only 11% of the
sample variation is attributable to, or explained by, the independent variable x.
The best model from the grouped bidder performance was compared with the
individual bidder performance to find the best overall competitiveness model. To
make the data sets identical for comparative purposes, the same 15 bidders were
grouped into small, medium and large and the best model found. It was perhaps
no surprise to find that the individual best model was substantially better than the
grouped best model.
The likely reason for the poor results of the grouped bidder model is that the
individual bidders contained within each bidder size group have different
performance patterns. Evidence of this can be seen in the previous section in
which it is shown that the individual bidders appear to fall into five distinct
competitiveness groupings. Another possible reason for the poor results may be
that the data set comprised contracts that were nearly all small to medium in size,
thereby restricting the competitiveness range of the large contractors.
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These results in this analysis therefore indicate that there is little difference in
terms of competitiveness between small, medium and large bidders and that a
better competitiveness model is obtained by analysing the competitiveness
according to individual bidding behaviour rather than that of grouped behaviour.
In other words, the results appear to be inconclusive in providing evidence that
large contractors are more competitive on larger contracts and vice versa.
12.6 Possible connotations for the construction industry
A fundamental goal of any bidding system is to obtain a competitive bid and
reveal the identity of the entity submitting the bid. It is contended that a bidding
system is operating at maximum efficiency when the optimal bid is found from the
optimal bidder under an optimal level of competition. The optimum bid has been
defined by Merna and Smith (1990) as 'the lowest priced evaluated bid which has
undergone a process of assessment to identify and, where necessary, to price the
consequences inherent in the submission'. The optimum bidder may be defined as
one who is not only capable of fulfilling clients' requirements a terms a( time,
quality and risk, but also in respect of cost is willing and able to submit a bid
lower than any competitor. The optimal level of competition may be taken to be
engaging the minimum number of bidders to obtain a genuine competitive bid.
Improving the efficiency of construction contract bidding systems essentially rests
with the clients and/or advisors of the construction industry as they set up the
competition which includes determining the number and identity of contractors.
It is usually assumed that the mere existence of a free market will automatically
ensure competitive bidding. As a result, large numbers of contractors are often
encouraged to enter bids to guarantee a fully competitive competition. The ideal
number of contractors for competition has been the subject of much debate. The
arguments for increasing the number of bidders include pressure from contractors
who want to be included on the tender lists to compete for work and the
assumption that the greater number of bidders, the higher the chances of obtaining
a low price. In addition, since many bids are predominantly made up of
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subcontractor quotations, to which the contractor adds an oncost, the actual cost
of preparing the bid is spread between the main contractor and subcontractors. The
counter argument is that bidding is expensive , time consuming and that there is
a quantifiable cost associated with every bid which will ultimately be recovered
from the construction industry clients. More specifically, procuring bids from too
many contractors is likely to result in contractors having (1) to make more bids
to reach target turnover, (2) higher bidding overheads, (3) less control over the
work they really want to undertake, (4) less accuracy in tender pricing and (5) a
greater chance of making an error of omission.
Conclusions reached from empirical research findings are that competitions
comprising four to five bidders will ensure a genuine competitive bid with the
addition in the number of contractors above four or five only having a marginal
impact on competitiveness. Rather than increasing the number of competitors,
Flanagan and Norman (1985) point out that improvement in information is
to be a more efficient method for increasing the competitiveness of bras. They
propose that one relatively costless method of improving the information base of
bidders can be accomplished by selecting contractors with experience of the
contract type.
The competitiveness models presented in this thesis may be used as part of a more
informed approach in selecting contractors for competition. It is suggested that
Flanagan and Norman's proposal can be taken a stage further by urging clients
and/or advisors to select contractors on the basis of likely competitiveness,
particularly toward type and size of contract. Information on contractor
competitiveness will enable the selection of contractors who are potentially more
competitive over those who are likely to be less competitive. This should alleviate
the need for clients to select such large numbers of contractors for competition,
thereby improving the efficiency of the whole bidding process.
'For example, UK contractors expend between 0.7 - 1.0% turnover in the
handling and preparation of tender documentation (Flanagan and Norman 1989).
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The competitiveness models can also be developed as part of a more systematic
approach in prequalifying contractors. Russell and Skibniewski (1988), for
example, propose a bidder selection model based on composite decision factors
such as references, financial stability, status of current work programme, technical
expertise and project specific criteria. This rationale is used to construct a
knowledge based system (Russell and Skibniewski 1990). Their model and
knowledge based system could be further developed by attempting to account for
a bidder's likely competitiveness since their is little point in selecting a bidder who
is unable to submit a competitive bid.
Contractors can use the competitiveness models in attempts to become more cost
efficient and so be in a better competitive position. For example, contractors may,
consider developing their strategic domain according to their competitiveness level.
Also if the information is available, undertake competitor analysis to determine the
likely competitiveness of rival contractors and identify key competitors. Such
information is likely to be useful to contractors in deciding which future contracts
to bid for and, if opting to bid, the bid level. In addition contractors may consider
using such competitiveness models in the selection of their subcontractors.
12.7 Suggestions for further research
Further research could be undertaken by refining the models or developing similar
models in related areas (Since the following number of suggestions is quite
extensive, for the sake of brevity this is shown in list form). The models presented
in this thesis could be refined by:
(1) adding one or more important variables (eg. market conditions or bidder's
workload) to the models;
(2) using different type or market sector groupings (eg. commercial, educational
and residential buildings and/or new and alteration work)2;
2A Flanagan and Norman (1982b) criterion was that the buildings were of a
similar building type. A better model might arise from a data set of dissimilar
types or market sectors.
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(3) using a wider range of contract sizes to explore further the notion that
bidders have preferred size ranges at which they are competitive;
(4) selecting bidders for analysis according to other bidding behaviour criteria,
for example, according to bidding strategy rather than on the basis of most
bidding attempts;
(5) modelling competitiveness in bidding using data collected from contractors
rather than from clients3;
(6) modelling competitiveness in bidding using data collected from a different
time frame;
(7) selecting only the serious bids and/or more competitive bidders for analysis;
(8) using competitiveness baselines other than lowest bid (eg. second lowest bid,
mean bid, cost estimate);
(9) using a non-chunicwise approach with which to model competitiveness;
(10) using other tests to examine violations of the regression assumptions;
(11) developing and using other approaches to correct regression assumption
violations;
(12) testing further the transformed versions of candidate models against the best
model;
(13) exploring further the weighted least squares approach;
(14) exploring other regression approaches to modelling competitiveness in
bidding (eg. generalised least squares, non-linear regression);
(15) exploring other approaches to modelling competitiveness (eg. other
multivariate methods, fuzzy set theory, neural nets).
Many of the research limitations can be identified in the above list. Work relating
to contract type and size could further be extended by modelling the competitive
behaviour of subcontractors within a main contractor's bid and also, perhaps, by
considering the competitive behaviour of contractors from an international and/or
3The data was collected for this analysis from Government tender reports.
Bidders' competitiveness is, therefore, only being assessed from the perspective
of a single client. Also no distinction is made between serious and non-serious
bids.
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joint venture perspective. So as to have a better understanding of the sequential
effect of competitiveness, McCaffer's longitudinal study (McCaffer 1976) on the
bidding behaviour of contractors according to contract type could also be extended
to take into account contract size.
Models based on similar methodology could also be developed using data
collected from a bidder to assess a bidder's competitive positioning relative to
rival bidders according to various types and sizes of contract. The competitiveness
relationship between cost estimate and bid can also be explored in an attempt to
determine which areas of the market are most profitable by using lowest bid/bid
ratio and lowest bid/cost estimate ratios. Models showing differences between the
lowest bid and cost estimate for a particular contract size could be analysed as part
of a more objective approach to determine mark-up levels for future competitions.
The notion that bidders have a range of preferred contract sizes arising from
possible economies of scale between contract size and bidder size has been
accounted for in the model by the inclusion of a quadratic term and bidder size has
been measured according to Hong Kong Government classification criteria. It
would be useful to explore this notion further by using a wider range of contract
sizes than that contained in this data set and analyzing the individual and grouped
competitive behaviour of bidders in terms of bidder size (eg. small, medium or
large), according to different measures of size (eg. turnover, number of employees
and market share).
The relationship between competitiveness in bidding and market share would also
be an interesting area to explore since market share and experience appear to be
directly related.
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APPENDIX A
Original data set (in chronological order)
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Record No. Rank Bid Pct.
(Cl/Sfb)
Type	 Bidder Size Date New/
Code	 Alt.
Alt.
Type
1145 1 1314658 0.00 374 52 2 8101 1 4
1146 2 1454463 10.63 374 99 2 8101 1 4
1147 3 1469140 11.75 374 118 1 8101 1 4
1148 4 1575984 19.88 374 139 1 8101 1 4
1149 5 1792079 36.32 374 114 2 8101 1 4
1541 1 6330507 0.00 712 84 2 8101 1 7
1542 2 6556127 3.56 712 52 2 8101 1 7
1543 3 6560000 3.63 712 40 2 8101 1 7
1544 4 6680000 5.52 712 175 2 8101 1 7
1545 5 6696733 5.79 712 136 2 8101 1 7
1546 6 6758000 6.75 712 126 2 8101 1 7
1547 7 6925304 9.40 712 119 3 8101 1 7
1548 8 6930960 9.49 712 68 2 8101 1 7
1549 9 6946080 9.72 712 20 2 8101 1 7
1550 10 7002435 10.61 712 79 2 8101 1 7
1551 11 7090806 12.01 712 127 2 8101 1 7
1552 12 7212313 13.93 712 170 1 8101 1 7
1553 13 7228054 14.18 712 69 3 8101 1 7
1554 14 7440006 17.53 712 43 2 8101 1 7
1555 15 7486245 18.26 712 138 2 8101 1 7
1556 16 7528221 18.92 712 149 2 8101 1 7
1557 17 7941634 25.45 712 37 2 8101 1 7
1558 18 8140353 28.59 712 156 2 8101 1 7
1559 19 9269428 46.42 712 91 3 8101 1 7
2061 1 12946707 0.00 713 140 3 8101 1 8
2062 2 13031884 0.66 713 148 3 8101 1 8
2063 3 15554426 20.14 713 150 3 8101 1 8
2064 4 18236878 40.86 713 24 3 8101 1 8
2644 1 13528825 0.00 848 8 3 8101 1 15
2645 2 13892691 2.69 848 148 3 8101 1 15
2646 3 14215874 5.08 848 124 3 8101 1 15
2647 4 14715007 8.77 848 51 3 8101 1 15
2648 5 14942379 10.45 848 105 3 8101 1 15
2649 6 15275364 12.91 848 28 3 8101 1 15
2650 7 15780610 16.64 848 24 3 8101 1 15
2651 8 17367764 28.38 848 150 3 8101 1 15
2652 9 19718357 45.75 848 135 3 8101 1 15
2653 1 18200082 0.00 848 150 3 8101 1 15
2654 2 20446649 12.34 848 119 3 8101 1 15
2655 3 20607788 13.23 848 69 3 8101 1 15
2656 4 21967257 20.70 848 24 3 8101 1 15
2657 5 21978549 20.76 848 109 3 8101 1 15
2658 6 22789799 25.22 848 146 3 8101 1 15
2659 7 23165511 27.28 848 51 3 8101 1 15
2660 8 26024567 42.99 848 148 3 8101 1 15
1523 1 6040829 0.00 712 149 2 8103 1 7
1524 2 6429670 6.44 712 141 2 8103 1 7
1525 3 6487647 7.40 712 96 2 8103 1 7
1526 4 6490000 1.44 112 40 2 8103 1 7
1527 5 6542417 8.30 712 136 2 8103 1 7
1528 6 6660190 10.25 712 52 2 8103 1 7
1529 7 6660787 10.26 712 126 2 8103 1 7
1530 8 6759157 11.89 712 48 1 8103 1 7
1531 9 6890364 14.06 712 127 2 8103 1 7
1532 10 7148228 18.33 712 119 3 8103 1 7
1533 11 7294641 20.76 712 79 2 8103 1 7
1534 12 7382801 22.22 712 143 3 8103 1 7
1535 13 7432734 23.04 712 175 2 8103 1 7
1536 14 7568023 25.28 712 68 2 8103 1 7
1537 15 7687510 27.26 712 157 3 8103 1 7
1538 16 7773323 28.68 712 104 2 8103 1 7
1539 17 8350085 38.23 712 99 2 8103 1 7
1540 18 13291675 120.03 712 50 2 8103 1 7
2065 1 10076427 0.00 713 119 3 8103 1 8
2066 2 11778530 16.89 713 148 3 8103 1 8
2067 3 12396568 23.03 713 140 3 8103 1 8
2068 4 12944163 28.46 713 24 3 8103 1 8
2069 1 17615000 0.00 713 162 3 8103 1 9
2070 2 19102148 8.44 713 119 3 8103 1 9
2071 3 19388000 10.07 713 46 3 8103 1 9
2072 4 23018244 30.67 713 140 3 8103 1 9
2073 5 23416342 32.93 713 51 3 8103 1 9
2074 6 23439573 33.07 713 124 3 8103 1 9
347
2075 7 23743836 34.79 713 28 3 8103 1 9
2076 8 24116962 36.91 713 148 3 8103 1 9
2077 9 24210255 37.44 713 24 3 8103 1 9
2661 1 3717109 0.00 848 96 2 8103 1 14
2662 2 4145166 11.52 848 149 2 8103 1 14
2663 3 4338000 16.70 848 40 2 8103 1 14
2664 4 4464930 20.12 848 138 2 8103 1 14
2665 5 4738181 27.47 848 143 3 8103 1 14
2666 6 4791888 28.91 848 118 1 8103 1 14
2667 7 4887348 31.48 848 68 2 8103 1 14
2668 8 4958545 33.40 848 126 2 8103 1 14
2669 9 4992050 34.30 848 136 2 8103 1 14
2670 10 5570788 49.87 848 43 2 8103 1 14
2671 11 5986328 61.05 848 79 2 8103 1 14
2672 12 6246654 68.05 848 45 2 8103 1 14
2673 13 7222361 94.30 848 15 2 8103 1 14
598 1 8697186 0.00 372 60 3 8104 1 3
599 2 9632319 10.75 372 148 3 8104 1 3
600 3 10156913 16.78 372 105 3 8104 1 3
601 4 11213972 28.94 372 140 3 8104 1 3
602 s 11276985 29.66 372 27 3 8104 1 3
1140 1 14220004 0.00 374 51 3 8104 1 5
1141 2 15177141 6.73 374 178 3 8104 1 5
1142 3 15402269 8.31 374 37 2 8104 1 5
1143 4 16173135 13.74 374 28 3 8104 1 5
1144 5 16367808 15.10 374 27 3 8104 1 5
2052 1 13280000 0.00 713 175 2 8104 1 8
2053 2 13997626 5.40 713 140 3 8104 1 8
2054 3 14388217 8.35 713 148 3 8104 1 8
2055 4 14692914 10.64 713 119 3 8104 1 8
2056 1 11881826 0.00 713 148 3 8104 1 8
2057 2 12394748 4.32 713 150 3 8104 1 8
2058 3 12602443 6.06 713 119 3 8104 1 8
2059 4 13274000 11.72 713 46 3 8104 1 8
2060 5 13291991 11.87 713 140 3 8104 1 8
2078 1 15818862 0.00 713 119 3 8104 1 8
2079 2 17316810 9.47 713 124 3 8104 1 8
2080 3 18293459 15.64 713 27 3 8104 1 8
2081 4 18971076 19.93 713 135 3 8104 1 8
2082 1 10772000 0.00 713 46 3 8104 1 8
2083 2 11072394 2.79 713 119 3 8104 1 8
2084 3 11770390 9.27 713 36 3 8104 1 8
2085 4 12547683 16.48 713 140 3 8104 1 8
2086 5 12578711 16.77 713 24 3 8104 1 8
2087 6 13354911 23.98 713 146 3 8104 1 8
2615 1 1302956 0.00 848 118 1 8104 1 14
2616 2 1451863 11.43 848 68 2 8104 1 14
2617 3 1508292 15.76 848 139 1 8104 1 14
2618 4 1530201 17.44 848 132 1 8104 1 14
2619 5 1720135 32.02 848 154 2 8104 1 14
2620 6 1837950 41.06 848 92 1 8104 1 14
2621 7 2121909 62.85 848 97 1 8104 1 14
2622 1 15276156 0.00 848 36 3 8104 1 15
2623 2 16101903 5.41 848 18 3 8104 1 15
2624 3 23405797 53.22 848 119 3 8104 1 15
2630 1 13713919 0.00 848 150 3 8104 1 15
2631 2 15284374 11.45 848 8 3 8104 1 15
2632 3 15567720 13.52 848 105 3 8104 1 15
2633 4 15583903 13.64 848 51 3 8104 1 15
2634 5 15642578 14.06 848 24 3 8104 1 15
2635 6 15808806 15.28 848 119 3 8104 1 15
2636 7 15976986 16.50 848 69 3 8104 1 15
2637 8 19498552 42.18 848 113 3 8104 1 15
2674 1 4195950 0.00 848 96 2 8104 2 14
2675 2 4354250 3.77 848 27 3 8104 2 14
2676 3 4396400 4.78 848 68 2 8104 2 14
2677 4 4501050 7.27 848 118 1 8104 2 14
2678 5 4610400 9.88 848 151 2 8104 2 14
2625 1 15139709 0.00 848 109 3 8105 1 15
2626 2 17448297 15.25 848 51 3 8105 1 15
2627 3 17454582 15.29 848 146 3 8105 1 15
2628 4 17999545 18.89 848 36 3 8105 1 15
2629 5 22218176 46.75 848 24 3 8105 1 15
1481 1 1696000 0.00 712 68 2 8106 2 7
1482 2 1870373 10.28 712 44 1 8106 2 7
1483 3 1885605 11.18 712 71 1 8106 2 7
1484 4 2152748 26.93 712 92 1 8106 2 7
348
1485 5 2354383 38.82 712 114 2 8106 2 7
1486 6 2792236 64.64 712 119 3 8106 2 7
1518 1 1106869 0.00 712 115 2 8106 2 7
1519 2 1154231 4.28 712 154 2 8106 2 7
1520 3 1505773 36.04 712 39 1 8106 2 7
1521 4 1610642 45.51 712 71 1 8106 2 7
1522 5 1709924 54.48 712 92 1 8106 2 7
2556 1 27896535 0.00 848 150 3 8107 1 15
2557 2 28393323 1.78 848 135 3 8107 1 15
2558 3 30893333 10.74 848 148 3 8107 1 15
2559 4 32533671 16.62 848 24 3 8107 1 15
2560 5 32863948 17.81 848 51 3 8107 1 15
2561 6 33048869 18.47 848 36 3 8107 1 15
2562 7 36956654 32.48 848 146 3 8107 1 15
2563 8 37143301 33.15 848 10 3 8107 1 15
2638 1 9616259 0.00 848 150 3 8107 1 13
2639 2 10419689 8.35 848 69 3 8107 1 13
2640 3 12383149 28.77 848 140 3 8107 1 13
2641 4 12856737 33.70 848 105 3 8107 1 13
2642 5 13423154 39.59 848 4 3 8107 1 13
2643 6 18184424 89.10 848 24 3 8107 1 13
2564 1 18836970 0.00 848 69 3 8108 1 14
2565 2 20242585 7.46 848 150 3 8108 1 14
2566 3 20877450 10.83 848 37 2 8108 1 14
2567 4 20951318 11.22 848 146 3 8108 1 14
2568 5 21122845 12.14 848 134 3 8108 1 14
2569 6 22449564 19.18 848 124 3 8108 1 14
2570 7 22784862 20.96 848 135 3 8108 1 14
2571 8 23369559 24.06 848 51 3 8108 1 14
2572 9 24496675 30.05 848 133 3 8108 1 14
2573 10 30099623 59.79 848 10 3 8108 1 14
2583 1 2755406 0.00 848 154 2 8108 1 15
2584 2 3036873 10.22 848 136 2 8108 1 15
2585 3 3386996 22.92 848 118 1 8108 1 15
2586 4 3522134 27.83 848 141 2 8108 1 15
2587 5 3628617 31.69 848 16 2 8108 1 15
2588 6 3865186 40.28 848 79 2 8108 1 15
2589 7 3970485 44.10 848 96 2 8108 1 15
2590 8 4975051 80.56 848 149 2 8108 1 15
2591 9 6458343 134.39 848 114 2 8108 1 15
2600 1 7147568 0.00 848 96 2 8108 1 14
2601 2 7663399 7.22 848 43 2 8108 1 14
2602 3 7772951 8.75 848 2 2 8108 1 14
2603 4 8055309 12.70 848 52 2 8108 1 14
2604 5 8089235 13.17 848 154 2 8108 1 14
2605 6 8428000 17.91 848 40 2 8108 1 14
2606 7 8682741 21.48 848 122 2 8108 1 14
2607 8 8842348 23.71 848 114 2 8108 1 14
2608 9 8954801 25.28 848 45 2 8108 1 14
2609 10 9126190 27.68 848 18 3 8108 1 14
2610 11 9287699 29.94 848 68 2 8108 1 14
2611 12 9390499 31.38 848 175 2 8108 1 14
2612 13 9411115 31.67 848 136 2 8108 1 14
2613 14 9552049 33.64 848 99 2 8108 1 14
2614 15 10481303 46.64 848 20 2 8108 1 14
2574 1 3351110 0.00 848 20 2 8109 2 13
2575 2 3478896 3.81 848 65 3 8109 2 13
2576 3 3522194 5.11 848 7 3 8109 .	 2 13
2577 4 3668411 9.47 848 51 3 8109 2 13
2578 5 4204091 25.45 848 148 3 8109 2 13
2579 6 5149581 53.67 848 27 3 8109 2 13
2580 7 6037279 80.16 848 105 3 8109 2 13
2581 8 6445689 92.34 848 43 2 8109 2 13
2582 9 8336021 148.75 848 61 2 8109 2 13
2592 1 4750072 0.00 848 122 2 8109 1 14
2593 2 5292761 11.42 848 68 2 8109 1 14
2594 3 5948965 25.24 848 114 2 8109 1 14
2595 4 6101023 28.44 848 18 3 8109 1 14
2596 5 6422309 35.20 848 154 2 8109 1 14
2597 6 7146029 50.44 848 102 2 8109 1 14
2598 7 9101486 91.61 848 45 2 8109 1 14
2599 8 13626269 186.86 848 10 3 8109 1 14
588 1 4231921 0.00 372 68 2 8110 1 3
589 2 4702131 11.11 372 71 1 8110 1 3
590 3 4928000 16.45 372 40 2 8110 1 3
591 4 5083894 20.13 372 51 3 8110 1 3
592 5 5214108 23.21 372 141 2 8110 1 3
349
593 6 5250228 24.06 372 61 2 8110 1 3
594 7 5311746 25.52 372 84 2 8110 1 3
595 8 5620172 32.80 372 94 2 8110 1 3
596 9 5641235 33.30 372 20 2 8110 1 3
597 10 7099899 67.77 372 114 2 8110 1 3
1133 1 23698205 0.00 374 27 3 8110 1 5
1134 2 24012625 1.33 374 178 3 8110 1 5
1135 3 24682413 4.15 374 36 3 8110 1 5
1136 4 25331010 6.89 374 133 3 8110 1 5
1137 5 26008849 9.75 374 51 3 8110 1 5
1138 6 26109513 10.18 374 148 3 8110 1 5
1139 7 29998861 26.59 374 24 3 8110 1 5
1487 1 647042 0.00 712 6 1 8110 2 7
1488 2 671762 3.82 712 71 1 8110 2 7
1489 3 720638 11.37 712 179 1 8110 2 7
1490 4 730000 12.82 712 175 2 8110 2 7
1491 5 749000 15.76 712 68 2 8110 2 7
1492 6 767411 18.60 712 38 1 8110 2 7
1493 7 785295 21.37 712 64 1 8110 2 7
1494 8 787323 21.68 712 190 1 8110 2 7
1495 9 834686 29.00 712 21 1 8110 2 7
1496 10 844740 30.55 712 17 1 8110 2 7
1497 11 867300 34.04 712 95 1 8110 2 7
1498 12 878203 35.73 712 39 1 8110 2 7
1499 13 975395 50.75 712 154 2 8110 2 7
1500 14 975461 50.76 712 114 2 8110 2 7
1501 15 987000 52.54 712 130 1 8110 2 7
1502 16 1047941 61.96 712 103 1 8110 2 7
1503 17 1118960 72.93 712 92 1 8110 2 7
1504 18 1316774 103.51 712 18 3 8110 2 7
2545 1 12286672 0.00 848 134 3 8112 1 15
2546 2 13648765 11.09 848 28 3 8112 1 15
2547 3 13895260 13.09 848 119 3 8112 1 15
2548 4 15260701 24.21 848 140 3 8112 1 15
2549 5 16019420 30.38 848 36 3 8112 1 15
2550 6 16671040 35.68 848 51 3 8112 1 15
2551 7 17539554 42.75 848 124 3 8112 1 15
2552 8 18337628 49.25 848 27 3 8112 1 15
2553 9 27641954 124.98 848 105 3 8112 1 15
2554 10 28731955 133.85 848 24 3 8112 1 15
2555 11 29164129 137.36 848 123 3 8112 1 15
1452 1 531110 0.00 712 48 1 8201 2 7
1453 2 644980 21.44 712 6 1 8201 2 7
1454 3 897000 68.89 712 71 1 8201 2 7
1455 4 898935 69.26 712 92 1 8201 2 7
1456 5 899253 69.32 712 114 2 8201 2 7
1457 6 986080 85.66 712 152 3 8201 2 7
1458 7 1018103 91.69 712 64 1 8201 2 7
1459 8 1366300 157.25 712 68 2 8201 2 7
1460 9 1607452 202.66 712 139 1 8201 2 7
2443 1 8197816 0.00 848 68 2 8201 1 14
2444 2 8260000 0.76 848 40 2 8201 1 14
2445 3 8394885 2.40 848 154 2 8201 1 14
2446 4 8538270 4.15 848 9 2 8201 1 14
2447 5 8583424 4.70 848 20 2 8201 1 14
2448 6 8777700 7.07 848 49 2 8201 1 14
2449 7 8800000 7.35 848 175 2 8201 1 14
2450 8 8847171 7.92 848 96 2 8201 1 14
2451 9 9816649 19.75 848 138 2 8201 1 14
2452 10 9855315 20.22 848 114 2 8201 1 14
2453 11 10162754 23.97 848 150 3 8201 1 14
2454 12 10215056 24.61 848 18 3 8201 1 14
2455 13 10602218 29.33 848 149 2 8201 1 14
630 1 1221776 0.00 374 100 1 8202 2 5
631 2 1294470 5.95 374 75 2 8202 2 5
632 3 1307088 6.98 374 71 1 8202 2 5
633 4 1467225 20.09 374 38 1 8202 2 5
634 5 1473129 20.57 374 141 2 8202 2 5
635 6 1680000 37.50 374 68 2 8202 2 5
636 7 1744370 42.77 374 64 1 8202 2 5
2408 1 2005544 0.00 848 45 2 8203 2 14
2409 2 2225587 10.97 848 114 2 8203 2 14
2410 3 2246979 12.04 848 119 3 8203 2 14
2411 4 2272190 13.30 848 99 2 8203 2 14
2412 5 2347134 17.03 848 109 3 8203 2 14
2413 6 2572816 28.29 848 68 2 8203 2 14
2414 7 2611879 30.23 848 149 2 8203 2 14
350
2415 8 2630588 31.17 848 52 2 8203 2 14
2416 9 2666680 32.97 848 96 2 8203 2 14
2417 10 2926000 45.90 848 40 2 8203 2 14
2418 11 3337394 66.41 848 141 2 8203 2 14
2419 1 5131914 0.00 848 96 2 8204 1 14
2420 2 5288300 3.05 848 52 2 8204 1 14
2421 3 5320615 3.68 848 79 2 8204 1 14
2422 4 5328953 3.84 848 45 2 8204 1 14
2423 5 5830414 13.61 848 140 3 8204 1 14
2424 6 5932795 15.61 848 141 2 8204 1 14
2425 7 5966975 16.27 848 119 3 8204 1 14
2426 8 6090437 18.68 848 148 3 8204 1 14
2427 9 6116288 19.18 848 135 3 8204 1 14
2428 10 6130000 19.45 848 174 2 8204 1 14
2429 11 6321066 23.17 848 126 3 8204 1 14
2430 12 8197953 59.74 848 142 3 8204 1 14
2431 1 1603050 0.00 848 96 2 8205 2 14
2432 2 1649460 2.90 848 7 3 8205 2 14
2433 3 1702500 6.20 848 118 2 8205 2 14
2434 4 1827150 13.98 848 52 2 8205 2 14
2435 5 1842050 14.91 848 41 2 8205 2 14
2436 6 1850750 15.45 848 20 2 8205 2 14
2437 7 1921900 19.89 848 64 1 8205 2 14
2438 8 1927240 20.22 848 48 1 8205 2 14
2439 9 1928050 20.27 848 68 2 8205 2 14
2440 10 2099800 30.99 848 97 1 8205 2 14
2441 11 2325860 45.09 848 92 1 8205 2 14
2442 12 2515500 56.92 848 45 2 8205 2 14
2362 1 22869278 0.00 848 119 3 8206 2 15
2363 2 24036083 5.10 848 135 3 8206 2 15
2364 3 24998835 9.31 848 10 3 8206 2 15
2365 4 25222351 10.29 848 52 2 8206 2 15
2366 5 26347311 15.21 848 150 3 8206 2 15
2367 6 26655452 16.56 848 140 3 8206 2 15
2368 7 27239992 19.11 848 65 3 8206 2 15
2369 8 27885649 21.93 848 133 3 8206 2 15
2370 9 28228484 23.43 848 142 3 8206 2 15
2371 10 28444471 24.38 848 60 3 8206 2 15
2372 11 28585018 24.99 848 8 3 8206 2 15
2373 12 31889467 39.44 848 105 3 8206 2 15
2374 1 3097997 0.00 848 7 3 8207 2 13
2375 2 3321374 7.21 848 178 3 8207 2 13
2376 3 3584591 15.71 848 148 3 8207 2 13
2377 4 3598044 16.14 848 154 2 8207 2 13
2378 5 4748962 53.29 848 122 2 8207 2 13
2379 6 4851571 56.60 848 65 3 8207 2 13
2380 7 5321297 71.77 848 24 3 8207 2 13
2381 1 1177887 0.00 713 118 2 8208 2 8
2382 2 1194127 1.38 713 48 1 8208 2 8
2383 3 1234424 4.80 713 21 1 8208 2 8
2384 4 1279476 8.62 713 99 2 8208 2 8
2385 5 1292423 9.72 713 136 2 8208 2 8
2386 6 1299482 10.32 713 87 1 8208 2 8
2387 7 1370335 16.34 713 64 1 8208 2 8
2388 8 1378999 17.07 713 92 1 8208 2 8
2389 9 1415651 20.19 713 44 2 8208 2 8
2390 10 1459764 23.93 713 55 1 8208 2 8
2391 11 1524780 29.45 713 45 2 8208 2 8
2392 1 2480000 0.00 848 68 2 8208 1 14
2393 2 2492650 0.51 848 2 2 8208 1 14
2394 3 2552885 2.94 848 136 2 8208 1 14
2395 4 2617453 5.54 848 175 2 8208 1 14
2396 5 2619393 5.62 848 118 2 8208 1 14
2397 6 2716000 9.52 848 40 2 8208 1 14
2398 7 2781141 12.14 848 154 2 8208 1 14
2399 8 2832413 14.21 848 149 2 8208 1 14
2400 9 2867476 15.62 848 142 3 8208 1 14
2401 10 2929572 18.13 848 9 2 8208 1 14
2402 11 2931185 18.19 848 52 2 8208 1 14
2403 12 3013968 21.53 848 153 2 8208 1 14
2404 13 3014459 21.55 848 99 2 8208 1 14
2405 14 3119060 25.77 848 96 2 8208 1 14
2406 15 3433445 38.45 848 45 2 8208 1 14
2407 16 3505923 41.37 848 84 2 8208 1 14
652 1 14774821 0.00 374 65 3 8209 1 5
653 2 15533536 5.14 374 148 3 8209 1 5
654 3 15978752 8.15 374 150 3 8209 1 5
351
655 4 15989324 8.22 374 60 3 8209 1 5
656 5 16512000 11.76 374 98 3 8209 1 5
657 6 16568476 12.14 374 140 3 8209 1 5
658 7 16875594 14.22 374 69 3 8209 1 5
659 8 16966031 14.83 374 134 3 8209 1 5
660 9 17000000 15.06 374 88 3 8209 1 5
661 10 17198834 16.41 374 143 3 8209 1 5
662 11 17257666 16.80 374 126 3 8209 1 5
663 12 17388717 17.69 374 27 3 8209 1 5
664 13 17413372 17.86 374 105 3 8209 1 5
665 14 17465605 18.21 374 24 3 8209 1 5
666 15 17472388 18.26 374 121 3 8209 1 5
667 16 17548714 18.77 374 8 3 8209 1 5
668 17 18108918 22.57 374 119 3 8209 1 5
669 18 20264897 37.16 374 124 3 8209 1 5
670 19 21822165 47.70 374 36 3 8209 1 5
942 1 13883359 0.00 374 148 3 8209 1 5
943 2 14620120 5.31 374 98 3 8209 1 5
944 3 14772029 6.40 374 65 3 8209 1 5
945 4 14999510 8.04 374 69 3 8209 1 5
946 5 15128908 8.97 374 134 3 8209 1 5
947 6 15131236 8.99 374 36 3 8209 1 5
948 7 15424329 11.10 374 150 3 8209 1 5
949 8 15873820 14.34 374 119 3 8209 1 5
950 9 16065000 15.71 374 88 3 8209 1 5
951 10 16117398 16.09 374 60 3 8209 1 5
952 11 16183889 16.57 374 121 3 8209 1 5
953 12 16293163 17.36 374 140 3 8209 1 5
954 13 16385425 18.02 374 37 2 8209 1 5
955 14 16508482 18.91 374 10 3 8209 1 5
956 15 16873856 21.54 374 8 3 8209 1 5
957 16 16980732 22.31 374 169 3 8209 1 5
958 17 17011830 22.53 374 109 3 8209 1 5
959 18 17042993 22.76 374 24 3 8209 1 5
960 19 17118361 23.30 374 105 3 8209 1 5
961 20 17437917 25.60 374 142 3 8209 1 5
962 21 17498200 26.04 374 27 3 8209 1 5
963 22 17782946 28.09 374 126 3 8209 1 5
614 1 18450182 0.00 374 150 3 8210 1 5
615 2 18715000 1.44 374 98 3 8210 1 5
616 3 20348146 10.29 374 69 3 8210 1 5
617 4 20351568 10.31 374 65 3 8210 1 5
618 5 21019122 13.92 374 142 3 8210 1 5
619 6 21372485 15.84 374 140 3 8210 1 5
620 7 21417415 16.08 374 126 3 8210 1 5
621 8 21960473 19.03 374 148 3 8210 1 5
622 9 22815892 23.66 374 109 3 8210 1 5
623 10 23356548 26.59 374 105 3 8210 1 5
624 11 24548164 33.05 374 113 3 8210 1 5
625 12 25473706 38.07 374 135 3 8210 1 5
626 13 25698496 39.29 374 60 3 8210 1 5
627 14 26147576 41.72 374 24 3 8210 1 5
628 15 26198612 42.00 374 27 3 8210 1 5
629 16 26802058 45.27 374 10 3 8210 1 5
1739 1 5660338 0.00 713 136 2 8211 2 8
1740 2 6026740 6.47 713 122 2 8211 2 8
1741 3 6082914 7.47 713 141 2 8211 2 8
1742 4 6182257 9.22 713 79 2 8211 2 8
1743 5 6188120 9.32 713 16 2 8211 2 8
1744 6 6247476 10.37 713 142 3 8211 2 8
1745 7 6247912 10.38 713 68 2 8211 2 8
1746 8 6336029 11.94 713 127 2 8211 2 8
1747 9 6362610 12.41 713 9 2 8211 2 8
1748 10 6380607 12.72 713 154 2 8211 2 8
1749 11 6580584 16.26 713 2 2 8211 2 8
1750 12 6717451 18.68 713 77 2 8211 2 8
1751 13 6797132 20.08 713 60 3 8211 2 8
1752 14 6860578 21.20 713 149 2 8211 2 8
1753 15 6942560 22.65 713 69 3 8211 2 8
1754 16 7280772 28.63 713 45 2 8211 2 8
1755 17 7296924 28.91 713 119 3 8211 2 8
1756 18 7329288 29.48 713 43 2 8211 2 8
1757 19 7457382 31.75 713 18 3 8211 2 8
2292 1 4594950 0.00 848 7 3 8211 2 14
2293 2 4910740 6.87 848 96 2 8211 2 14
2294 3 4928720 7.26 848 118 2 8211 2 14
2295 4 4974320 8.26 848 18 3 8211 2 14
352
2296 5 5079310 10.54 848 109 3 8211 2 14
2297 6 5090380 10.78 848 68 2 8211 2 14
2298 7 5117070 11.36 848 142 3 8211 2 14
2299 8 5263630 14.55 848 122 2 8211 2 14
2300 9 5368730 16.84 848 119 3 8211 2 14
2301 10 5376320 17.00 848 20 2 8211 2 14
2302 11 5697230 23.99 848 45 2 8211 2 14
2303 12 6160540 34.07 848 2 2 8211 2 14
1700 1 18400910 0.00 713 150 3 8212 1 9
1701 2 18905843 2.74 713 42 3 8212 1 9
1702 3 19033169 3.44 713 65 3 8212 1 9
1703 4 19233724 4.53 713 109 3 8212 1 9
1704 5 19328278 5.04 713 133 3 8212 1 9
1705 6 19374519 5.29 713 105 3 8212 1 9
1706 7 19419610 5.54 713 142 3 8212 1 9
1707 a 19453819 5.72 713 121 3 8212 1 9
1708 9 19460493 5.76 713 126 3 8212 1 9
1709 10 19504340 6.00 713 119 3 8212 1 9
1710 11 19556564 6.28 713 69 3 8212 1 9
1711 12 20090023 9.18 713 10 3 8212 1 9
1712 13 20735295 12.69 713 148 3 8212 1 9
1713 14 20750516 12.77 713 152 3 8212 1 9
1714 15 21123764 14.80 713 60 3 8212 1 9
1715 16 21898598 19.01 713 140 3 8212 1 9
1716 17 22037454 19.76 713 134 3 8212 1 9
1717 18 22180276 20.54 713 124 3 8212 1 9
1718 19 22786833 23.84 713 117 3 8212 1 9
1719 20 22888574 24.39 713 27 3 8212 1 9
1720 21 23449022 27.43 713 4 3 8212 1 9
1721 22 27180235 47.71 713 89 3 8212 1 9
2304 1 2598790 0.00 848 141 2 8212 1 14
2305 2 2778020 6.90 848 7 3 8212 1 14
2306 3 2881990 10.90 848 45 2 8212 1 14
2307 4 2894190 11.37 848 96 2 8212 1 14
2308 5 2958300 13.83 848 27 3 8212 1 14
2309 6 2975280 14.49 848 68 2 8212 1 14
2310 7 3074770 18.32 848 52 2 8212 1 14
2311 8 3074790 18.32 848 119 3 8212 1 14
2312 9 3096900 19.17 848 142 3 8212 1 14
2313 10 3109980 19.67 848 43 2 8212 1 14
2314 11 3111820 19.74 848 20 2 8212 1 14
2315 12 3130150 20.45 848 109 3 8212 1 14
2316 13 3308140 27.30 848 16 2 8212 1 14
2317 14 3315650 27.58 848 2 2 8212 1 14
2318 15 3400620 30.85 848 122 2 8212 1 14
2319 16 3844750 47.94 848 150 3 8212 1 14
2320 1 46032537 0.00 848 69 3 8301 1 15
2321 2 46118929 0.19 848 36 3 8301 1 15
2322 3 47889386 4.03 848 119 3 8301 1 15
2323 4 49429577 7.38 848 7 3 8301 1 15
2324 5 49983171 8.58 848 33 3 8301 1 15
2325 6 50529984 9.77 848 117 3 8301 1 15
2326 7 50571184 9.86 848 10 3 8301 1 15
2327 8 50848277 10.46 848 109 3 8301 1 15
2328 9 51424102 11.71 848 105 3 8301 1 15
2329 10 51999670 12.96 848 134 3 8301 1 15
2330 11 52203675 13.41 848 178 3 8301 1 15
2331 12 52703601 14.49 848 150 3 8301 1 15
2332 13 55213832 19.95 848 140 3 13301 1 15
2333 14 56881073 23.57 848 148 3 8301 1 15
2334 1 4148621 0.00 848 141 2 8301 2 14
2335 2 4300370 3.66 848 2 2 8301 2 14
2336 3 4316699 4.05 848 109 3 8301 2 14
2337 4 4476826 7.91 848 119 3 8301 2 14
2338 5 4780000 15.22 848 68 2 8301 2 14
2339 6 4966231 19.71 848 20 2 8301 2 14
2340 7 4989088 20.26 848 16 2 8301 2 14
2341 8 5142526 23.96 848 7 3 8301 2 14
2342 9 5215572 25.72 848 122 2 8301 2 14
2343 10 5356483 29.11 848 127 2 8301 2 14
2344 11 5389747 29.92 848 45 2 8301 2 14
2345 12 5483155 32.17 848 52 2 8301 2 14
2346 13 5484983 32.21 848 142 3 8301 2 14
2347 14 6165494 48.62 848 115 2 8301 2 14
2348 15 6452752 55.54 848 92 2 8301 2 14
2349 16 8307750 100.25 848 61 2 8301 2 14
1652 1 9583643 0.00 713 16 2 8302 1 8
353
1653 2 10346623 7.96 713 152 3 8302 1 8
1654 3 10679691 11.44 713 154 2 8302 1 8
1655 4 10734753 12.01 713 52 2 8302 1 8
1656 5 10876064 13.49 713 96 2 8302 1 8
1657 6 10931583 14.07 713 84 2 8302 1 8
1658 7 10972776 14.49 713 115 2 8302 1 8
1659 8 11073768 15.55 713 150 3 8302 1 8
1660 9 11173281 16.59 713 9 2 8302 1 8
1661 10 11273428 17.63 713 22 2 8302 1 8
1662 11 11277697 17.68 713 49 2 8302 1 8
1663 12 11422445 19.19 713 69 3 8302 1 8
1664 13 11741758 22.52 713 109 3 8302 1 8
1665 14 11851814 23.67 713 122 2 8302 1 8
1666 15 11927780 24.46 713 153 2 8302 1 8
1667 16 12060000 25.84 713 40 2 8302 1 8
1668 17 12080356 26.05 713 10 3 8302 1 8
1669 18 12121400 26.48 713 104 2 8302 1 8
1670 19 12685364 32.36 713 142 3 8302 1 8
1671 20 12841437 33.99 713 68 2 8302 1 8
1672 21 13168170 37.40 713 99 2 8302 1 8
1673 22 13270992 38.48 713 61 2 8302 1 8
1674 23 13309448 38.88 713 60 3 8302 1 8
1675 24 13364549 39.45 713 149 2 8302 1 8
1676 25 13583919 41.74 713 127 2 8302 1 8
1677 26 14600791 52.35 713 143 3 8302 1 8
1678 27 15215105 58.76 713 45 2 8302 1 8
1679 28 15714677 63.97 713 92 2 8302 1 8
1680 29 17131187 78.75 713 19 2 8302 1 8
1560 1 9993758 0.00 713 84 2 8303 1 8
1561 2 9995001 0.01 713 104 2 8303 1 8
1562 3 10053937 0.60 713 115 2 8303 1 8
1563 4 10058785 0.65 713 152 3 8303 1 8
1564 5 10195714 2.02 713 141 2 8303 1 8
1565 6 10215562 2.22 713 96 2 8303 1 8
1566 7 10310000 3.16 713 40 2 8303 1 8
1567 8 10406225 4.13 713 52 2 8303 1 8
1568 9 10475459 4.82 713 9 2 8303 1 8
1569 10 10512330 5.19 713 154 2 8303 1 8
1570 11 10647946 6.55 713 150 3 8303 1 8
1571 12 10830436 8.37 713 99 2 8303 1 8
1572 13 10868370 8.75 713 77 2 8303 1 8
1573 14 11183164 11.90 713 119 3 8303 1 8
1574 15 11311111 13.18 713 109 3 8303 1 8
1575 16 11481091 14.88 713 143 3 8303 1 8
1576 17 11625556 16.33 713 20 2 8303 1 8
1577 18 11740083 17.47 713 122 2 8303 1 8
1578 19 11755861 17.63 713 127 2 8303 1 8
1579 20 12197231 22.05 713 92 2 8303 1 8
1580 21 12387017 23.95 713 10 3 8303 1 8
1581 22 13813847 38.22 713 43 2 8303 1 8
1582 1 9674741 0.00 713 84 2 8303 1 8
1583 2 9677712 0.03 713 152 3 8303 1 8
1584 3 9867962 2.00 713 115 2 8303 1 8
1585 4 9878007 2.10 713 104 2 8303 1 8
1586 5 9885876 2.18 713 154 2 8303 1 8
1587 6 9896000 2.29 713 40 2 8303 1 8
1588 7 9949871 2.84 713 99 2 8303 1 8
1589 8 10097424 4.37 713 96 2 8303 1 8
1590 9 10127565 4.68 713 9 2 8303 1 8
1591 10 10204580 5.48 713 69 3 8303 1 8
1592 11 10309509 6.56 713 133 3 8303 1 8
1593 12 10592949 9.49 713 49 2 8303 1 8
1594 13 10686676 10.46 713 77 2 8303 1 8
1595 14 10800000 11.63 713 59 2 8303 1 8
1596 15 10835903 12.00 713 109 3 8303 1 8
1597 16 10837641 12.02 713 150 3 8303 1 8
1598 17 10859917 12.25 713 122 2 8303 1 8
1599 18 10919138 12.86 713 10 3 8303 1 8
1600 19 11245573 16.24 713 20 2 8303 1 8
1601 20 11585937 19.75 713 149 2 8303 1 8
1602 21 11802027 21.99 713 52 2 8303 1 8
1603 22 11913619 23.14 713 94 2 8303 1 8
1604 23 12201661 26.12 713 92 2 8303 1 8
1605 24 12437983 28.56 713 127 2 8303 1 8
1606 25 12706402 31.34 713 143 3 8303 1 8
1607 26 12922819 33.57 713 75 2 8303 1 8
1608 27 13646689 41.05 713 43 2 8303 1 8
354
1609 28 13735201 41.97 713 61 2 8303 1 8
1610 29 14800773 52.98 713 95 2 8303 1 8
1611 30 16473165 70.27 713 19 2 8303 1 8
2350 1 1650441 0.00 848 118 2 8303 2 14
2351 2 1954091 18.40 848 141 2 8303 2 14
2352 3 2029227 22.95 848 109 3 8303 2 14
2353 4 2124126 28.70 848 145 1 8303 2 14
2354 5 2157955 30.75 848 2 2 8303 2 14
2355 6 2170554 31.51 848 52 2 8303 2 14
2356 7 2186430 32.48 848 45 2 8303 2 14
2357 8 2240410 35.75 848 119 3 8303 2 14
2358 9 2360112 43.00 848 122 2 8303 2 14
2359 10 2582254 56.46 848 25 1 8303 2 14
2360 11 2663179 61.36 848 142 3 8303 2 14
2361 12 2732720 65.58 848 55 1 8303 2 14
234 1 4265195 0.00 372 99 2 8304 1 3
235 2 4498885 5.48 372 102 2 8304 1 3
236 3 4519497 5.96 372 79 2 8304 1 3
237 4 4523800 6.06 372 68 2 8304 1 3
238 5 4608316 8.04 372 122 2 8304 1 3
239 6 4630552 8.57 372 10 3 8304 1 3
240 7 4653078 9.09 372 115 2 8304 1 3
241 8 4665806 9.39 372 9 2 8304 1 3
242 9 4689544 9.95 372 152 3 8304 1 3
243 10 4741767 11.17 372 138 2 8304 1 3
244 11 4757616 11.55 372 49 2 8304 1 3
245 12 4773623 11.92 372 2 2 8304 1 3
246 13 4790202 12.31 372 20 2 8304 1 3
247 14 4844205 13.58 372 77 2 8304 1 3
248 15 4851000 13.73 372 40 2 8304 1 3
249 16 4871748 14.22 372 150 3 8304 1 3
250 17 4904605 14.99 372 95 2 8304 1 3
251 18 4982984 16.83 372 154 2 8304 1 3
252 19 5012784 17.53 372 118 2 8304 1 3
253 20 5031745 17.97 372 127 2 8304 1 3
254 21 5045289 18.29 372 52 2 8304 1 3
255 22 5132056 20.32 372 61 2 8304 1 3
256 23 5195094 21.80 372 112 2 8304 1 3
257 24 5224274 22.49 372 149 2 8304 1 3
258 25 5289183 24.01 372 69 3 8304 1 3
259 26 5295793 24.16 372 141 2 8304 1 3
260 27 5359923 25.67 372 30 2 8304 1 3
261 28 5486549 28.64 372 92 2 8304 1 3
262 29 5554851 30.24 372 45 2 8304 1 3
263 30 5593564 31.14 372 60 3 8304 1 3
264 31 6579684 54.26 372 91 3 8304 1 3
265 32 7083087 66.07 372 43 2 8304 1 3
266 33 8759625 105.37 372 123 3 8304 1 3
1612 1 10327335 0.00 713 152 3 8305 1 8
1613 2 10639991 3.03 713 9 2 8305 1 8
1614 3 10947699 6.01 713 149 2 8305 1 8
1615 4 10958556 6.11 713 49 2 8305 1 8
1616 5 11267000 9.10 713 40 2 8305 1 8
1617 6 11285987 9.28 713 69 3 8305 1 8
1618 7 11328064 9.69 713 150 3 8305 1 8
1619 8 11468127 11.05 713 104 2 8305 1 8
1620 9 11484180 11.20 713 154 2 8305 1 8
1621 10 11485288 11.21 713 122 2 8305 1 8
1622 11 11680299 13.10 713 2 2 8305 1 8
1623 12 12001524 16.21 713 115 2 8305 1 8
1624 13 12116285 17.32 713 79 2 8305 1 8
1625 14 12296999 19.07 713 99 2 8305 1 8
1626 15 12546525 21.49 713 153 2 8305 1 8
1627 16 12584463 21.86 713 77 2 8305 1 8
1628 17 12748039 23.44 713 20 2 8305 1 8
1629 18 13135534 27.19 713 61 2 8305 1 8
1630 19 13549001 31.20 713 142 3 8305 1 8
1631 20 13814636 33.77 713 89 3 8305 1 8
1632 21 13992446 35.49 713 45 2 8305 1 8
1633 22 14650447 41.86 713 118 2 8305 1 8
1634 23 15380106 48.93 713 30 2 8305 1 8
286 1 4632255 0.00 372 7 3 8307 1 3
287 2 4645966 0.30 372 122 2 8307 1 3
288 3 5182842 11.89 372 92 2 8307 1 3
289 4 5328000 15.02 372 68 2 8307 1 3
290 5 5400822 16.59 372 79 2 8307 1 3
291 6 5424954 17.11 372 2 2 8307 1 3
355
292 7 5688436 22.80 372 119 3 8307 1 3
293 8 5733494 23.77 372 149 2 8307 1 3
294 9 5847350 26.23 372 45 2 8307 1 3
295 10 5937295 28.17 372 150 3 8307 1 3
296 11 5983194 29.16 372 71 1 8307 1 3
297 12 6386109 37.86 372 109 3 8307 1 3
298 13 6698000 44.59 372 40 2 8307 1 3
1049 1 2830623 0.00 374 118 2 8307 2 5
1050 2 3025481 6.88 374 7 3 8307 2 5
1051 3 3283738 16.01 374 122 2 8307 2 5
1052 4 3751860 32.55 374 52 2 8307 2 5
1053 5 3832142 35.38 374 119 3 8307 2 5
1054 6 3889725 37.42 374 96 2 8307 2 5
1055 7 4103646 44.97 374 79 2 8307 2 5
1056 8 4240377 49.80 374 49 2 8307 2 5
1057 9 4573479 61.57 374 69 3 8307 2 5
1058 10 6029800 113.02 374 45 2 8307 2 5
1059 11 7336500 159.18 374 43 2 8307 2 5
2256 1 1973130 0.00 848 118 2 8307 2 15
2257 2 2035956 3.18 848 2 2 8307 2 15
2258 3 2067676 4.79 848 45 2 8307 2 15
2259 4 2099598 6.41 848 39 1 8307 2 15
2260 5 2127159 7.81 848 141 2 8307 2 15
2261 6 2136506 8.28 848 122 2 8307 2 15
2262 7 2566566 30.08 848 48 1 8307 2 15
2263 8 2600754 31.81 848 25 1 8307 2 15
2264 9 3227910 63.59 848 92 2 8307 2 15
1681 1 13819706 0.00 713 119 3 8308 1 8
1682 2 13941042 0.88 713 109 3 8308 1 8
1683 3 14245068 3.08 713 73 3 8308 1 8
1684 4 14761566 6.82 713 24 3 8308 1 8
1685 5 14764027 6.83 713 69 3 8308 1 8
1686 6 14868668 7.59 713 54 3 8308 1 8
1687 7 14903768 7.84 713 150 3 8308 1 8
1688 8 15781731 14.20 713 42 3 8308 1 8
1689 9 15880000 14.91 713 46 3 8308 1 8
1690 10 16135271 16.76 713 143 3 8308 1 8
1691 11 16369281 18.45 713 33 3 8308 1 8
1692 12 16518334 19.53 713 65 3 8308 1 8
1693 13 16779504 21.42 713 140 3 8308 1 8
1694 14 16957032 22.70 713 60 3 8308 1 8
1695 15 16998585 23.00 713 4 3 8308 1 8
1696 16 17118440 23.87 713 121 3 8308 1 8
1697 17 17243674 24.78 713 126 3 8308 1 8
1698 18 17993299 30.20 713 37 2 8308 1 8
1699 19 18940730 37.06 713 124 3 8308 1 8
2250 1 6970313 0.00 848 7 3 8308 1 13
2251 2 7427930 6.57 848 118 2 8308 1 13
2252 3 7886695 13.15 848 65 3 8308 1 13
2253 4 8920323 27.98 848 109 3 8308 1 13
2254 5 10336864 48.30 848 148 3 8308 1 13
2255 6 11435561 64.06 848 24 3 8308 1 13
2265 1 4362116 0.00 848 109 3 8309 1 15
2266 2 4800583 10.05 848 9 2 8309 1 15
2267 3 4902451 12.39 848 134 3 8309 1 15
2268 4 5048238 15.73 848 69 3 8309 1 15
2269 5 5213300 19.51 848 52 2 8309 1 15
2270 6 5225818 19.80 848 150 3 8309 1 15
2271 7 5386829 23.49 848 118 2 8309 1 15
2272 8 5420179 24.26 848 79 2 8309 1 15
2273 9 5455469 25.06 848 36 3 8309 1 15
2274 10 5456622 25.09 848 92 2 8309 1 15
2275 11 5520590 26.56 848 140 3 8309 1 15
2276 12 5598863 28.35 848 119 3 8309 1 15
2277 13 5776183 32.42 848 142 3 8309 1 15
2278 14 5838188 33.84 848 176 2 8309 1 15
2279 15 5915480 35.61 848 99 2 8309 1 15
2280 16 6105064 39.96 848 122 2 8309 1 15
2281 17 6132357 40.58 848 154 2 8309 1 15
2282 18 6177467 41.62 848 133 3 8309 1 15
2283 19 6188411 41.87 848 45 2 8309 1 15
2284 20 6299809 44.42 848 50 2 8309 1 15
2285 21 6431079 47.43 848 27 3 8309 1 15
2286 22 6528000 49.65 848 68 2 8309 1 15
2287 23 6529767 49.69 848 20 2 8309 1 15
2288 24 6662728 52.74 848 43 2 8309 1 15
2289 25 6882884 57.79 848 123 3 8309 1 15
356
2290 26 6962670 59.62 848 149 2 8309 1 15
2291 27 7124600 63.33 848 175 2 8309 1 15
1150 1 5600586 0.00 712 71 1 8310 1 7
1151 2 5719715 2.13 712 99 2 8310 1 7
1152 3 5850000 4.45 712 40 2 8310 1 7
1153 4 5990434 6.96 712 127 2 8310 1 7
1154 s 6077998 8.52 712 74 2 8310 1 7
1155 6 6383013 13.97 712 24 3 8310 1 7
1156 7 6450763 15.18 712 69 3 8310 1 7
1157 8 6573273 17.37 712 9 2 8310 1 7
1158 9 6615491 18.12 712 122 2 8310 1 7
1159 10 6762379 20.74 712 92 2 8310 1 7
1160 11 6977800 24.59 712 136 2 8310 1 7
1161 12 7996197 42.77 712 45 2 8310 1 7
1187 1 6612834 0.00 712 99 2 8310 1 7
1188 2 6680354 1.02 712 79 2 8310 1 7
1189 3 7087486 7.18 712 150 3 8310 1 7
1190 4 7120000 7.67 712 40 2 8310 1 7
1191 5 7419570 12.20 712 74 2 8310 1 7
1192 6 7473558 13.02 712 9 2 8310 1 7
1193 7 7440665 12.52 712 69 3 8310 1 7
1194 8 7615653 15.16 712 92 2 8310 1 7
1195 9 7620350 15.24 712 127 2 8310 1 7
1196 10 8310474 25.67 712 149 2 8310 1 7
1197 11 8865639 34.07 712 140 3 8310 1 7
1198 12 8989392 35.94 712 50 2 8310 1 7
1199 13 9556844 44.52 712 45 2 8310 1 7
2197 1 16626082 0.00 848 150 3 8310 1 15
2198 2 19361204 16.45 848 140 3 8310 1 15
2199 3 19639166 18.12 848 8 3 8310 1 15
2200 4 20235234 21.71 848 109 3 8310 1 15
2201 5 20361378 22.47 848 134 3 8310 1 15
2202 6 20445396 22.97 848 27 3 8310 1 15
2203 7 21523264 29.45 848 37 2 8310 1 15
2204 8 21599097 29.91 848 126 3 8310 1 15
2205 9 21653818 30.24 848 117 3 8310 1 15
2206 10 22174598 33.37 848 60 3 8310 1 15
2207 11 22177688 33.39 848 69 3 8310 1 15
2208 12 22869715 37.55 848 135 3 8310 1 15
2209 13 23121489 39.07 848 4 3 8310 1 15
2210 14 23148254 39.23 848 124 3 8310 1 15
2211 15 23385059 40.65 848 24 3 8310 1 15
2212 16 24124095 45.10 848 142 3 8310 1 15
2213 17 25138289 51.20 848 89 3 8310 1 15
2214 18 25183884 51.47 848 148 3 8310 1 15
2215 19 25336043 52.39 848 123 3 8310 1 15
2216 1 2522600 0.00 848 52 2 8311 1 14
2217 2 2528830 0.25 848 71 1 8311 1 14
2218 3 2886627 14.43 848 172 1 8311 1 14
2219 4 2900000 14.96 848 6 1 8311 1 14
2220 s 3256423 29.09 848 16 2 8311 1 14
2221 6 3498773 38.70 848 100 1 8311 1 14
2222 7 4130797 63.75 848 149 2 8311 1 14
2223 1 17817951 0.00 848 119 3 8312 1 14
2224 2 18030541 1.19 848 126 3 8312 1 14
2225 3 18665099 4.75 848 133 3 8312 1 14
2226 4 18759726 5.29 848 150 3 8312 1 14
2227 5 19378266 8.76 848 69 3 8312 1 14
2228 6 19389619 8.82 848 65 3 8312 1 14
2229 7 20391247 14.44 848 124 3 8312 1 14
2230 8 20478068 14.93 848 140 3 8312 1 14
2231 9 21993664 23.44 848 4 3 8312 1 14
2232 10 22305958 25.19 848 146 3 8312 1 14
2233 11 22671666 27.24 848 33 3 8312 1 14
2234 12 22872768 28.37 848 109 3 8312 1 14
2235 13 24623181 38.19 848 90 3 8312 1 14
2236 1 766366 0.00 848 119 3 8312 2 14
2237 2 951952 24.22 848 92 2 8312 2 14
2238 3 964175 25.81 848 187 1 8312 2 14
2239 4 991669 29.40 848 52 2 8312 2 14
2240 5 1026500 33.94 848 45 2 8312 2 14
2241 6 1053192 37.43 848 96 2 8312 2 14
2242 7 1056288 37.83 848 48 1 8312 2 14
2243 8 1082632 41.27 848 118 2 8312 2 14
2244 9 1086477 41.77 848 20 2 8312 2 14
2245 10 1113718 45.32 848 135 3 8312 2 14
2246 11 1185383 54.68 848 133 3 8312 2 14
357
2247 12 1249041 62.98 848 79 2 8312 2 14
2248 13 1316442 71.78 848 132 1 8312 2 14
2249 14 1546906 101.85 848 24 3 8312 2 14
212 1 4541128 0.00 372 79 2 8401 2 3
213 2 4614370 1.61 372 127 2 8401 2 3
214 3 4688784 3.25 372 9 2 8401 2 3
215 4 4821448 6.17 372 150 3 8401 2 3
216 5 4896905 7.83 372 115 2 8401 2 3
217 6 4912514 8.18 372 52 2 8401 2 3
218 7 4929981 8.56 372 58 2 8401 2 3
219 8 4975916 9.57 372 74 2 8401 2 3
220 9 5200892 14.53 372 154 2 8401 2 3
221 10 5214074 14.82 372 43 2 8401 2 3
222 11 5214453 14.83 372 20 2 8401 2 3
223 12 5283646 16.35 372 122 2 8401 2 3
224 13 5384392 18.57 372 134 3 8401 2 3
225 14 5608248 23.50 372 136 2 8401 2 3
226 15 5688362 25.26 372 102 2 8401 2 3
227 16 5758520 26.81 372 142 3 8401 2 3
228 17 5872868 29.33 372 99 2 8401 2 3
229 18 6024928 32.67 372 92 2 8401 2 3
230 19 6245493 37.53 372 71 1 8401 2 3
231 20 6425436 41.49 372 60 3 8401 2 3
232 21 6437711 41.76 372 143 3 8401 2 3
233 22 6453272 42.11 372 45 2 8401 2 3
2187 1 1705169 0.00 848 96 2 8402 2 14
2188 2 1957738 14.81 848 194 1 8402 2 14
2189 3 1971206 15.60 848 145 1 8402 2 14
2190 4 2045204 19.94 848 120 1 8402 2 14
2191 5 2101297 23.23 848 71 1 8402 2 14
2192 6 2153735 26.31 848 64 1 8402 2 14
2193 7 2321240 36.13 848 187 1 8402 2 14
2194 8 2379076 39.52 848 20 2 8402 2 14
2195 9 2471238 44.93 848 27 3 8402 2 14
2196 10 2866670 68.12 848 25 1 8402 2 14
2498 1 603009 0.00 848 18 3 8402 2 14
2499 2 616714 2.27 848 25 1 8402 2 14
2500 3 680390 12.83 848 45 2 8402 2 14
2501 4 715767 18.70 848 71 1 8402 2 14
2502 5 775213 28.56 848 92 2 8402 2 14
2503 6 775383 28.59 848 100 1 8402 2 14
2504 7 783630 29.95 848 103 1 8402 2 14
2505 8 806467 33.74 848 43 2 8402 2 14
2506 9 1449699 140.41 848 191 1 8402 2 14
170 1 5939516 0.00 372 152 3 8403 1 3
171 2 6293727 5.96 372 52 2 8403 1 3
172 3 6312477 6.28 372 20 2 8403 1 3
173 4 6325416 6.50 372 9 2 8403 1 3
174 5 6458932 8.75 372 49 2 8403 1 3
175 6 6474634 9.01 372 58 2 8403 1 3
176 7 6546318 10.22 372 154 2 8403 1 3
177 8 6654689 12.04 372 71 1 8403 1 3
178 9 6690566 12.64 372 115 2 8403 1 3
179 10 6744152 13.55 372 127 2 8403 1 3
180 11 6766144 13.92 372 18 3 8403 1 3
181 12 6919095 16.49 372 96 2 8403 1 3
182 13 7172991 20.77 372 27 3 8403 1 3
183 14 7187788 21.02 372 99 2 8403 1 3
184 15 7291004 22.75 372 79 2 8403 1 3
185 16 7318137 23.21 372 136 2 8403 1 3
186 17 7436767 25.21 372 92 2 8403 1 3
187 18 7518819 26.59 372 60 3 8403 1 3
188 19 7610222 28.13 372 142 3 8403 1 3
189 20 8073111 35.92 372 149 2 8403 1 3
190 21 8089644 36.20 372 45 2 8403 1 3
191 22 8132255 36.92 372 98 3 8403 1 3
192 23 8550305 43.96 372 84 2 8403 1 3
193 24 8827320 48.62 372 151 2 8403 1 3
701 1 1417052 0.00 374 92 2 8403 2 5
702 2 1459037 2.96 374 64 1 8403 2 5
703 3 1586042 11.93 374 39 1 8403 2 5
704 4 1652120 16.59 374 120 1 8403 2 5
705 5 1681997 18.70 374 48 1 8403 2 5
706 6 1756000 23.92 374 125 1 8403 2 5
707 7 1815204 28.10 374 115 2 8403 2 5
708 8 1835141 29.50 374 122 2 8403 2 5
709 9 1916550 35.25 374 45 2 8403 2 5
358
710 10 1927415 36.02 374 17 1 8403 2 5
711 11 1988819 40.35 374 20 2 8403 2 5
712 12 1992958 40.64 374 118 2 8403 2 5
713 13 1998235 41.01 374 71 1 8403 2 5
714 14 2085690 47.19 374 30 2 8403 2 5
715 15 2107826 48.75 374 100 1 8403 2 5
716 16 3904700 175.55 374 52 2 8403 2 5
717 1 853837 0.00 374 71 1 8404 2 5
718 2 1095561 28.31 374 115 2 8404 2 5
719 3 1115593 30.66 374 78 1 8404 2 5
720 4 1138520 33.34 374 119 3 8404 2 5
721 5 1139000 33.40 374 52 2 8404 2 5
722 6 1188118 39.15 374 48 1 8404 2 5
723 7 1188482 39.19 374 92 2 8404 2 5
724 8 1252000 46.63 374 64 1 8404 2 5
725 9 1422565 66.61 374 45 2 8404 2 5
726 10 1649131 93.14 374 63 1 8404 2 5
727 11 1947799 128.12 374 18 3 8404 2 5
728 12 3500000 309.91 374 130 1 8404 2 5
1162 1 6432606 0.00 712 115 2 8405 1 7
1163 2 6497708 1.01 712 99 2 8405 1 7
1164 3 6523140 1.41 712 74 2 8405 1 7
1165 4 6550413 1.83 712 153 2 8405 1 7
1166 5 6570302 2.14 712 49 2 8405 1 7
1167 6 6597346 2.56 712 122 2 8405 1 7
1168 7 6638497 3.20 712 127 2 8405 1 7
1169 8 6675723 3.78 712 118 2 8405 1 7
1170 9 6813213 5.92 712 148 3 8405 1 7
1171 10 6906554 7.37 712 69 3 8405 1 7
1172 11 6997815 8.79 712 18 3 8405 1 7
1173 12 7051427 9.62 712 79 2 8405 1 7
1174 13 7118628 10.66 712 133 3 8405 1 7
1175 14 7180763 11.63 712 27 3 8405 1 7
1176 15 7195818 11.86 712 142 3 8405 1 7
1177 16 7215828 12.18 712 9 2 8405 1 7
1178 17 7227034 12.35 712 84 2 8405 1 7
1179 18 7580157 17.84 712 151 2 8405 1 7
1180 19 7592071 18.02 712 40 2 8405 1 7
1181 20 7846621 21.98 712 109 3 8405 1 7
1182 21 7869177 22.33 712 92 2 8405 1 7
1183 22 7990530 24.22 712 71 1 8405 1 7
1184 23 8112017 26.11 712 149 2 8405 1 7
1185 24 8807053 36.91 712 45 2 8405 1 7
1186 25 10925518 69.85 712 43 2 8405 1 7
1200 1 5929773 0.00 712 52 2 8405 1 7
1201 2 6280649 5.92 712 152 3 8405 1 7
1202 3 6281573 5.93 712 115 2 8405 1 7
1203 4 6388902 7.74 712 99 2 8405 1 7
1204 5 6431486 8.46 712 58 2 8405 1 7
1205 6 6455225 8.86 712 153 2 8405 1 7
1206 7 6487390 9.40 712 127 2 8405 1 7
1207 8 6498390 9.59 712 49 2 8405 1 7
1208 9 6580230 10.97 712 122 2 8405 1 7
1209 10 6687081 12.77 712 84 2 8405 1 7
1210 11 6726280 13.43 712 18 3 8405 1 7
1211 12 6740609 13.67 712 74 2 8405 1 7
1212 13 6838734 15.33 712 79 2 8405 1 7
1213 14 6850278 15.52 712 69 3 8405 1 7
1214 15 7158888 20.73 712 142 3 8405 1 7
1215 16 7217395 21.71 712 43 2 8405 1 7
1216 17 7358758 24.10 712 149 2 8405 1 7
1217 18 7567979 27.63 712 40 2 8405 1 7
1218 19 7860090 32.55 712 133 3 8405 1 7
1219 20 8084834 36.34 712 45 2 8405 1 7
1220 21 8125337 37.03 712 71 1 8405 1 7
1221 22 9318049 57.14 712 138 2 8405 1 7
401 1 8619752 0.00 372 49 2 8407 1 3
402 2 8928274 3.58 372 96 2 8407 1 3
403 3 8947326 3.80 372 127 2 8407 1 3
404 4 8990500 4.30 372 58 2 8407 1 3
405 5 9111454 5.70 372 122 2 8407 1 3
406 6 9302501 7.92 372 88 3 8407 1 3
407 7 9426337 9.36 372 20 2 8407 1 3
408 8 9461647 9.77 372 74 2 8407 1 3
409 9 9707685 12.62 372 27 3 8407 1 3
410 10 9716340 12.72 372 115 2 8407 1 3
411 11 9839693 14.15 372 117 3 8407 1 3
359
412 12 9859135 14.38 372 149 2 8407 1 3
413 13 10291808 19.40 372 99 2 8407 1 3
414 14 10390755 20.55 372 69 3 8407 1 3
415 15 10591843 22.88 372 52 2 8407 1 3
416 16 10600000 22.97 372 98 3 8407 1 3
417 17 10622644 23.24 372 102 2 8407 1 3
418 18 11079189 28.53 372 148 3 8407 1 3
419 19 11100103 28.78 372 142 3 8407 1 3
420 20 11303792 31.14 372 60 3 8407 1 3
421 21 11418421 32.47 372 45 2 8407 1 3
2137 1 12147504 0.00 848 119 3 8407 1 15
2138 2 12469494 2.65 848 69 3 8407 1 15
2139 3 12998620 7.01 848 24 3 8407 1 15
2140 4 13180870 8.51 848 95 2 8407 1 15
2141 5 13282177 9.34 848 43 2 8407 1 15
2142 6 13304419 9.52 848 89 3 8407 1 15
2143 7 13482222 10.99 848 178 3 8407 1 15
2144 8 13535875 11.43 848 152 3 8407 1 15
2145 9 13749927 13.19 848 2 2 8407 1 15
2146 10 13828679 13.84 848 127 2 8407 1 15
2147 11 13942622 14.78 848 122 2 8407 1 15
2148 12 13991593 15.18 848 99 2 8407 1 15
2149 13 14060660 15.75 848 9 2 8407 1 15
2150 14 14087828 15.97 848 58 2 8407 1 15
2151 15 14398124 18.53 848 151 2 8407 1 15
2152 16 14398947 18.53 848 149 2 8407 1 15
2153 17 14572050 19.96 848 36 3 8407 1 15
2154 18 14587492 20.09 848 49 2 8407 1 15
2155 19 14730625 21.26 848 104 2 8407 1 15
2156 20 14752742 21.45 848 26 3 8407 1 15
2157 21 14839245 22.16 848 96 2 8407 1 15
2158 22 14919851 22.82 848 27 3 8407 1 15
2159 23 14999134 23.48 848 118 2 8407 1 15
2160 24 15039976 23.81 848 15 2 8407 1 15
2161 25 15076320 24.11 848 150 3 8407 1 15
2162 26 15316815 26.09 848 133 3 8407 1 15
2163 27 15585631 28.30 848 142 3 8407 1 15
2164 28 15875090 30.69 848 20 2 8407 1 15
2165 29 15885191 30.77 848 109 3 8407 1 15
2166 30 15988062 31.62 848 60 3 8407 1 15
2167 31 16065406 32.25 848 45 2 8407 1 15
2168 32 16133698 32.81 848 52 2 8407 1 15
2169 33 16414528 35.13 848 30 2 8407 1 15
2170 34 17313741 42.53 848 92 2 8407 1 15
2171 35 20971941 72.64 848 182 2 8407 1 15
637 1 3710343 0.00 374 18 3 8411 2 5
638 2 3712413 0.06 374 71 1 8411 2 5
639 3 3732321 0.59 374 99 2 8411 2 5
640 4 3781241 1.91 374 122 2 8411 2 5
641 5 3893673 4.94 374 58 2 8411 2 5
642 6 4002722 7.88 374 9 2 8411 2 5
643 7 4060384 9.43 374 95 2 8411 2 5
644 8 4109856 10.77 374 133 3 8411 2 5
645 9 4288012 15.57 374 27 3 8411 2 5
646 10 4333152 16.79 374 45 2 8411 2 5
647 11 4467702 20.41 374 142 3 8411 2 5
648 12 4470906 20.50 374 127 2 8411 2 5
649 13 4549070 22.61 374 119 3 8411 2 5
650 14 4607729 24.19 374 73 3 8411 2 5
651 15 4767233 28.48 374 151 2 8411 2 5
882 1 6879111 0.00 374 40 2 8411 1 5
883 2 6926902 0.69 374 118 2 8411 1 5
884 3 6957687 1.14 374 104 2 8411 1 5
885 4 7080982 2.93 374 45 2 8411 1 5
886 5 7211817 4.84 374 20 2 8411 1 5
887 6 7262240 5.57 374 21 2 8411 1 5
888 7 7338546 6.68 374 9 2 8411 1 5
889 8 7553565 9.80 374 18 3 8411 1 5
890 9 7636752 11.01 374 7 3 8411 1 5
891 10 7808114 13.50 374 6 2 8411 1 5
892 11 7989419 16.14 374 99 2 8411 1 5
893 12 8479643 23.27 374 122 2 8411 1 5
894 13 8506224 23.65 374 16 2 8411 1 5
895 14 8544000 24.20 374 88 3 8411 1 5
896 15 8795659 27.86 374 115 2 8411 1 5
897 16 8907723 29.49 374 140 3 8411 1 5
898 17 9862867 43.37 374 152 3 8411 1 5
360
899 18 12139000 76.46 374 4 3 8411 1 5
900 19 12139258 76.47 374 58 2 8411 1 5
1313 1 5867709 0.00 712 58 2 8411 1 7
1314 2 6206461 5.77 712 74 2 8411 1 7
1315 3 6220000 6.00 712 52 2 8411 1 7
1316 4 6260784 6.70 712 99 2 8411 1 7
1317 5 6339680 8.04 712 115 2 8411 1 7
1318 6 6430018 9.58 712 136 2 8411 1 7
1319 7 6455495 10.02 712 140 3 8411 1 7
1320 8 6550686 11.64 712 127 2 8411 1 7
1321 9 6583508 12.20 712 20 2 8411 1 7
1322 10 6690098 14.02 712 9 2 8411 1 7
1323 11 6698941 14.17 712 18 3 8411 1 7
1324 12 6972380 18.83 712 149 2 8411 1 7
1325 13 7042436 20.02 712 95 2 8411 1 7
1326 14 7063000 20.37 712 30 2 8411 1 7
1327 15 7255075 23.64 712 36 3 8411 1 7
1328 16 7329171 24.91 712 24 3 8411 1 7
1329 17 8121908 38.42 712 92 2 8411 1 7
2113 1 18643813 0.00 848 7 3 8411 1 15
2114 2 19566965 4.95 848 33 3 8411 1 15
2115 3 19970207 7.11 848 126 3 8411 1 15
2116 4 20105881 7.84 848 150 3 8411 1 15
2117 5 20189160 8.29 848 24 3 8411 1 15
2118 6 20397090 9.40 848 65 3 8411 1 15
2119 7 20518881 10.06 848 69 3 8411 1 15
2120 8 20602316 10.50 848 134 3 8411 1 15
2121 9 20650943 10.77 848 10 3 8411 1 15
2122 10 20889036 12.04 848 109 3 8411 1 15
2123 11 20895023 12.07 848 140 3 8411 1 15
2124 12 20988000 12.57 848 54 3 8411 1 15
2125 13 21016685 12.73 848 148 3 8411 1 15
2126 14 21184856 13.63 848 89 3 8411 1 15
2127 15 21226692 13.85 848 119 3 8411 1 15
2128 16 22284770 19.53 848 88 3 8411 1 15
2129 17 22558746 21.00 848 154 2 8411 1 15
2130 18 22700000 21.76 848 188 3 8411 1 15
2131 19 23332886 25.15 848 149 2 8411 1 15
2132 20 23358463 25.29 848 26 3 8411 1 15
2133 21 24483181 31.32 848 124 3 8411 1 15
2134 22 24671768 32.33 848 134 3 8411 1 15
2135 23 25103457 34.65 848 142 3 8411 1 15
2136 24 25975444 39.32 848 53 3 8411 1 15
983 1 8619620 0.00 374 178 3 8502 2 5
984 2 8766058 1.70 374 104 2 8502 2 5
985 3 9283077 7.70 374 18 3 8502 2 5
986 4 9487750 10.07 374 45 2 8502 2 5
987 5 9935649 15.27 374 58 2 8502 2 5
988 6 10016301 16.20 374 122 2 8502 2 5
989 7 10267515 19.12 374 142 3 8502 2 5
990 8 10274345 19.20 374 20 2 8502 2 5
991 9 10760000 24.83 374 152 3 8502 2 5
992 10 11022600 27.88 374 54 3 8502 2 5
993 11 12187673 41.39 374 27 3 8502 2 5
994 12 12244025 42.05 374 71 2 8502 2 5
1041 1 1546025 0.00 374 71 2 8503 2 5
1042 2 1556950 0.71 374 86 1 8503 2 5
1043 3 1724145 11.52 374 45 2 8503 2 5
1044 4 1842041 19.15 374 119 3 8503 2 5
1045 5 1883000 21.80 374 103 1 8503 2 5
1046 6 1899516 22.86 374 27 3 8503 2 5
1047 7 2192369 41.81 374 147 1 8503 2 5
1048 8 2245700 45.26 374 44 1 8503 2 5
1060 1 7399365 0.00 374 153 2 8503 1 5
1061 2 7403136 0.05 374 115 2 8503 1 5
1062 3 7832567 5.85 374 99 2 8503 1 5
1063 4 7850000 6.09 374 52 2 8503 1 5
1064 5 7914351 6.96 374 129 2 8503 1 5
1065 6 7959635 7.57 374 9 2 8503 1 5
1066 7 8239053 11.35 374 152 3 8503 1 5
1067 8 8310363 12.31 374 20 2 8503 1 5
1068 9 8413295 13.70 374 7 3 8503 1 5
1069 10 8428800 13.91 374 30 2 8503 1 5
1070 11 8526925 15.24 374 18 3 8503 1 5
1071 12 8948420 20.93 374 121 3 8503 1 5
1072 13 9489617 28.25 374 150 3 8503 1 5
1073 14 9489972 28.25 374 176 2 8503 1 5
361
1074 15 9622906 30.05
	 374 43 2	 8503 1 5
1075 16 10169068 37.43
	 374 71 2	 8503 1 5
1076 17 11078088 49.72	 374 45 2	 8503 1 5
1635 1 18093930 0.00	 713 152 3	 8503 1 9
1636 2 18932586 4.64	 713 69 3	 8503 1 9
1637 3 18956814 4.77	 713 109 3	 8503 1 9
1638 4 19383258 7.13	 713 143 3	 8503 1 9
1639 5 19455520 7.53	 713 133 3	 8503 1 9
1640 6 19688989 8.82	 713 54 3	 8503 1 9
1641 7 19717646 8.97	 713 119 3	 8503 1 9
1642 8 19970000 10.37	 713 10 3	 8503 1 9
1643 9 20074934 10.95	 713 150 3	 8503 1 9
1644 10 20141898 11.32	 713 51 3	 8503 1 9
1645 11 20542000 13.53	 713 46 3	 8503 1 9
1646 12 21674376 19.79	 713 126 3	 8503 1 9
1647 13 21965277 21.40	 713 33 3	 8503 1 9
1648 14 22704841 25.48	 713 124 3	 8503 1 9
1649 15 22794828 25.98	 713 89 3	 8503 1 9
1650 16 22868261 26.39	 713 4 3	 8503 1 9
1651 17 29815055 64.78	 713 9 2	 8503 1 9
683 1 2656409 0.00	 374 103 1	 8504 2 5
684 2 2795800 5.25	 374 75 2	 8504 2 5
685 3 3038000 14.36	 374 45 2	 8504 2 5
686 4 3260642 22.75	 374 71 2	 8504 2 5
687 5 3368654 26.81	 374 27 3	 8504 2 5
688 6 3855170 45.13	 374 23 1	 8504 2 5
964 1 7832155 0.00	 374 129 2	 8504 1 5
965 2 8150000 4.06	 374 52 2	 8504 1 5
966 3 8314293 6.16	 374 136 2	 8504 1 5
967 4 8374542 6.93	 374 9 2	 8504 1 5
968 5 8392440 7.15	 374 2 2	 8504 1 5
969 6 8475250 8.21	 374 149 2	 8504 1 5
970 7 8838288 12.85	 374 150 3	 8504 1 5
971 8 8990307 14.79	 374 27 3	 8504 1 5
972 9 9006056 14.99	 374 152 3	 8504 1 5
973 10 9067116 15.77	 374 20 2	 8504 1 5
974 11 9170502 17.09	 374 119 3	 8504 1 5
975 12 9246313 18.06	 374 99 2	 8504 1 5
976 13 9320742 19.01	 374 37 3	 8504 1 5
977 14 9448385 20.64	 374 142 3	 8504 1 5
978 15 9482529 21.07	 374 127 2	 8504 1 5
979 16 9825946 25.46	 374 109 3	 8504 1 5
980 17 9998174 27.66	 374 124 3	 8504 1 5
981 18 10769549 37.50	 374 45 2	 8504 1 5
982 19 10770000 37.51	 374 98 3	 8504 1 5
1272 1 6470000 0.00	 712 52 2	 8506 1 7
1273 2 6490983 0.32	 712 58 2	 8506 1 7
1274 3 6643518 2.68	 712 119 3	 8506 1 7
1275 4 6677612 3.21	 712 127 2	 8506 1 7
1276 5 6747398 4.29	 712 18 3	 8506 1 7
1277 6 6760479 4.49	 712 60 3	 8506 1 7
1278 7 6760680 4.49	 712 149 2	 8506 1 7
1279 8 6845835 5.81	 712 6 2	 8506 1 7
1280 9 6875889 6.27	 712 74 2	 8506 1 7
1281 10 6958183 7.55	 712 36 3	 8506 1 7
1282 11 7138259 10.33	 712 20 2	 8506 1 7
1283 12 7500000 15.92	 712 54 3	 8506 1 7
1284 13 8315810 28.53	 712 99 2	 8506 1 7
1285 14 8550297 32.15	 712 45 2	 8506 1 7
829 1 17825901 0.00	 374 69 3	 8507 1 6
830 2 17969483 0.81	 374 135 3	 8507 1 6
831 3 18088355 1.47	 374 18 3	 8507 1 6
832 4 18242102 2.33	 374 140 3	 8507 1 6
833 5 18274420 2.52
	 374 7 3	 8507 1 6
834 6 18670108 4.74
	 374 27 3	 8507 1 6
835 7 18779681 5.35	 374 109 3	 8507 1 6
836 8 19313000 8.34	 374 66 3	 8507 1 6
837 9 19400156 8.83	 374 124 3	 8507 1 6
838 10 19758028 10.84	 374 150 3	 8507 1 6
839 11 20298800 13.87	 374 88 3	 8507 1 6
840 12 20611922 15.63	 374 148 3	 8507 1 6
841 13 20706978 16.16	 374 33 3	 8507 1 6
842 14 22536556 26.43	 374 10 3	 8507 1 6
843 15 23235712 30.35	 374 134 3	 8507 1 6
158 1 33833556 0.00	 848 7 3	 8508 1 15
159 2 34343328 1.51	 848 10 3	 8508 1 15
160 3 34427167 1.75	 848 51 3	 8508 1 15
362
161 4 34670047 2.47 848 121 3 8508 1 15
162 5 34750231 2.71 848 135 3 8508 1 15
163 6 35780830 5.76 848 69 _3 8508 1 15
164 7 36090667 6.67 848 140 3 8508 1 15
165 8 36525000 7.95 848 108 3 8508 1 15
166 9 36940801 9.18 848 124 3 8508 1 15
167 10 37740353 11.55 848 24 3 8508 1 15
168 11 38874454 14.90 848 146 3 8508 1 15
169 12 39829293 17.72 848 89 3 8508 1 15
384 1 6281800 0.00 372 108 3 8508 1 3
385 2 6430893 2.37 372 18 3 8508 1 3
386 3 6443581 2.58 372 74 2 8508 1 3
387 4 6486056 3.25 372 20 2 8508 1 3
388 5 6644171 5.77 372 116 2 8508 1 3
389 6 6867184 9.32 372 50 2 8508 1 3
390 7 6900950 9.86 372 16 2 8508 1 3
391 8 7036741 12.02 372 142 3 8508 1 3
392 9 7040838 12.08 372 75 2 8508 1 3
393 10 7045514 12.16 372 127 2 8508 1 3
394 11 7070169 12.55 372 96 2 8508 1 3
395 12 7277213 15.85 372 134 3 8508 1 3
396 13 7346688 16.95 372 122 2 8508 1 3
397 14 7405849 17.89 372 149 2 8508 1 3
398 15 7993888 27.25 372 71 2 8508 1 3
399 16 8683325 38.23 372 45 2 8508 1 3
400 17 8749456 39.28 372 99 2 8508 1 3
362 1 4632091 0.00 372 75 2 8509 1 3
363 2 5267689 13.72 372 50 2 8509 1 3
364 3 6024215 30.05 372 142 3 8509 1 3
365 4 6344655 36.97 372 45 2 8509 1 3
366 5 6933709 49.69 372 71 2 8509 1 3
1254 1 6339823 0.00 712 58 2 8509 1 7
1255 2 6469666 2.05 712 74 2 8509 1 7
1256 3 6606760 4.21 712 71 2 8509 1 7
1257 4 6703949 5.74 712 127 2 8509 1 7
1258 5 6741560 6.34 712 6 2 8509 1 7
1259 6 6884827 8.60 712 99 2 8509 1 7
1260 7 6898476 8.81 712 20 2 8509 1 7
1261 8 6933195 9.36 712 27 3 8509 1 7
1262 9 6980712 10.11 712 69 3 8509 1 7
1263 10 7000191 10.42 712 122 2 8509 1 7
1264 11 7039636 11.04 712 18 3 8509 1 7
1265 12 7134434 12.53 712 149 2 8509 1 7
1266 13 7214207 13.79 712 49 2 8509 1 7
1267 14 7221250 13.90 712 142 3 8509 1 7
1268 15 7512918 18.50 712 50 2 8509 1 7
1269 16 7635406 20.44 712 40 3 8509 1 7
1270 17 7659108 20.81 712 126 3 8509 1 7
1271 18 8424649 32.88 712 45 2 8509 1 7
1722 1 12615990 0.00 713 20 2 8509 1 8
1723 2 12724294 0.86 713 16 2 8509 1 8
1724 3 12739640 0.98 713 152 3 8509 1 8
1725 4 13326634 5.63 713 151 2 8509 1 8
1726 5 13570075 7.56 713 75 2 8509 1 8
1727 6 13959898 10.65 713 140 3 8509 1 8
1728 7 13977458 10.79 713 122 2 8509 1 8
1729 8 14230559 12.80 713 50 2 8509 1 8
1730 9 14398898 14.13 713 26 3 8509 1 8
1731 10 14849496 17.70 713 71 2 8509 1 8
1732 11 15459935 22.54 713 127 2 8509 1 8
1733 12 15684115 24.32 713 124 3 8509 1 8
1734 13 15849331 25.63 713 80 3 8509 1 8
1735 14 18008174 42.74 713 45 2 8509 1 8
1736 15 18554947 47.07 713 99 2 8509 1 8
1737 16 19128135 51.62 713 142 3 8509 1 8
1738 17 19954924 58.17 713 40 3 8509 1 8
2507 1 3991006 0.00 848 96 2 8509 1 14
250111 2 4041822 1.27 848 43 2 8509 1 14
2509 3 4212843 5.56 848 115 2 8509 1 14
2510 4 4382886 9.82 848 119 3 8509 1 14
2511 5 4562370 14.32 848 122 2 8509 1 14
2512 6 4563741 14.35 848 16 2 8509 1 14
2513 7 4668355 16.97 848 20 2 8509 1 14
2514 8 4678752 17.23 848 18 3 8509 1 14
2515 9 4808644 20.49 848 36 3 8509 1 14
2516 10 4925295 23.41 848 149 2 8509 1 14
2517 11 4970778 24.55 848 127 2 8509 1 14
363
2518 12 5012870 25.60 848 49 2 8509 1 14
2519 13 5059673 26.78 848 58 2 8509 1 14
2520 14 5060000 26.79 848 30 2 8509 1 14
2521 15 5286008 32.45 848 71 2 8509 1 14
2522 16 5303466 32.89 848 142 3 8509 1 14
2523 17 5581028 39.84 848 50 2 8509 1 14
2524 18 5915396 48.22 848 99 2 8509 1 14
2525 19 5988681 50.05 848 45 2 8509 1 14
353 1 4056233 0.00 372 74 2 8510 1 3
354 2 4396197 8.38 372 127 2 8510 1 3
355 3 4407156 8.65 372 18 3 8510 1 3
356 4 4526610 11.60 372 58 2 8510 1 3
357 5 4758694 17.32 372 49 2 8510 1 3
358 6 4813000 18.66 372 30 2 8510 1 3
359 7 4861509 19.85 372 SO 2 8510 1 3
360 8 5094198 25.59 372 102 2 8510 1 3
361 9 5697619 40.47 372 45 2 8510 1 3
689 1 2791950 0.00 372 71 2 8510 2 3
690 2 2794269 0.08 372 41 2 8510 2 3
691 3 2798100 0.22 372 48 1 8510 2 3
692 4 2811900 0.71 372 130 1 8510 2 3
693 5 2891343 3.56 372 131 2 8510 2 3
694 6 2895300 3.70 372 64 1 8510 2 3
695 7 2955500 5.86 372 45 2 8510 2 3
696 8 3012928 7.91 372 101 1 8510 2 3
697 9 3030775 8.55 372 86 1 8510 2 3
698 10 3158420 13.13 372 57 1 8510 2 3
699 11 3176193 13.76 372 144 1 8510 2 3
700 12 3428216 22.79 372 103 1 8510 2 3
2456 1 11794043 0.00 848 119 3 8510 1 15
2457 2 12196848 3.42 848 43 2 8510 1 15
2458 3 12463247 5.67 848 60 3 8510 1 15
2459 4 12575550 6.63 848 75 2 8510 1 15
2460 5 13041171 10.57 848 36 3 8510 1 15
2461 6 13085501 10.95 848 6 2 8510 1 15
2462 7 13488821 14.37 848 71 2 8510 1 15
2463 8 13693324 16.10 848 18 3 8510 1 15
2464 9 13732168 16.43 848 58 2 8510 1 15
2465 10 13828437 17.25 848 127 2 8510 1 15
2466 11 14030726 18.96 848 9 2 8510 1 15
2467 12 14243926 20.77 848 140 3 8510 1 15
2468 13 14996294 27.15 848 50 2 8510 1 15
2469 14 14998055 27.17 848 99 2 8510 1 15
2470 15 15265094 29.43 848 122 2 8510 1 15
2471 16 16097620 36.49 848 142 3 8510 1 15
2472 17 19002490 61.12 848 45 2 8510 1 15
2473 18 19335457 63.94 848 69 3 8510 1 15
2474 1 31950538 0.00 848 140 3 8510 1 15
2475 2 35370585 10.70 848 33 3 8510 1 15
2476 3 35800723 12.05 848 124 3 8510 1 15
2477 4 38445000 20.33 848 66 3 8510 1 15
2478 5 40064713 25.40 848 7 3 8510 1 15
2479 6 40280451 26.07 848 119 3 8510 1 15
2480 7 40488040 26.72 848 10 3 8510 1 15
2481 8 54317895 70.01 848 146 3 8510 1 15
194 1 2642930 0.00 372 58 2 8511 1 3
195 2 2677345 1.30 372 134 3 8511 1 3
196 3 2688379 1.72 372 115 2 8511 1 3
197 4 2711165 2.58 372 127 2 8511 1 3
198 5 2810260 6.33 372 60 3 8511 1 3
199 6 2939969 11.24 372 96 2 8511 1 3
200 7 2946008 11.47 372 71 2 8511 1 3
201 8 3004733 13.69 372 75 2 8511 1 3
202 9 3036003 14.87 372 16 2 8511 1 3
203 10 3154250 19.35 372 122 2 8511 1 3
204 11 3320099 25.62 372 49 2 8511 1 3
205 12 3413608 29.16 372 30 2 8511 1 3
206 13 3420091 29.41 372 74 2 8511 1 3
207 14 3692896 39.73 372 18 3 8511 1 3
208 15 3760031 42.27 372 118 2 8511 1 3
209 16 3880483 46.83 372 45 2 8511 1 3
210 17 4690587 77.48 372 140 3 8511 1 3
211 18 5946159 124.98 372 85 2 8511 1 3
541 1 5901867 0.00 372 75 2 8511 1 3
542 2 6892302 16.78 372 140 3 8511 1 3
543 3 7212620 22.21 372 45 2 8511 1 3
544 4 8075441 36.83 372 71 2 8511 1 3
364
844 1 18897242 0.00 374 119 3 8511 1 6
845 2 19110118 1.13 374 69 3 8511 1 6
846 3 19138800 1.28 374 121 3 8511 1 6
847 4 19228875 1.75 374 33 3 8511 1 6
848 5 19602937 3.73 374 140 3 8511 1 6
849 6 19727937 4.40 374 18 3 8511 1 6
850 7 20071330 6.21 374 150 3 8511 1 6
851 8 20184000 6.81 374 108 3 8511 1 6
852 9 20248567 7.15 374 10 3 8511 1 6
853 10 22093380 16.91 374 124 3 8511 1 6
854 11 22332828 18.18 374 142 3 8511 1 6
855 12 22717913 20.22 374 24 3 8511 1 6
856 13 22922190 21.30 374 133 3 8511 1 6
1222 1 6379834 0.00 712 20 2 8511 1 7
1223 2 6392210 0.19 712 109 3 8511 1 7
1224 3 6403743 0.37 712 127 2 8511 1 7
1225 4 6432205 0.82 712 74 2 8511 1 7
1226 5 6497361 1.84 712 58 2 8511 1 7
1227 6 6510443 2.05 712 122 2 8511 1 7
1228 7 6550000 2.67 712 52 2 8511 1 7
1229 8 6588464 3.27 712 102 2 8511 1 7
1230 9 6629100 3.91 712 18 3 8511 1 7
1231 10 6672712 4.59 712 99 2 8511 1 7
1232 11 6736888 5.60 712 140 3 8511 1 7
1233 12 6881105 7.86 712 115 2 8511 1 7
1234 13 6900170 8.16 712 133 3 8511 1 7
1235 14 7220680 13.18 712 9 2 8511 1 7
1236 15 7274412 14.02 712 142 3 8511 1 7
1237 16 7284320 14.18 712 84 2 8511 1 7
1238 17 7330644 14.90 712 36 3 8511 1 7
1239 18 7420198 16.31 712 45 2 8511 1 7
1240 19 7525911 17.96 712 149 2 8511 1 7
1241 20 7747666 21.44 712 26 3 8511 1 7
1242 21 8075621 26.58 712 37 3 8511 1 7
323 1 4226784 0.00 372 115 2 8601 1 3
324 2 4683886 10.81 372 96 2 8601 1 3
325 3 4800000 13.56 372 52 2 8601 1 3
326 4 4901327 15.96 372 152 3 8601 1 3
327 5 4914049 16.26 372 74 2 8601 1 3
328 6 4952424 17.17 372 18 3 8601 1 3
329 7 4965868 17.49 372 71 2 8601 1 3
330 8 5060590 19.73 372 142 3 8601 1 3
331 9 5242190 24.02 372 102 2 8601 1 3
332 10 5792200 37.04 372 43 2 8601 1 3
603 1 11015409 0.00 374 118 2 8601 1 5
604 2 11171771 1.42 374 2 2 8601 1 5
605 3 11274935 2.36 374 18 3 8601 1 5
606 4 11318724 2.75 374 96 2 8601 1 5
607 5 12315651 11.80 374 122 2 8601 1 5
608 6 12317056 11.82 374 61 2 8601 1 5
609 7 12450804 13.03 374 43 2 8601 1 5
610 8 12615047 14.52 374 133 3 8601 1 5
611 9 13085846 18.80 374 71 2 8601 1 5
612 10 13398888 21.64 374 108 3 8601 1 5
613 11 13455680 22.15 374 21 2 8601 1 5
2482 1 4798494 0.00 (348 96 2 8601 1 14
2483 2 5007141 4.35 848 30 2 8601 1 14
2484 3 5059713 5.44 848 19 2 8601 1 14
2485 4 5210000 8.58 848 52 2 8601 1 14
2486 5 5461984 13.83 848 95 2 8601 1 14
2487 6 5889705 22.74 848 119 3 8601 1 14
2488 7 6758520 40.85 848 71 2 8601 1 14
336 1 4976206 0.00 372 115 2 8603 1 3
337 2 5278616 6.08 372 95 2 8603 1 3
338 3 5343000 7.37 372 52 2 8603 1 3
339 4 5390818 8.33 372 16 2 8603 1 3
340 5 5395307 8.42 372 61 2 8603 1 3
341 6 5491678 10.36 372 127 2 8603 1 3
342 7 5491800 10.36 372 72 2 8603 1 3
343 8 5543392 11.40 372 49 2 8603 1 3
344 9 5632916 13.20 372 96 2 8603 1 3
345 10 5771255 15.98 372 21 2 8603 1 3
346 11 5824840 17.05 372 30 2 8603 1 3
347 12 5879835 18.16 372 122 2 8603 1 3
348 13 6088272 22.35 372 142 3 8603 1 3
349 14 6288539 26.37 372 2 2 8603 1 3
350 15 6293714 26.48 372 26 3 8603 1 3
365
351 16 6680000 34.24 372 54 3 8603 1 3
352 17 6825235 37.16 372 SO 2 8603 1 3
729 1 2528168 0.00 374 48 1 8605 2 5
730 2 2677421 5.90 374 71 2 8605 2 5
731 3 2803564 10.89 374 95 2 8605 2 5
732 4 2887957 14.23 374 32 1 8605 2 5
733 5 2931858 15.97 374 144 1 8605 2 5
734 6 2996300 18.52 374 143 1 8605 2 5
735 7 3282828 29.85 374 64 1 8605 2 5
736 8 3301135 30.57 374 93 1 8605 2 5
737 9 3328304 31.65 374 86 1 8605 2 5
738 10 4037178 59.69 374 139 1 8605 2 5
1286 1 6903000 0.00 712 52 2 8605 1 7
1287 2 7100804 2.87 712 1 2 8605 1 7
1288 3 7168181 3.84 712 74 2 8605 1 7
1289 4 7187275 4.12 712 72 2 8605 1 7
1290 5 7188923 4.14 712 18 3 8605 1 7
1291 6 7339759 6.33 712 43 2 8605 1 7
1292 7 7365802 6.70 712 115 2 8605 1 7
1293 8 7339515 6.32 712 96 2 8605 1 7
1294 9 7412336 7.38 712 148 3 8605 1 7
1295 10 7455564 8.00 712 21 2 8605 1 7
1296 11 7555210 9.45 712 54 3 8605 1 7
1297 12 7666230 11.06 712 36 3 8605 1 7
1298 13 7688035 11.37 712 9 2 8605 1 7
1299 14 7792000 12.88 712 30 2 8605 1 7
1300 15 7803922 13.05 712 49 2 8605 1 7
1301 16 7894192 14.36 712 131 2 8605 1 7
1302 17 7904763 14.51 712 75 2 8605 1 7
1303 18 7905937 14.53 712 133 3 8605 1 7
1304 19 7988804 15.73 712 102 2 8605 1 7
1305 20 8039076 16.46 712 58 2 8605 1 7
1306 21 8064486 16.83 712 142 3 8605 1 7
1307 22 8069038 16.89 712 61 2 8605 1 7
1308 23 8081934 17.08 712 151 2 8605 1 7
1309 24 8268000 19.77 712 108 3 8605 1 7
1310 25 8272789 19.84 712 40 3 8605 1 7
1311 26 8444292 22.33 712 127 2 8605 1 7
1312 27 10804697 56.52 712 110 2 8605 1 7
267 1 8160101 0.00 372 6 2 8606 1 2
268 2 8490926 4.05 372 96 2 8606 1 2
269 3 8645156 5.94 372 129 2 8606 1 2
270 4 8721509 6.88 372 20 2 8606 1 2
271 5 8832495 8.24 372 27 3 8606 1 2
272 6 8955165 9.74 372 133 3 8606 1 2
273 7 9050000 10.91 372 30 2 8606 1 2
274 8 9054737 10.96 372 127 2 8606 1 2
275 9 9069058 11.14 372 50 2 8606 1 2
276 10 9161546 12.27 372 43 2 8606 1 2
277 11 9196038 12.70 372 18 3 8606 1 2
278 12 9277305 13.69 372 71 2 8606 1 2
279 13 9298176 13.95 372 69 3 8606 1 2
280 14 9373853 14.87 372 149 2 8606 1 2
281 15 9901508 21.34 372 152 3 8606 1 2
282 16 10232283 25.39 372 136 2 8606 1 2
283 17 10549951 29.29 372 99 2 8606 1 2
284 18 10625490 30.21 372 142 3 8606 1 2
285 19 11587222 42.00 372 45 2 8606 1 2
864 1 8253724 0.00 374 9 2 8606 1 5
865 2 8493000 2.90 374 108 3 8606 1 5
866 3 8677936 5.14 374 96 2 8606 1 5
867 4 8947479 8.41 374 115 2 8606 1 5
868 5 9108210 10.35 374 1 2 8606 1 5
869 6 9130956 10.63 374 72 2 8606 1 5
870 7 9274086 12.36 374 133 3 8606 1 5
871 8 9306778 12.76 374 58 2 8606 1 5
872 9 9331159 13.05 374 148 3 8606 1 5
873 10 9383957 13.69 374 61 2 8606 1 5
874 11 9385193 13.71 374 16 2 8606 1 5
875 12 9480000 14.86 374 54 3 8606 1 5
876 13 9510000 15.22 374 52 2 8606 1 5
877 14 9649634 16.91 374 49 2 8606 1 5
878 15 9727151 17.85 374 21 2 8606 1 5
879 16 9810956 18.87 374 142 3 8606 1 5
880 17 10357831 25.49 374 151 2 8606 1 5
881 18 10951369 32.68 374 104 2 8606 1 5
1077 1 21477171 0.00 374 51 3 8607 1 5
366
1078 2 22649529 5.46 374 152 3 8607 1 5
1079 3 22944365 6.83 374 121 3 8607 1 5
1080 4 23282529 8.41 374 148 3 8607 1 5
1081 5 23380000 8.86 374 108 3 8607 1 5
1082 6 23386172 8.89 374 26 3 8607 1 5
1083 7 24217153 12.76 374 119 3 8607 1 5
1084 8 24310849 13.19 374 4 3 8607 1 5
1085 9 24729719 15.14 374 24 3 8607 1 5
1086 10 26719621 24.41 374 109 3 8607 1 5
1087 11 27022887 25.82 374 124 3 8607 1 5
1088 12 28652465 33.41 374 146 3 8607 1 5
367 1 11553623 0.00 372 1 2 8608 1 2
368 2 11663176 0.95 372 21 2 8608 1 2
369 3 12088191 4.63 372 106 2 8608 1 2
370 4 12898572 11.64 372 9 2 8608 1 2
371 5 12899736 11.65 372 96 2 8608 1 2
372 6 12910098 11.74 372 16 2 8608 1 2
373 7 13180449 14.08 372 58 2 8608 1 2
374 8 13200000 14.25 372 52 2 8608 1 2
375 9 13227292 14.49 372 61 2 8608 1 2
376 10 13230058 14.51 372 74 2 8608 1 2
377 11 13671395 18.33 372 2 2 8608 1 2
378 12 13870000 20.05 372 108 3 8608 1 2
379 13 14431161 24.91 372 20 2 8608 1 2
380 14 14717026 27.38 372 119 3 8608 1 2
381 15 14830243 28.36 372 26 3 8608 1 2
382 16 15291058 32.35 372 142 3 8608 1 2
383 17 15298536 32.41 372 18 3 8608 1 2
739 1 1033373 0.00 374 101 1 8608 2 5
740 2 1119440 8.33 374 93 1 8608 2 5
741 3 1157631 12.02 374 34 1 8608 2 5
742 4 1373488 32.91 374 127 2 8608 2 5
743 5 1484748 43.68 374 119 3 8608 2 5
744 6 1502060 45.36 374 32 1 8608 2 5
745 7 1566933 51.63 374 48 1 8608 2 5
746 8 1571077 52.03 374 71 2 8608 2 5
747 9 1617426 56.52 374 64 1 8608 2 5
748 10 1654811 60.14 374 18 3 8608 2 5
749 11 3298910 219.24 374 70 1 8608 2 5
750 1 1888888 0.00 374 64 1 8609 2 5
751 2 2293926 21.44 374 119 3 8609 2 5
752 3 2378000 25.89 374 130 1 8609 2 5
753 4 2447478 29.57 374 48 1 8609 2 5
754 5 2450818 29.75 374 55 1 8609 2 5
755 6 2613804 38.38 374 93 1 8609 2 5
756 7 2946772 56.01 374 32 1 8609 2 5
757 8 2988842 58.23 374 137 1 8609 2 5
758 9 3433494 81.77 374 20 2 8609 2 5
448 1 9030485 0.00 372 119 3 8610 1 2
449 2 9309231 3.09 372 43 2 8610 1 2
450 3 9403687 4.13 372 96 2 8610 1 2
451 4 9840673 8.97 372 48 2 8610 1 2
452 5 9861721 9.20 372 74 2 8610 1 2
453 6 9868610 9.28 372 21 2 8610 1 2
454 7 10186837 12.80 372 115 2 8610 1 2
455 8 10385000 15.00 372 108 3 8610 1 2
456 9 10404419 15.21 372 118 2 8610 1 2
457 10 10654982 17.99 372 2 2 8610 1 2
458 11 10688544 18.36 372 16 2 8610 1 2
459 12 11338135 25.55 372 72 2 8610 1 2
460 13 11355660 25.75 372 151 2 8610 1 2
461 14 11561506 28.03 372 61 2 8610 1 2
462 15 12299832 36.20 372 148 3 8610 1 2
463 16 12812812 41.88 372 127 2 8610 1 2
759 1 1300000 0.00 374 130 1 8610 2 5
760 2 1338023 2.92 374 17 1 8610 2 5
761 3 1488560 14.50 374 83 1 8610 2 5
762 4 1633631 25.66 374 119 3 8610 2 5
763 5 2700000 107.69 374 64 1 8610 2 5
918 1 28603634 0.00 374 124 3 8610 2 5
919 2 29661595 3.70 374 67 3 8610 2 5
920 3 31141000 8.87 374 88 3 8610 2 5
921 4 32261692 12.79 374 76 3 8610 2 5
922 5 32996853 15.36 374 10 3 8610 2 5
923 6 33788000 18.12 374 66 3 8610 2 5
924 7 35195628 23.05 374 51 3 8610 2 5
925 8 37653522 31.64 374 31 3 8610 2 5
367
926 9 38323000 33.98 374 108 3 8610 2 5
927 10 38500000 34.60 374 111 3 8610 2 5
928 11 39801842 39.15 374 18 3 8610 2 5
929 12 41131113 43.80 374 109 3 8610 2 5
930 13 42057416 47.04 374 148 3 8610 2 5
1422 1 629414 0.00 712 97 1 8611 2 7
1423 2 722182 14.74 712 127 2 8611 2 7
1424 3 844123 34.11 712 64 1 8611 2 7
1425 4 865337 37.48 712 18 3 8611 2 7
901 1 9257333 0.00 374 96 2 8612 2 5
902 2 9389505 1.43 374 94 2 8612 2 5
903 3 9898133 6.92 374 71 2 8612 2 5
904 4 9990000 7.91 374 52 2 8612 2 5
905 5 10016002 8.20 374 21 2 8612 2 5
906 6 10713512 15.73 374 118 2 8612 2 S
907 7 11551103 24.78 374 50 2 8612 2 S
1411 1 1475575 0.00 712 155 1 8612 1 7
1412 2 1711416 15.98 712 118 2 8612 1 7
1413 3 1770873 20.01 712 48 2 8612 1 7
1414 4 1784381 20.93 712 16 2 8612 1 7
1415 5 1894612 28.40 712 180 1 8612 1 7
1416 6 1899601 28.74 712 38 1 8612 1 7
1417 7 1930000 30.80 712 52 2 8612 1 7
1418 8 1969765 33.49 712 86 1 8612 1 7
1419 9 2013226 36.44 712 119 3 8612 1 7
1420 10 2092330 41.80 712 32 1 8612 1 7
1421 11 2727889 84.87 712 64 1 8612 1 7
1779 1 11525142 0.00 713 61 2 8703 1 8
1780 2 11772000 2.14 713 43 2 8703 1 8
1781 3 12044151 4.50 713 18 3 8703 1 8
1782 4 12070000 4.73 713 52 2 8703 1 8
1783 5 12170540 5.60 713 96 2 8703 1 8
1784 6 12318883 6.89 713 48 2 8703 1 8
1785 7 12418440 7.75 713 49 2 8703 1 8
1786 8 12439554 7.93 713 6 2 8703 1 8
1787 9 12623804 9.53 713 115 2 8703 1 8
1788 10 12740225 10.54 713 16 2 8703 1 8
1789 11 12782480 10.91 713 21 2 8703 1 8
1790 12 13090405 13.58 713 127 2 8703 1 8
1791 13 13572132 17.76 713 9 2 8703 1 8
1792 14 13619445 18.17 713 122 2 8703 1 8
1793 15 13703711 18.90 713 152 3 8703 1 8
1794 16 14292235 24.01 713 60 3 8703 1 8
1795 17 14413336 25.06 713 94 2 8703 1 8
1796 18 14973961 29.92 713 71 2 8703 1 8
1797 19 15991038 38.75 713 50 2 8703 1 8
431 1 4750155 0.00 372 21 2 8704 1 3
432 2 4971933 4.67 372 96 2 8704 1 3
433 3 5077800 6.90 372 52 2 6704 1 3
434 4 5185224 9.16 372 49 2 8704 1 3
435 5 5204283 9.56 372 142 3 8704 1 3
436 6 5374313 13.14 372 127 2 8704 1 3
437 7 5528638 16.39 372 122 2 8704 1 3
438 8 5651593 18.98 372 64 1 8704 1 3
439 9 5853394 23.23 372 16 2 8704 1 3
440 10 5882338 23.83 372 136 2 8704 1 3
441 11 6454896 35.89 372 18 3 8704 1 3
442 12 6621286 39.39 372 94 2 8704 1 3
1764 1 11882332 0.00 713 43 2 8704 1 8
1765 2 11891023 0.07 713 18 3 8704 1 8
1766 3 12323000 3.71 713 52 2 8704 1 8
1767 4 12528522 5.44 713 6 2 8704 1 8
1768 5 12745126 7.26 713 49 2 8704 1 8
1769 6 12843713 8.09 713 122 2 8704 1 8
1770 7 12860000 8.23 713 94 2 13704 1 8
1771 8 12985719 9.29 713 127 2 8704 1 8
1772 9 13417005 12.92 713 16 2 8704 1 8
1773 10 13497359 13.59 713 9 2 8704 1 8
1774 11 13557837 14.10 713 26 3 8704 1 8
1775 12 13681131 15.14 713 136 2 8704 1 8
1776 13 14760237 24.22 713 61 2 8704 1 8
764 1 2278880 0.00 374 101 1 8706 2 5
765 2 2811620 23.38 374 148 3 8706 2 5
766 3 2928434 28.50 374 18 3 8706 2 5
767 4 2944480 29.21 374 137 1 8706 2 5
768 5 2963451 30.04 374 62 1 8706 2 5
769 6 3615000 58.63 374 64 1 8706 2 5
368
857 1 54535944 0.00 374 148 3 8706 1 6
858 2 54815585 0.51 374 135 3 8706 1 6
859 3 55069270 0.98 374 69 3 8706 1 6
860 4 58053379 6.45 374 119 3 8706 1 6
861 5 59700000 9.47 374 3 3 8706 1 6
862 6 59800000 9.65 374 111 3 8706 1 6
863 7 67882699 24.47 374 113 3 8706 1 6
1330 1 7665000 0.00 712 52 2 8706 1 7
1331 2 7729000 0.83 712 107 2 8706 1 7
1332 3 7794000 1.68 712 29 2 8706 1 7
1333 4 7908189 3.17 712 49 2 8706 1 7
1334 5 7938523 3.57 712 36 3 8706 1 7
1335 6 7950804 3.73 712 18 3 8706 1 7
1336 7 7986231 4.19 712 20 2 8706 1 7
1337 8 7989934 4.24 712 127 2 8706 1 7
1338 9 8084941 5.48 712 115 2 8706 1 7
1339 10 8116806 5.89 712 122 2 8706 1 7
1340 11 8155640 6.40 712 43 2 8706 1 7
1341 12 8495375 10.83 712 21 2 8706 1 7
1342 13 8976526 17.11 712 37 3 8706 1 7
1343 14 8981269 17.17 712 94 2 8706 1 7
1344 15 9104054 18.77 712 146 3 8706 1 7
1345 16 9288248 21.18 712 64 1 8706 1 7
1346 17 9385411 22.45 712 9 2 8706 1 7
1375 1 7919000 0.00 712 107 2 8706 1 7
1376 2 7923523 0.06 712 142 3 8706 1 7
1377 3 8021357 1.29 712 49 2 8706 1 7
1378 4 8039647 1.52 712 96 2 8706 1 7
1379 5 8064730 1.84 712 20 2 8706 1 7
1380 6 8150000 2.92 712 52 2 8706 1 7
1381 7 8290723 4.69 712 127 2 8706 1 7
1382 8 8492297 7.24 712 18 3 8706 1 7
1383 9 8623658 8.90 712 26 3 8706 1 7
1384 10 8674521 9.54 712 64 1 8706 1 7
1385 11 8678461 9.59 712 21 2 8706 1 7
1386 12 8951599 13.04 712 131 2 8706 1 7
1387 13 9202451 16.21 712 9 2 8706 1 7
1388 14 9260000 16.93 712 94 2 8706 1 7
1389 15 9261174 16.95 712 36 3 8706 1 7
443 1 4600000 0.00 372 18 3 8708 1 3
444 2 4817144 4.72 372 21 2 8708 1 3
445 3 6093090 32.46 372 48 2 8708 1 3
446 4 6400966 39.15 372 26 3 8708 1 3
447 5 6900000 50.00 372 40 3 8708 1 3
1402 1 1019238 0.00 712 185 1 8708 2 7
1403 2 1030670 1.12 712 179 1 8708 2 7
1404 3 1032300 1.28 712 125 1 8708 2 7
1405 4 1093259 7.26 712 195 1 8708 2 7
1406 5 1145941 12.43 712 86 1 8708 2 7
1407 6 1238701 21.53 712 64 1 8708 2 7
1408 7 1767830 73.45 712 25 1 8708 2 7
1409 8 1794370 76.05 712 103 1 8708 2 7
1410 9 1988000 95.05 712 8 3 8708 2 7
908 1 111168000 0.00 374 124 3 8709 1 6
909 2 117382053 5.59 374 135 3 8709 1 6
910 3 118807679 6.87 374 109 3 8709 1 6
911 4 119980000 7.93 374 14 3 8709 1 6
912 5 121231728 9.05 374 140 3 8709 1 6
913 6 122000000 9.74 374 108 3 8709 1 6
914 7 122970000 10.62 374 3 3 8709 1 6
915 8 126100000 13.43 374 88 3 8709 1 6
916 9 126685982 13.96 374 148 3 8709 1 6
917 10 138000000 24.14 374 111 3 8709 1 6
2489 1 18286365 0.00 848 18 3 8710 1 15
2490 2 21436285 17.23 848 119 3 8710 1 15
2491 3 21643021 18.36 848 37 3 8710 1 15
2492 4 21738027 18.88 848 135 3 8710 1 15
2493 5 22843513 24.92 848 12 3 8710 1 15
2494 6 25221584 37.93 848 69 3 8710 1 15
2495 7 25581925 39.90 848 9 2 8710 1 15
2496 8 25833102 41.27 848 133 3 8710 1 15
2497 9 27786655 51.95 848 142 3 8710 1 15
152 1 9334750 0.00 372 49 2 8711 1 3
153 2 9892174 5.97 372 48 2 8711 1 3
154 3 10599411 13.55 372 136 2 8711 1 3
155 4 11431397 22.46 372 127 2 8711 1 3
156 5 12986229 39.12 372 40 3 8711 1 3
369
157 6 22219690 138.03 372 85 2 8711 1 3
333 1 3888550 0.00 372 49 2 8711 1 3
334 2 4586058 17.94 372 18 3 8711 1 3
335 3 7244241 86.30 372 129 2 8711 1 3
464 1 16857446 0.00 848 74 2 8711 1 15
465 2 16890166 0.19 848 8 3 8711 1 15
466 3 17221604 2.16 848 11 3 8711 1 15
467 4 17419208 3.33 848 14 3 8711 1 15
468 5 17819409 5.71 848 148 3 8711 1 15
469 6 17873043 6.02 848 119 3 8711 1 15
470 7 17977374 6.64 848 134 3 8711 1 15
471 8 18680000 10.81 848 81 3 8711 1 15
472 9 19252677 14.21 848 24 3 8711 1 15
473 10 19452000 15.39 848 88 3 8711 1 15
474 11 19621523 16.40 848 69 3 8711 1 15
475 12 20452269 21.32 848 109 3 8711 1 15
476 13 21370000 26.77 848 3 3 8711 1 15
477 14 23414551 38.90 848 142 3 8711 1 15
478 15 30942009 83.55 848 33 3 8711 1 15
1956 1 29418936 0.00 713 109 3 8711 1 9
1957 2 30733884 4.47 713 142 3 8711 1 9
1958 3 32508717 10.50 713 11 3 8711 1 9
1959 4 32600000 10.81 713 3 3 8711 1 9
1960 5 32798241 11.49 713 18 3 8711 1 9
1961 6 34102653 15.92 713 12 3 8711 1 9
1962 7 34600000 17.61 713 108 3 8711 1 9
1963 8 36423648 23.81 713 133 3 8711 1 9
479 1 34299000 0.00 848 42 3 8712 1 15
480 2 34969867 1.96 848 37 3 8712 1 15
481 3 35856023 4.54 848 12 3 8712 1 15
482 4 35992074 4.94 848 142 3 8712 1 15
483 5 36200000 5.54 848 18 3 8712 1 15
484 6 36214044 5.58 848 113 3 8712 1 15
485 7 37823388 10.28 848 133 3 8712 1 15
486 8 38179105 11.31 848 24 3 8712 1 15
487 9 41699211 21.58 848 14 3 8712 1 15
488 10 44480000 29.68 848 124 3 8712 1 15
936 1 54516745 0.00 374 148 3 8712 1 5
937 2 55433968 1.68 374 11 3 8712 1 5
938 3 55670000 2.12 374 108 3 8712 1 5
939 4 60404341 10.80 374 35 3 8712 1 5
940 5 62546000 14.73 374 117 3 8712 1 5
941 6 74788648 37.18 374 14 3 8712 1 5
1964 1 20299047 0.00 713 133 3 8712 1 8
1965 2 20391470 0.46 713 188 3 8712 1 8
1966 3 22000611 8.38 713 142 3 8712 1 8
1967 4 22805463 12.35 713 42 3 8712 1 8
1968 5 23231397 14.45 713 109 3 8712 1 8
1969 6 23400000 15.28 713 3 3 8712 1 8
1970 7 23787827 17.19 713 12 3 8712 1 8
422 1 25000010 0.00 372 18 3 8801 1 3
423 2 26456357 5.83 372 37 3 8801 1 3
424 3 26682212 6.73 372 12 3 8801 1 3
425 4 27370778 9.48 372 142 3 8801 1 3
426 5 27790471 11.16 372 24 3 8801 1 3
427 6 29659090 18.64 372 148 3 8801 1 3
428 7 29941072 19.76 372 135 3 8801 1 3
429 8 33015650 32.06 372 133 3 8801 1 3
430 9 35751893 43.01 372 109 3 8801 1 3
788 1 29913191 0.00 374 37 3 8803 1 5
789 2 30200000 0.96 374 12 3 8803 1 5
790 3 31658743 5.84 374 9 2 8803 1 5
791 4 36000000 20.35 374 40 3 8803 1 5
792 5 36410187 21.72 374 148 3 8803 1 5
1243 1 62639711 0.00 713 148 3 8803 1 11
1244 2 69373394 10.75 713 109 3 8803 1 11
1777 1 41550816 0.00 713 148 3 8803 1 9
1778 2 49726871 19.68 713 109 3 8803 1 9
1245 1 13513399 0.00 712 43 2 8804 1 7
1246 2 14362387 6.28 712 1 2 8804 1 7
1247 3 14385499 6.45 712 48 2 8804 1 7
1248 4 14641961 8.35 712 39 2 8804 1 7
1249 5 15438000 14.24 712 52 2 8804 1 7
1250 6 15608070 15.50 712 142 3 8804 1 7
1251 7 15613839 15.54 712 128 2 8804 1 7
1252 8 16468192 21.87 712 27 3 8804 1 7
1253 9 18356997 35.84 712 18 3 8804 1 7
370
1758 1 80683227 0.00 713 27 3 8804 1 10
1759 2 82984716 2.85 713 69 3 8804 1 10
1760 3 92937599 15.19 713 148 3 8804 1 10
1761 4 99682802 23.55 713 109 3 8804 1 10
1971 1 9923551 0.00 713 122 2 8804 2 8
1972 2 13580250 36.85 713 52 2 8804 2 8
1973 3 13654916 37.60 713 48 2 8804 2 8
1974 4 22793236 129.69 713 94 2 8804 2 8
1347 1 10096092 0.00 712 118 2 8805 1 7
1348 2 10135602 0.39 712 1 2 8805 1 7
1349 3 10430184 3.31 712 127 2 8805 1 7
1350 4 10475901 3.76 712 52 2 8805 1 7
1351 5 10768016 6.66 712 39 2 8805 1 7
1352 6 10855213 7.52 712 136 2 8805 1 7
1353 7 11638726 15.28 712 48 2 8805 1 7
1354 8 11680279 15.69 712 61 2 8805 1 7
1355 9 12000000 18.86 712 107 2 8805 1 7
1356 10 12380289 22.62 712 21 2 8805 1 7
1357 11 12889648 27.67 712 18 3 8805 1 7
1358 12 12968895 28.45 712 129 2 8805 1 7
1359 13 13222629 30.97 712 152 3 8805 1 7
1360 14 13629688 35.00 712 26 3 8805 1 7
1361 15 14998379 48.56 712 94 2 8805 1 7
1505 1 5898990 0.00 712 48 2 8805 1 7
1506 2 6173869 4.66 712 127 2 8805 1 7
1507 3 6177415 4.72 712 126 3 8805 1 7
1508 4 6251036 5.97 712 52 2 8805 1 7
1509 s 6319307 7.13 712 9 2 8805 1 7
1510 6 6330000 7.31 712 40 3 8805 1 7
1511 7 6442759 9.22 712 136 2 8805 1 7
1512 8 6453173 9.39 712 74 2 8805 1 7
1513 9 6701806 13.61 712 79 2 8805 1 7
1514 10 6812568 15.49 712 150 3 8805 1 7
1515 11 7042903 19.39 712 104 2 8805 1 7
1516 12 7063475 19.74 712 61 2 8805 1 7
1517 13 7098039 20.33 712 102 2 8805 1 7
1362 1 9665075 0.00 712 52 2 8806 1 7
1363 2 9685226 0.21 712 1 2 8806 1 7
1364 3 9881497 2.24 712 136 2 8806 1 7
1365 4 10637737 10.06 712 152 3 8806 1 7
1366 5 10670351 10.40 712 61 2 8806 1 7
1367 6 10839158 12.15 712 127 2 8806 1 7
1368 7 11292277 16.84 712 41 2 8806 1 7
1369 8 11559696 19.60 712 48 2 8806 1 7
1370 9 12098037 25.17 712 21 2 8806 1 7
1371 10 12335411 27.63 712 18 3 8806 1 7
1372 11 12348648 27.77 712 71 2 8806 1 7
1373 12 12493935 29.27 712 142 3 8806 1 7
1374 13 12932331 33.80 712 94 2 8806 1 7
1390 1 10006665 0.00 712 52 2 8806 1 7
1391 2 10094092 0.87 712 1 2 8806 1 7
1392 3 11100000 10.93 712 107 2 8806 1 7
1393 4 11133088 11.26 712 127 2 8806 1 7
1394 5 11246654 12.39 712 152 3 8806 1 7
1395 6 11709137 17.01 712 136 2 8806 1 7
1396 7 11840505 18.33 712 48 2 8806 1 7
1397 8 12209361 22.01 712 142 3 8806 1 7
1398 9 12304241 22.96 712 61 2 8806 1 7
1399 10 13258519 32.50 712 18 3 8806 1 7
1400 11 13767284 37.58 712 50 2 8806 1 7
1401 12 13890035 38.81 712 129 2 8806 1 7
561 1 7315666 0.00 372 1 2 8809 1 3
562 2 7571670 3.50 372 136 2 8809 1 3
563 3 7636397 4.38 372 96 2 8809 1 3
564 4 7951058 8.69 372 127 2 8809 1 3
565 s 8596529 17.51 372 75 2 8809 1 3
566 6 8713245 19.10 372 48 2 8809 1 3
567 7 8751424 19.63 372 21 2 8809 1 3
568 8 8831898 20.73 372 18 3 8809 1 3
569 9 8855209 21.04 372 50 2 8809 1 3
570 10 9293973 27.04 372 128 2 8809 1 3
571 11 10339844 41.34 372 58 2 8809 1 3
572 12 10775618 47.30 372 158 2 8809 1 3
573 13 15888794 117.19 372 2 2 8809 1 3
1089 1 49333192 0.00 374 148 3 8811 1 5
1090 2 51255305 3.90 374 109 3 8811 1 5
1091 3 53230000 7.90 374 117 3 8811 1 5
371
1977 1 41868321 0.00 713 11 3 8811 1 9
1978 2 41999995 0.31 713 61 2 8811 1 9
1979 3 42430222 1.34 713 48 2 8811 1 9
1980 4 43351437 3.54 713 136 2 8811 1 9
1981 5 43702287 4.38 713 160 3 8811 1 9
1982 6 43949336 4.97 713 9 2 8811 1 9
1983 7 44015053 5.13 713 115 2 8811 1 9
1984 8 44993347 7.46 713 122 2 8811 1 9
1985 9 46127000 10.17 713 43 2 8811 1 9
1986 10 47468551 13.38 713 148 3 8811 1 9
1987 11 48022030 14.70 713 164 3 8811 1 9
1988 12 48600000 16.08 713 40 3 8811 1 9
1989 13 48742133 16.42 713 74 3 8811 1 9
1990 14 50808338 21.35 713 76 3 8811 1 9
1991 15 51340449 22.62 713 104 2 8811 1 9
1992 1 20358464 0.00 713 160 3 8811 1 8
1993 2 20880174 2.56 713 136 2 8811 1 8
1994 3 21995700 8.04 713 127 2 8811 1 8
1995 4 22519758 10.62 713 21 2 8811 1 8
1996 5 22876714 12.37 713 96 2 8811 1 8
1997 6 23500000 15.43 713 159 3 8811 1 8
1998 7 23936172 17.57 713 43 2 8811 1 8
1999 8 23983817 17.81 713 11 3 8811 1 8
2000 9 24184736 18.79 713 164 3 8811 1 8
2001 10 24748052 21.56 713 122 2 8811 1 8
2002 11 25362938 24.58 713 61 2 8811 1 8
2003 12 25415039 24.84 713 115 2 8811 1 8
2004 13 25464967 25.08 713 148 3 8811 1 8
2005 14 35947527 76.57 713 152 3 8811 1 8
2006 15 26000000 27.71 713 40 3 8811 1 8
2007 16 26152282 28.46 713 48 2 8811 1 8
2008 17 26289053 29.13 713 24 3 8811 1 8
2009 18 26712923 31.21 713 74 3 8811 1 8
2010 19 27133174 33.28 713 119 3 8811 1 8
2011 20 28375702 39.38 713 121 3 8811 1 8
2012 21 28962405 42.26 713 126 3 8811 1 8
2013 22 31376013 54.12 713 27 3 8811 1 8
2014 1 38880525 0.00 713 136 2 8811 1 9
2015 2 39595064 1.84 713 11 3 8811 1 9
2016 3 39670505 2.03 713 61 2 8811 1 9
2017 4 39993000 2.86 713 159 3 8811 1 9
2018 5 40772922 4.87 713 115 2 8811 1 9
2019 6 42000000 8.02 713 40 3 8811 1 9
2020 7 42088570 8.25 713 122 2 8811 1 9
2021 8 42971490 10.52 713 52 2 8811 1 9
2022 9 42998900 10.59 713 9 2 8811 1 9
2023 10 43211322 11.14 713 48 2 8811 1 9
2024 11 43547413 12.00 713 75 2 8811 1 9
2025 12 44187036 13.65 713 74 3 8811 1 9
2026 13 45891843 18.03 713 1 2 8811 1 9
2027 14 47310743 21.68 713 148 3 8811 1 9
2028 15 47699684 22.68 713 104 2 8811 1 9
2029 16 48545376 24.86 713 27 3 8811 1 9
2030 17 49631538 27.65 713 121 3 8811 1 9
574 1 8390311 0.00 372 96 2 8812 1 3
575 2 8824379 5.17 372 127 2 8812 1 3
576 3 8979025 7.02 372 75 2 8812 1 3
577 4 9360188 11.56 372 136 2 8812 1 3
578 5 9380667 11.80 372 1 2 8812 1 3
579 6 9398900 12.02 372 50 2 8812 1 3
580 7 9634629 14.83 372 128 2 8812 1 3
581 8 9666100 15.21 372 193 2 8812 1 3
582 9 10136944 20.82 372 18 3 8812 1 3
583 10 10198676 21.55 372 72 2 8812 1 3
584 11 10397721 23.93 372 61 2 8812 1 3
585 12 10579937 26.10 372 16 2 8812 1 3
586 13 10812000 28.86 372 107 2 8812 1 3
587 14 12685849 51.20 372 121 3 8812 1 3
1461 1 21676592 0.00 712 128 2 8901 1 7
1462 2 23098745 6.56 712 1 2 8901 1 7
1463 3 23980000 10.63 712 158 2 8901 1 7
1464 4 24882160 14.79 712 121 3 8901 1 7
1465 5 25980678 19.86 712 96 2 8901 1 7
1466 6 26282800 21.25 712 107 2 8901 1 7
1467 7 26343820 21.53 712 11 3 8901 1 7
1468 8 26606940 22.75 712 74 3 8901 1 7
1469 9 26815569 23.71 712 104 2 8901 1 7
372
1470 10 27316571 26.02 712 33 3	 8901 1 7
1471 11 27755321 28.04 712 122 3	 8901 1 7
1472 12 28224697 30.21 712 50 2	 8901 1 7
1473 13 30365905 40.09 712 18 3	 8901 1 7
1474 14 31509948 45.36 712 129 2	 8901 1 7
2031 1 45416275 0.00 713 152 3	 8901 1 9
2032 2 47502608 4.59 713 1 2	 8901 1 9
2033 3 47900381 5.47 713 21 2	 8901 1 9
2034 4 49907992 9.89 713 118 2	 8901 1 9
2035 5 52800000 16.26 713 9 2	 8901 1 9
2036 6 53252307 17.25 713 69 3	 8901 1 9
2037 7 53506813 17.81 713 26 3	 8901 1 9
2038 8 54008080 18.92 713 61 2	 8901 1 9
2039 9 54047953 19.01 713 74 3	 8901 1 9
2040 10 54073195 19.06 713 122 3	 8901 1 9
2041 11 54160337 19.25 713 104 2	 8901 1 9
2042 12 56137235 23.61 713 96 2	 8901 1 9
2043 13 56700000 24.85 713 126 3	 8901 1 9
2044 14 61502697 35.42 713 121 3	 8901 1 9
2045 15 65855222 45.00 713 18 3	 8901 1 9
2046 16 70048649 54.24 713 142 3	 8901 1 9
1105 1 49360690 0.00 374 119 3	 8902 1 6
1106 2 50713504 2.74 374 73 3	 8902 1 6
1107 3 54883841 11.19 374 108 3	 8902 1 6
1108 4 55373908 12.18 374 35 3	 8902 1 6
1109 5 56055860 13.56 374 148 3	 8902 1 6
1110 6 56162258 13.78 374 24 3	 8902 1 6
1111 7 57220973 15.92 374 109 3	 8902 1 6
1112 8 57900000 17.30 374 3 3	 8902 1 6
1113 9 61534072 24.66 374 135 3	 8902 1 6
1475 1 23033382 0.00 712 127 2	 8902 1 7
1476 2 23297565 1.15 712 1 2	 8902 1 7
1477 3 23829330 3.46 712 121 3	 8902 1 7
1478 4 24695267 7.22 712 61 2	 8902 1 7
1479 5 24990015 8.49 712 73 3	 8902 1 7
1480 6 28572376 24.05 712 18 3	 8902 1 7
1092 1 680338 0.00 374 64 1	 8903 2 5
1093 2 743586 9.30 374 132 1	 8903 2 5
1094 3 827094 21.57 374 171 1	 8903 2 5
1095 4 884000 29.94 374 101 1	 8903 2 5
1096 5 898581 32.08 374 86 1	 8903 2 5
1097 6 899428 32.20 374 72 2	 8903 2 5
1098 7 906790 33.29 374 44 1	 8903 2 5
1099 8 938349 37.92 374 191 1	 8903 2 5
1100 9 971264 42.76 374 143 1	 8903 2 5
1101 10 993188 45.98 374 131 2	 8903 2 5
1102 11 1096258 61.13 374 165 1	 8903 2 5
1103 12 1099215 61.57 374 139 1	 8903 2 5
1104 13 1411174 107.42 374 5 1	 8903 2 5
1114 1 32740988 0.00 374 24 3	 8903 1 5
1115 2 32754120 0.04 374 106 2	 8903 1 5
1116 3 33500000 2.32 374 3 3	 8903 1 5
1117 4 34121275 4.22 374 9 2	 8903 1 5
1118 5 34604731 5.69 374 148 3	 8903 1 5
1119 6 35742011 9.17 374 35 3	 8903 1 5
1120 7 37879003 15.69 374 166 3	 8903 1 5
1034 1 6286516 0.00 374 75 2	 8904 2 5
1035 2 6301522 0.24 374 118 2	 8904 2 5
1036 3 6543139 4.08 374 72 2	 8904 2 5
1037 4 6900321 9.76 374 127 2	 8904 2 5
1038 5 6976500 10.98 374 26 3	 8904 2 5
1039 6 7649049 21.67 374 43 2	 8904 2 5
1040 7 7933049 26.19 374 18 3	 8904 2 5
2108 1 1422699 0.00 374 93 1	 8904 2 5
2109 2 1598381 12.35 374 101 1	 8904 2 5
2110 3 1768800 24.33 374 183 1	 8904 2 5
2111 4 1797454 26.34 374 165 1	 8904 2 5
2112 5 1888198 32.72 374 86 1	 8904 2 5
2047 1 4751506 0.00 713 129 2	 8905 2 8
2048 2 4781000 0.62 713 96 2	 8905 2 8
2049 3 5289184 11.32 713 122 3	 8905 2 8
2050 4 6146142 29.35 713 21 2	 8905 2 8
2051 5 6182542 30.12 713 20 2	 8905 2 8
1121 1 55490957 0.00 374 69 3	 8907 2 6
1122 2 59000000 6.32 374 124 3	 8907 2 6
1123 3 59108470 6.52 374 35 3	 8907 2 6
1124 4 59475096 7.18 374 24 3	 8907 2 6
373
1125 5 60519618 9.06 374 135 3	 8907 2	 6
1126 6 61187795 10.27 374 148 3	 8907 2	 6
1127 7 61447280 10.73 374 178 3	 8907 2	 6
1128 8 62898852 13.35 374 146 3	 8907 2	 6
1129 9 64025840 15.38 374 109 3	 8907 2	 6
1130 10 64500000 16.24 374 3 3	 8907 2	 6
1131 11 65769724 18.52 374 108 3	 8907 2	 6
1132 12 66378000 19.62 374 117 3	 8907 2	 6
2097 1 35447695 0.00 848 69 3	 8907 1	 15
2098 2 38304584 8.06 848 14 3	 8907 1	 15
2099 3 38435378 8.43 848 109 3	 8907 1	 15
2100 4 38798863 9.45 848 9 2	 8907 1	 15
2101 5 38950501 9.88 848 146 3	 8907 1	 15
2102 6 38964887 9.92 848 148 3	 8907 1	 15
2103 7 41087560 15.91 848 108 3	 8907 1	 15
2104 8 42450000 19.75 848 3 3	 8907 1	 15
2105 9 44846000 26.51 848 117 3	 8907 1	 15
2106 10 45321189 27.85 848 152 3	 8907 1	 15
2107 11 46168824 30.24 848 71 3	 8907 1	 15
2526 1 17271800 0.00 848 39 2	 8907 1	 13
2527 2 17403008 0.76 848 72 2	 8907 1	 13
2528 3 17708730 2.53 848 6 2	 8907 1	 13
2529 4 18160025 5.14 848 96 2	 8907 1	 13
2530 5 18215000 5.46 848 158 2	 8907 1	 13
2531 6 18387088 6.46 848 48 2	 8907 1	 13
2532 7 18722908 8.40 848 129 2	 8907 1	 13
2533 8 18737348 8.49 848 1 2	 8907 1	 13
2534 9 18810908 8.91 848 21 2	 8907 1	 13
2535 10 19046718 10.28 848 61 2	 8907 1	 13
2536 11 19545591 13.16 848 118 2	 8907 1	 13
2537 12 19976975 15.66 848 9 2	 8907 1	 13
2538 13 20285732 17.45 848 26 3	 8907 1	 13
2539 14 21278833 23.20 848 151 2	 8907 1	 13
2540 15 21866903 26.60 848 104 2	 8907 1	 13
2541 16 21992033 27.33 848 18 3	 8907 1	 13
2542 17 22504947 30.30 848 121 3	 8907 1	 13
2543 18 22992584 33.12 848 177 2	 8907 1	 13
2544 19 23686760 37.14 848 142 3	 8907 1	 13
527 1 10599165 0.00 372 129 2	 8908 1	 3
528 2 10778268 1.69 372 50 2	 8908 1	 3
529 3 10837058 2.24 372 26 3	 8908 1	 3
530 4 11369560 7.27 372 72 2	 8908 1	 3
531 5 11558646 9.05 372 1 2	 8908 1	 3
532 6 11750236 10.86 372 127 2	 8908 1	 3
533 7 11884134 12.12 372 48 2	 8908 1	 3
534 8 12212059 15.22 372 96 2	 8908 1	 3
535 9 13080000 23.41 372 158 2	 8908 1	 3
536 10 13332685 25.79 372 18 3	 8908 1	 3
537 11 13870063 30.86 372 136 2	 8908 1	 3
538 12 14871806 40.31 372 142 3	 8908 1	 3
539 13 15056978 42.06 372 177 2	 8908 1	 3
540 14 17650823 66.53 372 2 2	 8908 1	 3
2088 1 28499808 0.00 848 148 3	 8908 1	 13
2089 2 29200000 2.46 848 3 3	 8908 1	 13
2090 3 30071662 5.52 848 133 3	 8908 1	 13
2091 4 31712934 11.27 848 69 3	 8908 1	 13
2092 5 31915310 11.98 848 71 3	 8908 1	 13
2093 6 33500000 17.54 848 40 3	 8908 1	 13
2094 7 33692373 18.22 848 36 3	 8908 1	 13
2095 8 36466673 27.95 848 122 3	 8908 1	 13
2096 9 37483946 31.52 848 146 3	 8908 1	 13
1884 1 58065212 0.00 713 146 3	 8909 1	 9
1885 2 60000088 3.33 713 152 3	 8909 1	 9
1886 3 60329000 3.90 713 74 3	 8909 1	 9
1887 4 60978329 5.02 713 26 3	 8909 1	 9
1888 5 61268668 5.52 713 24 3	 8909 1	 9
1889 6 63304583 9.02 713 27 3	 8909 1	 9
1890 7 63687127 9.68 713 160 3	 8909 1	 9
1891 8 64537131 11.15 713 11 3	 8909 1	 9
1892 9 64730698 11.48 713 148 3	 8909 1	 9
1893 10 64761223 11.53 713 71 3	 8909 1	 9
1894 11 64953708 11.86 713 8 3	 8909 1	 9
1895 12 66492882 14.51 713 109 3	 8909 1	 9
1896 13 68600000 18.14 713 40 3	 8909 1	 9
1897 14 69516783 19.72 713 12 3	 8909 1	 9
1898 15 70133274 20.78 713 122 3	 8909 1	 9
1899 16 71669260 23.43 713 88 3	 8909 1	 9
374
1900 1 29769999 0.00 713 72 2 8909 1 8
1901 2 31399326 5.47 713 61 2 8909 1 8
1902 3 32530010 9.27 713 26 3 8909 1 8
1903 4 33356739 12.05 713 127 2 8909 1 8
1904 s 33365075 12.08 713 1 2 8909 1 8
1905 6 33511451 12.57 713 74 3 8909 1 8
1906 7 34035811 14.33 713 24 3 8909 1 8
1907 8 34500000 15.89 713 94 2 8909 1 8
1908 9 34501897 15.89 713 48 2 8909 1 8
1909 10 35536611 19.37 713 129 2 8909 1 8
1910 11 35729346 20.02 713 21 2 8909 1 8
1911 12 36504915 22.62 713 142 3 8909 1 8
1912 13 36953402 24.13 713 122 3 8909 1 8
1913 14 37158348 24.82 713 121 3 8909 1 8
1914 15 37843941 27.12 713 138 2 8909 1 8
1915 16 38625361 29.75 713 18 3 8909 1 8
1916 17 40544014 36.19 713 177 2 8909 1 8
1917 1 31490739 0.00 713 61 2 8909 1 8
1918 2 31945992 1.45 713 18 3 8909 1 8
1919 3 32614144 3.57 713 127 2 8909 1 8
1920 4 32825032 4.24 713 1 2 8909 1 8
1921 5 32950000 4.63 713 158 2 8909 1 8
1922 6 33165119 5.32 713 26 3 8909 1 8
1923 7 33478440 6.31 713 48 2 8909 1 8
1924 8 35560868 12.92 713 43 2 8909 1 8
1925 9 38476764 22.18 713 15 2 8909 1 8
1926 10 39907241 26.73 713 24 3 8909 1 8
1927 11 42214560 34.05 713 136 2 8909 1 8
1928 1 28828689 0.00 713 61 2 8909 1 8
1929 2 29806236 3.39 713 1 2 8909 1 8
1930 3 29814850 3.42 713 96 2 13909 1 8
1931 4 29886234 3.67 713 118 2 8909 1 8
1932 5 30060000 4.27 713 158 2 8909 1 8
1933 6 30762207 6.71 713 26 3 8909 1 8
1934 7 30996903 7.52 713 48 2 8909 1 8
1935 8 31293170 8.55 713 129 2 8909 1 8
1936 9 31747273 10.12 713 127 2 8909 1 8
1937 10 31885256 10.60 713 18 3 8909 1 8
1938 11 38330192 32.96 713 136 2 8909 1 8
1022 1 54291819 0.00 374 148 3 8910 1 6
1023 2 58500000 7.75 374 40 3 8910 1 6
1024 3 58606500 7.95 374 115 3 8910 1 6
1025 4 59244634 9.12 374 12 3 8910 1 6
1026 5 59414838 9.44 374 109 3 8910 1 6
1027 6 59868803 10.27 374 122 3 8910 1 6
1028 7 60900000 12.17 374 126 3 8910 1 6
1029 8 62566886 15.24 374 37 3 8910 1 6
1030 9 65180682 20.06 374 142 3 8910 1 6
1031 10 67978353 25.21 374 18 3 13910 1 6
1032 11 68100972 25.44 374 166 3 8910 1 6
1033 12 73339545 35.08 374 71 3 8910 1 6
1426 1 28670767 0.00 712 1 2 8910 1 7
1427 2 29193487 1.82 712 127 2 8910 1 7
1428 3 29479449 2.82 712 167 2 8910 1 7
1429 4 29981103 4.57 712 129 2 8910 1 7
1430 5 29985534 4.59 712 20 2 8910 1 7
1431 6 30099584 4.98 712 6 2 8910 1 7
1432 7 30417620 6.09 712 152 3 8910 1 7
1433 8 30780940 7.36 712 128 2 8910 1 7
1434 9 32390574 12.97 712 61 2 8910 1 7
1435 10 33433000 16.61 712 159 3 8910 1 7
1436 11 36741626 28.15 712 18 3 8910 1 7
1437 12 44772640 56.16 712 2 2 13910 1 7
1855 1 29500000 0.00 713 158 2 8910 1 8
1856 2 30432746 3.16 713 74 3 8910 1 8
1857 3 30531109 3.50 713 18 3 8910 1 8
1858 4 30548025 3.55 713 148 3 8910 1 8
1859 5 30577239 3.65 713 26 3 8910 1 8
1860 6 31012474 5.13 713 1 2 8910 1 8
1861 7 31228695 5.86 713 11 3 8910 1 8
1862 8 31437315 6.57 713 129 2 8910 1 8
11363 9 31792299 7.77 713 127 2 8910 1 8
1864 10 31841151 7.94 713 20 2 8910 1 8
1865 11 32773376 11.10 713 61 2 8910 1 8
1866 12 32800000 11.19 713 94 2 8910 1 8
1867 13 33191385 12.51 713 24 3 8910 1 8
1868 14 34970930 18.55 713 48 2 8910 1 8
375
1869 15 35406436 20.02 713 15 2 8910 1 8
1870 16 35500000 20.34 713 3 3 8910 1 8
1871 17 35907251 21.72 713 142 3 8910 1 8
1872 1 57521942 0.00 713 74 3 8910 1 9
1873 2 58448470 1.61 713 11 3 8910 1 9
1874 3 59555446 3.54 713 146 3 8910 1 9
1875 4 59590763 3.60 713 18 3 8910 1 9
1876 5 59766729 3.90 713 148 3 8910 1 9
1877 6 60279852 4.79 713 24 3 8910 1 9
1878 7 62801658 9.18 713 160 3 8910 1 9
1879 8 63000000 9.52 713 40 3 8910 1 9
1880 9 63333333 10.10 713 71 3 8910 1 9
1881 10 63576943 10.53 713 109 3 8910 1 9
1882 11 64545997 12.21 713 115 3 8910 1 9
1883 12 64562378 12.24 713 122 3 8910 1 9
1835 1 66699396 0.00 713 152 3 8911 1 9
1836 2 67880000 1.77 713 142 3 8911 1 9
1837 3 68379149 2.52 713 24 3 8911 1 9
1838 4 69154406 3.68 713 148 3 8911 1 9
1839 5 69300000 3.90 713 71 3 8911 1 9
1840 6 69808732 4.66 713 160 3 8911 1 9
1841 7 70359922 5.49 713 106 2 8911 1 9
1842 8 71043000 6.51 713 159 3 8911 1 9
1843 9 71637833 7.40 713 69 3 8911 1 9
1844 10 71843097 7.71 713 146 3 8911 1 9
1845 11 72786624 9.13 713 36 3 8911 1 9
1846 12 72821164 9.18 713 188 3 8911 1 9
1847 13 73041251 9.51 713 27 3 8911 1 9
1848 14 73043046 9.51 713 18 3 8911 1 9
1849 15 74946335 12.36 713 109 3 8911 1 9
1850 16 75494816 13.19 713 133 3 8911 1 9
1851 17 75986862 13.92 713 181 3 8911 1 9
1852 18 77871191 16.75 713 166 3 8911 1 9
1853 19 78603682 17.85 713 173 3 8911 1 9
1854 20 79067947 18.54 713 161 3 8911 1 9
1815 1 30571000 0.00 713 158 2 8912 1 8
1816 2 30898000 1.07 713 26 3 8912 1 8
1817 3 30961173 1.28 713 96 2 8912 1 8
1818 4 31074486 1.65 713 152 3 8912 1 8
1819 5 31275859 2.31 713 127 2 8912 1 8
1820 6 31297788 2.38 713 167 2 8912 1 8
1821 7 31301881 2.39 713 118 2 8912 1 8
1822 8 31409238 2.74 713 129 2 8912 1 8
1823 9 31543039 3.18 713 21 2 8912 1 8
1824 10 31644798 3.51 713 6 2 8912 1 8
1825 11 31899501 4.35 713 18 3 8912 1 8
1826 12 33235817 8.72 713 1 2 8912 1 8
1827 13 34446762 12.68 713 15 2 8912 1 8
1828 14 34712783 13.55 713 104 2 8912 1 8
1829 15 35273626 15.38 713 43 2 8912 1 8
1830 16 35349660 15.63 713 94 2 8912 1 8
1831 17 35582146 16.39 713 61 2 8912 1 8
1832 18 36104348 18.10 713 153 2 8912 1 8
1833 19 36932439 20.81 713 136 2 8912 1 8
1834 20 43326549 41.72 713 2 2 8912 1 8
1010 1 37838321 0.00 374 12 3 9001 1 5
1011 2 38034325 0.52 374 9 3 9001 1 5
1012 3 38233000 1.04 374 142 3 9001 1 5
1013 4 38330586 1.30 374 148 3 9001 1 5
1014 5 39114502 3.37 374 122 3 9001 1 5
1015 6 39500000 4.39 374 40 3 9001 1 5
1016 7 39824135 5.25 374 65 3 9001 1 5
1017 8 39878073 5.39 374 133 3 9001 1 5
1018 9 39916246 5.49 374 37 3 9001 1 5
1019 10 39999900 5.71 374 161 3 9001 1 5
1020 11 41513895 9.71 374 18 3 9001 1 5
1021 12 43376534 14.64 374 109 3 9001 1 5
1438 1 25341807 0.00 712 21 2 9001 1 7
1439 2 26054350 2.81 712 129 2 9001 1 7
1440 3 26616551 5.03 712 1 2 9001 1 7
1441 4 27006262 6.57 712 6 2 9001 1 7
1442 5 28518000 12.53 712 167 2 9001 1 7
1443 6 28607724 12.89 712 18 3 9001 1 7
1444 7 28734650 13.39 712 168 2 9001 1 7
1445 8 28830000 13.76 712 64 1 9001 1 7
1446 9 29287611 15.57 712 176 2 9001 1 7
1447 10 29381016 15.94 712 136 2 9001 1 7
376
1448 11 29648893 17.00 712 75 2 9001 1 7
1449 12 31935575 26.02 712 94 2 9001 1 7
1450 13 32919294 29.90 712 54 3 9001 1 7
1451 14 35342894 39.46 712 71 3 9001 1 7
505 1 16830192 0.00 372 1 2 9004 1 2
506 2 16888618 0.35 372 96 2 9004 1 2
507 3 17802918 5.78 372 129 2 9004 1 2
508 4 17862537 6.13 372 168 2 9004 1 2
509 5 17965655 6.75 372 104 2 9004 1 2
510 6 18353724 9.05 372 64 1 9004 1 2
511 7 18902881 12.32 372 55 1 9004 1 2
512 8 18937236 12.52 372 15 2 9004 1 2
513 9 19250000 14.38 372 43 2 9004 1 2
514 10 19253264 14.40 372 127 2 9004 1 2
515 11 19777057 17.51 372 24 3 9004 1 2
516 12 20389413 21.15 372 16 2 9004 1 2
517 13 20430134 21.39 372 74 3 9004 1 2
518 14 21101866 25.38 372 142 3 9004 1 2
519 15 21738475 29.16 372 21 2 9004 1 2
520 16 21994951 30.69 372 192 2 9004 1 2
521 17 21995465 30.69 372 184 1 9004 1 2
522 18 22308786 32.55 372 20 2 9004 1 2
523 19 22823391 35.61 372 71 3 9004 1 2
524 20 22894252 36.03 372 177 2 9004 1 2
525 21 23760584 41.18 372 2 2 9004 1 2
526 22 25978395 54.36 372 94 2 9004 1 2
489 1 9966287 0.00 372 96 2 9005 1 3
490 2 10131229 1.65 372 129 2 9005 1 3
491 3 10238674 2.73 372 133 3 9005 1 3
492 4 10322673 3.58 372 1 2 9005 1 3
493 5 10658983 6.95 372 55 1 9005 1 3
494 6 10790839 8.27 372 168 2 9005 1 3
495 7 10888280 9.25 372 110 2 9005 1 3
496 8 11453875 14.93 372 48 2 9005 1 3
497 9 11969396 20.10 372 178 3 9005 1 3
498 10 12288787 23.30 372 50 2 9005 1 3
499 11 12302054 23.44 372 184 1 9005 1 3
500 12 12436132 24.78 372 142 3 9005 1 3
501 13 13151845 31.96 372 177 2 9005 1 3
502 14 13248510 32.93 372 128 2 9005 1 3
503 15 13509488 35.55 372 2 2 9005 1 3
504 16 13860990 39.08 372 18 3 9005 1 3
995 1 46087409 0.00 374 11 3 9005 1 5
996 2 47000000 1.98 374 161 3 9005 1 5
997 3 47339555 2.72 374 133 3 9005 1 5
998 4 49207422 6.77 374 24 3 9005 1 5
999 5 49575000 7.57 374 159 3 9005 1 5
1000 6 50110556 8.73 374 119 3 9005 1 5
1001 7 50365843 9.28 374 178 3 9005 1 5
1002 8 50589967 9.77 374 196 2 9005 1 5
1003 9 51305888 11.32 374 160 3 9005 1 5
1004 10 52543617 14.01 374 142 3 9005 1 5
1005 11 55045760 19.44 374 189 3 9005 1 5
1006 12 55133499 19.63 374 135 3 9005 1 5
1007 13 57100000 23.90 374 3 3 9005 1 5
1008 14 62188305 34.94 374 65 3 9005 1 5
1009 15 65748475 42.66 374 163 3 9005 1 5
109 1 38816299 0.00 372 178 3 9006 1 2
110 2 41888000 7.91 372 161 3 9006 1 2
111 3 43000000 10.78 372 133 3 9006 1 2
112 4 43447804 11.93 372 11 3 9006 1 2
113 5 44333825 14.21 372 142 3 9006 1 2
114 6 44669560 15.08 372 24 3 9006 1 2
115 7 45069261 16.11 372 148 3 9006 1 2
116 8 45389265 16.93 372 69 3 9006 1 2
117 9 45613921 17.51 372 40 3 9006 1 2
118 10 46000000 18.51 372 126 3 9006 1 2
119 11 46768305 20.49 372 186 3 9006 1 2
120 12 46777545 20.51 372 37 3 9006 1 2
121 13 48288399 24.40 372 135 3 9006 1 2
122 14 50005763 28.83 372 71 3 9006 1 2
123 15 51602524 32.94 372 122 3 9006 1 2
1798 1 62800000 0.00 713 15 2 9007 1 12
1799 2 63183000 0.61 713 158 2 9007 1 12
1800 3 63688866 1.42 713 1 2 9007 1 12
1801 4 64280355 2.36 713 133 3 9007 1 12
1802 5 65000000 3.50 713 40 3 9007 1 12
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1803 6 65681000 4.59 713 159 3 9007 1 12
1804 7 66174097 5.37 713 18 3 9007 1 12
1805 8 66833671 6.42 713 161 3 9007 1 12
1806 9 69028340 9.92 713 21 2 9007 1 12
1807 10 69801459 11.15 713 43 2 9007 1 12
1808 11 69846838 11.22 713 167 2 9007 1 12
1809 12 69875732 11.27 713 142 3 9007 1 12
1810 13 75484129 20.20 713 127 2 9007 1 12
1811 14 76118560 21.21 713 163 3 9007 1 12
1812 15 78605248 25.17 713 36 3 9007 1 12
1813 16 89772586 42.95 713 146 3 9007 1 12
1814 17 113835007 81.27 713 74 3 9007 1 12
%
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APPENDIX B
SPSS-X command file for selecting best model (using MANOVA)
379
file handle drew/name='bs_d01:[bsdsdrew]phd99dat.txt.'
data list file=drew fixed
/record 1-7 rank 8-14 bid 15-26 pct 27-35 type 36-40 bidder 41-47
size 48-52 date 53-58 nat 59-62 alt 63-66.
compute lowbid.(bid/1000000)/(1+(pct*0.01)).
compute bid=bid/1000000.
compute bd1=bid.
compute bd2=lowbid.
compute pct=pct/100.
compute rata=bid/lowbid.
compute ratb=lowbid/bid.
compute bid=bd2.
compute dep=pct.
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
i f
if
if
ifif
ifif
i f
i fif
if
if
(bidder eq 18)b=1.
(bidder eq 142)b=2.
(bidder eq 119)b=3.
(bidder eq 127)b=4.
(bidder eq 148)b=5.
(bidder eq 122)b=6.
(bidder eq 45)b=7.
(bidder eq 52)b=8.
(bidder eq 96)b=9.
(bidder eq 71)b=10.
(bidder eq 109)b=11.
(bidder eq 69)b=12.
(bidder eq 24)b.13.
(bidder eq 20)b=14.
(bidder eq 9)b=15.
(type eq 372)j=1.
(type eq 374)j=2.
(type eq 712)j=3.
(type eq 713)j=4.
(type eq 848)j=5.
((date eq 8001)
	 or (date eq 8002) or (date eq 8003))index=347.
((date eq 8004)
	 or (date eq 8005) or (date eq 8006))index=353.
((date eq 8007)
	 or (date eq 8008) or (date eq 8009))index=369.
((date eq 8010)
	 or (date eq 8011) or (date eq 8012))index=381.
((date eq 8101)
	 or (date eq 8102) or (date eq 8103))index=389.
((date eq 8104)
	 or (date eq 8105) or (date eq 8106))index=393.
((date eq 8107)
	 or (date eq 8108) or (date eq 8109))index=375.
((date eq 8110)
	 or (date eq 8111) or (date eq 8112))index=376.
((date eq 8201)
	 or (date eq 8202) or (date eq 8203))index=364.
((date eq 8204)
	 or (date eq 13205) or (date eq 8206))index=370.
((date eq 8207)
	 or (date eq 8208) or (date eq 8209))index=342.((date eq 8210)
	 or (date eq 8211) or (date eq 8212))index=327.
((date eq 8301)
	 or (date eq 8302) or (date eq 8303))index=298.((date eq 8304)
	 or (date eq 8305) or (date eq 8306))index=298.
((date eq 8307)
	 or (date eq 8308) or (date eq 8309))index=317.((date eq 8310)
	 or (date eq 8311) or (date eq 8312))index=326.
((date eq 8401)
	 or (date eq 8402) or (date eq 8403))index=328.
((date eq 8404)
	 or (date eq 8405) or (date eq 8406))index=332.
((date eq 8407)
	 or (date eq 8408) or (date eq 8409))index=323.((date eq 8410)
	 or (date eq 8411) or (date eq 8412))index=337.
((date eq 8501)
	 or (date eq 8502) or (date eq 8503))index=326.
((date eq 8504)
	 or (date eq 8505) or (date eq 8506))index=335.
((date eq 8507)
	 or (date eq 8508) or (date eq 8509))index=344.((date eq 8510)
	 or (date eq 8511) or (date eq 8512))index=351.
((date eq 8601)
	 or (date eq 8602) or (date eq 8603))index=376.
((date eq 8604)
	 or (date eq 8605) or (date eq 8606))index=392.
((date eq 8607)
	 or (date eq 8608) or (date eq 8609))index=373.
((date eq 8610)
	 or (date eq 8611) or (date eq 8612))index=380.
((date eq 8701)
	 or (date eq 8702) or (date eq 8703))index=385.
((date eq 8704)
	 or (date eq 8705) or (date eq 8706))index=403.
((date eq 8707)
	 or (date eq 8708) or (date eq 8709))index=411.
((date eq 8710)
	 or (date eq 8711) or (date eq 8712))index=438.
((date eq 8801)
	 or (date eq 8802) or (date eq 8803))index=479.
((date eq 8804)
	 or (date eq 8805) or (date eq 8806))index=510.
((date eq 8807)
	 or (date eq 8808) or (date eq 8809))index=521.
((date eq 8810)
	 or (date eq 8811) or (date eq 8812))index=541.
((date eq 8901)
	 or (date eq 8902) or (date eq 8903))index=542.
((date eq 8904)
	 or (date eq 8905) or (date eq 8906))index=548.
((date eq 8907)
	 or (date eq 8908) or (date eq 8909))index=552.
((date eq 8910)
	 or (date eq 8911) or (date eq 8912))index=559.
((date eq 9001)
	 or (date eq 9002) or (date eq 9003))index=574.
((date eq 9004)
	 or (date eq 9005) or (date eq 9006))index=561.
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if ((date eq 9007) or (date eq 9008) or (date eq 9009))index=582.
compute bid=bid*582/index.
compute bid2=bid*bid.
select if (bidder eq 18) or (bidder eq 142) or (bidder eq 119)
or (bidder eq 127) or (bidder eq 148) or (bidder eq 122) or (bidder eq 45)
or (bidder eq 52) or (bidder eq 96) or (bidder eq 71) or (bidder eq 109)
or (bidder eq 69) or (bidder eq 24) or (bidder eq 20) or (bidder eq 9)
descriptives variables=all
select if (type eq 372) or (type eq 374) or (type eq 712) or (type eq 713)
or (type eq 848)
descriptives variables=all
comment 1. MODEL 3 (S+T)
manova dep by j(1,5) with bid bid2
/design=constant,j
comment 2. MODEL 4 (S+B)
manova dep by b(1,15) with bid bid2
/design=constant,b
comment 3. MODEL 5 (S+T+ST)
manova dep by j(1,5) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,j by bid,j by bid2
comment 4. MODEL 6 (S+B+SB)
manova dep by b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,b,b by bid,b by bid2
comment 5. MODEL 7 (S+T+B)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b
comment 6. MODEL 8 (S+T+B+ST)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2
comment 7. MODEL 9 (S+T+B+SB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,b by bid,b by bid2
comment 8. MODEL 10 (S+T+B+TB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by b
comment 9. MODEL 11 (S+T+B+STB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by b by bid,j by b by bid2
comment 10. MODEL 12 (S+T+B+ST+SB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,b by bid,b by bid2
comment 11. MODEL 13 (S+T+B+ST+TB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,j by b
comment 12. MODEL 14 (S+T+B+TB+SB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,b by bid,b by bid2,j by b
comment 13. MODEL 15 (S+T+B+STB+ST)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,j by b by bid,
j by b by bid2
comment 14. MODEL 16 (S+T+B+STB+SB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,b by bid,b by bid2,j by b by bid,
j by b by bid2
comment 15. MODEL 17 (S+T+B+STB+TB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by b,j by b by bid,j by b by bid2
comment 16. MODEL 18 (S+T+B+SB+ST+STB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,b by bid,b by bid2,
j by b by bid,j by b by bid2
comment 17. MODEL 19 (S+T+B+SB+BT+STB)
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manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by b,b by bid,b by bid2,
j by b by bid,j by b by bid2
comment 18. MODEL 20 (S+T+B+BT+ST+STB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,j by b,
j by b by bid,j by b by bid2
comment 19. MODEL 21 (S+T+B+BT+SB+ST)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,b by bid,b by bid2,
j by b
comment 20. MODEL 22 (S+T+B+BT+SB+ST+STB)
manova dep by j(1,5) b(1,15) with bid bid2
/analysis=dep
/design=constant,bid,bid2,j,b,j by bid,j by bid2,b by bid,b by bid2,
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APPENDIX C
SPSS-X command file for testing regression assumptions
383
file handle drew/name='bre_d01:(bsdsdrewlphd99uuu.zzz.'
data list file=drew fixed
/record 1-7 rank 8-14 bid 15-26 pct 27-35 type 36-40 bidder 41-47
size 48-52 date 53-58 nat 59-62 alt 63-66.
compute lowbid=(bid/1000000)/(14-(pct*0.01)).
compute bid=bid/1000000.
compute rata=bid/lowbid
compute ratb=lowbid/bid
compute bd1=bid.
compute bd2=lowbid**(2/3)
compute pct=pct/100.
compute bid=bd2.
compute dep=rata
compute lambda= -4.2
if (lambda ne 0)dep = (dep**lambda-1)/lambda
if (lambda eq 0)dep = ln(dep)
if (bidder ne 18)b1=0.
if (bidder eq 18)b1=1.
if (bidder ne 142)b2=0.
if (bidder eq 142)b2=1.
if (bidder ne 119)b3=0.
if (bidder eq 119)b3=1.
if (bidder ne 127)b4=0.
if (bidder eq 127)b4=1.
if (bidder ne 122)b5=0.
if (bidder eq 122)1)6=1.
if (bidder ne 148)b6=0.
if (bidder eq 148)b6=1.
if (bidder ne 45)b7=0.
if (bidder eq 45)b7=1.
if (bidder ne 52)b8=0.
if (bidder eq 52)b8=1.
if (bidder ne 96)b9=0.
if (bidder eq 96)b9=1.
if (bidder ne 71)b10=0.
if (bidder eq 71)b10=1.
if (bidder ne 109)b11=0.
if (bidder eq 109)b11=1.
if (bidder ne 69)b12=0.
if (bidder eq 69)b12=1.
if (bidder ne 20)b13=0.if (bidder eq 20)b13=1.if (bidder ne 24)b14=0.
if (bidder eq 24)b14=1.if (bidder ne 9)b15=0.
if (bidder eq 9)b15=1.if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
(type ne 372)j1=0.
(type eq 372)j1=1.
(type ne 374)j2=0.
(type eq 374)j2=1.
(type ne 712) j3=0.
(type eq 712)j3=1.
(type ne 713)j4=0.
(type eq 713)j4=1.
(type ne 848)j5=0.
(type eq 848)j5=1.
((date eq 8001)
	 or (date eq 8002) or (date eq 8003))index=347.
((date eq 8004)
	 or (date eq 8005) or (date eq 8006))index=353.
((date eq 8007)
	 or (date eq 8008) or (date eq 8009))index=369.
((date eq 8010)	 or (date eq 8011) or (date eq 8012))index=381.
((date eq 8101)
	 or (date eq 8102) or (date eq 8103))index=389.
((date eq 8104)
	 or (date eq 8105) or (date eq 8106))index=398.
((date eq 8107)
	 or (date eq 8108) or (date eq 8109))index=375.
((date eq 8110)
	 or (date eq 8111) or (date eq 8112))index=376.
((date eq 8201)	 or (date eq 8202) or (date eq 8203))index=364.
((date eq 8204)
	 or (date eq 8205) or (date eq 8206))index=370.
((date eq 8207)
	 or (date eq 8208) or (date eq 8209))index=342.
((date eq 8210)
	 or (date eq 8211) or (date eq 8212))index=327.
((date eq 8301)
	 or (date eq 8302) or (date eq 8303))index=298.
((date eq 8304)
	 or (date eq 8305) or (date eq 8306))index=298.
((date eq 8307)
	 or (date eq 8308) or (date eq 8309))index=317.
((date eq 8310)
	 or (date eq 8311) or (date eq 8312))index=326.
((date eq 8401)
	 or (date eq 8402) or (date eq 8403))index=328.
((date eq 8404)
	 or (date eq 8405) or (date eq 8406))index=332.
((date eq 8407)	 or (date eq 8408) or (date eq 8409))index=323.
((date eq 8410)
	 or (date eq 8411) or (date eq 8412))index=337.
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(date eq 8503))index=326.
(date eq 8506))index=335.
(date eq 8509))index=344.
(date eq 8512))index=351.
(date eq 8603))index=376.
(date eq 8606))index=392.
(date eq 8609))index=373.
(date eq 8612))index=380.
(date eq 8703))index=385.
(date eq 8706))index=403.
(date eq 8709))index=411.
(date eq 8712))index=438.
(date eq 8803))index=479.
(date eq 8806))index=510.
(date eq 8809))index=521.
(date eq 8812))index=541.
(date eq 8903))index=542.
(date eq 8906))index=548.
(date eq 8909))index=552.
(date eq 8912))index=559
(date eq 9003))index=574
(date eq 9006))index=561.
(date eq 9009))index=582
if ((date eq 8501) or (date eq 8502) or
if ((date eq 8504) or (date eq 8505) or
if ((date eq 8507) or (date eq 8508) or
if ((date eq 8510) or (date eq 8511) or
if ((date eq 8601) or (date eq 8602) or
if ((date eq 8604) or (date eq 8605) or
if ((date eq 8607) or (date eq 8608) or
if ((date eq 8610) or (date eq 8611) or
if ((date eq 8701) or (date eq 8702) or
if ((date eq 8704) or (date eq 8705) or
if ((date eq 8707) or (date eq 8708) or
if ((date eq 8710) or (date eq 8711) or
if ((date eq 8801) or (date eq 8802) or
if ((date eq 8804) or (date eq 8805) or
if ((date eq 8807) or (date eq 8808) or
if ((date eq 8810) or (date eq 8811) or
if ((date eq 8901) or (date eq 8902) or
if ((date eq 8904) or (date eq 8905) or
if ((date eq 8907) or (date eq 8908) or
if ((date eq 8910) or (date eq 8911) or
if ((date eq 9001) or (date eq 9002) or
if ((date eq 9004) or (date eq 9005) or
if ((date eq 9007) or (date eq 9008) or
compute bid=(bid*582/index) -7.68
compute bid2=bid*bid.
descriptives variables=all
compute jlbid=j1*bid
compute j2bid=j2*bid
compute j3bid=j3*bid
compute j4bid=j4*bid
compute jlbid2=j1*bid2
compute j2bid2=j2*bid2
compute j3bid2=j3*bid2
compute j4bid2=j4*bid2
compute blbid=bl*bid
compute b2bid=b2*bid
compute b3bid=b3*bid
compute b4bid=b4*bid
compute b5bid=b5*bid
compute b6bid=b6*bid
compute b7bid=b7*bid
compute b8bid=b8*bid
compute b9bid=b9*bid
compute blObid=b10*bid
compute bllbid=b11*bid
compute bl2bid=b12*bid
compute bl3bid=b13*bid
compute bl4bid=b14*bid
compute blbid2=bl*bid2
compute b2bid2=b2*bid2
compute b3bid2=b3*bid2
compute b4bid2=b4*bid2
compute b5bid2=b5*bid2
compute b6bid2=b6*bid2
compute b6bid2=b6*bid2
compute b7bid2=b7*bid2
compute b8bid2=b8*bid2
compute b9bid2=b9*bid2
compute blObid2=b10*bid2
compute bllbid2=b11*bid2
compute bl2bid2=b12*bid2
compute bl3bid2=b13*bid2
compute bl4bid2=b14*bid2
compute j1b1=j1*bl
compute j2b1=j2*bl
compute j3b1=j3*bl
compute j4b1=j4*bl
compute j1b2=114,b2
compute j2b2=j2*b2
compute j3b2=j3*b2
compute j4b2=j4*b2
compute j1b3=ji*b3
compute j2b3=j2*b3
compute j3b3=j3*b3
compute 14b3=j4*b3
compute j1b4=j14,b4
compute j2b4=j2*b4
Abu
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compute j3b4=j3*b4
compute j4b4=34*b4
compute j1b5=j1*b5
compute j2b5=j2*b5
compute j3b5=j3*b5
compute j4b5=j4*b5
compute j1b6=j1*b6
compute j2b6=j2*b6
compute j3b6=j3*b6
compute j4b6=j4*b6
compute j1b7=j1*b7
compute j2b7=j2*b7
compute j3b7=j3*b7
compute 14b7=14*b7
compute j1b8=j1*b8
compute j2b8=j2*b8
compute j3b8=j3*b8
compute j4b8=j4*b8
compute j1b9=j1*b9
compute j2b9=j2*b9
compute j3b9=j3*b9
compute j4b9=j4*b9
compute j1b10=j1*b10
compute j2b10=j2*b10
compute j3b10=j3*b10
compute j4b10=j4*b10
compute j1b11=j1*bll
compute j2b11=32*bll
compute j3b11=j3*bli
compute j4b11=14*bll
compute j1b12=j1*b12
compute 12b12=j2*b12
compute j3b12=j3*b12
compute j4b12=j4*b12
compute j1b13=j1*b13
compute j2b13=j2*b13
compute j3b13=j3*b13
compute j4b13=j4*b13
compute jibl4=j1*b14
compute j2b14=12*b14
compute j3b14=j3*b14
compute j4b14=j4*b14
compute jlblid=j1*bl*bid
compute j2blid=j2*bl*bid
compute j3blid=j3*bl*bid
compute j4blid=j4*bl*bid
compute j1b2id=j1*b2*bid
compute j2b2id=j2*b2*bid
compute j3b2id=j3*b2*bid
compute j4b2id=j4*b2*bid
compute j1b3id=j1*b3*bid
compute j2b3id=j2*b3*bid
compute j3b3id=j3*b3*bid
compute j4b3id=j4*b3*bid
compute jib4id=j1*b4*bid
compute j2b4id=j2*b4*bid
compute j3b4id=j3*b4*bid
compute j4b4id=j4*b4*bid
compute jib5id=j1*b5*bid
compute j2b5id=j2*b5*bid
compute j3b5id=j3*b5*bid
compute j4b5id=j4*b5*bid
compute jib6id=j1*b6*bid
compute j2b6id=j2*b6*bid
compute j3b6id=j3*b6*bid
compute j4b6id=j4*b6*bid
compute j1b7id=j1*b7*bid
compute j2b7id=j2*b7*bid
compute j3b7id=j3*b7*bid
compute j4b7id=j4*b7*bid
compute j1b8id=j1*b8*bid
compute j2b8id=j2*b8*bid
compute j3b8id=j3*b8*bid
compute j4b8id=j4*b8*bid
compute j1b9id=ji*b9*bid
compute j2b9id=j2*b9*bid
compute j3b9id=j3*b9*bid
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compute j4b9id=j4*b9*bid
compute jlblOid=j1*b10*bid
compute j2b1Oid=j2*b10*bid
compute j3blOid=j3*b10*bid
compute j4blOid=j4*b10*bid
compute jlbllid=j1*bll*bid
compute j2b1lid=j2*bll*bid
compute j3b11id=j3*b11*b1d
compute j4bilid=j4*bll*bid
compute j1b12id=j1*b12*bid
compute j2b12id=j2*b12*bid
compute j3b12id=j3*b12*bid
compute j4b12id=j4*b12*bid
compute j1b13id=j1*b13*bid
compute j2b13id=j2*b13*bid
compute j3b13id=j3*b13*bid
compute j4b13id=j4*b13*bid
compute j1b14id=j1*b14*bid
compute j2b14id=j2*b14*bid
compute j3b14id=j3*b14*bid
compute j4b14id=j4*b14*bid
compute jlblid2=j1*bl*bid2
compute j2blid2=j2*bl*bid2
compute j3blid2=j3*bl*bid2
compute j4blid2=j4*bl*bid2
compute j1b2id2=j1*b2*bid2
compute j2b2id2=j2*b2*bid2
compute j3b2id2=j3*b2*bid2
compute j4b2id2=j4*b2*bid2
compute j1b3id2=j1*b3*bid2
compute j2b3id2=j2*b3*bid2
compute j3b3id2=j3*b3*bid2
compute j4b3id2=j4*b3*bid2
compute j1b4id2=j1*b4*bid2
compute j2b4id2=j2*b4*bid2
compute j3b4id2=j3*b4*bid2
compute j4b4id2=j4*b4*bid2
compute j1b5id2=j1*b5*bid2
compute j2b5id2=j2*b5*bid2
compute j3b5id2=j3*b5*bid2
compute j4b5id2=j4*b5*bid2
compute j1b6id2=j1*b6*bid2
compute j2b6id2=j2*b6*bid2
compute j3b6id2=j3*b6*bid2
compute j4b6id2=j4*b6*bid2
compute j1b7id2=j1*b7*bid2
compute j2b7id2=j2*b7*bid2
compute j3b7id2=j3*b7*bid2
compute j4b7id2=j4*b7*bid2
compute j1b8id2=j1*b8*bid2
compute j2b8id2=j2*b8*bid2
compute j3b8id2=j3*b8*bid2
compute j4b8id2=j4*b8*bid2
compute j1b9id2=j1*b9*bid2
compute j2b9id2=j2*b9*bid2
compute j3b9id2=j3*b9*bid2
compute j4b9id2=j4*b9*bid2
compute jlblOid2=j1*b10*bid2
compute j2blOid2=j2*b10*bid2
compute j3blOid2=j3*b10*bid2
compute j4blOid2=j4*b10*bid2
compute jlbllid2=j1*bll*bid2
compute j2b1lid2=j2*bll*bid2
compute j3b1lid2=j3*bll*bid2
compute j4b1lid2=j4*bil*bid2
compute j1b12id2=j1*b12*bid2
compute j2b12id2=12*b12*bid2
compute j3b12id2=j3*b12*bid2
compute j4b12id2=j4*b12*bid2
compute j1b13id2=j1*b13*bid2
compute j2b13id2=j2*b13*bid2
compute j3b13id2=j3*b13*bid2
compute j4b131d2=j4*b13*bid2
compute j1b14id2=j1*b14*bid2
compute j2b14id2=j2*b14*bid2
compute j3b14id2=j3*b14*bid2
compute j4b14id2=j4*b14*bid2
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missing value bid to j4b14id2 (999)
comment MODEL 12 (S+T+B+SB+ST)
regression
/width=76
/descriptives corr
/vari=dep bid bid2 bl to b14 ji to j4 blbid to b14bid2
jlbid to j4bid2
/statistics=defaults tol
/depe=dep
/enter /backwards /stepwise
/residual=defaults
/casewise=defaults all
/scatterplot =(*sresid,*pre) (*sresid, b2bid2) (*sresid, b3bid)
(*sresid, b7bid) (*sresid, b8bid2) (*sresid, b9bid)
(*sresid, b9bid2) (*sresid, blObid) (*sresid, blObid2) (*sresid, bl2bid)
(*sresid, bl3bid2) (*sresid, b14bid) (*sresid, j2bid)
(*sresid, j2bid2) (*sresid, j3bid) (*sresid, j3bid2) (*resid, b2)
(*resid, b7) (*resid, b8) (*resid, b9) (*resid, b10) (*resid, b14)
(*resid, j2) (*resid, j3) (*resid, j4)
/save	 resid (res)
comment test for normality
npar tests k-s (normal)=res
comment homoscedacity test
sort cases by bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
compute bottom=res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
compute bottom=res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bibid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
compute bottom=res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bibid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b2bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b2bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b3bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b3bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b4bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b4bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b5bid
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compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b5bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b6bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b6bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b7bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b7bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b8bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b8bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b9bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b9bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b1Obid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b1Obid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b1lbid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b11bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bl2bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by b12bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
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descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bl3bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bl3bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bl4bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by bl4bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j1bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by jlbid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j2bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j2bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j3bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j3bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j4bid
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
sort cases by j4bid2
compute caseno=$casenum
compute top=caseno*res*res
descriptives variables=top bottom
/statistics=sum
oneway res by b1(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b2(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b3(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b4(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b5(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b6(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b7(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b8(0,1)
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/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b9(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b10(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b11(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b12(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b13(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by b14(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by j1(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway rea by j2(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by j3(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
oneway res by j4(0,1)
/statistics=homogeneity
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APPENDIX D
Confidence intervals t for Szroeter's test statistic based on 5% level of
significance according to different values of b for 776 cases
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b t
Non-significant values
Minimum
	 Maximum
b t
Non-significant values
Minimum	 Maximum
1.00 369.79 407.21 10.50 3882.82 4275.68
1.20 443.75 488.65 11.00 4067.72 4479.28
1.40 517.71 570.09 11.50 4252.61 4682.89
1.60 591.67 651.53 12.00 4437.51 4886.49
1.80 665.63 732.97 12.50 4622.40 5090.10
2.00 739.58 814.42 13.00 4807.30 5293.70
2.20 813.54 895.86 13.50 4992.20 5497.30
2.40 887.50 977.30 14.00 5177.09 5700.91
2.60 961.46 1058.74 14.50 5361.99 5904.51
2.80 1035.42 1140.18 15.00 5546.88 6108.12
3.00 1109.38 1221.62 15.50 5731.78 6311.72
3.20 1183.34 1303.06 16.00 5916.68 6515.32
3.40 1257.29 1384.51 16.50 6101.57 6718.93
3.60 1331.25 1465.95 17.00 6286.47 6922.53
3.80 1405.21 1547.39 17.50 6471.36 7126.14
4.00 1479.17 1628.83 18.00 6656.26 7329.74
4.20 1553.13 1710.27 18.50 6841.16 7533.34
4.40 1627.09 1791.71 19.00 7026.05 7736.95
4.60 1701.04 1873.16 19.50 7210.95 7940.55
4.80 1775.00 1954.60 20.00 7395.85 8144.15
5.00 1848.96 2036.04 20.50 7580.74 8347.76
5.20 1922.92 2117.48 21.00 7765.64 8551.36
5.40 1996.88 2198.92 21.50 7950.53 8754.97
5.60 2070.84 2280.36 22.00 8135.43 8958.57
5.80 2144.80 2361.80 22.50 8320.33 9162.17
6.00 2218.75 2443.25 23.00 8505.22 9365.78
6.20 2292.71 2524.69 23.50 8690.12 9569.38
6.40 2366.67 2606.13 24.00 8875.01 9772.99
6.60 2440.63 2687.57 24.50 9059.91 9976.59
6.80 2514.59 2769.01 25.00 9244.81 10180.19
7.00 2588.55 2850.45 26.00 9614.60 10587.40
7.20 2662.50 2931.90 27.00 9984.39 10994.61
7.40 2736.46 3013.34 28.00 10354.18 11401.82
7.60 2810.42 3094.78 29.00 10723.98 11809.02
7.80 2884.38 3176.22 30.00 11093.77 12216.23
8.00 2958.34 3257.66 31.00 11463.56 12623.44
8.20 3032.30 3339.10 32.00 11833.35 13030.65
8.40 3106.26 3420.54 33.00 12203.15 13437.85
8.60 3180.21 3501.99 34.00 12572.94 13845.06
8.80 3254.17 3583.43 35.00 12942.73 14252.27
9.00 3328.13 3664.87 36.00 13312.52 14659.48
9.20 3402.09 3746.31 37.00 13682.31 15066.69
9.40 3476.05 3827.75 38.00 14052.11 15473.89
9.60 3550.01 3909.19 39.00 14421.90 15881.10
9.80 3623.96 3990.64 40.00 14791.69 16288.31
10.00 3697.92 4072.08 41.00 15161.48 16695.52
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APPENDIX E
SAS command file for determining 95% prediction intervals
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OPTIONS	 LINESIZE = 80;
DATA DREW;
INFILE 'bre_d01:[bsdsdrewlphd99uuu.zzz.';
INPUT @1	 rec	 7.
@8 rank 7.
@15 bid 12.
@27 pct 9.2
@36 type 5.
@41 bidder	 7.
@48 size 5.
@53 date 6.
@59 nat 4.
@63 alt 4.;
lowbid=(bid/1000000)/(1+(pct*0.01));
bid=bid/1000000;
rata=bid/lowbid;
ratb=lowbid/bid;
bd1=bid;
bd2=lowbid**(2/3);
pct=pct/100;
bid=bd2;
dep=rata;
lambda= -4.2;
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
(lambda ne 0)
	 then dep =	 (dep**lambda-1)/lambda;
(lambda eq 0)
	 then dep = log(dep);
(bidder ne 18)
	 then b1=0.;
(bidder eq 18)
	 then b1=1.;
(bidder ne 142)
	 then b2=0.;
(bidder eq 142)
	 then b2=1.;
(bidder ne 119)
	 then b3=0.;
(bidder eq 119)
	 then b3=1.;
(bidder ne 127)
	 then b4=0.;
(bidder eq 127)
	 then b4=1.;
(bidder ne 122)
	 then b5=0.;
(bidder eq 122)	 then b5=1.;
(bidder ne 148)
	 then b6=0.;
(bidder eq 148)	 then b6=1.;
(bidder ne 45)	 then b7=0.;
(bidder eq 45)	 then b7=1.;
(bidder ne 52)	 then b8=0.;
(bidder eq 52)	 then b8=1.;
(bidder ne 96)	 then b9=0.;
(bidder eq 96)	 then b9=1.;
(bidder ne 71)	 then bl0=0.;
(bidder eq 71)	 then bl0=1.;
(bidder ne 109)
	 then bl1=0.;
(bidder eq 109)
	 then bl1=1.;
(bidder ne 69)
	 then b12=0.;
(bidder eq 69)
	 then b12=1.;
(bidder ne 20)
	 then b13=0.;
(bidder eq 20)
	 then bl3=1.;
(bidder ne 24)
	 then b14=0.;
(bidder eq 24)
	 then b14=1.;
(bidder ne 9)
	 then b15=0.;
(bidder eq 9)
	 then b15=1.;
(type ne 372)
	 then j1=0.
(type eq 372)
	 then j1=1.
(type ne 374)
	 then j2=0.
(type eq 374)
	 then j2=1.
(type ne 712)
	 then j3=0.
(type eq 712)
	 then j3=1.
(type ne 713)
	 then j4=0.
(type eq 713)
	 then j4=1.
(type ne 848)
	 then j5=0.
(type eq 848)
	 then j5=1.
if ((date eq 8001)
	 or (date eq 8002) or (date eq 8003)) then index=347.;if ((date eq 8004)
	 or (date eq 8005) or (date eq 8006)) then index=353.;if ((date eq 8007)
	 or (date eq 8008) or (date eq 8009)) then index=369.;if ((date eq 8010)
	 or (date eq 8011) or (date eq 8012)) then index=381.;if ((date eq 8101)
	 or (date eq 8102) or (date eq 8103)) then index=389.;if ((date eq 8104)
	 or (date eq 8105) or (date eq 8106)) then index=398.;if ((date eq 8107)
	 or	 (date eq 8108) or (date eq 8109)) then index=375.;if ((date eq 8110)
	 or	 (date eq 8111) or (date eq 8112)) then index=376.;if ((date eq 8201)
	 or (date eq 8202) or (date eq 8203)) then index=364.;if ((date eq 8204)
	 or (date eq 8205) or (date eq 8206)) then index=370.;if ((date eq 8207)	 or	 (date eq 8208) or (date eq 8209)) then index=342.;
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if ((date eq 8210) or (date eq 8211) or (date eq 8212)) then index=327.;
if ((date eq 8301) or (date eq 8302) or (date eq 8303)) then index=298.;
if ((date eq 8304) or (date eq 8305) or (date eq 8306)) then index=298.;
if ((date eq 8307) or (date eq 8308) or (date eq 8309)) then index=317.;
if ((date eq 8310) or (date eq 8311) or (date eq 8312)) then index=326.;
if ((date eq 8401) or (date eq 8402) or (date eq 8403)) then index=328.;
if ((date eq 8404) or (date eq 8405) or (date eq 8406)) then index=332.;
if ((date eq 8407) or (date eq 8408) or (date eq 8409)) then index=323.;
if ((date eq 8410) or (date eq 8411) or (date eq 8412)) then index=337.;
if ((date eq 8501) or (date eq 8502) or (date eq 8503)) then index=326.;
if ((date eq 8504) or (date eq 8505) or (date eq 8506)) then index=335.;
if ((date eq 8507) or (date eq 8508) or (date eq 8509)) then index=344.;
if ((date eq 8510) or (date eq 8511) or (date eq 8512)) then index=351.;
if ((date eq 8601) or (date eq 8602) or (date eq 8603)) then index=376.;
if ((date eq 8604) or (date eq 8605) or (date eq 8606)) then index=392.;
if ((date eq 8607) or (date eq 8608) or (date eq 8609)) then index=373.;
if ((date eq 8610) or (date eq 8611) or (date eq 8612)) then index=380.;
if ((date eq 8701) or (date eq 8702) or (date eq 8703)) then index=385.;
if ((date eq 8704) or (date eq 8705) or (date eq 8706)) then index=403.;
if ((date eq 8707) or (date eq 8708) or (date eq 8709)) then index=411.;
if ((date eq 8710) or (date eq 8711) or (date eq 8712)) then index=438.;
if ((date eq 8801) or (date eq 8802) or (date eq 8803)) then index=479.;
if ((date eq 8804) or (date eq 8805) or (date eq 8806)) then index=510.;
if ((date eq 8807) or (date eq 8808) or (date eq 8809)) then index=521.;
if ((date eq 8810) or (date eq 8811) or (date eq 8812)) then index=541.;if ((date eq 8901) or (date eq 8902) or (date eq 8903)) then index=542.;
if ((date eq 8904) or (date eq 8905) or (date eq 8906)) then index=548.;if ((date eq 8907) or (date eq 8908) or (date eq 8909)) then index=552.;
if ((date eq 8910) or (date eq 8911) or (date eq 8912)) then index=559.;if ((date eq 9001) or (date eq 9002) or (date eq 9003)) then index=574.;
if ((date eq 9004) or (date eq 9005) or (date eq 9006)) then index=561.;
if ((date eq 9007) or (date eq 9008) or (date eq 9009)) then index=582.;
bid=(bid*582/index) -7.68;
bid2=bid*bid;
jlbid=j1*bid;
j2bid=j2*bid;
j3bid=j3*bid;
j4bid=j4*bid;
jlbid2=j1*bid2;
j2bid2=j2*bid2;
j3bid2=j3*bid2;
j4bid2=j4*bid2;
blbid=bl*bid;
b2bid=b2*bid;
b3bid=b3*bid;
b4bid=b4*bid;
b5bid=b5*bid;
b6bid=b6*bid;
b7bid=b7*bid;
b8bid=b8*bid;
b9bid=b9*bid;
blObid=b10*bid;
bllbid=b11*bid;
bl2bid=b12*bid;
bl3bid=b13*bid;
b14bid=b14*bid;
blbid2=bl*bid2;
b2bid2=b2*bid2;
b3bid2=b3*bid2;
b4bid2=b4*bid2;
b5bid2=b5*bid2;
b6bid2=b6*bid2;
b6bid2=b6*bid2;
b7bid2=b7*bid2;
b8bid2=b8*bid2;
b9bid2=b9*bid2;
blObid2=b10*bid2;
bllbid2=b11*bid2;
bl2bid2=b12*bid2;
bl3bid2=b13*bid2;
bl4bid2=b14*bid2;
j1b1=j1*b1;
j2b1=j2*bl;
j3b1=j3*bl;
j4b1=j4*bl;
j1b2=j1*b2;
j2b2=j2*b2;
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j3b2=j3*b2;
j4b2=j4*b2;
j1b3=11*b3;
j2b3=j2*b3;
j3b3=j3*b3;
j4b3=j4*13;
j1b4=114,b4;
j2b4=j2*b4;
j3b4=j3*b4;
j4b4=j4*b4;
j1b5=j1*b5;
j2b5=j2*b5;
j3b5=j3*b5;
j4b5=j4*b5;
j1b6=j1*b6;
j2b6=j2*b6;
j3b6=j3*b6;
j4b6=j4*b6;
j1b7=j1*b7;
j2b7=j2*b7;
j3b7=j3*b7;
j4b7=j4*b7;
j1b8=j1*b8;
j2b8=j2*b8;
j3b8=j3*b8;
j4b8=j4*b8;
j1b9=j1*b9;
j2b9=j2*b9;
j3b9=j3*b9;
j4b9=j4*b9;
j1b10=j1*b10;
j2b10=j2*b10;
j3b10=j3*b10;
j4b10=j4*b10;
j1b11=j1*b11;
12b11=j2*b11;
j3b11=j3*b11;
j4b11=j4*b11;
j1b12=j1*b12;
j2b12=j2*b12;
j3b12=j3*b12;
j4b12=j4*b12;
j1b13=j1*b13;
j2b13=j2*b13;
j3b13=j3*b13;
j4b13=j4*b13;
j1b14=j1*b14;
j2b14=j2*b14;
j3b14=j3*b14;
14b14=j4*b14;
jlblid=j1*bl*bid;
j2blid=j2*bl*bid;
j3blid=j3*bl*bid;
j4blid=j4*bl*bid;
j1b2id=j1*b2*bid;
j2b2id=j2*b2*bid;
j3b2id=j3*b2*bid;
j4b2id=j4*b2*bid;
j1b3id=j1*b3*bid;
j2b3id=j2*b3*bid;
j3b3id=j3*b3*bid;
j4b3id=j4*b3*bid;
j1b4id=j1*b4*bid;
j2b4id=j2*b4*bid;
j3b4id=j3*b4*bid;
j4b4id=j4*b4*bid;
j1b5id=j1*b5*bid;
j2b5id=j2*b5*bid;
j3b5id=j3*b5*bid;
j4b5id=j4*b5*bid;
j1b6id=j1*b6*bid;
j2b6id=j2*b6*bid;
j3b6id=j3*b6*bid;
j4b6id=j4*b6*bid;
j1b7id=j1*b7*bid;
j2b7id=j2*b7*bid;
j3b7id=j3*b7*bid;
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j4b7id=j4*b7*bid;
j1b8id=j1*b8*bid;
j2b8id=j2*b8*bid;
j3b8id=j3*b8*bid;
j4b8id=j4*b8*bid;
j1b9id=j1*b9*bid;
j2b9id=j2*b9*bid;
j3b9id=j3*b9*bid;
j4b9id=14*b9*bid;
jlblOid=j1*b10*bid;
j2blOid=j2*b10*bid;
j3blOid=j3*b10*bid;
j4blOid=j4*b10*bid;
jlbllid=j1*bll*bid;
j2b1lid=j2*bll*bid;
j3b111d=j3*bll*bid;
14b111d=j4*b11*bid;
j1b12id=j1*b12*bid;
j2b12id=12*b12*bid;
j3b12id=j3*b12*bid;
j4b12id=j4*b12*bid;
j1b13id=j1*b13*bid;
j2b13id=j2*b13*bid;
j3b13id=j3*b13*bid;
j4b13id=j4*b13*bid;
j1b14id=j1*b14*bid;
12b14id=j2*b14*bid;
j3b14id=j3*b14*bid;
j4b14id=j4*b14*bid;
jlblid2=j1*bl*bid2;
j2blid2=j2*bl*bid2;
j3blid2=j3*bl*bid2;
j4blid2=j4*bl*bid2;
j1b2id2=11*b2*bid2;
12b2id2=j2*b2*bid2;
j3b2id2=j3*b2*bid2;
j4b2id2=j4*b2*bid2;
j1b3id2=j1*b3*bid2;
j2b3id2=j2*b3*bid2;
j3b3id2=j3*b3*bid2;
j4b31d2=j4*b3*bid2;
j1b4id2=j1*b4*bid2;
j2b4id2=j2*b4*bid2;
j3b4id2=j3*b4*bid2;
14b4id2=j4*b4*bid2;
j1b5id2=j1*b5*bid2;
j2b5id2=j2*b5*bid2;
j3b5id2=j3*b5*bid2;
j4b5id2=j4*b5*bid2;
j1b6id2=j1*b6*bid2;
j2b6id2=j2*b6*bid2;
j3b6id2=j3*b6*bid2;
j4b6id2=j4*b6*bid2;
j1b7id2=j1*b7*bid2;
j2b71d2=j2*b7*bid2;
j3b7id2=j3*b7*bid2;
j4b7id2=14*b7*bid2;
j1b8id2=11*b8*bid2;
j2b8id2=j2*b8*bid2;
j3b8id2=13*b8*bid2;
j4b8id2=j4*b8*bid2;
j1b9id2=j1*b9*bid2;
j2b9id2=j2*b9*bid2;
j3b9id2=j3*b9*bid2;
j4b9id2=j4*b9*bid2;
jlblOid2=j1*b10*bid2;
j2blOid2=j2*b10*bid2;
j3blOid2=j3*b10*bid2;
j4b10id2=j4*b10*bid2;
jlbllid2=j1*bll*bid2;
j2b1lid2=j2*bll*bid2;
j3b1lid2=j3*bll*bid2;
j4b1lid2=j4*bll*bid2;
j1b12id2=j1*b12*bid2;
j2b12id2=j2*b12*bid2;
j3b12id2=j3*b12*bid2;
j4b121d2=j4*b12*bid2;
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j1b13id2=j1*b13*bid2;
j2b13id2=j2*b13*bid2;
j3b13id2=j3*b13*bid2;
j4b13id2=j4*b13*bid2;
j1b14id2=j1*b14*bid2;
j2b14id2=j2*b14*bid2;
j3b14id2=j3*b14*bid2;
j4b14id2=j4*b14*bid2;
RUN;
PROC reg;
MODEL dep = b2 b7 b8 b9 b10 b14 j2 j3 j4
b3bid b7bid b9bid blObid bl2bid bl4bid
b2bid2 b8bid2 b9bid2 blObid2 bl3bid2
j2bid j3bid j2bid2 j3bid2
/ cli clm;
RUN;
